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Abstract 
Before the Arts Council: Campaigns for state funding of the arts in Britain 
1934-1944 
This thesis examines the origins of government subsidy of live music and 
theatre in Britain before and during World War II. It challenges the prevailing 
narrative that in Britain before 1939 the issue was rarely raised and even more rarely 
supported. The thesis reveals that the 1930s was a period of intense discussion about 
state involvement in the arts, with active movements in favour of subsidy and strong 
support within parts of the government; and that these discussions continued during 
the war independently of the Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts 
(CEMA), the state agency set up to distribute money for theatre, music and the visual 
arts. This is the first attempt to study these issues in detail.  
The focus is research into three campaigns. First, Alfred Wareing’s League 
of Audiences gained thousands of column inches of favourable press coverage 
between 1934 and 1938 and at several points appeared close to success. It raised 
fundamental issues about the role of the arts in what many saw as a struggle against 
an increasingly mechanised society where film, radio and recording were damaging 
not only the live arts but society more generally. Second, the Stage and Allied Arts 
Defence League ran a remarkably successful campaign for ‘negative state subsidy’ - 
the removal of Entertainments Duty, imposed on live theatre and music in 1916. The 
tax concessions it gained in the 1930s were worth more than any annual grant to 
CEMA or the Arts Council before the 1950s. The third was John Christie’s 
‘Council of Power’/National Council of Music, active from 1938 to 1944. Christie, 
founder of Glyndebourne Festival Opera, gathered some of the leading cultural 
figures of the day as an ‘alternative Arts Council’. During the war Christie’s Council 
attracted opposition from John Maynard Keynes, CEMA’s Chairman, and Rab 
Butler, the Minister responsible for CEMA. This conflict influenced the design and 
principles of the Arts Council. 
The thesis demonstrates that campaigns for state arts funding had high profile 
and considerable influence before and during the war; that the creation of an arm’s 
length government body to channel public funds to the arts was close to realisation 
in the 1930s; that through tax breaks the government actively supported live music 
and theatre during the 1930s; and that even after CEMA was established, its 
evolution into the Arts Council was neither smooth nor certain. 
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War was the foundation of the arts 
Andrew Sinclair1 
 
Subject and research questions 
 
 This thesis examines the origins of government arts subsidy in 
Britain before and during World War II. In some respects this is well-
trodden ground for cultural historians. The problem is that most who 
have written about it have deviated little from the path of those who 
went before. Despite its elliptical drafting, the quotation above, from 
Andrew Sinclair’s 1995 official history of the Arts Council of Great 
Britain, exemplifies the consensus: that the agencies delivering central 
government arts subsidy, from 1940 the Council for the Encouragement 
of Music and the Arts (CEMA), from 1945 the Arts Council, were 
wholly a product of the war and lacked earlier roots.  
The historiography of arts subsidy is considered below, but it is 
relevant to cite here possibly the earliest and certainly the most 
influential statement of this view. It came in a radio talk of July 1945 by 
John Maynard Keynes,2 CEMA’s second Chairman and the founding 
Chairman of the Arts Council. In it Keynes set out a creation myth of the 
Arts Council. He did not acknowledge the existence of campaigns for 
arts subsidy before the war, despite being well aware of at least one of 
them and probably more.3 He presented CEMA as arising, without pre-
 
1 Andrew Sinclair: Art and Cultures (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1995), p24 
2 ‘The Arts Council: Its Policy and Hopes’, reprinted in The Listener, 12/7/45  
3 See, generally, Chapter 6 
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war roots, from the early wartime landscape, and implied that the Arts 
Council was CEMA’s almost inevitable successor: 
…in the early days of the war, when all sources of comfort were at a low ebb, 
there came into existence… a body officially styled the “Council for the 
Encouragement of Music and the Arts” ….one of the last acts of the Coalition 
Government was to decide that C.E.M.A., with a new name and wider 
opportunities, should be continued in time of peace.4  
Ever since, commentators have followed him in all respects.  
This thesis challenges the orthodoxy. It considers three campaigns 
of the 1930s and early 1940s for state arts funding. All were influential 
at the time; all have since been ignored or forgotten. By according them 
their proper place in the history of the British state and the arts, the 
thesis demonstrates that the consensus view is in most key respects 
mistaken. 
This consensus is a small example of a form of historical 
interpretation which prevailed for decades after World War II in relation 
to many areas of social policy. As Jose Harris wrote in 1992, ‘Politicians 
and historians writing both during and after the war continually 
reaffirmed the image of the war as the cradle of the welfare state…’.5 
But Harris suggested that more recently ‘there has been widespread 
reaction, partly ideological, partly based simply on scrutiny of primary 
sources, against what Cannadine has called the ‘welfare state 
triumphalism’ of much post-Second World War British historiography’.6  
This reaction has not extended to historians of the relationship 
between the arts and the state in Britain, most of whom have failed not 
only to scrutinise pre-war primary sources but even to recognise that 
such sources exist. Harris questioned whether wartime and post-war 
 
4 ibid 
5 Jose Harris: ‘War and Social History: Britain and the Home Front During the Second World War’, 
Contemporary European History, Vol 1, No 1 (March 1992), p17 
6 ibid, p20 
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changes to institutions in Britain were ‘directly induced by the war, or 
were… part of a much longer-term process of societal change that was 
occurring anyway, and in which the war was merely a passing episode’.7 
Her answer was nuanced. For those from Keynes onwards who have 
written about the origins of the Arts Council the answer has been a 
crude: ‘Induced by the war, obviously’.                 
This orthodox view ignores two other important issues affecting 
live music and theatre in the 1930s: public funding by local authorities 
and, more significantly, the role of the BBC as a public funder of the 
arts. Chapter 2 of the thesis deals briefly the latter, but a detailed 
assessment of this and of funding by local government is beyond its 
scope.    
The thesis began as a study of the founding and early history of 
CEMA and the Arts Council; the plan was to cover the 1930s in a single 
early chapter. In researching that chapter the focus changed. The 
discovery of these pre-war and wartime campaigns to gain public money 
for the arts, the realisation of their importance in the history of the 
subject and the uncovering of a rich seam of largely unexplored primary 
material about each of them led to the campaigns becoming the focus of 
the thesis. Accordingly the following research questions emerged only as 
the research was undertaken: 
  (i) What were the main currents of thought about public 
funding of the arts, and the role of the state in relation to culture, in the 
1930s and early 1940s? 
(ii) How active were the debates and campaigns on these issues 
in the press, publicly, among politicians and among those involved in the 
arts? 
 
7 ibid, p21 
  10 
(iii)    What was the history of each of the campaigns, and why 
have they all been largely forgotten? 
(iv)    To what extent, why and how did each of them succeed or 
fail?  
(v) How far did the creation of CEMA in 1940 and the Arts 
Council in 1945 represent continuity with, and how far a break from, 
these campaigns? 
  (vi) Why did debates of the 1930s about the benefits and 
assumed harm of the ‘mechanised arts’ of film, recording and 
broadcasting, and about the danger that state funding of drama and 
music might lead to state control of these arts, change their form or 
simply diminish after 1940?   
In brief, once the preliminary research revealed the existence of 
these campaigns for public funding of the arts in the 1930s and, 
separately from CEMA, the early 1940s, the aims of the thesis became to 
trace their history, assess their importance and legacy, and as a result 
place the founding of CEMA and the Arts Council in a fuller context.      
 
Sources, methodology and structure of the thesis 
 
 Given the gap between the conventional wisdom and what the 
research revealed, secondary sources, while interesting, required careful 
handling. There is useful material on the condition of live theatre and 
classical music in Britain before the war, some of which is drawn on in 
Chapter 2. But there are few secondary sources on the main subject of 
the thesis, the 1930s and early 1940s campaigns for government funding. 
Indeed, as the historiography section below suggests, secondary sources 
about the history of CEMA and the Arts Council proved useful more as 
material to react against than as scholarship to rely on.  
  11 
By contrast there are extensive and valuable primary sources on 
all three of the campaigns. The research attempted to identify underlying 
themes in this sometimes kaleidoscopic mass of evidence; the method 
was inductive, with the analysis of a wide range of documents leading to 
the development of hypotheses and their subsequent testing, refinement 
or abandonment. All sources are cited in the thesis and listed in the 
bibliography, but it is worth noting key issues about sources in relation 
to each of the three campaigns.   
The first was Alfred Wareing’s League of Audiences, active 
between 1934 and 1938. The League depended on public and press 
support; fortunately it retained full records of this. Its comprehensive 
files in the Victoria and Albert Museum Theatre and Performance 
Archive not only document its internal discussions and external dealings, 
but also include its membership lists and extensive press cuttings books. 
The latter in particular proved invaluable. Without them it would have 
been impossible to follow the League’s progress as reflected in local, 
regional, national and imperial newspapers and periodicals. Indeed, 
without these records the fact of this widespread coverage, and the 
strength of feeling which it revealed for and against the League, might 
have remained unknown. To quote just one example, the cuttings books 
contained a sustained attack on the League by T S Eliot published in his 
magazine The Criterion.8 This essay has been cited just once before, in 
an article in the Agricultural History Review about The Criterion’s role 
as a platform for discussion of agricultural issues.9 But for the purposes 
of the thesis it was of considerable value, both revealing a particular line 
of criticism of the League and, perhaps more important, demonstrating 
 
8 ‘A Commentary’, The Criterion, March 1938, pp478-85 
9 Jeremy Diaper: ‘The Criterion: an inter-war platform for agricultural discussion’, Agricultural 
History Review, 61.2 (2013), pp282-300 
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that Eliot considered the League important enough to justify his 
attacking it at length in print.  
Equally valuable was a copy of the privately published biography 
of Alfred Wareing by his deputy and disciple Winifred Isaac (1951),10 
annotated by the author, in the Special Collection of Senate House 
Library. And documents in the Church of England archives at Lambeth 
Palace and the BBC archives enabled Wareing and his League to be seen 
from the external perspective of these two institutions.    
The second campaign was that of John Christie, the founder of 
Glyndebourne opera. This initially bore the unfortunate name ‘Council 
of Power’, before becoming the National Council of Music. Under 
Christie’s dominant leadership, it neither sought nor received press 
coverage. By far the most important sources on Christie’s work in this 
area from 1936 to 1944 are in the extensive collection at the 
Glyndebourne archive. Alongside the relevant topic files was an 
unexpected but vital source: Christie’s letters to his wife Audrey, written 
between 1940 and 1944 while she was in Canada and the USA with their 
children. Few of her letters are retained in the archive; fortunately she 
retained his, around two a week on average for the full period of their 
separation. Alongside much domestic and personal material, these letters 
included detailed accounts of his wartime work on the National Council 
of Music. Written to be read by the person Christie trusted most in the 
world, they provide a unique insight into his thinking. They also made a 
fascinating contrast with the other main documentary sources about 
Christie’s campaign, CEMA’s papers in the V&A Theatre and 
Performance Archive and Board of Education papers in the National 
Archives. Views of Christie expressed by Keynes and Mary Glasgow, 
the senior administrator at CEMA, and Rab Butler and senior civil 
 
10 Alfred Wareing: a biography (London: Green Bank Press, 1951) 
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servants at the Board of Education, were rarely flattering and were on 
occasion written apparently to amuse writer or reader. The contrast 
between Christie’s account to his wife of a meeting with Butler and 
Butler’s account of the same meeting, for instance, was both fascinating 
and revealing.11  
The third campaign was that against Entertainments Duty, a tax 
introduced in 1916 on admission prices to all sporting and entertainment 
events. The campaign had specific and general aspects. The former was 
led by the Old Vic and Sadler’s Wells, two theatres managed as one, 
seeking tax exemption as a not-for-profit organisation whose work was 
‘partly educational’. The general campaign was led in the 1930s by the 
strangely named Stage and Allied Arts Defence League (it later dropped 
the ‘Defence’). The Old Vic’s archive does not contain the relevant 
papers, and the Stage and Allied Arts League’s papers appear not to 
have survived. Their absence was amply compensated by the wealth of 
relevant Customs and Excise and Treasury papers in the National 
Archives. These contain both sides of the extensive correspondence 
taking place throughout the 1930s between the government and the 
organisations seeking tax relief. In addition they record many internal 
discussions within and between Customs and Excise and the Treasury at 
both official and ministerial level, providing a valuable insight into the 
British government’s attitude to the arts in the 1930s. Given that the 
rates of Entertainments Duty required frequent adjustment and that this 
was a subject of much parliamentary concern, Hansard was a further 
important source for this part of the thesis. Among the MPs most active 
on the issue was the writer and playwright A P Herbert. His book ‘No 
 
11 See Chapter 8, pp231-33 
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Fine on Fun’ (1957)12 is by no means objective but provided useful 
background.  
As to the structure of the thesis, Chapter 2 is a brief survey of the 
health of live theatre and classical music in the 1930s and the influence 
on this of cinema and the BBC respectively. Chapters 3 to 5 deal with 
the League of Audiences. Chapters 3 and 5 cover its rise and fall 
chronologically; Chapter 4 discusses its supporters, its underlying 
philosophy (in particular its ‘fight against the machine’), its opponents 
and their arguments against it. Chapters 6 to 8 are devoted to John 
Christie’s ‘Council of Power’/National Council of Music. Chapter 6 
deals with the pre-war period, Chapters 7 and 8 with Christie in wartime. 
Chapter 9 covers the campaign against Entertainments Duty, focusing on 
the 1930s but for context dealing also with the duty’s origins in World 
War I and its history through the 1920s. The significance and legacy of 
each campaign is discussed in the relevant part of the thesis. Chapter 10 
is a brief summary and suggests areas for possible future research.             
 
Historiography 
        
Chapter 2 draws on primary and secondary sources to provide a 
brief survey of live theatre and classical music in Britain in the 1930s. 
Both types of source have proved helpful. By contrast secondary sources 
on the main subject of the thesis – 1930s and early 1940s campaigns for 
public funding of the arts – are almost non-existent. Secondary sources 
about the founding and early history of CEMA and the Arts Council are 
generally misleading, by commission or omission, on the subject of what 
preceded them.    
 
12 London: Methuen, 1957  
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This introduction began with quotations from Andrew Sinclair 
and John Maynard Keynes. Their views show clear continuity despite 
the fifty years between them. Further consideration of Sinclair’s book 
Art and Cultures (1995)13 illustrates how the Arts Council, which 
commissioned it, perpetuated Keynes’ account. In his five-hundred-page 
history of the Council’s first fifty years, Sinclair devoted the opening 
twenty-four pages to a prologue ambitiously covering the period from 
Gilgamesh and Nebuchadnezzar to 1939. The prologue’s penultimate 
page lists a number of ‘bodies interested in adult education and the arts 
in the nineteen-thirties’.14 Despite casting his net so widely as to include 
organisations such as the Women’s Institutes and Townswomen’s 
Guilds, Sinclair mentioned no 1930s campaigns for arts subsidy. Indeed 
he made two assertions strongly suggesting that there were no significant 
campaigns. The first was the quotation above: ‘War was the foundation 
of the arts’.15 The second was that ‘the rise of Fascism and Communism’ 
meant that the 1930s ‘was no climate for the patronage of threatened 
cultures’.16 In the context of a chapter on what preceded CEMA the 
meaning is clear: the cause of public funding of the arts was either 
neglected or actively unpopular in the 1930s and it took the war to 
change this.  
Having disposed of the pre-war period, Sinclair began Chapter 1 
with an account of the conference of December 1939 which led to 
CEMA’s establishment. This, Sinclair suggested, resulted from the 
insight that ‘There would be no victory without uplift as well as 
entertainment’.17 Again, Keynes’ view prevailed: the setting-up of 
 
13 London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1995  
14 ibid, p23 
15 ibid, p24 
16 ibid, pp23-4 
17 ibid, p26 
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CEMA was due to the war, and before the war there had been no 
prospect of such a body being created.   
It is perhaps understandable that a history of the Arts Council 
commissioned by the Council itself is light on historical context. It is 
less understandable that such context as it does provide should be 
misleading. Worse still, the weaknesses in Sinclair’s account are 
replicated by researchers with no such connection to the Arts Council. 
Almost all published work on the subject illustrates the problem in one 
form or another: failing, without explanation, to look back before the 
founding of CEMA in 1940; treating it as so settled that arts subsidy in 
Britain was a result of the war that the point required no further 
discussion; asserting that during the 1930s there was little campaigning 
and less appetite for public funding of the arts; and claiming that opinion 
on the issue in the 1930s was, in the main, actively opposed to the state’s 
taking a role. It is difficult to find anywhere a modern commentator who 
does not take up one or more of these positions. Some examples can 
illustrate this.   
The subtitle of Robert Hewison’s Culture and Consensus (1995)18 
is England, art and politics since 1940. Hewison explained in his 
introduction why he chose this starting date: ‘To understand how the 
present status and condition of the arts were arrived at in the British – or 
more specifically English – context, it is necessary to go back to the 
point when a British government first took on a formal and general 
responsibility for the arts in January 1940’.19 The implication was that 
no purpose would be served by going back before 1940. 
John S Harris’ Government Patronage of the Arts in Great Britain 
(1970)20 contained a chapter about public subsidy up to 1945. Its first six 
 
18 London: Methuen, 1995 
19 ibid, ppxiv-xv 
20 Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970 
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pages were largely devoted to the British government’s support for 
museums and galleries from the eighteenth century. The following 
section is headed ‘World War II and the Emergence of Government 
Support’. It placed government subsidy in this context: ‘When Britain 
declared war on Germany in 1939, few observers of the contemporary 
scene could have predicted that the six years of bitter conflict and 
privation would induce the nation to undertake a new and significant 
activity – public patronage of the arts.21 Harris’ clear, if implicit, view 
was that government arts subsidy was a consequence of the war.  
Clive Gray, in The Politics of the Arts (2000),22 set out the 
conventional wisdom briefly: ‘This change from [state] avoidance to 
direct intervention originated with the establishment of the Council for 
the Encouragement of Music and the Arts (CEMA) in 1940 by the 
Pilgrim Trust’.23 
Fred Leventhal began his otherwise helpful brief survey of 
CEMA’s history, ‘The Best for the Most’ (1990),24 with this assertion: 
‘Until 1939, public expenditure to subsidize the performing arts in Great 
Britain was widely regarded as objectionable, and efforts by the Soviet 
Union and later by Nazi Germany to ‘nationalize’ culture only 
reinforced the long-standing bias against state intervention’.25 He then 
examined the history of CEMA without reference to events preceding it.     
These views have been widespread and largely unchallenged. A 
writer who exemplifies this problem in extreme form is Jorn 
Weingartner. His book The Arts as a Weapon of War (2006)26 merits 
more extensive examination because it is by some distance the most 
 
21 ibid, p19 
22 Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000 
23 ibid, p39 
24 ‘‘The Best for the Most’: CEMA and State Sponsorship of the Arts in Wartime 1939-45’, Twentieth 
Century British History, Vol 1, No 3 (1990), pp289-317 
25 ibid. p289 
26 London and New York: I B Tauris 2012 [date of revised paperback edition]; hereafter 
‘Weingartner’. 
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detailed study so far published of CEMA and the founding of the Arts 
Council, and because he devoted well over a quarter of its length to an 
attempt to establish that CEMA represented a break with the past rather 
than continuity with it.27 The book has the grand though misleading 
subtitle Britain and the Shaping of National Morale in the Second World 
War. Weingartner began his analysis of UK government cultural policy 
before and during World War II by setting out ‘Four hypotheses [which] 
form the analytical frame of this study’.28 The first was that ‘Active, 
programmatic and institutionalised arts sponsorship through the state in 
Britain began only in the winter of 1939/40 with the setting up of the 
Committee/Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts during 
the ‘Bore War’’; and the second, ‘The beginning of cultural policy was a 
direct result of the repercussions of the Second World War’.29  
Stating ‘initial hypotheses’ is unlikely to be the best prelude to 
rigorous historical analysis. It seems to have led Weingartner to place 
undue weight on evidence supporting the hypotheses and to ignore, 
undervalue or fail to look for anything which might undermine them. 
The book’s opening page provides a glaring example of the latter 
tendency: ‘Only in the second half of 1939, two articles in The New 
Statesman and Nation [sic] indicated that the principle of state neutrality 
[towards the arts] was facing a serious challenge in Great Britain’.30 As 
will be seen, the implication that before July 1939 ‘the principle of state 
neutrality’ to the arts was generally unchallenged is wildly inaccurate.  
Among the least satisfactory of Weingartner’s chapters, one 
particularly relevant to the subject of this thesis, is devoted to the 
attitudes in the 1930s of what he termed the cultural elites.31 Focusing on 
 
27 Weingartner, Chapters I-IV, pp1-49 
28 ibid, p5 
29 ibid, pp5 and 6 respectively 
30 ibid, p1 
31 ibid, Chapter III      
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five members of these ‘elites’, E M Forster, T S Eliot, Cyril Connolly, 
George Orwell and J B Priestley, he sought to demonstrate that ‘the 
political principle of cultural laissez-faire…was complemented by a very 
similar line of thought by a large number of artists with only few 
exceptions’.32 But Weingartner achieved his purpose only by failing to 
notice or pursue contrary evidence and by making the heroic and 
unfounded assumption that these five somehow covered the 1930s 
cultural waterfront. As to the latter, he claimed, in a linguistic sleight-of-
hand, that they formed ‘if not a cross-section of the society, a 
representative cross-section of the existing political creeds held within 
that society’.33   
Furthermore, his evidence was incomplete and misleading even on 
its own terms. Weingartner sought to use these five commentators to 
illustrate his hypothesis that pre-war attitudes towards public arts 
funding were generally negative; but every source which he cited from 
them, without exception, dated from wartime or later.34 Analysis of pre-
war sources, or the mere recognition of their existence, might have 
transformed or destroyed his argument. As it was, he wrongly asserted 
that two of his five, Eliot and Priestley, took no part in debate on the 
issues until after the war. As for Eliot, Weingartner cited only Notes 
Towards the Definition of Culture, published in 1948.35 He made no 
reference to Eliot’s highly relevant 1938 essay about the League of 
Audiences in The Criterion, cited above. And he claimed that Priestley 
‘did not directly contribute to the public debate about state funding 
before the setting up of CEMA [in 1940]’.36 This too is simply wrong: as 
 
32 ibid, p23 
33 ibid 
34 Despite these sources all dating from the 1940s, Weingartner in his introduction (p9) suggested that 
the chapter’s purpose was to describe ‘the picture ‘before the war’’, in order to assist his task of 
demonstrating how the war changed things.    
35 London: Faber and Faber, 1948 
36 Weingartner, p32 
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discussed at several points in this thesis, Priestley was active in the 
debate in the 1930s, both publicly and behind the scenes, and was highly 
supportive of state funding.  
In one area Weingartner also exhibited an extraordinary failure to 
draw reasonable conclusions from facts which he himself brought to the 
reader’s attention. Elsewhere in this thesis the role of the BBC is 
touched on.37 Five pages of Weingartner’s book are devoted to the 
BBC,38 in which he referred to contemporary criticism of its spending 
public money on its own symphony orchestra and on sponsoring the 
Promenade Concerts.39 The criticism, he noted, came from two quarters: 
conductors of non-BBC orchestras such as Sir Thomas Beecham, 
complaining about ‘state aided intrusion into the free market of music 
promotion and production’ (Weingartner’s rather than Beecham’s 
terms);40 and the ‘conservative press’ (again, Weingartner’s term), 
arguing that at a time when ‘National expenditure is undergoing strict 
scrutiny… the economic policy of the BBC cannot expect to escape the 
general examination’.41    
For reasons he did not explain, Weingartner focused on these 
criticisms but ignored the facts criticised: ‘Both strands of criticism 
easily fit into the picture drawn in the first chapters of this book, that 
performing arts were widely seen as commercial affairs… into which the 
state was not to interfere’.42 The facts, on the other hand, conclusively 
make the opposite case: that the BBC was carrying out ‘state-aided 
intrusion into the free market of music’ (including helping to fund 
enterprises run by Beecham)43 on a large scale. As if hedging his bets, 
 
37 See Chapter 2, pp32-40, and Chapter 10, pp310-12 
38 Weingartner, pp38-43 
39 ibid, pp41-2; see also Chapter 2 below, pp35-6 
40 Weingartner, p41 
41 ibid, quoting the Daily Telegraph (1931, but date unspecified)   
42 ibid, p42 
43 See Chapter 2, pp34 and 36 
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Weingartner then accepted that the BBC ‘broke with the political 
paradigm that the state was not to interfere in any way in the 
entertainment business…. [but the] encouragement given to art and 
artists in Britain by the BBC were [sic]… at best a by-product of 
governmental policy’.44 This, a sophistry both doubtful and obscure, 
somehow allowed him to preserve the purity of his view.  
It is probably best to leave Weingartner’s book at this point and 
turn to a final example, Janet Minihan’s The Nationalization of Culture 
(1977).45 Minihan considered arts subsidy in the United Kingdom over a 
longer period, 1800 to the 1970s. Her presentation was more balanced 
than Weingartner’s. She argued that the Labour Party, and the Labour 
governments of 1923-24 and 1929-31, ‘wanted to secure a more 
honourable place for the arts than either the Conservative or Liberal 
Parties’.46 But while her reasoning was different, her conclusion was 
similar to Weingartner’s. She referred to no 1930s campaigns for arts 
subsidy, and concluded that there was no realistic hope of subsidy during 
the decade: ‘If the Depression had not occurred, the story of Great 
Britain’s official arts policy might have been accelerated by twenty 
years, but the economic catastrophe effectively destroyed all chances for 
significant support for the arts between the wars.’47     
So Weingartner argued on highly dubious grounds that the 
intellectual climate was generally hostile to public arts funding, and 
Minihan that the economic climate of the 1930s made such funding 
politically impossible. Neither they nor the other writers cited above 
mentioned any of the campaigns discussed in this thesis.          
There is one historical study which examines some aspects of 
Christie’s campaign and at least mentions Wareing’s: Richard Witts’ 
 
44 Weingartner, pp42-3 
45 London: Hamish Hamilton, 1977 
46 ibid, p185 
47 ibid, p173 
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Artist Unknown (1998), rightly subtitled An Alternative History of the 
Arts Council.48 This is discussed at relevant points of the thesis. For now 
it can be suggested that Witts’ questionable judgements, love of 
overstatement, appetite for non sequiturs and lack of referencing greatly 
reduce his book’s value; but he is almost the only modern writer to 
consider any of these movements for government arts subsidy. 
In summary, most writers who have considered the origins of 
CEMA and the Arts Council have not considered what preceded them, 
have explicitly argued that there was nothing relevant preceding them, 
have asserted that if there were earlier campaigns for arts subsidy they 
were insignificant, or have taken the view that the climate in the 1930s 
was actively hostile to the cause of subsidy. They have ignored vital 
debates before the war, published and private, practical and 
philosophical, about state involvement in the arts; active movements to 
encourage such involvement; and intense discussions during the war 
about the future nature and direction of state support for the arts. The 
evidence presented in this thesis gives this forgotten or ignored history 
the place it deserves. By doing so it casts new light upon the history of 
government funding of the arts. 
  
 
48 London: Warner Books, 1998 
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Chapter 2 
 
Theatre and classical music in 1930s Britain  
 
The cinema slaughtered all competitors 




The campaigns in 1930s Britain for state funding of the arts had 
one major element in common: the belief that live theatre and classical 
music were under serious threat. For some, the issue was primarily 
economic; it was this that drove particularly the campaign against 
Entertainments Duty, led by theatre managers, discussed in Chapter 9. 
The main concern of others was about the quality of what was produced. 
John Christie’s ‘Council of Power’/National Council of Music, 
discussed in Chapters 6 to 8, was inspired by Christie’s belief that what 
he called ‘the good stuff’ was being driven out by ‘the rubbish’. For 
others again the threat was practical – diminished employment prospects 
for workers in theatre and live music. This was among the beliefs 
driving the League of Audiences, discussed in Chapters 3 to 5.  
For the Entertainments Duty campaigners and the League of 
Audiences, there was a further common feature: the belief that the main 
threat to live performance was from cinema, broadcasting and recording. 
Many people working in theatre and classical music in the 1930s made 
such arguments, which took both economic and more broadly social 
forms: that their livelihoods were under attack from these ‘mechanised 
arts’, and that film, radio and music recording posed a moral threat to 
 
1 A J P Taylor: English History 1914-1945 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970 [originally 
published OUP, 1965]), hereafter ‘Taylor’, p392 
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society, with the critical and creative faculties of the population at large 
in danger due to the loss of opportunities to engage with theatre and live 
music. Later chapters consider these views, and their influence on the 
campaigns, in more detail. This chapter provides context, attempting to 
assess both how healthy theatre and live classical music in Britain were 
in the 1930s and how they were affected by the ‘mechanised arts’.                 
 
Cinema v theatre 
 
Many histories of 1930s Britain present a picture of its performing 
arts scene consistent with the views described above: theatre-going in 
decline, plays tailored for the well-heeled and uncritical, music-making 
and amateur arts practice in a trough, and increasing recourse by people 
of all classes to the canned entertainment offered by ‘Hollywood’, the 
gramophone and the wireless. A causal link is often suggested, as in A J 
P Taylor’s quotation at the head of this chapter: cinema’s dominance 
was at the expense of theatre and other live entertainment.  
 Taylor’s argument had both quantitative and qualitative aspects: 
that compared with earlier times there were fewer theatres, productions 
and audience members, and that what was put before the public was 
simply not as good. The available statistics and many contemporary 
accounts tell a different story.  
 Statistics about theatre productions and performances in the 1930s 
compared with earlier and later decades are, if not comprehensive, 
substantial and solid. They do not support Taylor’s contention that 
cinema ‘slaughtered’ theatre; indeed, they suggest no evident decline in 
the quantity of theatre (for quality, see below) and establish no strong 
causal link between the rise of the cinema and the condition of live 
theatre. The best systematic quantitative evidence is in J P Wearing’s 
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sixteen volume series providing details of every production in each of 
what he classified as ‘the major theatres of central London’ for every 
year from 1890 to 1959.2 Wearing’s work has received some, generally 
minor, criticism, most relevantly about its geographical restrictions.3 But 
even its critics have acknowledged its unique value: ‘I know of no other 
venture on this scale making available the theatrical riches of a great 
modern city in this detailed way’.4 The work has two obvious 
limitations: it included neither audience numbers nor theatres outside 
London. But production and performance numbers are a reasonable 
surrogate for audience numbers, and while there was more theatre in 
London than elsewhere in Britain in the 1930s, this is true of every 
decade. So Wearing’s work is a good quantitative indicator of the health 
of live professional theatre in the period covered.  
In brief, it shows that far from the 1930s being a period in which 
theatre was in steep decline, it was the busiest of all the seven decades 
studied in terms of both active theatres and numbers of productions in 
London.5 The next busiest in terms of numbers of theatres was the 1940s 
and in terms of productions was the 1920s.6 The only area where the 
1930s did not lead was in numbers of performances: fewer than in the 
1920s, 1940s and 1950s but more than in the 1900s and 1910s.7 This 
means that theatrical productions had on average shorter runs in the 
1930s than in some other decades. The figures provide no other evidence 
 
2 J P Wearing: The London Stage: A Calendar of Plays and Players 1890-1899, 1900-1909, 1910-
1919, 1920-1929, 1930-1939, 1940-1949 and 1950-1959 (Metuchen, NJ, USA: The Scarecrow Press, 
1976, 1981, 1982, 1984, 1990, 1991 and 1993 respectively), hereafter ‘Wearing 1890s’, ‘Wearing 
1900s’ etc  
3 See, for instance, Joseph Donohue: ‘Review of The London Stage 1890-99: A Calendar of Plays 
and Players by J P Wearing’, Educational Theatre Journal, Vol 29, No 2 (May 1977), pp268-71, and 
George Dorris: ‘Review of The London Stage: A Calendar of Plays and Players by J P Wearing’, 
Dance Chronicle Vol. 18, No. 3 (1995), pp505-510 
4 Dorris, op cit, p506 
5 61 and 4256 respectively; Wearing 1930s, vol 1, pvii 
6 53 and 3980 respectively; Wearing 1940s and Wearing 1920s respectively, vol 1, pvii, in each case 
7 The figure for each decade is in each case in vol 1, pvii, of that decade’s volumes; the 1890s 
volumes do not provide the equivalent figure.  
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to support the view that there was ‘less theatre’ in the 1930s. On the 
contrary, given that more productions could be seen in more theatres in 
London in the 1930s than in any other decade between the 1890s and the 
1950s, it seems that live theatre was in fairly good health at this time, 
and certainly that it was holding its own despite the rise of cinema. 
Taylor also argued that the quality of live theatre deteriorated 
during the 1930s, in two repects. First, public appetite for ‘the classics’ 
declined greatly and companies specialising in this repertoire went 
under. He wrote: ‘In the nineteen-twenties there were still touring 
companies: two in Shakespeare, one in Shaw, two… in romantic plays. 
These all expired. Shakespeare dwindled to the London Old Vic and the 
Memorial Theatre at Stratford upon Avon, which was sustained mainly 
by American tourists and parties of schoolchildren’.8 Second, ‘The 
London theatres offered fewer new plays of distinction…. Galsworthy 
died in 1933…. Shaw was in his dotage’.9  
Contemporary sources cast doubt on Taylor’s conclusions. They 
also suggest what led him to them: he looked in the wrong place for his 
evidence – primarily in the West End, which, then as now, was not 
where the best new theatre was found. It is worth considering briefly 
some of these sources.    
Concerning performances of the classics, the theatre producer 
Norman Marshall published in 1947 The Other Theatre,10 a mixture of 
memoir and study of what would be called nowadays alternative or 
fringe theatre. It began with an account of Marshall’s theatre-going 
between September 1925 and June 1926:  
I doubt if there can ever have been a season when so many of the classics 
were to be seen in London.… I saw thirteen plays of Shakespeare, half-a-
dozen Elizabethan and Restoration classics, all five of Chekov’s full-length 
 
8 Taylor, pp392-3  
9 ibid, p393 
10 London: John Lehmann 
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plays, and one apiece by Moliere, Ibsen, Gogol, Calderon, Andreyev, 
Dostoievsky, Turgenev, Hauptmann and Benavente.11 
He then listed the plays he had seen by modern playwrights. But he 
explained:  
Hardly any of these plays were given within that ramshackle edifice known 
as “The West End Theatre”. The theatre which staged most of them was 
struggling for its existence in strange out-of-the-way edifices such as a drill 
hall in Hampstead…, a forgotten playhouse in Hammersmith…, a cramped 
little cinema out at Barnes…, and a backstreet attic in Covent Garden…. 
What had the West End to offer to compare with the work of these exiled 
groups of players?12   
For Marshall these points applied just as much to the 1930s: ‘Nearly 
everything that was most worthwhile in the English theatre in the period 
between the wars was due to the influence of these rebel 
organisations…. [This book] is a record of how the English theatre was 
saved from stagnation and sterility… imposed upon the theatre by the 
managers and by the Censor...’.13      
Cecil Chisholm’s Repertory (1934)14 expressed a similar view of 
West End theatre: ‘Glancing down the list of plays now running in 
London, I find… Only five reasonably interesting plays out of thirty-
three “shows”…. When the commercial manager does produce an 
interesting play, he does it merely by accident’.15 Chisholm’s view of 
theatre beyond the West End in the 1930s suggests that what Marshall 
had written of London was also true elsewhere in Britain. He began his 
final chapter: 
In twenty years the face of the British theatre has been transformed, 
particularly in the provinces. We have from thirty to forty repertory theatres 
and companies at work; a dozen keen amateur repertories, some of which 
 
11 ibid, p11 
12 ibid, pp11-12 
13 ibid, p13 
14 Repertory: An Outline of the Modern Theatre Movement (London: Peter Davies, 1934) 
15 ibid, pp75-6 
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will inevitably develop into professional theatres; a beginning of the building 
of beautiful modern playhouses…. A situation has arisen of which we dared 
not even dream twenty years ago.16  
These contemporary views contradict Taylor’s contention that the 
theatre in Britain in the 1930s was in decline. For Chisholm, as for 
Marshall, the main problem facing the theatre was a lack not of talent or 
audience but of money. Marshall described the type of theatre producing 
this new work as ‘struggling for its existence’; Chisholm noted that 
‘Nine out of ten of our repertory theatres live from hand to mouth. They 
are prevented from doing fine work well within their compass because it 
may reduce the takings for a single week’.17 The solution, for Chisholm, 
was public subsidy. The final page of his book was a plea for the theatre 
to organise ‘a special propagandist body’18 to campaign for this. In the 
very year Repertory was published, though apparently unconnected with 
it, the League of Audiences was formed to do just that.19   
 One significant contemporary writer expressed views in some 
respects similar to Taylor’s: the playwright and critic St John Ervine. 
Ervine believed that live theatre was in deep decline. He was a keen 
supporter of the League of Audiences and a passionate hater of cinema.20 
But his views only partly support Taylor’s. In The Theatre in My Time 
(1933)21 he suggested a link between the growth of cinema and the 
perceived decline of theatre; but for him, more fundamentally, both were 
symptoms of society’s decay from what he saw as the high point of 
1914. Ervine’s (by the 1930s) generally misanthropic and reactionary 
views led him to identify the war and its legacy as responsible for 
theatre’s problems:  
 
16 ibid, p226 
17 ibid, pp227-8 
18 ibid, p237 
19 See Chapters 3-5 
20 See below and Chapter 4, pp68-9 
21 London: Rich & Cowan; hereafter ‘Ervine’ 
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Soon after the signing of the Armistice, the theatre ceased to have an 
intelligent and educated audience…. A million men had been killed in the 
War, and these were, for the most part, the flower of the Nation. Millions of 
people, half educated and nervously agitated, were growing up without any 
discipline or training…. restless uninstructed people, whose only notion of 
entertainment was a frightful noise…. The theatre could not appease this 
nerve-racked, speed maddened population….22  
For Ervine the preceding golden age of theatre had itself been only a 
relatively brief period of light in the prevailing gloom: ‘In 1914, the 
second great period of the English theatre came to an end’,23 but this had 
followed ‘The destitution of the drama in England in the last forty years 
of the eighteenth century and the first seventy-five of the 
nineteenth….’.24 It may be relevant that, as The New York Times’ 
obituary of Ervine25 observed, ‘Probably his most successful plays were 
“Jane Clegg” and “John Ferguson,” both written before World War I’. 
Ervine provided some figures to support his argument: ‘Five years 
ago, there were about five hundred theatres [in Britain]…. Now, in 1933, 
there are about two hundred and fifty’.26 But he provided no source for 
this drastic claim of a fifty per cent reduction in just five years, and it is 
unconvincing set against the mass of contrary evidence. While Ervine 
showed a more constructive and enthusiastic side when the League of 
Audiences was founded, much of his book is best regarded as a 
polemical rant against the modern world.  
Other influential writers on theatre in the 1930s were less 
concerned than Ervine with the alleged threat which cinema posed to 
theatre. James Agate was theatre critic of the Sunday Times from 1923 
 
22 ibid, pp177-8 
23 ibid, p163 
24 ibid, p65 
25 25/1/71 
26 Ervine, p189 
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until his death in 1947.27 In the ‘Epistle Dedicatory to Mr. Ivor Brown’ 
(the style is typical) in First Nights, a 1934 collection of his Sunday 
Times reviews, he suggested that cinema’s threat had diminished: 
All theatre-lovers must be concerned with what is popularly called “the 
menace of the films”. The phrase has a nineteen-thirtyish ring about it…. 
Four years ago… it was thought that they would be in such direct 
competition with the theatre that one could survive only on condition that the 
other perished….  [In fact] the theatre has retained its old public and the 
cinema has created a new one.28   
Ivor Brown himself, a strong supporter of the League of Audiences and 
thus of the cause of subsidy,29 was more sanguine still. Writing in 
Drama, the magazine of the British Drama League, in 1937,30 Brown 
expressed confidence that live theatre could see off the threat of cinema. 
Noting the ‘extraordinary hold of the living actor seen and heard in 
person’, he asked ‘Is not this drama with its scenes of sinking ships and 
savage life knocked sideways by the meanest effort of Elstree [film 
studios]? The answer, delivered at the box office, is quite simply “No”’.  
Agate’s suggestion was that in 1930 the perceived economic 
danger which cinema posed to theatre was at its height. The date is 
significant, given the introduction of talking pictures in the late 1920s; 
for Agate, apparently, the threat of the ‘talkies’ had proved exaggerated. 
As early as 1929 the playwright and later Labour MP Benn Levy (of 
whom more in Chapter 4),31 in a memo for the Incorporated Society of 
Authors, foresaw a rather niche challenge which talking pictures might 
cause live theatre. Apart from ‘the more general effect upon Theatre 
business [caused] by the novelty and popularity (temporary or 
otherwise) of this new type of entertainment’, Levy suggested that ‘with 
 
27 https://www.britannica.com/biography/James-Agate, retrieved 15/10/18 
28 London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1934, pvi 
29 See Chapter 3, p46, and Chapter 5, pp127-9 
30 ‘Plays of the Month’, Drama, Vol 16, No 1, October 1937, p1  
31 pp88-90 
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the “talkie”, the Touring Manager is faced with the possibility of  his 
play being presented scene by scene and word by word at an opposition 
house’.32 Levy’s background was relevant: he was ‘dialogue writer’ for 
Alfred Hitchcock’s first talking picture (one of the first in Britain), 
Blackmail, released the same year and itself adapted from a play.33 But 
the danger seems not to have come to pass.   
A final source casts further light on theatre’s health in the 1930s, 
its relationship with cinema, and, incidentally, the views of St John 
Ervine. In December 1935 The Times reported that ‘[the actor] Sir 
Cedric Hardwicke and Mr. St. John Ervine took part in a debate on “You 
actors waste your time on films,” held yesterday at 45, Park Lane’.34 
According to The Times Ervine argued that ‘Actors were being seduced 
from the art they loved by money to take part in a thing they despised…. 
He wanted actors to come away from the entertainment of the 
charwoman, for it was only people with a charwoman’s mind who went 
to the cinema’. For Hardwicke there was no conflict between cinema and 
theatre: ‘The only part of the theatre that the cinema had killed was the 
provincial touring company, and he viewed its passing with no regret…. 
The films were not made for people who were able to go to the theatre 
but for those who for one reason or another were not so able’.  
The debate continued in the Theatre Managers’ Journal.35 
Hardwicke received more criticism than support; but the criticisms, from 
some of the leading theatre managers of the time, attacked his views on 
touring companies rather than backing Ervine’s views on cinema. The 
Managing Director of Moss Empires, which included the London 
 
32 The Keep (East Sussex Record Office), Benn Wolfe Levy papers, SxMs37/19/1, memo of 2/7/29, 
‘Talking Picture Versions of Stage Plays’ 
33 http://www.samuelfrench.com/author/3342/benn-w-levy and 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0019702/fullcredits#writers – retrieved 30/12/13 
34 14/12/35, p4, for all quotations in this paragraph 
35 Theatre Managers’ Journal, January 1936, for all quotations in this paragraph. The relevant pages – 
not numbered – were pasted into National Archives file CUST153/5: Entertainments Duty Volume 5: 
The Living Theatre 1932 to 1940, pp154-6. 
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Palladium, the Prince of Wales Theatre and many of the largest regional 
theatres,36 argued against every element of Hardwicke’s case. About the 
quality of theatre outside London, Hardwicke ‘cannot have had time to 
see some of the most excellent recent provincial productions’. 
Concerning its profitability, ‘I am sure quite a few West End Theatres 
will envy the numbers… [Noel Coward] has played to’ on a recent 
regional tour. And concerning competition between cinema and live 
theatre, ‘Some of us have noted a big reaction to “flesh and blood” this 
year…. [When the public] go to their local city or on their holidays they 
have a definite desire to see the real stuff “in the flesh”’. The Managing 
Director of the Howard and Wyndham theatre chain was the only 
commentator who accepted any of Hardwicke’s views, agreeing that 
cinema had almost eliminated small touring companies. But ‘Fortunately 
there is a decided come back to the Theatre, and Repertory, the real 
feeding ground of all, has been making vast strides’.               
The conclusion from all this is that there was no marked decline in 
the quality or quantity of theatre produced in Britain in the 1930s, that 
cinema was not ‘slaughtering’ live theatre, and that the arguments 
mounted against cinema by such writers as Ervine were more emotional 
and moral than statistical. They are considered further in Chapter 4.  
     
Broadcasting v live music 
 
In 1933 the music critic Ernest Newman wrote that ‘the musical 
destiny of this country [is] in the hands of the BBC’.37 Many agreed that, 
for better or worse, this was the case. Throughout history it had been 
possible to hear professionally performed music only in live 
 
36 http://www.arthurlloyd.co.uk/MossEmpiresJubilee1949.htm, retrieved 22/3/18 
37 Sunday Times, 15/11/33, quoted in Asa Briggs: The History of Broadcasting in the United 
Kingdom: Volume II -The Golden Age of Wireless (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), hereafter 
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performances. For economic, social, cultural and practical reasons, the 
vast majority of the population was excluded from live performances. In 
the inter-war period, for the first time, anyone who could afford a 
wireless and licence or a gramophone and records could hear such 
music. Even St John Ervine wrote positively of ‘the labourer in remote 
hamlet’ now being able to hear Beethoven’s Seventh Symphony ‘as 
easily as if he were an habitué of the Queen’s or the Albert Hall’.38  
In The Arts in England (1949) Mary Glasgow, Secretary-General 
of the Arts Council, fully accepted the point: ‘When, during the war, 
concerts were taken by C.E.M.A. to unlikely audiences in remote 
districts… it was discovered that a large and genuine audience for music 
existed…. The effect of radio music has shown itself to be wide and 
enduring’.39 In this, Glasgow was echoing her late Chairman, John 
Maynard Keynes: ‘...the BBC has played… the predominant part in 
creating this public demand…. I am told that today when a good 
symphony concert is broadcast as many as five million people may listen 
to it. Their ears become trained. With what anticipation many of them 
look forward if a chance comes their way to hear a living orchestra…’.40       
Such views seem uncontroversial, indeed obvious. But there was a 
surprising number of contrary voices, motivated as much by dislike of 
the BBC and fear of the damaging effects of the ‘mechanised arts’ in 
general as by a genuine belief that the wider availability of music was 
somehow harmful. Among later commentators, A J P Taylor’s opinion 
of the BBC (and of Sir Thomas Beecham) was as clear and lacking in 
evidence as his opinions of theatre and cinema in the 1930s: ‘...a single 
man, Sir Thomas Beecham, did more for British music than was done by 
 
38 Ervine, pp197-8 
39 B Ifor Evans and Mary Glasgow: The Arts in Britain (London: The Falcon Press, 1949), p16 
40 ‘The Arts Council: Its Policy and Hopes’ (The Listener, 12/7/45) 
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the massed battalions of the BBC’.41 Beecham’s own views were more 
extreme still: in 1934 he suggested that the BBC’s ‘monstrous monopoly 
of the air is infinitely more dangerous than the aeroplane menace’, and 
that within twenty years ‘[we] will depend for every kind of music on 
the radio and musical reproduction by mechanical devices’.42 Beecham 
was not a lone voice. In the Musical Times, W R Anderson wrote 
approvingly: ‘Sir Thomas was perfectly just in most of his remarks. We 
ought to be grateful for a man who is not frightened of anybody or 
anything…. The monstrous thing is that it [the BBC] is not answerable 
to anybody’43 – a surprising comment in a regular magazine column 
called ‘Wireless Notes’. 
Even so, aside from his general reputation as a controversialist, 
Beecham was an unlikely pessimist about the future of live classical 
music and the effects of broadcasting. Concerning the former, only two 
years earlier, in 1932, he had been responsible for founding one of 
Britain’s finest orchestras, the London Philharmonic.44 And not only did 
he frequently work with the BBC, he also frequently lobbied it for more 
broadcast time (and thus fees) for his own projects.45 Even so, it is worth 
considering the reality behind such arguments as Beecham’s. The 
influence of the arguments is considered further in Chapter 4.  
There is no study of classical music as thorough as Wearing’s 
volumes on London theatre. But it is likely that the case made by 
Beecham and those who thought like him was based on belief, gut 
feeling or prejudice more than on hard data. First, they provided no data 
- nothing to suggest that live classical music was at serious risk in the 
1930s, still less that the BBC or the recording industry was the cause. 
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Second, as noted above, classical music was now, for the first time, 
available to millions of potential listeners. It is counter-intuitive to 
believe that this development endangered live classical music, so it was 
for those who did believe it to make the case for it. Beyond arguing that 
the radio and gramophone discouraged home and other amateur music-
making (a point considered below), they simply did not do so. The third 
and most important point concerns what the BBC actually did; Taylor 
failed to address this and Beecham dismissed it in the phrase ‘monstrous 
monopoly of the air’.46  
The BBC was the dominant force not merely in broadcast music 
but in all aspects of professional classical music in Britain in the 1930s 
with the exception of musicians’ training. Ernest Newman recognised 
this in the quotation above. So did the composer Arthur Bliss, writing in 
1932: ‘The BBC has grown in ten years to be the greatest music-making 
machine… that has ever existed’.47 It was the pre-eminent promoter of 
live concerts, funder of concerts put on by other promoters (through 
broadcast fees), commissioner of new music, creator of new orchestras 
and employer of musicians. The following examples suggest that in all 
these areas its effect was highly positive rather than the reverse.  
The Promenade Concerts, perhaps the most famous concert series 
in the world, were founded in 1895 by Robert Newman and Sir Henry 
Wood. On Newman’s death in 1926, the Proms were on the point of 
folding until the BBC took them on;48 they have kept them in being ever 
since. According to Asa Briggs, ‘At the first concert under the new 
regime Wood… told a friend that he was so elated he had never 
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conducted with greater spirit. He also said how wonderful it was to be 
free at last from ‘the everlasting box office problem’’.49  
For several years from 1930 the BBC was also responsible for 
ensuring the survival of opera at the Royal Opera House: through a 
complex arrangement not only did the BBC became the controlling 
shareholder in the Covent Garden Opera Syndicate (1930) Ltd, but the 
Treasury offered subsidy to Covent Garden, via the BBC, of £5,000 in 
1930 and £7,500 for each of the following five years.50 And as Briggs 
pointed out, during the 1930s ‘the BBC gave considerable financial help 
not only to Covent Garden but to Sadler’s Wells and Carl Rosa, and it 
broadcast opera from Glyndebourne as early as 1935’,51 only its second 
season of operation. Despite his view of the BBC as a ‘menace’ and a 
desperate threat to live music, Sir Thomas Beecham ‘continued to press 
the BBC… to give more financial help to Covent Garden’ (of which he 
was then Music Director) through increasing the number of opera 
broadcasts.52  
 Furthermore, in the 1930s the BBC founded three symphony 
orchestras – the BBC Symphony Orchestra in 1930 and the BBC 
Scottish and Welsh Orchestras in 1935.53 As noted above, the field was, 
nonetheless, not so crowded as to prevent Beecham founding the 
London Philharmonic in 1932. Writing in 1935, the BBC’s Director of 
Music, and Principal Conductor of the BBC Symphony Orchestra, 
Adrian Boult, gave this view of the orchestral scene in Britain before 
and after 1930:  
…the reputation of British music and British musicianship abroad was 
extremely low. Our capital city contained but one orchestra [the London 
 
49 ibid, p173; Briggs footnotes the quotation within the quotation: ‘W. W. Thompson in the BBC 
Programme Scrapbook, 18 Jan. 1948’. 
50 ibid, pp178-83; the subsidy was discontinued in 1932 
51 ibid, p182 
52 ibid, pp182-3 
53 ibid, p170 
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Symphony Orchestra] and that an inferior one…. The formation of the 
Corporation’s Symphony Orchestra was the turning point…. With this fine 
orchestra working under admirable conditions, the Corporation was clearly 
capable of reaching a standard hitherto undreamt of in this country.54 
This might be considered special pleading were it not supported by 
visiting musicians including the famously demanding conductor Arturo 
Toscanini, who told Boult: ‘You have done with the BBC Orchestra in 
three years what took me with the New York Philharmonic five years… 
you have made it into one of the finest orchestras in the world’.55  
 The BBC’s role as commissioner of new music is too large a 
subject to cover here,56 but some idea of its contribution can be gained 
by considering briefly its role in Benjamin Britten’s early career. The 
BBC first broadcast one of Britten’s works in 1933, when he was just 
19.57 Although Britten was never on the BBC’s payroll, his employment 
from 1935 in the GPO Film Unit resulted from a recommendation by its 
Music Department.58 From 1937, appreciating his speed and facility in 
producing music to order, the BBC began commissioning scores from 
him; in 1937 and 1938 he wrote incidental music for seven radio plays 
and features.59 Also in 1938 the BBC commissioned Britten to write a 
piano concerto for premiere, with the composer as soloist, in that year’s 
Promenade Concerts60 - a work reviewed patronisingly by The Times as 
‘one of the most interesting novelties we have had at the Proms for some 
time’.61 Later in the same Proms season Britten conducted the BBC 
Symphony Orchestra in his Variations on a Theme of Frank Bridge, 
 
54 Quoted in Briggs, p184 
55 Quoted in Briggs, p171 
56 See, generally, Jenny Doctor: The BBC and Ultra-Modern Music, 1922-1936 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999) 
57 Humphrey Carpenter: Benjamin Britten – A Biography (London: Faber and Faber, 1992), p50 
58 ibid, p63 
59 John Evans (ed): Journeying Boy: The Diaries of the Young Benjamin Britten, 1928-1938 (London: 
Faber and Faber, 2010), p316 
60 ibid, p317 
61 19/8/38, p10 
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written the previous year.62 And later the same month some of his music 
for Auden and Isherwood’s play The Ascent of F6 was televised from 
Alexandra Palace.63 This was all before Britten had reached the age of 
twenty-five. Such opportunities for a young composer to write so much 
for almost immediate performance and to make a living from 
composing, and for listeners (and viewers) to hear the resulting music, 
were not only unprecedented but had been literally impossible at any 
earlier period. 
 Some of the most valuable contemporary accounts of classical 
music in Britain in the 1930s were written by Arthur Bliss, particularly a 
series of twelve articles in 1935 in the BBC’s magazine The Listener 
under the general title A Musical Pilgrimage of Britain.64 This had some 
resemblances to J B Priestley’s English Journey (1934);65 while Bliss 
and Priestley were friends,66 it is not clear whether it was inspired by 
Priestley’s book. Bliss, among the few musicians praised by John 
Christie,67 became the BBC’s Director of Music in 1942.68  
Even before the Musical Pilgrimage he had written for The 
Listener about the BBC and music. In the article cited above, describing 
the BBC as ‘the greatest music-making machine that has ever existed’, 
he noted with approval what he saw as the corporation’s benignly elitist 
approach: ‘It has obviously decided rightly… to bridge any gulf between 
the public and itself by enticing the said public to creep up to its own 
level of taste…’.69 For Bliss, music on the BBC was an unqualified force 
for good: ‘A serious listener can in a year become acquainted with the 
best symphonic and chamber music of all periods performed sometimes 
 
62 8/9/38 - https://www.bbc.co.uk/events/rzhbj5/by/date/1938/09/07, retrieved 8/4/18 
63 The Times, 26/9/38. p19 
64 Published between 2/10/35 and 18/12/35; reprinted in Bliss on Music, pp105-55.  
65 London: William Heinemann/Victor Gollancz, 1934  
66 Arthur Bliss: As I Remember (London: Faber and Faber, 1970), p100  
67 See Chapter 8, p219 
68 As I Remember, pp139-64 
69 Bliss on Music, p63, for this and the following two quotations 
  39 
superbly, at all times adequately. It is the equivalent, in painting, of a 
year’s tour round the most famous galleries of the world. No one can 
fairly ask for anything better…’. Bliss suggested that the BBC was 
‘achieving on a national scale what Sir Henry Wood has done with his 
Queen’s Hall audiences – unostentatiously raising the level of musical 
appreciation’. Wood, of course, had achieved this partly due to the 
BBC’s funding the Proms. Finally, the BBC Symphony Orchestra ‘has 
set a standard of playing high enough to cause a perceptible stiffening 
and liveliness in other orchestras’.70               
 The Musical Pilgrimage looked more broadly at the state of music 
in Britain, in the form of despatches about musical life, amateur and 
professional, in places ranging from Cornwall to Glasgow, though 
excluding London and the south-east. Among the issues Bliss explored 
were the state of amateur music making and the BBC’s influence on this, 
the only aspect of musical life in which the corporation’s critics claimed 
that it had proved specifically rather than generally harmful. He 
provided many examples to suggest that the amateur tradition, choral 
and otherwise, was in good health. Indeed, his conclusions ran totally 
counter to those of the critics:  
There seems hardly a village which is not touched by some musical 
organization. In a general way broadcasting has been the most potent cause 
of this growth. It has awakened the sense of music in vast sections of the 
population. There is naturally a percentage… lazily content to take the ready-
made article… but there are other listeners who wish to get into closer touch 
with music by learning to take part themselves.71 
Bliss did acknowledge two dangers for amateur music: that ‘Saturation 
point is being reached…. There are frankly too many societies’; and, 
directly related to broadcasting and recording, that ‘probably due to the 
 
70 ibid, p64 
71 ibid, p152, for this and the following two quotations 
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effect of broadcasting, the public demand superfine performances’ – 
which amateur music societies were rarely able to deliver. But neither 
point suggests that the BBC had a negative effect on amateur music, let 
alone on music as a whole.   
Indeed, in all the ways discussed above the BBC was doing much 
to keep classical music and opera in reasonable health in the 1930s. 
There is one role to which it is worth drawing particular attention. By 
paying fees for permission to broadcast concerts and operas, and as a 
shareholder and regular funder of the Covent Garden Opera Syndicate, 
the BBC was acting in fact if not in name as a provider of subsidy. As 
noted in Chapter 1, this role has been largely ignored by writers about 
public funding of the arts, from Keynes onwards. This failure has further 
contributed to the myth that arts subsidy became a salient issue only on 
the outbreak of World War II.  
It would be tedious to emphasise this theme repeatedly, but the 
crucial, indeed pre-eminent, role of the BBC in classical music in the 
1930s is relevant to much of this thesis. Contrary to the views of 
Beecham and Taylor, the evidence strongly suggests that largely due to, 
rather than in spite of, the BBC, the 1930s saw a burgeoning in both the 
quantity and quality of classical music produced, performed and listened 




 This chapter has briefly surveyed the health of live theatre and 
classical music in 1930s Britain. It has been far from comprehensive. It 
has not, for instance, covered the campaign in the 1930s to create a 
National Theatre, the role of amateur drama, or, other than in passing, 
the recording industry. Its aim was to include sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate the condition of live theatre and classical music in the 
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1930s. That evidence shows that they were in better health than is often 
suggested; that in practice they were not harmed by the cinema and the 
BBC, indeed, that classical music was thriving because of rather than 
despite the BBC; and accordingly that the active and passionate 
campaigns for state funding of the arts in the 1930s considered in later 
chapters were driven more by politics and principle than by direct 
economic need. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The League of Audiences: (i) ‘I am progressing almost 
beyond my hopes’ 
 
Introduction: a forgotten debate 
 
This chapter and the two which follow trace the history of Alfred 
Wareing’s League of Audiences. The League had by far the highest 
public profile of the three campaigns discussed in this thesis. Its story 
demonstrates that arts subsidy was a subject of widespread public and 
press interest in the 1930s and a cause actively supported by many 
beyond obvious music and theatre lovers, notably the Church of 
England. The League also focused attention on two cultural debates, at 
least one of which is now largely forgotten. 
The first questioned whether state funding of the arts would 
inevitably lead to state control of the arts. Given the examples of 1930s 
Nazi, Fascist and Communist cultural policies, this concern was 
understandable. The other – more intense at the time, but now rarely 
remembered – was about the effects on British society of the 
‘mechanised arts’ of film, the wireless and the gramophone. At its core 
were not only matters of economics, such as the effects of the cinema, 
relatively cheap and widely available, on those who worked in live 
theatre, but also fundamental cultural and moral issues: whether 
‘mechanised music and drama [should] be allowed to extend their 
soulless sway, without protest’;1 what was the proper response to cinema 
– a place ‘where pop-eyed illiterates lie about in heaps, gaping at the 
 
1 Daily Telegraph, 5/12/36  
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Garbo! [sic]’;2 and whether, in brief, the ‘mechanised arts’ were creating 
a population of passive and inert consumers.    
In a sense both debates arose from a fear of authoritarian 
government, though they argued from opposite premises to opposite 
conclusions. The first was about the possible abuse of arts subsidy by a 
government aiming to create ‘state art’. The second considered cinema 
and broadcasting to be a means by which such a government might 
create a quiescent population; subsidy for live music and drama was 
seen as a way of combatting this. Both may seem exaggerated and 
unrealistic in hindsight, but the first was an important argument for the 
opponents of the League of Audiences and the second was central to its 
mission. This chapter is about the League’s rise, from 1934 to mid-1938. 
Chapter 4 focuses on these two central debates and discusses the 
involvement of the Church of England, prompted mainly by the second 
issue. Chapter 5 discusses the League’s decline as war approached, and 
its legacy and significance.  
 
‘Advancing upon the iron portals of Whitehall’: the League begins 
 
Alfred Wareing  
In October 1934 articles appeared in the British national, regional 
and imperial press reporting on, and applauding, a new organisation. 
‘Candidus’,3 in the Daily Sketch, summarised its key themes: 
I notice with pleasure the creation of a new society for the encouragement of 
the drama and music. It is called the League of Audiences, and if it succeeds, 
it will convert audiences, hitherto the passive objects of private commercial 
speculation, or sometimes of private philanthropy, into genuine assistants at 
 
2 Ervine, p235 
3 ‘Candidus’ was the pen name of Henry Newham 
(https://wellcomelibrary.org/item/b18228732#?c=0&m=0&s=0&cv=0., retrieved 19/9/18). Later in 
the 1930s Newham became editor of the right-wing magazine Truth (R B Cockett: ‘Ball, Chamberlain 
and Truth’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 33 No. 1, March 1990, p134).     
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their own entertainment….It will seek to induce our rulers to do as much 
for…[music and drama] as for the more consciously educational institutions 
of museums and art galleries….Its second object will be to “preserve and 
promote interpretation of these arts by persons present in person before their 
audiences” – a wholesome reaction against the mechanisation of the 
arts….Someone will say that this will cost money. Of course it will.4    
For the League of Audiences, live music and theatre, and their 
audiences, were threatened by film, records and broadcasting, and by 
commercial interests in general. These arts deserved public funding as 
much as those displayed in museums and galleries, in order to help make 
the fight more equal.  
 The League’s call for theatre subsidy was not 
unprecedented in the 1930s. Even as it was being established, Cecil 
Chisholm’s book Repertory (1934), discussed in Chapter 2,5 argued that 
without subsidy repertory theatres would fold: ‘Manchester failed Miss 
Horniman [and]… Birmingham has twice let down Sir Barry Jackson’.6  
Chisholm did not underestimate the challenge: ‘As the normal British 
cabinet has no electoral spur to foster taste in art, literature or the drama, 
it can hardly be expected that any Government will ever introduce a bill 
on the subject… an immense amount of educational work would be 
necessary in the press and on the platform’.7 Chisholm’s solution, the 
call which concluded his book, was ‘the formation of a special 
propagandist body to further this vital work. The need for a beginning is 
urgent; for many years of arduous work lie ahead’.8  
He might have been describing, or prophesying, the League of 
Audiences. The League was the creation of one man, Alfred Wareing. 
Biographical material on Wareing is sparse. The major source is a 
 
4 15/10/34 
5 London: Peter Davies, 1934; see pp27-8 above 
6 ibid, p234 
7 ibid, pp235-6 
8 ibid, p237 
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privately published, overly respectful, biography by Winifred Isaac, who 
after Wareing’s death saw the League of Audiences through its long 
decline.9 Wareing was a theatre man through and through. He was born 
in 1876, and after an undistinguished career as an actor founded the 
Glasgow Repertory Theatre in 1909. In its first year he gave Chekhov’s 
The Seagull its first production in English, along with plays by Ibsen, 
Shaw, Arnold Bennett and John Galsworthy.10 Wareing’s work in 
Glasgow (from which he had to resign in 1912 due to ill health), and 
subsequently as Director of the Theatre Royal Huddersfield throughout 
the 1920s, earned respect from colleagues in the repertory theatre 
movement and from theatre historians.11 Apart from the League of 
Audiences, his final posts were in Stratford-upon-Avon, as Librarian of 
the Shakespeare Memorial Theatre from 1931 to 1933 and Borough 
Librarian from 1941 until his death the following year.12  
But Wareing’s character was more notable than his CV. It shines 
through his writings, press accounts, and the tributes from friends and 
admirers with which Isaac’s book began. Among these was Walter 
Elliot, Scottish Unionist politician, a member of the Cabinets of the 
National governments for most of the 1930s,13 and a friend of Wareing’s 
since Elliot’s days as a medical student in Glasgow.14 Elliot wrote of 
Wareing’s ‘direct approach… which no amount of bludgeoning could 
knock away’,15 as apparent in the Glasgow days as twenty-five years 
later, when Wareing ‘was advancing, still with the same childlike 
certainty, upon the iron portals of Whitehall’. Wareing ‘was without 
genius in writing or eloquence in speech. He had simply an innate belief 
 
9  Alfred Wareing: a biography (London: Green Bank Press, 1951), hereafter ‘Isaac’.  
10 ibid, pp37-38  
11 See, for instance, George Rowell and Anthony Jackson: The Repertory Movement: A History of 
Regional Theatre in Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp46-8 and 66. 
12 Isaac, p76 
13 http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/people/mr-walter-elliot/, retrieved 21/12/2013 
14 Isaac, px  
15 ibid, pxi, for all Elliot quotations in this paragraph 
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in the good-heartedness and sincerity of those in whose hands lay power; 
and indefatigable persistence; and a cutting-edge which, though blunt, 
would in the long run saw asunder mountains’.  
Persistence was a quality much associated with Wareing. The 
theatre critic (and, later, editor of The Observer and Arts Council 
member) Ivor Brown, in his foreword to Isaac’s book, wrote: ‘The 
persistence which carried this deaf man, quite unknown to the big-wigs 
of S.W.1, through the barriers is astounding’.16 It had its downside, as 
Brown acknowledged: ‘The true proof of his zeal was his willingness to 
drive his friends to distraction for the cause… I remember a time when I 
groaned at every ring of the telephone. Wareing again!... He was after 
one like the Hound of Heaven, husky, smiling, anxious, indomitable’.17  
References to Wareing’s deafness were also common. The Daily 
Herald chose the headline ‘Deaf, But Wants New Music Law’ for a 
story about the League of Audiences.18 And as Ivor Brown’s comments 
suggest, he inspired love (the word is not too extreme) and exasperation 
equally, often in the same person. John Christie, founder of 
Glyndebourne and originator of the ‘Council of Power’,19 was 
particularly ambivalent. Christie described Wareing as ‘that damned old 
fool’ and reported to his friend (and League of Audiences Treasurer) 
Harold Baker that ‘[Wareing’s] answer to me was… simply not to listen.  
He is an infuriating old man’.20 Baker had to remind him that ‘His 
deafness is a great impediment’.21 Yet Christie contributed anonymously 
to Wareing’s personal expenses when, in 1939, times became hard for 
 
16 ibid, pix 
17 ibid, px 
18 1/2/38 
19 See Chapters 6-8. 
20 Glyndebourne Archive, box file ‘John Christie – letters re Glyndebourne - Conference of Musicians 
5&6/3/1938 and 2/7/1938’, Christie-Baker, 4/2/38  
21 ibid, Baker-Christie, 8/2/38 
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him.22 Baker conceded that ‘sometimes he [Wareing] resents criticism 
(from an excessive enthusiasm for his crusade), but I have never found 
him obstinate beyond reason’.23 James Mallon, Warden of Toynbee Hall, 
reflected a common view when describing Wareing to Cosmo Lang, 
Archbishop of Canterbury: ‘He is a simple and loveable man, 
handicapped by deafness and perhaps by volubility. But he is so much 
possessed by his dream of re-awakening England to love music and 
drama that one hears him stray from the point, or approach the wrong 
point, without impatience’.24  
Wareing’s optimism was apparent as early as December 1933, 
before the League was set up, when he wrote to a friend: 
…(in the strictest confidence and no one but you must know of this) that I 
am progressing almost beyond my hopes. There are good prospects of heart 
to heart talks with Mr [Stanley] Baldwin [then Lord President of the 
Council], the Chancellor of the Exchequer [Neville Chamberlain] and Sir 
John Simon [Foreign Secretary]. And probably the Premier [Ramsay 
MacDonald]….So that…we may hope to have some of the most important 
Cabinet Ministers in favour of relief for the living Theatre.25 
Devotion to his cause rather than bravado kept Wareing going. In letters 
of March 1934, he recorded that he had been coached by Walter Elliot 
for a meeting with Chamberlain’s Private Secretary; the meeting, he 
thought, ‘will [not] be anything like the ordeal of that [sic] which Mr. 
Baldwin gave me’,26 and he confessed that ‘I dreaded the interview with 
Mr. Baldwin. That was an ordeal indeed.’27 No record from the 
Government side survives of this ‘ordeal’.    
Optimism prevailed. In an early talk (Wareing was a tireless 
speaker at theatre clubs throughout Great Britain) he stated baldly: ‘It 
 
22 See Chapter 5, pp115-7 
23 op cit, Baker-Christie, 8/2/38 
24 Lambeth Palace archive: Lang Papers L1-L17 1938, Vol 162, p346, Mallon-Lang, 21/4/38   
25V&A/THM/149/5, Wareing-Selby 29/12/33   
26 ibid, Wareing-EW Record, 12/3/34  
27 ibid, Wareing-Billy Rhodes, 9/3/34  
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seems pretty certain that this plan will succeed, and in a very short time, 
for it is the first time that Music and Drama has [sic] come together to 
demand Government recognition’.28  
 
The League and the press  
Such views might seem unrealistically hopeful, but for much of 
the League’s early existence they appeared well-founded. The League 
received a range and quantity of press coverage which makes its 
subsequent oblivion all the harder to explain. A little of this was 
negative – the Birmingham Mail commented that ‘the “League of 
Audiences” is the latest alias and device of that active group of persons 
who are anxious to put music and the drama on the rates or taxes’.29 But 
such carping was unusual. The League’s apparently comprehensive 
press cuttings books30 contain more than 300 cuttings covering its first 
15 months (October 1934 to January 1936); almost all were highly 
favourable. Furthermore the quotation indicates that, contrary to the 
views of later commentators, arts subsidy was a familiar subject of 
campaigning in the 1930s. The Birmingham Mail also noted the variety 
of the League’s supporters: ‘They are a curiously mixed “League”. 
Beginning with the Archbishop of York and the Bishop of Worcester, 
they include our revolutionary friend Mr. Maxton… [James Maxton, 
Scottish Socialist MP and leader of the Independent Labour Party]’.31  
The Daily Telegraph, reporting the League’s creation, was not 
only sympathetic (and remained so) but managed to suggest that seeking 
government money for the arts was almost mainstream: ‘In most other 
countries music and the drama are recognised as essential to national 
 
28 ibid, undated draft talk by Wareing 
29 12/10/34 
30 V&A/THM/149/3. Comparison with references to the League in The Times, accessed via the Times 
Digital Archive, suggests that the cuttings books are fairly complete.   
31 op cit 
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well-being, and subsidised. In this country they are taxed. To induce our 
Government to moderate this attitude is the dream of all men who care 
deeply for these arts’.32 Apart from the Telegraph, newspapers of such 
varied political persuasion as the Daily Sketch, Observer, Morning Post 
and Manchester Guardian were early, and remained strong, supporters 
of the League.33 The regional press was equally enthusiastic: the 
Birmingham Post, Lancashire Daily Post, Yorkshire Post, Leicester 
Mercury, Northern Echo, Sheffield Independent and Glasgow Bulletin all 
reported the League’s founding at length, mostly favourably.34  
The regional press provided some of the most detailed analysis of 
the League. The Staffordshire Sentinel included a substantial opinion 
piece pointing to the paradox that ‘the factor which has been most 
effective in making a State subsidy for music necessary… is itself a 
State enterprise, namely, broadcasting’ and concluding that ‘if nothing is 
left of the Bill, if and when it passes through Parliament, but a 
concession of the general principle of State aid for the arts, much will 
have been gained’.35 The paradox does not withstand scrutiny. It 
depends on the idea that broadcasting reduced the audience for live 
music and drama. As noted in Chapter 2, there is no good evidence for 
this, and in the case of classical music the evidence strongly suggests 
that broadcasting increased demand substantially.  
Coverage of its founding extended to The Children’s Newspaper, 
which told its readers that ‘that new and curiously-named body the 
League of Audiences, which has been launched through the initiative of 
Mr Alfred Wareing… intends to make an appeal throughout the 
 
32 12/10/34; the Telegraph had further positive coverage of the League on 2/12/36, 5/12/36 and 
3/2/38. 
33 See for instance Daily Sketch 15/10/34, 11/4/35 and 14/2/38; Observer 3/6/34, 2/6/35, 29/9/35 and 
6/12/36; Morning Post 12/10/34, 17/1/36, 5/1/37 and 12/1/37; and Manchester Guardian 12/10/34, 
28/12/34 and 20/4/36.  
34 All between 12 and 19 October 1934 
35 3/1/36 
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Empire…[to all] who desire to see and hear living interpreters of the 
drama and music’.36 Even Wareing’s public talks were widely reported. 
In January 1936, for instance, he delivered at Fort Dunlop, Birmingham, 
‘a lively attack on London players and playgoers’37 which argued the 
case for subsidy to support the best of regional theatre. This talk 
received not only much local attention (‘Mr. Alfred Wareing ought not 
to need any introduction, because it was he who founded the League of 
Audiences’ - Wolverhampton Express),38 but also reports in The Times, 
News Chronicle, Evening News, Morning Post and even the South 
African Cape Argus.39  
Indeed, the imperial press was highly enthusiastic, particularly 
after Lord Bessborough, Governor-General of Canada 1931-35,40 
became the League’s President. Its press cuttings book includes reports 
from India, South Africa, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Malaya and 
Ceylon, with calls from the Natal Advertiser for a branch of the League 
to be established in Durban and from the Adelaide Daily Mail for the 
equivalent in Australia (‘It is to be hoped that a branch of the League of 
Audiences is formed in each Australian State’), and an article by 
Wareing himself in the New Zealand Dominion.41 The Madras (Chennai) 
Hindu put the League’s aims in a broader context: ‘The revolt against 
the machine has broken out in an unexpected quarter’ (the issue of ‘man 
versus machine’ is considered in Chapter 4).42 The Hindu, too, wondered 
‘When will somebody think of doing the same thing [establishing 




37 The Times, 16/1/36 
38 8/1/36 
39 All 16/1/36 except Morning Post (17/1/36) and Cape Argus (30/1/36) 
40 http://archive.gg.ca/gg/fgg/bios/01/bessborough_e.asp, retrieved 3/12/13  
41 Natal Advertiser, 23/5/36, Adelaide Daily Mail, 20/8/38, and Dominion, 2/6/36, respectively. 
Cuttings collected in V&A/THM/149/3 
42 8/5/36, and for the following quotation 
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The League’s supporters  
In addition to favourable press coverage, which continued for 
most of its existence, the League attracted to its ‘Council of Associates’ 
many leading theatrical figures, including J B Priestley, Arthur Wing 
Pinero, Sybil Thorndike and Lilian Baylis. Its smaller ‘General Council’, 
as the Birmingham Mail noted, was headed by the Archbishop of York, 
and included the Bishop of Worcester and James Maxton.43 Priestley 
was a particular catch. In 1934 he was among Britain’s most successful 
literary figures, famous for novels, plays and social commentary (his 
English Journey had just been published).44 In October 1934, the month 
the League was founded, he offered to include its circulars in 
programmes at the Duchess Theatre, which he co-managed and where 
his play Eden End was running.45 In December 1934 the Montreal Daily 
Star reported ‘Advocates of State Aid for the Stage in England Gain 
Supporter in J B Priestley’,46 he spoke at the launch of the League’s 
Music and Drama Bill (see below), and he wrote the postscript to a 1936 
League pamphlet ‘The Audience Assists’.47  
Wareing could generally find a wide and diverse range of 
celebrated ‘names’ to promote the League. A letter in its support 
published in The Times in April 1936,48 for instance, included among its 
signatories Lord Bessborough, the historian R H Tawney, the 
Archbishop of York, the Director of the Royal College of Music Sir 
Hugh Allen, the biologist Julian Huxley, the recently retired 
Conservative MP Sir Gervais Rentoul and the film producer Alexander 
 
43 V&A/THM/149/1, League’s proof annual accounts for 1934/35. For its relationship with the 
Church of England, see Chapter 4, pp75-82.   
44 London: William Heinemann/Victor Gollancz, 1934 
45 V&A/THM/149/5, Wareing’s report of 2/11/34 to the League’s Executive Committee contains 
Priestley’s offer; http://www.nimaxtheatres.com/duchess-theatre/, retrieved 9/12/13, for Priestley and 
the Duchess Theatre. 
46 22/12/34  
47 BBC Written Archive Centre (hereafter ‘BBC WAC’) file R44/228: ‘Publicity – League of 
Audiences 1934-1937’ 
48 14/4/36 
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Korda. And the League’s membership, though never beyond a few 
hundred strong, was highly distinguished. Among its members, paying 
an annual subscription of 10s/6d, were the musicians Adrian Boult, 
Myra Hess, Imogen Holst and Henry Wood; the actors Peggy Ashcroft, 
Lewis Casson, Gracie Fields and John Gielgud; and some who became 
notable in the later history of public arts funding, including John 
Christie, Eric White and William Emrys Williams.49  
 
The League’s programme 
As for what the press and these members were supporting, 
Wareing’s original plan was: 
…that this Government should…vote £50,000 per annum, to be administered 
by a Commission appointed to disburse this sum to those British enterprises 
in Drama and Music which stand in need of assistance and are worthy and 
deserving. The Commissioners would make grants in the form of loans 
bearing interest, the principal to be repaid if and when profits are made….50  
This concept was fleshed out and modified, and the projected budget 
increased, in a draft Music and Drama Bill. The League’s legal adviser, 
without other explanation, suggested the Forestry Act 1919, which had 
set up the Forestry Commission, as ‘certainly… the Act most 
appropriate to use as a basis for the present Bill’.51 The League’s papers 
include a marked-up copy of the Forestry Act, with ‘Forestry’ replaced 
by ‘Music and Drama’ throughout, the deletion of sections such as that 
dealing with the prevention of damage by rabbits, and the addition of 
clauses relevant to grant-making in the arts.52  
The Bill envisaged the government providing an initial capital 
sum as well as an annual grant, with the Crown appointing eight 
 
49 V&A/THM/149/6, the League’s membership card index 
50 V&A/THM/149/5, preamble to the League’s ‘Proposed Plan whereby the British Government may 
recognise the Arts of Drama and Music’(undated, but late 1934) 
51 V&A/THM/149/4, opinion by R J Sutcliffe, Barrister, 21/12/35  
52 ibid  
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Commissioners ‘of whom two at least shall have special knowledge and 
experience – one of Music and one of Drama’.53 The relative lack of arts 
expertise proposed for the Commissioners (one of the few issues on 
which Wareing seems to have agreed with John Christie)54 was not 
explained but may have been intended to prevent special pleading by 
professional interests and ensure that the League indeed represented 
audiences. Three of the Commissioners would be paid – a maximum of 
£4,500 a year was suggested as total salaries for the three. One of the 
unpaid Commissioners would be an MP. The Bill envisaged the 
Commissioners having wide powers, including making grants or loans 
‘to any person including local authorities to promote or encourage Music 
or Drama’ and, controversially, managing ‘any financially sound 
undertaking engaged in the production of musical or dramatic work’.  
This latter provision contributed to Wareing’s failure to gain full 
support within the theatrical profession, and to his failure to achieve 
regular public subsidy for music and drama by 1939. But what the 
League was not about ultimately damaged it more seriously. The flipside 
of Wareing’s singleness of purpose and persistence was a failure or 
inability to make alliances with those whose aims were similar but not 
identical to his own. This became apparent as early as November 1934, 
in an interview published in The Observer.55 Wareing acknowledged that 
the government’s removal of Entertainments Duty from the Old Vic and 
Sadler’s Wells theatres was ‘a Governmental recognition that their work 
is of public importance’.56  But ‘our plan is not primarily or even 
remotely concerned with the entertainment duty. And it differs from 
most other schemes, whose idea is to build a National Theatre, and so 
 
53 V&A/THM/149/5, synopsis accompanying printed version of the Bill, for all references in this 
paragraph.  
54 See, generally, Chapters 6-8 
55 25/11/34; and for the following quotations 
56 The campaign against Entertainments Duty is discussed in Chapter 9. 
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forth’. Wareing’s insistence on distancing the League from other 
campaigns for public support of live music and drama is discussed 
further in Chapter 5.  
 
‘A piece of idealistic blackmailing’: the League gains support  
  
  The League’s Music and Drama Bill was launched at a ‘Drawing-
Room meeting at Seaford House’ in May 1935, at which speakers 
including J B Priestley ‘strongly advocated State recognition of Drama 
and Music and the general decision of the guests was that the time had 
come to approach the Government to that end’.57 Priestley also ‘deplored 
the anomaly that, while theatre-goers are taxed for their pleasures, novel-
readers, via the public libraries, had free access to books bought with 
public money’,58 another attack on Entertainments Duty, again 
suggesting that co-operation between the two campaigns might have 
benefitted both. The Liverpool Post reported that the gathering included 
Sir Thomas Beecham and Sir Cedric Hardwicke, and noted ‘The League 
of Audiences was well and truly launched’; while The Observer 
commented: ‘A powerful and organised League of Audiences might be 
able to bring off a “piece of idealistic blackmailing”, making a 
Government listen to its mild demands. The chances are high, and the 
object is good’.59 At a further ‘at home’, in July 1935, Dame Sybil 
Thorndike gave a ‘tempestuous speech’ in favour of the League and the 
Bill.60  
While the press was mainly favourable, the League tended to 
exaggerate the enthusiasm within government. Reporting to the 
League’s Council of Management in October 1935, Harold Baker, then 
 
57 Isaac, p97, for both quotations.  
58 ibid 
59 31/5/35 and 2/6/35 respectively 
60 Yorkshire Post, 23/7/35 
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its General Secretary, wrote: ‘In my opinion, the chances that the next 
Government…will ultimately accept it [the Bill] are not merely good but 
steadily improving….we already have strong supporters among Cabinet 
and ex-Cabinet Ministers….Mr Wareing has secured an expression of 
opinion, most favourable to us, from the present Chancellor of the 
Exchequer [Neville Chamberlain]’.61 Baker’s colleagues may have seen 
him as someone who spoke with authority about the political world. At 
this time he was Warden of Winchester College,62 but he had been a 
Liberal MP before 1918 and a junior Minister under Asquith.63 He 
retained sufficient contacts to persuade Lord Bessborough to become the 
League’s President.64  
Baker did acknowledge that ‘in view of the European situation, it 
is improbable that the next budget will allow the Chancellor… to make 
the provision required by the Bill’. And Chamberlain’s support was 
more personal than political. Writing to Wareing in December 1935, 
Chamberlain was sympathetic to the League’s aims but refused any 
public association with it: ‘Although I believe I was the first to suggest a 
contribution from the rates to an orchestra in Birmingham when I was 
Lord Mayor… it is many years since I have had anything to do with the 
matter’.65 A subsequent letter, reported to the League’s Council of 
Management in July 1936, may be seen as either generally encouraging 
or kicking the subject into the long grass: ‘I think you are setting about it 
in the right way, namely, by educating and arousing public opinion. It 
would be difficult for any Government to act without some organised 
 
61 V&A/THM/149/5, report dated 2/10/35  
62 http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/c/F38062. His letters to John Christie from this 
period, in the Glydebourne  archive, are on his headed Winchester notepaper, On Baker, see, further, 
Chapter 5, pp115-7.   
63 https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/people/mr-harold-baker/index.html, accessed 13/10/18 
64 He undertook to do so in the report of 2/10/35 cited above. 
65 V&A/THM/149/1, Chamberlain-Wareing, 21/12/35 
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and vocal backing’.66 Chamberlain and other Ministers invariably saw 
the government’s role as following rather than leading public opinion on 
the issue. Wareing, however, put much weight on such statements. In his 
November 1934 Observer interview, 67 he said: ‘Mr Baldwin was one of 
the first to be interested in this new movement, and he gave me an 
interview earlier in the year [the one he privately described at the time as 
‘an ordeal’]…I have a very strong suspicion that the Government would 
not mind being ‘coerced’ if it could be given proof that any large general 
body of voters…were interested in the matter’.  
Harold Baker’s October 1935 report, cited above, included some 
ideas for broadening the League’s popular appeal, such as 
‘encouragement of Local Authorities to start Open Air Theatres, 
particularly where there are numbers of unemployed’,68 campaigning 
against both theatre censorship and Entertainments Duty, and 
establishing ‘offshoots [of the League] in the Dominions and Colonies’. 
But Baker was half-hearted about Entertainments Duty, suggesting that 
‘there is no demand for this, except from managers’, and, as noted, 
Wareing actively disapproved of mingling the two campaigns. For Baker 
‘the Music and Drama Bill [should] be considered our main objective’; 
for Wareing it was the only objective.  
Despite the League’s limited success with the government, there 
was support for the Bill among MPs. On 1 December 1936 a meeting 
was held at the House of Commons, called by eight Conservative, 
Labour and Independent MPs who wished to ‘discuss the formation of a 
Music and Drama Committee’ and who promised an attendance 
including  Laurence Binyon (the poet of ‘For the Fallen’) and Gracie 
 
66 V&A/THM/149/3, report by Wareing, 10/7/36 
67 25/11/34 
68 V&A/THM/149/5, report of 2/10/35, for all quotations in this paragraph 
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Fields.69 The Daily Telegraph reported that the meeting was ‘presided 
over by Capt. V. A. Cazalet M.P., and addressed by… [among others] 
Lord Bessborough… Dr. Malcolm Sargent… and (the moving spirit) 
Mr. Alfred Wareing’.70  The Telegraph commented: 
The questions before us were two. Shall mechanised music and drama be 
allowed triumphantly to extend their soulless sway without protest or 
defence…on behalf of “the real thing”? And….Is not the time ripe for 
Laisser-faire to relinquish its grip on music and drama in England, seeing that 
it has been discredited in its workings in so many other directions, such as 
tramp steamers, sugar-beet and fat cattle?71   
The answers provided were a clear ‘No and ‘Yes’ respectively. The 
Telegraph strongly supported the principle of government involvement 
in the arts:  
On the day this [Music and Drama] bill becomes an Act of Parliament 
Laisser-faire will be recognised as having suffered defeat in one of its last 
and remotest strongholds….The day may surely be hoped for when a 
repertory theatre in a town of 100,000 population will no more have to fight 
for existence than the library or museum.72  
The left-wing Daily Herald noted the breadth of political support for the 
Bill: ‘…a meeting, arranged by the League of Audiences, supported the 
Music and Drama Bill – yes, and it is backed by Tory members …. 
“Fancy leaving that to private enterprise!” said one Tory! We are getting 
on’.73  
The League saw further grounds for optimism around this time. A 
few weeks before the House of Commons meeting, Wareing discussed 
the League at 10 Downing Street with Sir Geoffrey Fry, Stanley 
Baldwin’s Private Secretary. Fry’s view was that ‘the present 
Government would not be able to find the money for the Music and 
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Drama Bill, but he thought the League of Audiences would ultimately 
come to success’74 – the sort of ‘jam tomorrow’ pronouncement on 
which Wareing thrived. And some saw Neville Chamberlain’s 
appointment as Prime Minister in May 1937 as a hopeful sign. The 
Birmingham Post, Chamberlain’s home newspaper, commented: ‘Now 
that we have a Prime Minister whose interest in drama and music is 
serious… we may perhaps look forward to some kind of State support of 
these intellectually still quite vigorous but materially languishing arts’.75   
The Post had a nuanced view of the issue. It opposed direct 
government subsidy as ‘entirely antagonistic to a democratic rule… 
[leading to] the subservience of art to national propaganda’; but it 
supported the League’s Bill since funding decisions would be taken not 
by the government but by a Commission ‘empowered to grant aid to 
dramatic companies and to choirs or orchestras which can prove to the 
satisfaction of experts the social and artistic value of their work and the 
necessity of some help to assure its continuance’. This description in 
1937 of Wareing’s proposed Commission is remarkably similar to 
Keynes’ description, eight years later, of the newly created Arts Council: 
‘…a semi-independent body… provided with modest funds to stimulate, 
comfort and support any societies… which are striving with serious 
purpose and a reasonable prospect of success to present for public 
enjoyment the arts of music, drama and painting’.76 With Chamberlain’s 
appointment, the Post concluded, ‘we seem to be nearer to the 
realisation of something of this kind than ever before’.  
This optimism continued into 1938. The Times reported a further 
House of Commons meeting in February, which ‘attracted Members of 
Parliament of all parties… in support of the Music and Drama Bill’. 
 
74 V&A/ THM/149/7, minutes of League Executive Committee meeting, 5/11/36 
75 28/6/37, and for quotations from the Post in the following paragraph 
76 ‘The Arts Council: Its Policy and Hopes’ (The Listener, 12/7/45) 
  59 
Little of substance occurred, though ‘It was decided to summon a 
meeting at a later date and to invite the Prime Minister’.77 Wareing 
explained to the meeting that ‘the Bill came not from vested interests or 
professions, but from the electorate’ and that ‘the object of the Bill was 
to obtain Government recognition of music and drama without setting up 
a Ministry of Fine Arts’. The claim about the absence of vested interests 
was all too well-founded: opposition from vested interests in the theatre 
industry seriously damaged the Bill’s chances of success.78  
The Times reported extreme claims made at the meeting, it is not 
clear by whom, for the Bill’s effects in Britain and abroad: 
…the [Bill’s] Commissioners would encourage… the organization of 
companies of the highest standard to produce notable English works of drama 
and music and present them overseas, where they would help bring a better 
understanding of our national outlook and so help to keep the peace of the 
world and preserve the spirit of community.  
This was more the remit of the British Council. In Britain, the Bill would 
‘increase the amenities of rural life by visits of performers, orchestras, 
brass bands… thus helping to arrest the drift to the towns’. Neither claim 
had much to do with the Bill’s provisions. Both provided ammunition 
for its critics.79      
Two other factors at this period fed the optimism of campaigners 
for subsidy. The first was the government’s decision to exempt some 
not-for-profit theatres from Entertainments Duty on the grounds that 
their work was partly educational.80 When the government removed the 
duty from the Old Vic and Sadler’s Wells, the Sunday Times suggested 
that ‘for the first time it brought an aesthetic principle into 
politics….The remission of a tax is, of course, a form of subsidy, and… 
 
77 10/2/38, for all quotations in this and the following paragraph  
78 See, generally, Chapters 4, 5 and 9 
79 Including T S Eliot: see Chapter 4, pp91-2  
80 See Chapter 9, pp276-88 
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is given on aesthetic grounds’.81 The issue was more complex than this. 
The exemption had no aesthetic motivation, and as Wareing emphasised, 
‘our plan is not primarily or even remotely concerned with the 
entertainment duty’.82 Furthermore, in practice the campaign to end the 
duty clashed with and damaged the League of Audiences.83 But as noted 
above, Wareing accepted the Old Vic and Sadler’s Wells decision as ‘a 
beginning. It is a Governmental recognition that their work is of public 
importance’.84 These Entertainments Duty decisions strengthened the 
view that arts subsidy was gaining support within the government.   
The other ground for optimism was the 1937 Physical Training 
and Recreation Act. This authorised, and quickly led to, major public 
funding of sports and recreational facilities. In the Act’s first six months, 
42 grants were made for capital projects including swimming pools and 
community centres, plus ‘a substantial sum… placed at the disposal of 
the National Playing Fields Association’.85 By November 1938 grants 
totalling around a million pounds had been made by central government 
to local authorities, with further grants to voluntary organisations.86  
In the Musical Times in early 1938 Wareing suggested that this 
demonstrated ‘the Government’s attention to other forms of 
entertainment and recreation’.87 He was not alone in seeing an analogy 
with funding for culture. Also in early 1938, J H Alden wrote in Music 
& Letters that ‘many people imagine the [League of Audiences’] 
proposals to be either too idealistic or to savour of undesirable 
Government control… but… the scheme bids fair to materialize sooner 
than the most hopeful at one time thought possible.… The Music and 
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Drama Bill [is]… complementary to the recent Physical Training and 
Recreation Act’.88 Alden reported that the initial capital to launch the 
scheme was £2.4 million and the annual grant £170,000, figures far 
larger than those envisaged under Wareing’s Bill. He suggested that the 
government’s having made ‘physical fitness… a subject for the law of 
the land… is evidence of an intention to go to the logical conclusion and 
to care also for the welfare of the nation’s mind’. Alden quoted 
‘Scrutator’, who in the Sunday Times in August 1937 had forcefully 
argued for a link between public funding of physical recreation and the 
implementation of Wareing’s proposals:  
We are organizing the gymnastic of our body with the assistance of the 
State… by the same reasoning we must organize ourselves in the pleasures of 
the arts…. As youth and strength must exercise itself… so audiences… must 
organize themselves into a League as Mr. Alfred Wareing exhorts us. The 
cult of beauty in mind and body must be part of our democratic economy. 
In early 1938 there seemed good grounds for believing that this vision 
could be realised. 
  
 
88 Music & Letters, Vol 19, No1 (January 1938), pp79-83, for all quotations in this paragraph, 
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Chapter 4 
 
The League of Audiences: (ii) Fear of the machine and 




The League of Audiences’ aims were simple – public subsidy for 
live drama and music, distributed by a body at arm’s length from the 
government. The underlying arguments were more complex. The League 
was a coalition of supporters and practitioners of theatre and live music. 
As Chapter 3 showed, this coalition was drawn from across the political 
spectrum. But there were broadly ideological beliefs uniting most of 
those in favour of subsidy, and similarly ideological beliefs uniting most 
of those opposed to it.  
For supporters, the unifying belief was that ‘mechanised 
entertainment’ – broadcasting, gramophone records and cinema – was 
harmful not only to theatre and live music but to society as a whole, in 
ways which went far beyond its economic impact. The first section of 
this chapter considers the origin, nature and extent of this view. The 
second section considers the involvement in the debate of the churches 
in general and the Church of England in particular.   
The belief shared, or at least expressed, by many of the League’s 
opponents was that government funding could harm artistic freedom, 
lead to state control of the arts and be misused by an authoritarian 
government. The final section of the chapter considers how strong, 
widespread, influential and sincerely held this view was. 
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The League and mechanised art: (i) ‘A sensation of impotence and 
dumb acquiescence’  
 
The fear of ‘mechanised art’ in the 1930s, a prominent feature of 
the decade’s cultural politics, has received little academic attention. It 
was a manifestation of the more general fear that men and women were 
becoming victims rather than masters of machines. This belief underlay, 
for instance, Charlie Chaplin’s 1936 film Modern Times. It can also be 
seen in a speech the same year to the British Drama League by Elsie 
Fogarty, founder of the Central School of Speech and Drama, against 
‘such a movement as tap dancing [which] submitted the whole body to 
the rhythm of a machine’.1 At its most practical, it was a fear that mass 
distribution of culture via film, recordings and radio would reduce 
demand for live performance and thus harm the music and theatre 
professions. Chapter 2 suggested that that fear was misplaced. This 
section considers the moral and political aspects of the 1930s fight 
against the mechanised arts. 
 
‘Condemned to death by being canned alive’: the scope of the issue  
The fight was fundamental to the philosophy of the League of 
Audiences from the start. Indeed, earlier still: a draft manifesto from 
early 1934, when its proposed name was ‘The Fellowship of British 
Audiences’, undertook that the Fellowship would provide ‘British 
Audiences with an articulate voice to express the claims of audiences to 
see and hear living performers actually present in person wherever this 
just right may be challenged by the mechanical’.2 And later the League 
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briefly experimented with the Latin motto ‘Homo Potior Machina’ 
(‘Man is Mightier than the Machine’).3  
The ‘challenge of the mechanical’ underlay press support of the 
Music and Drama Bill, but different newspapers perceived the challenge 
differently. An editorial in the Manchester Guardian argued that the 
growth of mechanical reproduction was self-defeating: ‘What material 
will there be for the machine to reproduce if creative effort dwindles? ... 
the decadence of creative work in two important arts makes the 
production of some such plan [as the Music and Drama Bill] one of 
considerable interest’.4 Others had more fundamental objections. The 
Birmingham Post was concerned ‘at the plight in which serious art finds 
itself owing to the mechanisation of public entertainment and, what is 
still worse, the appalling standardisation of this mechanical 
distribution’.5 The Post warned: ‘It will not be long before we shall… 
have lost all sense of the difference between celluloid or shellac and 
human flesh and blood, if something is not done to save actors and 
musicians from being, as it were, condemned to death by being canned 
alive. But the League of Audiences can do it…’.6 
The Daily Sketch took a line based partly on equity: the visual arts 
had long been funded by central and local government; the performing 
arts should receive similar treatment, and the threat of mechanised art 
had increased the need. As already noted, the Sketch was an early and 
consistent supporter of the League, perhaps surprising for a populist and 
politically Conservative newspaper.7 In February 1938, the Sketch’s 
commentator ‘Candidus’ was ‘pleased to see that Mr. Alfred Wareing’s  
 
3 Lambeth Palace archive: Lang Papers, L1-L17 1938, Vol 162 ( hereafter ‘Lang papers’), p324, 
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Music and Drama Bill continues to gain supporters, both in Parliament 
and in the country’.8 ‘Candidus’ supported the Bill because it was ‘no 
more than an accident of history that has given the pictorial arts a claim 
on the public purse which is denied to music and drama… [and because] 
the grievance of music and drama would not be so grievous but for the 
rise of wireless entertainment, …[which] enables the Government to say 
that its patronage of the arts is not confined to pictures’. Unusually, 
‘Candidus’ criticised unsubsidised live as well as broadcast art – and 
audiences: ‘The average commercial play is for people who have dined 
well and are having a night out. Audiences – whether in theatres or over 
the wireless – are becoming more and more passive: the practice of the 
arts of music and the drama is something that is switched on or plugged 
in’. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the fight against mechanised art was on 
occasion linked with that against physical passivity. The government’s 
funding of physical recreation was seen as a hopeful sign for music and 
drama. For some, the analogy went further. Thus ‘Scrutator’ wrote in the 
Sunday Times in 1937 that: 
 …there was danger that our democracy would become merely the passive 
recipients of manufactured pleasures, instead of being the artificers of their 
own joy. Sport was in danger of becoming something to read about or watch, 
not to engage in; music of being something you turned on with a handle 
instead of making; and the vast silent audiences of the cinema took in but 
never assisted at a performance.9 
The evidence presented in Chapter 210 suggested that this fear too – that 
broadcasting, for instance, threatened amateur music-making - was 
misplaced; but there is no reason to doubt that the fear was genuine. 
 
8 14/2/38, for all quotations in this paragraph  
9 Quoted in Music & Letters, Vol 19, No1, January 1938, pp79-83 
10 pp39-40 
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Along the same lines but more generally, writing in the Yorkshire 
Post in April 1936 Sir Gervais Rentoul, ex-MP, founding Chairman of 
the Conservative backbench 1922 Committee and a member of the 
League of Audiences’ Executive Committee, described ‘the new 
mechanisation’ as producing ‘a sensation of impotence and dumb 
acquiescence’.11  These words may have been written for Rentoul by 
Alfred Wareing: see below. The same month, the Glasgow Herald 
merely noted that ‘In another column today, Mr. Alfred Wareing, whose 
name and achievements will not be readily be forgotten by friends of the 
old Glasgow repertory theatre movement, discusses the function of the 
audience and the part it has to play in saving music and the drama from 
the evils inherent in mechanical reproduction’12 – the evils apparently 
being too obvious to require spelling out. By the late 1930s television 
was considered alongside cinema, radio and recording as a potential 
drug for its audiences. Writing to Wareing in July 1939 the Secretary of 
the Theatrical Management Association (not a supporter of the League)13 
agreed that ‘the whole question is one of man v machine, but we want 
man to control the machine, and not to become its slave as Television 
will make him if we are not careful’.14 (It is a picturesque detail that 
Alfred Wareing’s daughter, the actor Lesley Wareing, starred as Lydia 
Languish in a television production of Sheridan’s The Rivals broadcast 
in August 1938.)15      
The actor and theatrical manager Lena Ashwell presented this 
anti-mechanised art position in both a moderate and a stark form. 
Ashwell was famous for providing drama productions for troops at the 
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the war.16 Her memoir Myself a Player (1936)17 presented a common 
view of the theatre/cinema distinction: ‘…the theatre demands the co-
operation of the audience and establishes a living cord in which the 
audience give, as well as receive. The cinema is a picture, observed with 
interest, but necessarily the audience is merely the spectator…’.18  This 
was a common argument: that film, recordings and radio provided 
‘product’ to passive consumers while inherent in live theatre and music 
was collaboration between performers and audience – though the nature 
of the collaboration was rarely spelt out.  
Ashwell’s other position was more extreme, linking mechanised 
art explicitly with political dictatorship: ‘…no adverse force, whether the 
limitation of art…, the Entertainment Tax or the expense which excludes 
patrons, is half so disastrous to the drama as the influence of the 
machine’.19 After arguing that the microphone and movie camera had 
diminished the art of acting, she damned cinema with the very faintest 
praise as having ‘provided amusement as an alternative to drinking’.20 
Then she got into her stride. For her, the defining element of cinema was 
the producer/director:  
All the creative powers which spring up within the artist are inhibited by 
being directed, so all spontaneity and freedom of expression are reduced to 
efficiency…. It is an age of Producer-Directors: Stalin at Moscow, Mussolini 
in Rome, Hitler in Berlin, conducting a mass-mind and using such 
instruments as death or ruin as penalties for independent thought or 
independent action.21   
      
 
 
16 https://www.britannica.com/biography/Lena-Ashwell, retrieved 14/10/18. See also Chapter 9, 
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18 Ashwell, p265 
19 ibid, p257 
20 ibid, p258 
21 ibid, p259-60 
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‘Death to Hollywood’?  
While Ashwell was rare in drawing a direct parallel between 
cinema and totalitarian government, she was among many who disliked 
and distrusted the medium. Some attacked it in general; others focused 
on the influence of American popular culture via Hollywood in 
particular – a concern mainly associated with later decades, but one 
strongly present in the 1930s. Writing about the December 1936 House 
of Commons meeting of the League of Audiences, the Daily Express 
reported the comedian Gillie Potter telling the assembled MPs: ‘Simple 
people in the shires of England are addressing each other in the patois of 
the middle States of America. This [Music and Drama] Bill will help the 
British actor to counteract this effect on our people’.22 Similarly, in J B 
Priestley’s English Journey (1934), ‘...they [‘girls’ in Boston, 
Lincolnshire] are almost indistinguishable from girls in a dozen different 
capitals, for they all have the same models, from Hollywood’.23  
Hostility to Hollywood could take extreme forms. As was seen in 
Chapter 2, the playwright and Observer critic St John Ervine was among 
the extremists, inveighing against ‘pop-eyed illiterates… gaping at the 
Garbo!’.24 He was better disposed to other aspects of mechanised art (see 
below), but he loathed cinema unreservedly.25 He feared that theatre was 
losing out to cinema (‘Shall I ever forget my dismay when, on 
pilgrimage to Bergen to see the little theatre in which Ibsen learnt his 
craft, I found that it, too, had been given over to the pictures!’),26 and 
saw the struggle between theatre and cinema as surrogate for a greater 
battle: ‘The mechanisation of mankind is rapidly being accomplished. 
 
22 2/12/36 
23 London: William Heinemann/Victor Gollancz, 1934 (1937 cheap edition), pp366-7 
24 Ervine, p235 
25 See pp28-9 and 31 above 
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We have canned music and canned actors’.27 But his book The Theatre 
in My Time ended on a note of surprising, indeed inconsistent, optimism: 
‘…some cheerfully announce its [theatre’s] imminent demise. But it 
lives on, and presently, when adult minds prevail again, it will revive… 
Even in these days… a good play will outlast the most popular picture. 
Can creatures of celluloid prevail over living actors? Not in a world of 
living men and women!’.28 
Ervine was an early and strong supporter of the League of 
Audiences. In 1935 he wrote in The Observer,29 in a more pessimistic 
mood, that ‘we are in grave danger of rearing up a machine-maddened 
people who have lost their sight and their hearing and the use of their 
hands, and have no taste…. [This] is the problem which Mr. Alfred 
Wareing, this man whose faith moves mountains, is setting out to attack 
and solve’. Wareing himself suggested that ‘the mechanisation of 
amusement…produce[s] a feeling of impotence, a dumb acquiescence 
[the phrase used by Sir Gervase Rentoul in the Yorkshire Post article 
cited above]’.30 The Daily Telegraph’s report of the December 1936 
House of Commons meeting concurred. Two speakers had discussed 
‘…“ the devouring onrush of mechanical amusement.” The devourers, 
hardly named, but present in the minds of all, were, of course, the 
B.B.C., the H.M.V., but above all, the cinema’.31  
John Maynard Keynes made a direct, somewhat gratuitous, attack 
of this sort in his 1945 radio talk about the Arts Council, while extolling 
Englishness in art: ‘Let every part of Merry England be merry in its own 
way. Death to Hollywood.’.32 But there were always powerful voices 
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raised on the other side. The 1932 report The Film in National Life, 33 
produced by the Commission on Educational and Cultural Films and 
funded by the Carnegie UK Trust, provides a contrasting view of the 
theatre versus cinema debate soon after the arrival of the talkies. The 
Commission’s membership was large and varied, including academics, 
civil servants, county Directors of Education, St John Ervine and the 
editor of the BBC magazine The Listener,34 and it investigated 
extensively the educational and cultural value of film. The report’s 
major outcome was the creation in 1933 of the British Film Institute.35 In 
its opening pages the report made a pragmatic point equally applicable 
to any technological change: ‘It is as idle to rail at the machines, to talk 
of “mechanised culture” and “canned music,” as it would have been to 
ignore the invention of printing as a cultural influence’.36 And among its 
cultural observations was a suggestion that, by 1932, previously 
snobbish attitudes towards the cinema had relaxed: 
A fellow of an Oxford College no longer feels an embarrassed explanation to 
be necessary when he is recognised leaving a cinema. A growing number of 
cultivated and unaffected people enjoy going to the pictures, and frequent not 
merely the performances of intellectual film societies, but also the local 
picture house to see, for instance, Marlene Dietrich.37 
The novelist Graham Greene, film critic for The Spectator and 
Night and Day for much of the 1930s,38 went further in a 1937 essay. 
For him, film had gone beyond theatre in depicting ‘Life as it is and life 
as it ought to be… The stage of course has long ceased… [to do so] at 
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all. Mr St John Irvine [sic], Miss Dodie Smith, these are the popular 
playwrights of the moment: they have no sense of life as it is lived’.39     
Some supporters of the League of Audiences occupied the middle 
ground between these intensely pro- and anti-cinema positions. They 
argued that live and mechanised arts, particularly but not only film and 
theatre, were mutually dependent, that each strengthened the other, and 
that films, broadcasts and recordings both promoted and required a 
healthy tradition of live performance. Such views led the The Radio 
Times, published by the ‘mechanised’ BBC, to print articles supporting 
the League:  
It is only the most prejudiced and near-sighted person who can think there is 
any essential rivalry between, say, broadcasting and the theatre, or 
broadcasting and the concert hall....Broadcasting is not necessary to, but can 
help, the theatre; the theatre is necessary to, and can help, broadcast 
drama…a visible audience is an important factor in any healthy art….40   
And publicly declared donors to the League included not only the 
Governors of the Shakespeare Memorial Theatre and Rupert D’Oyly 
Carte (proprietor of the eponymous opera company, and thus keeper of 
the flame of Gilbert and Sullivan operettas), but also the film producer 
Alexander Korda.41   
Wareing himself never accepted that mechanised art could assist 
live performance, but suggested that there was a relationship of 
dependence in the other direction: 
This League… stands for Man versus Machinery. In all such contests hitherto 
man has lost, but if he wakes up and joins the League of Audiences he will 
not lose now; for… the machine needs man and cannot function without 
him…. Makers of mechanized amusement depend upon a constant flow of 
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creative artists…. So the big men in the mechanical amusement industry were 
among the first to come forward and aid this movement…42  
 
Opposition to ‘mechanised music’  
In assessing the health of live classical music in the 1930s, 
Chapter 2 considered the role of the BBC, the dominant force in 
classical music in Britain, and the views of some of its supporters and 
opponents.43 Sir Thomas Beecham’s extreme anti-BBC position was 
noted, alongside the equally strong pro-BBC views of the composer 
Arthur Bliss and of Mary Glasgow, who from 1940 was the executive 
head of, successively, CEMA and the Arts Council.  
In general the BBC was less subject than the film industry to 
hostility by supporters of subsidy. The League of Audiences was mainly 
concerned with drama, so its usual target was films rather than broadcast 
music. And by contrast with the views about cinema of those in the 
theatre world, generally negative and rarely warmer than neutral, 
commentators such as Bliss and Glasgow acknowledged that broadcast 
music positively encouraged both amateur music-making and attendance 
at live music. Even some of League’s fundamentalist cinema haters were 
relatively well disposed to the BBC and gramophone. St John Ervine 
was almost gushing: ‘Mechanisation has undeniably achieved great 
results and done great good. The labourer in a remote hamlet, who had 
no expectation of ever hearing Beethoven’s Symphony No 7… now 
hears… [it] as easily as if he were an habitué of the Queen’s or the 
Albert Hall. The world has been widened for millions of men and 
women by the B.B.C.’.44 Other supporters of the League expressed 
similar views. J B Priestley wrote in 1937 of broadcasts and recordings: 
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‘…now I make my own programmes at home, and though the 
performances are not quite so vivid and exciting, I can choose them 
myself, and they are free from that prima donna silliness… which still 
runs riot in big concert halls’.45 He painted a fairly accurate view of a 
future which may have appeared dystopian to opponents of mechanised 
music: ‘What we need now is a tiny portable instrument, to which one 
listens through earphones, so that it does not disturb anybody else, and 
whole symphonies and concertos and operas recorded on miniature rolls 
of film so that they could easily be carried about with us. Then we could 
lie in our bed at sea or in the desert, and still have our music.’46  
Nonetheless broadcast music was by no means exempt from the 
sort of attacks which the League mounted against cinema. Most such 
attacks originated within the musical world. Sir Thomas Beecham’s 
diatribe against the BBC’s ‘monstrous monopoly of the air’ is one 
example.47 The composer, conductor and critic Constant Lambert 
provides another, rather more interesting. At 21 Lambert had composed 
a ballet score for Diaghilev’s Ballets Russes,48 and he was still in his 
twenties when, in 1934, his book Music Ho! was published.49 It 
remained influential for many years – a reviewer commented on a 1960s 
reprint that ‘There can be no disputing the fact that Music Ho! ‘has 
achieved the status of a classic’, as the publisher’s blurb goes’.50  Music 
Ho!, subtitled ‘A Study of Music in Decline’, was primarily an attack on 
trends in modern music; but Lambert devoted several chapters to what 
he called ‘The Mechanical Stimulus’.51 
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Lambert’s argument was that ‘Since the advent of the 
gramophone, and more particularly the wireless, music of a sort is 
everywhere and at every time; in the heavens, the lower parts of the 
earth, the mountains, the forest and every tree therein. It is a Psalmist’s 
nightmare’.52 Lambert’s was a subtler and less elitist version of the 
‘more means worse’ argument of T S Eliot in his post-war Notes 
Towards the Definition of Culture (see below). For Lambert, the wider 
availability of music, primarily due to the radio, meant a dilution of the 
intensity of musical experience. He saw this happening both in people’s 
homes (‘the more people use the wireless, the less they listen to it’)53 and 
in public. As to the latter, he wrote: 
In the neighbourhood where I live… there is a loudspeaker every hundred 
yards or so, and it is only rarely that they are tuned in to different stations… 
It would not matter so much were the music bad music but, as the B.B.C. can 
boast with some satisfaction, most of it is good. We board buses to the strains 
of Beethoven and drink our beer to the accompaniment of Bach.54 
…which may have been an exaggeration to bolster and dramatise the 
argument.   
Lambert objected on grounds of monotony and unsuitability, 
novel arguments in 1934. He also argued that the BBC exercised undue 
influence on the creation of popular artistic taste – that ‘the whole of 
London… is made to listen to the choice of a privileged few, or even a 
privileged one’.55 The ‘privileged one’ was Christopher Stone, ‘whose 
well-modulated voice has doubtless given pleasure to millions’.56 Stone 
was (according to Asa Briggs) ‘the first of the British ‘disc jockeys’ and 
thereby ‘founder of a very exclusive profession’’.57 Lambert noted that 
 
52 ibid, p233 
53 ibid 
54 ibid, pp234-35 
55 ibid, p235 
56 ibid 
57 Briggs, p77, quoting from an interview with Christopher Stone from 1952. 
  75 
‘at certain hours of the day it is impossible for anyone to escape from his 
breezy diffidence. That he is a benevolent autocrat I am sure is true…. 
But the fact remains that he enjoys a position of dictatorship as fantastic 
as anything in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World’.58    
Lambert reiterated his concern at the high quality of the music 
now so widely available: ‘we are fast losing even the minor stimulus of 
genuine healthy vulgarity. In the present age it is impossible to escape 
from Culture’.59 He feared that this would ‘eventually produce in us, 
when we hear a Bach concerto, the faint nausea felt towards a piece of 
toffee by a worker in a sweet factory’. Lambert considered the situation 
‘even more trying for the musical than for the non-musical’. Such views 
were ahead of their time. Even thirty years later, in 1964, Benjamin 
Britten attracted controversy for saying something similar: 
[Music] can be audible in any corner of the globe, at any hour of the day or 
night, through a loudspeaker, without any question of suitability or 
comprehensibility…. If I say the loudspeaker is the principal enemy of 
music, I don’t mean that I am not grateful to it as a means of education…. 
But it is not part of true musical experience…. Music demands more from a 
listener than simply the possession of a tape machine or a transistor radio.60  
Britten later suggested that ‘I may have slightly overstated the case’.61  
 
The League and mechanised art: (ii) The involvement of the 
Churches 
      
Lambert’s and Britten’s objections to ‘mechanised music’, stated 
a generation apart, were primarily cultural: both were concerned about 
its effects on music and listeners rather than on society as a whole 
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(despite Lambert’s reference to Huxley’s Brave New World, published 
only two years before Music Ho!). But as discussed above the issue of 
live versus mechanised art was also seen as a battle to preserve values 
believed threatened by an increasingly regimented and uniform way of 
life. It is in this context that the Catholic and Anglican press, and 
Anglican Church leaders, became involved. As early as May 1935, 
Christian World reported on the League of Audiences’ ‘campaign to 
save music and drama in this country from the curse of too much 
mechanization… The League’s proposals seem to have a real social 
importance’.62 The following month, the Catholic Herald gave 
substantial coverage to what it called ‘A Society for the Protection of 
“Personal” Arts’.63 Under the subheading ‘Danger of Mechanism’, the 
Herald argued the case for government support, and cited a precedent: 
‘Everyone will remember that the B.B.C. came to the aid of the 
promenade concerts at Queen’s Hall a few years ago, for even they were 
in financial difficulties’.64 This was a rare acknowledgement that the 
BBC was itself a major public funder of the arts.  
The involvement in the League of senior members of the Church 
of England, led by William Temple, Archbishop of York, particularly 
caught the attention of the religious press. From the League’s earliest 
days, Temple headed the names on the League’s General Council65 and 
was one of its Vice-Presidents.66 Temple, who was to succeed Cosmo 
Lang as Archbishop of Canterbury in 1942, had long been active in 
social and political causes (he had been a member of the Labour Party 
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In June 1937 he planned to address the Church Assembly in favour of a 
motion supporting the League.68 For reasons not easy to discern the 
debate did not take place, but in early 1938 Temple revived the motion 
and wrote an article for the Daily Telegraph promoting the League and 
the Music and Drama Bill.69 It took up most of a page, with the headline 
‘Mass-produced Entertainment Is Not Enough – How the Nation Must 
Support Human Elements’. Under the subheading ‘Peril to Whole 
Spiritual Life’, Temple wrote that the Bill ‘should be able to claim the 
support of all who appreciate the deep unity of a people’s culture and 
spiritual life… We do well to welcome the wireless and the film; we 
shall do ill if we allow them to obliterate the creative work of musical 
and dramatic artists in living touch with the audiences which they bring 
together’. The Quiver magazine noted: ‘…it testifies to the change in 
public opinion that a leading dignitary of the Church should be pleading 
for the better recognition of drama. May we not… say that the effort of 
the Archbishop … is but a sign of the very healthy reaction from the 
mass-production which is threatening all of us?’.70     
In a story headed ‘Archbishops Disagree About State Subsidy’, 
the Manchester Guardian reported on Temple’s motion for the Church 
Assembly.71 The motion urged the government to ‘recognise’ music and 
drama as it did libraries, museums and galleries, and pledged the Church 
Assembly’s support for the principles of the Music and Drama Bill. It 
suggested that live performance created a greater sense of community 
than broadcasts or films ever could; that a reduction in professional live 
performances harmed amateur music and drama; and that ‘there would 
be a danger for the film industry itself if there should be no adequate 
supply of actors trained in direct intercourse with an audience’. The 
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Guardian reported that Cosmo Lang opposed the motion on the grounds 
that ‘the Assembly was not sufficiently informed about the proposed bill 
to justify passing the motion… [and] libraries and museums were public 
institutions different from private enterprises like theatres’.72  
The Church Times devoted an equivocal editorial to this 
disagreement.73 On the one hand, ‘Gramophone, film and radio have 
brought entertainment in abundance… there has probably been a 
valuable gain in aesthetic appreciation, and a considerable advance in 
musical education’. On the other, ‘amateur music-making and drama 
could not be expected to thrive against the competition of the singing 
and playing of the most gifted artists of the day broadcast into every 
home’. Furthermore, the price of mechanised art was that ‘thousands of 
actors, actresses, musicians and variety artists have been put out of 
employment… [and] it has induced a passivity unknown at any former 
age’. Chapter 2 above cast strong doubt on the former assertion; and it is 
not clear how the latter squared with the alleged gain in aesthetic 
appreciation. But despite its concerns about mechanised art the Church 
Times thought the cure proposed in the Music and Drama Bill more 
dangerous than the illness: it ‘seems to us to smack ominously of Fascist 
methods… once let Commissioners… have a footing in the theatre, and 
much of that spontaneity and creativeness that the Archbishop [of York] 
desires to foster will be destroyed’ – a concern explored in the next 
section of this chapter.  
The Catholic Herald reported on the Archbishops’ disagreement 
and the Church Times’ ‘Fascist’ gibe: ‘What, then, is one to make of the 
opposition of the Archbishop of Canterbury on the feeble pretext that the 
Church Assembly did not know enough about the Bill (its provisions 
have been before the Assembly for three sessions)? What is one to say of 
 
72 It is not clear whether this was a quotation from Lang or a paraphrase. 
73 11/2/38, for all quotations in this paragraph 
  79 
the Church Times’ suggestion that parts of the Bill smack of Fascism 
(not Socialism, mind you)?’74 The Herald left these questions hanging. 
But less than three months later the disagreement seemed resolved: on 5 
May 1938 Cosmo Lang presided at a meeting at Toynbee Hall to 
promote the Music and Drama Bill.75  
A likely cause of his change of heart was a typically direct letter 
(using equally typical moral blackmail) from Alfred Wareing.76 This 
claimed that ‘your [Lang’s] statement “that the Church Assembly was 
not sufficiently informed about the proposed Bill to justify a Motion” is 
unfair to the League and to me personally… such damage as this 
statement has already done should be repaired as soon as possible’.77 
Lang’s Chaplain, noting that Wareing seemed ‘much distressed’ by 
Lang’s words asked the Secretary of the Church Assembly whether the 
motion might be reinstated.78 The reply was discouraging: ‘…it is 
obviously not [a subject] in which the Assembly as such is particularly 
interested’.79 But the campaign for Lang’s support spread.  
First, Lang’s Chaplain and William Temple agreed between them 
that a new Church Assembly motion supporting the Bill should be 
tabled.80 Second, Lord Rathcreedan (from whom no other record 
survives of interest in the League) requested that Lang support a motion 
in favour of the Bill in a possible House of Lords debate.81 Lang’s 
Chaplain replied that Lang could not propose the motion, but ‘is 
genuinely interested in the subject and is anxious to do what he can to 
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help’.82 And third, George Gordon, Vice-Chancellor of Oxford 
University and Lord Bessborough’s successor as President of the League 
of Audiences, wrote asking Lang to help the League in any way he 
could.83 The League was apparently on Lang’s mind: replying to Gordon 
he reported that he had ‘had a long talk with [James] Mallon of Toynbee 
Hall today on the subject of the League of Audiences and the proposed 
Bill…. [because] it is always awkward if one introduces a subject 
without having considered all possible objections to it’.84  The outcome 
was Lang’s decision to chair the Toynbee Hall meeting.85 
Preparing for the meeting, Lang again consulted Mallon. Mallon’s 
reply (describing Wareing as a ‘simple and loveable man’) was quoted 
in Chapter 3.86 Mallon also undertook to consult ‘the Treasury official 
who advised on the form of the [Music and Drama] Bill… [and who] 
thought that the Forestry Commission was closely analogous’.87 Lang’s 
papers contain no results from this consultation. In addition, Alfred 
Wareing met and provided written briefing for Lang.88   
An invited audience of around a hundred, including five MPs, 
attended the Toynbee Hall meeting.89 Among the speakers was the critic 
James Agate, who, according to Wareing’s disciple Winifred Isaac, 
‘gave a glowing account of what the Works Progress Administration was 
doing to help music and the stage in the United States’.90 Agate himself 
recorded in his diary: ‘The important points are how much the people 
can afford… what balance of loss that must leave, and whether the 
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government can afford to make up that loss. The vital thing in this 
question is not eloquence but data’.91    
John Christie of Glyndebourne, whose relationship with the 
League is discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, also spoke. Isaac suggested that 
he did not much advance the League’s cause: ‘Mr Christie obviously 
favoured a more selective encouragement…. [He] asserted that there was 
no demand for what was good; there was only a demand for what people 
were accustomed to see, which in these days was films’.92 Cosmo Lang 
himself recorded: ‘I expressed my general sympathy with the objects of 
the League and the meeting. But I was careful to point out that I could 
not be expected to approve of all the content of the Music and Drama 
Bill’.93 The Times’ report of the meeting94 was less nuanced: Lang had 
noted that ‘the first difficulty was the increasing mechanization of both 
music and drama’; had suggested that ‘there was precedent [for state 
subsidy of music and drama] in the museums, libraries and picture 
galleries’; and had ‘express[ed] his cordial sympathy with the [Bill’s] 
general principle’. 
Thus by May 1938 the Archbishops of Canterbury and York 
appeared to be on the same side as the Catholic Herald. The aim of the 
Music and Drama Bill, according to the Herald, was to persuade the 
government to recognise that live music and drama had to be protected 
‘in an age when both are rapidly succumbing to mechanisation… by 
means which enable the public to be a purely passive recipient needing 
only to press a button to be doped by entertainment....As the age of 
leisure develops, so will the evil of mechanised entertainment’.95 
 
91 https://archive.org/stream/in.ernet.dli.2015.173789/2015.173789.E-G-O-3_djvu.txt , retrieved 
26/12/17 – Agate’s diary entry for 5/5/38 
92 Isaac, p126 
93 Lang papers, p354 
94 6/5/38 
95 18/2/38 
  82 
These images are closer to Huxley’s Brave New World than was 
Constant Lambert’s description of the ‘position of dictatorship’ enjoyed 
by a BBC presenter. 
 
‘Under the shadow of a new State obligation’: opposition to the 
League of Audiences 
 
The League of Audiences argued that without government subsidy 
of live performance, the public would respond with ‘dumb 
acquiescence… [to] the devouring onrush of mechanised amusement’. 
At the same time an opposing argument used similarly loaded imagery 
to reach a very different conclusion: that subsidy itself would cause 
artists and public to respond with dumb acquiescence to an over-
powerful government. As discussed in Chapter 1,96 to bolster their case 
that the concept of arts subsidy was either disregarded or treated with 
hostility in the 1930s, writers such as Andrew Sinclair and Jorn 
Weingartner have focused on the latter argument alone, wrongly 
suggesting that no other was current at the time. But while they have 
overemphasised the argument, it does have its place.      
Sir Thomas Beecham presented the argument in characteristically 
niche form. Beecham – a large, unpredictable and often mistrusted force 
in the arts at the time – was an equivocal supporter of the Music and 
Drama Bill. Writing to Alfred Wareing in March 1937, he expressed 
general agreement, but was concerned that ‘out of eight Commissioners 
to be appointed [under the Bill], only two are required to have any 
special knowledge and experience of the subject’.97 He feared that the 
Commission would be a body ‘selected upon the plausible principle that, 
knowing nothing whatever about the subject it has to administer or deal 
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with, it is thereby enabled to preserve an open mind about it. My 
experience is that in all artistic matters, an open mind is the same as a 
vacant one’. Beecham continued: ‘I am from beginning to end against 
the inclusion among the Board of  Commissioners of political “duds” 
and departmental “washouts”, and any attempt to provide… places for 
the more conspicuous failures in our political world will meet with the 
most strenuous opposition… from one representative at least of the 
musical profession’. 
Other commentators presented more ‘classic’ statements of the 
view that subsidy in general, or the Music and Drama Bill in particular, 
would open the way to state control of the arts. It is worth considering 
three of them – one from the political left, one from the right and one 
probably motivated largely by self-interest. 
 The last of these was expressed by the British Drama League 
(BDL) in private correspondence and in the pages of its magazine 
Drama. The BDL was an important organisation in the theatrical world, 
its Director, Geoffrey Whitworth, skilled at forming alliances and 
securing influential backers. But its argument against the Bill had an 
ulterior motive. It was part of Whitworth’s larger campaign against the 
League of Audiences (see Chapter 5) and against Entertainments Duty 
(see Chapter 9). The issue emerged first in a letter from Whitworth to 
Wareing of March 1937,98 a solemn counterpart to Beecham’s more 
cavalier correspondence.  
Whitworth paid glowing tribute to Wareing (‘You have yourself 
worked so long and so nobly for the Theatre’), as prelude to criticising 
the Bill. While ‘it would be fantastic to assume that you would willingly 
associate yourself with any movement which might have an opposite 
result to that which you and we desire’, Whitworth felt that Wareing had 
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not properly considered the arguments against the Bill. Among these 
was one about state control. Whitworth claimed to support ‘simple’ 
subsidy. His work with the Carnegie UK Trust had convinced him of its 
value, and ‘An extension of that policy, under the permanent control of 
the State, could do an immense amount to preserve the living Art of the 
Theatre’. But for Whitworth, the Bill went damagingly far beyond this, 
giving the Commissioners power ‘to engage in theatrical management 
on their own account… which might easily end in control of the entire 
entertainment industry by the State’. Whitworth’s argument then took a 
surprising turn: he suggested that Wareing was ‘presenting the 
Government of the day with a weapon they could use… with a 
universality scarcely second to that of the British Broadcasting 
Corporation itself’. So according to Whitworth, while there were deep 
objections of principle to the Bill, the BBC already embodied these 
objections in a more extreme form.           
This illogicality is just one reason why one might doubt 
Whitworth’s sincerity. Another was the BDL’s role and position. It 
represented a wide range of interests, including those of commercial 
theatre managers. Whitworth’s letter included the comment that 
‘Interference with private enterprise should surely be forbidden’ (his 
emphasis), suggesting that his concern was with political influence in the 
business side of theatre at least as much as with state control of content. 
Furthermore, elsewhere99 he repeatedly argued that abolishing 
Entertainments Duty on live performances, sought particularly by the 
commercial theatre sector, was a higher priority than subsidy, and indeed 
that the campaign for subsidy might be a damaging diversion from this. 
Finally, Whitworth’s letter reported that ‘…having had opportunities for 
first-hand study of the Theatre both in Soviet Russia and in Germany, I 
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have come to the conclusion that although State control has undoubtedly 
given opportunities for theatrical production on a scale unknown in non-
totalitarian States, the result has been unfavourable to dramatic 
expression’.  Given this tame criticism of cultural practice in totalitarian 
states, it is hard to take at face value Whitworth’s apparently intense 
opposition to the modest and arm’s length state involvement envisaged 
in the Music and Drama Bill.     
That was a private communication. Whitworth and the BDL also 
dealt with the issues in the magazine Drama, which Whitworth edited. 
In 1937 and 1938, Drama reported several times on state arts funding 
abroad. It gave positive coverage to the US Federal Theatre Project, part 
of President Roosevelt’s Works Progress Administration and a 
programme far larger, and more directly under government control, than 
anything envisaged by the League of Audiences. In July 1937, Drama 
printed a long, eulogistic article about ‘the true National Theatre of 
America’ which was ‘springing into being with all the vigour of a 
giant’.100 The writer was optimistic that if current progress was 
maintained, ‘the W.P.A. Theatre… will undoubtedly prove the most 
impressive theatre in the world’. He  noted that since it ‘originally came 
into being to deal with the problem of the many players who were 
literally starving due to the depression… the trend of the theatre is 
definitely and understandably “left”’. Yet in three highly positive pages 
there was just one reference to the danger that ‘being Government 
controlled it can be used as a powerful political weapon, a fact which the 
Anti-Roosevelt group are not slow to point out’ – but a fact which did 
not otherwise appear to trouble the writer.   
There was a further article on the Federal Theatre Project, by its 
Director, Hallie Flanagan, in November 1938. This made no reference to 
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the danger of government control; indeed, there was little mention of the 
Project’s politics beyond Flanagan’s opening claim that ‘Government 
support of the theatre brings the United States into the best historic 
theatre tradition’.101 The accompanying editorial was equally silent on 
the issue, noting merely that ‘we are pleased to be able to print an 
authoritative account’ of the Project.102  
More startling was an article in the January 1937 issue, ‘The 
Theatre in Berlin’.103 This contained no hint of concern about state 
control. Instead it reported: ‘Last season the National-Socialist 
Government subsidised the German theatre to the extent of thirty-six 
million marks. Out of the twenty-three important theatres in Berlin, 
thirteen are still privately owned, five are under the direction of General 
Goering; while another five are protected by Dr. Goebbels’. The author 
went on to note that ‘National Socialism’s main contribution to drama 
has been the construction of a number of open-air theatres which have 
been built with the help of the compulsory Labour Service’.   
Given the extraordinary tone of this article, the absence of articles 
in Drama expressing critical views of theatre in Nazi Germany, and 
Drama’s dismissal of the political dangers of the Federal Theatre 
Project, Whitworth’s claim that the Music and Drama Bill would 
damage artistic freedom appears at best disingenuous.  
Nonetheless the BDL was slow to adopt a formal position on the 
Bill.  Drama gave Alfred Wareing space in its November 1937 issue to 
write about it.104 He began with a question based on a doubtful premise: 
‘Does it make you uncomfortable to know that… ours is now the only 
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Government in the whole world which does nothing for Drama?’. He 
attempted to deal with the concern that government funding might lead 
to government control by distinguishing between direct funding by a 
Ministry of Fine Arts (‘people… know about the evils which lurk in 
these Ministries’) and the Bill’s proposal to establish a Commission at 
one remove from the government. Wareing’s belief that direct 
government funding would threaten freedom of expression seems to 
have been sincere. A copy of the Bill in the Lambeth Palace archive 
contains his manuscript note: ‘It is the general opinion that a Ministry of 
Fine Arts would establish a Dictatorship, would become a hot-bed of 
intrigue, and a dangerous instrument of propaganda’.105  
Wareing’s distinction between direct and arm’s length funding 
failed to reassure the BDL. In April 1938 an article in Drama 
announced: ‘The time has come when it seems only right that readers of 
“Drama” should be informed of the official attitude of the Drama 
League to the League of Audiences and to the Music and Drama Bill’.106 
The attitude was not positive. The article paid tribute to Wareing’s 
‘indominatable [sic] courage’ and noted that he had gone ‘further than 
any of his predecessors in obtaining State aid for the theatre’. But while 
conceding (unlike Whitworth, writing to Wareing a year earlier) that ‘the 
Bill itself is… contrived on a sound principle’, it concluded ‘with the 
utmost regret’ that the BDL could not fully endorse it. It put forward two 
main reasons. The first, that the campaign to end Entertainments Duty 
on live performances should take precedence over the campaign for 
subsidy, is discussed later.107 The other was that ‘A Government of 
propagandist tendency might easily, through subservient 
Commissioners, gain ideological control of the theatres benefiting by 
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their grants… A National Theatre is one thing. The nationalisation of the 
theatre another. It seems to us that the objection has only to be stated to 
become conclusive’.  
Given the approving articles in Drama about state-funded theatre 
in the USA and even Nazi Germany, it is difficult to take this statement 
at face value.  
There were others whose opposition to state subsidy on such 
grounds was more clearly sincere. One was the playwright Benn Levy, 
whose early views on talking pictures were quoted in Chapter 2.108 Levy 
became an MP, on the left of the Labour Party, in the Attlee 
administration, and – surprisingly, given his pre-war views – a member 
of the Arts Council and of its Executive Committee from 1953 to 
1961.109 Levy had been at the House of Commons meeting of February 
1938, discussed in Chapter 3,110 and wrote to Wareing about the Music 
and Drama Bill a few weeks later.111 For Levy, ‘this question of 
freedom, especially in these times, is of over-riding importance, and I 
hoped to persuade you [that]… you and your enthusiasm would serve 
the theatre much better by pressing for its emancipation from its present 
control instead of putting it under the shadow of a new State obligation’. 
He suggested that if Wareing ‘should still believe that money is more 
important to the theatre than freedom… abolishing the Entertainment 
Tax… is obviously a far better form of subsidy in that it admits of… no 
possibility of even indirect State interference’. He concluded: ‘… much 
as I hate to be, I am definitely against you, and with the friendliest 
goodwill in the world I shall do my best either to oppose your plan or, 
better still, convert you to mine’. 
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Levy next went public, in the Society of Authors’ journal The 
Author.112 He insisted that he had no wish ‘to start a dog fight with the 
League of Audiences, which happens to be that rare occurrence in the 
world of the theatre, a body forceful, well-organized and effectual’. 
Instead, he hoped to persuade it ‘to reconsider the highly debatable 
means by which it proposes to seek an objective that is not debatable at 
all’. He argued for remission of Entertainments Duty in almost identical 
terms to those in his letter to Wareing. But direct state subsidy was very 
different: ‘…if we are to pipe for State payment, we will probably be 
expected… to pipe a State tune’. The Bill would mean ‘that playwrights 
and managers would then have to steer a course so circumspect as to 
avoid offending not only the Censor’s undefined susceptibilities, as at 
present, but also the undefined susceptibilities of any [person or 
group]… powerful enough to make things difficult for the unfortunate  
Commission administering the Government subsidy’. There were several 
pages more in this vein. Levy was repelled by ‘this proposed additional 
premium on mediocrity’: 
…now especially, when freedom everywhere is on the retreat… when 
hundreds of thousands of children are being trained… to grow up with the 
mentality of fighters, haters, bullies and slaves… a passionate holding fast to 
the idea of England as a rallying point for the free… even in what may seem 
such secondary branches of the national life as its theatre, is the purest… 
form that patriotism can take. 
Levy continued his campaign in the pages of the film and theatre 
magazine The Era. Interviewed ‘about some strong criticism of the 
League of Audiences which he expresses in the current issue of “The 
Author”’, Levy said: ‘What the theatre needs is freedom, not cash’.113 
Levy presumed that the production plans of theatres seeking help would 
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be presented to the Commissioners: ‘Then the fun would begin. One 
member would think a play a bit too Left, another that one was rather 
too violent, or too Right, or likely to offend the Church’. Levy 
considered that the League’s ‘objective is sound and its motives pure. 
But it is trying to help the theatre in an entirely wrong-headed way’.  
The following week, The Era interviewed Alfred Wareing.114 
With uncharacteristic asperity Wareing attacked Levy for his lack of 
positive ideas without dealing directly with Levy’s concerns: ‘What is 
biting Benn Levy?... He is… unhappy about the current state of the 
theatre… He thinks something should be done about it. But though he 
presents not even the foggiest notion of what or how, he attacks the 
movement which aims to put things right’. The disagreement continued 
in the following issue. In a letter to The Era, Levy summarised his case 
(that public subsidy would put theatre under an obligation to the state; 
that the profession should campaign against censorship, not for 
additional state control; and that if money was crucial, remission of 
Entertainments Duty was the better approach), and attacked Wareing’s 
method of discussion: ‘…it is a time-honoured resort in debating 
societies to ignore your opponent’s arguments and to attack him for a 
case that he never advanced’.115  Levy returned to the subject once more, 
in The Era in October 1938, replying to an article criticising the failure 
of the theatrical profession to get behind the League of Audiences. He 
opposed subsidy, he said, because ‘the only theatre guaranteed to 
stimulate no opposition anywhere is a dead theatre’.116 And there Levy’s 
statements on this issue rested – until, in 1953, he became a member of 
the Arts Council.   
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Fear of ‘mechanised art’ was expressed by people from a wide 
variety of political backgrounds; so was fear of state control. T S Eliot 
was a far more conservative opponent of state funding than Benn Levy. 
Eliot was one of the five members of the ‘cultural elites’ on whom Jorn 
Weingartner based his argument in The Arts as a Weapon of War that 
fear of state control of the arts caused intellectual opinion in the 1930s to 
be generally hostile to state subsidy.117 In his use of Eliot, Weingartner 
failed in three respects. First, he cited only Eliot’s Notes Towards the 
Definition of Culture, 118 published in 1948, nearly ten years after the 
period under discussion. Second, the book’s main argument about state 
funding was that it would lead not to undue state influence in the arts but 
to an increase in production. For Eliot more meant worse: ‘to aim to 
make everyone share in the fruits…of culture…is to adulterate and 
cheapen what you give’; ‘[it is an] essential condition of the preservation 
of the quality of the culture of the minority, that it should continue to be 
a minority culture’; and ‘in our headlong rush to educate everybody, we 
are lowering the standards’.119 This has nothing to do with artistic 
freedom.    
Third, Weingartner failed to cite an essay by Eliot which not only 
supported his case but was published before the war.120 In his quarterly 
magazine The Criterion, Eliot considered at length the campaign of the 
League of Audiences, ‘an organization from which in the past I have 
received leaflets which I fear I have treated with inadequate attention’. 
He had been alerted to it by the Church Times’ editorial of February 
1938, discussed above: ‘…the Editor of the Church Times… devotes a 
leading article in his issue of 11th February to arousing dubiety in the 
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minds of his readers on the subject of the Music and Drama Bill… I am 
happy to be at one with the Editor of the Church Times in this matter’. 
He also relied on The Times’ report of the League’s House of Commons 
meeting of February 1938, discussed in Chapter 3.121  
Eliot recalled that in the previous issue of The Criterion he 
had ‘suggested the possibility that the creation of a National Theatre was 
a step which might lead to the eventual creation of a Ministry of Fine 
Arts’. He now suggested that, even if it was not Wareing’s intention, it 
was possible ‘once the Government takes an active and overt part in the 
cultivation of the Arts, such confusion will ensue that in time there will 
be a call for a ‘dictator of the Arts’ (will it by that time be Mr. Hore-
Belisha or Mr. Duff-Cooper?) to put things to rights’. In his view, more 
thought had gone into how to establish a Commission to spend money 
on the arts than into ‘the problem of how to spend the money. It is a pity 
that action should take precedence over thought…. the more the State 
takes over, the less will be the private initiative’. He concluded by 
suggesting that the state might simply treat the arts as another branch of 
public administration. Rather obscurely, Eliot cited a proposal by the 
writer G D H Cole that a National Investment Board be created. He 
adapted Cole’s description in order to suggest how the Music and Drama 
Bill would operate: 
…socially undesirable forms of music or drama (…according to the opinion 
of the eight Commissioners appointed by the Crown – i.e. nominally by the 
Prime Minister but actually by civil servants whom no-one will ever be able 
to trace) could be prevented from crowding more useful music and drama out 
of the market. …the State can begin to guide music and drama into the right 
channels… What should be produced in the way of music and drama depends 
on what the people is [sic] willing to have imposed on it….  
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Alfred Wareing may not have taken Levy’s and Eliot’s views 
seriously enough. But he sincerely opposed the establishment of an Arts 
Ministry and proposed the appointment of independent Commissioners 
as a safeguard. This was in essence the model adopted by the 
government when it set up CEMA and subsequently the Arts Council. 
Even in the1930s the League was not alone in distinguishing between 
direct government funding and funding at one remove. As noted in 
Chapter 3,122 the Birmingham Post, for example, made this distinction 
the subject of an editorial in June 1937.123 Direct subsidy would be 
‘entirely antagonistic to democratic rule’, and a government ‘that runs, 
let us say, a group of national opera-houses… can only be… despotic in 
its executive practice’. But with a semi-independent Commission, while 
there would have to be ‘constant critical vigilance on the part of the 
public and the Press… its control… will not be insuperably difficult’.  
There were probably two reasons why Wareing paid relatively 
little attention to arguments about the dangers of state control. First, 
pragmatically, the performing arts needed money, and the government 
was the only likely source. Second, the Eliot/Levy arguments were 
generally less important than those to the effect that the performing arts 
were simply a low priority for public funding. 
 Jorn Weingartner argued, from a small and unrepresentative 
sample of evidence and without mentioning the existence of the League 
of Audiences, that the predominant attitude towards subsidy among the 
‘cultural elites’ before the war was opposition, due to fear that ‘the state 
will take over everything’.124 Typically for Weingartner, this quotation, 
from Cyril Connolly, is from a 1940s, not a pre-war, essay. This attitude 
was not widespread, and few expressed it with the force of Benn Levy or 
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T S Eliot. Furthermore, as suggested above in discussing Geoffrey 
Whitworth and the BDL, in some cases apparent anxiety that the Music 
and Drama Bill would usher in an era of state control may have masked 




The view that public subsidy was necessary to combat the menace 
of mechanised art was expressed far more widely in the 1930s than the 
view that subsidy should be opposed because it would limit artistic 
freedom.  
As Geoffrey Whitworth (perhaps unwittingly) conceded in his 
letter to Wareing of March 1937, and as Constant Lambert argued in 
Music Ho! in 1934, the BBC already offered the government a means of 
exerting, if it chose, a strong and direct influence on cultural life in 
Britain. If Whitworth was genuinely concerned about the dangers of 
state control of the arts, and was unpersuaded by Wareing’s argument 
that subsidy provided at arm’s length from government would protect 
against this, he should have been more concerned about the greater 
danger embodied in the BBC. Some others did have such concerns. 
‘Scrutator’, in the Sunday Times, expressed them starkly: ‘For the first 
time, the State set up in the business of entertainment… It made a 
monopoly of arts and pleasures… it risked creating a tyranny all the 
more monstrous and dangerous because it was exercised over men’s 
minds’.125 The BBC, the arm’s length monopoly state broadcaster of 
news and light entertainment as well as of ‘high culture’, had the 
potential to be a far more powerful weapon in the hands of a determined 
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and malevolent government than the modest arm’s length funding 
organisation envisaged in the Music and Drama Bill.  
The next chapter discusses the decline and fall of the League of 
Audiences. Fear of mechanised art helps explain both the League’s rise 
and support for public subsidy generally in the 1930s.  The fear that state 
subsidy of live music and drama would lead to state control was far less 
important in the League’s history, and played no significant role in its 
failure to secure such subsidy by 1939. 
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Chapter 5 
 




The Toynbee Hall meeting of May 1938, chaired by the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, proved to be the high point of support for the 
League of Audiences. After this it went quickly downhill. This chapter 
examines what happened to the League from spring 1938, the reasons 
for its decline and its importance in the history of public funding of the 
arts. But it begins earlier, with an account of Alfred Wareing’s 
relationship with the BBC. This was significant in the League’s history, 
and also illustrated Waring’s inability to understand people and 
organisations not sharing his total commitment to arts subsidy. As such 
it served as a pattern for the League’s decline. The chapter then 
examines Wareing’s relationship with the theatrical establishment. His 
failure to work with key organisations in the theatre world, indeed his 
incurring their strong opposition, were central to this decline. These case 
studies help explain why the League failed to secure central government 
subsidy for music and drama by 1939. The following sections examine 
the League’s slow extinction as war approached and later. The chapter 
ends by considering the League’s legacy: its influence on CEMA and the 
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‘Mr Wareing is filled with something of the crank ingredient’: the 
League of Audiences and the BBC 
 
Despite influential supporters and widespread and positive press 
coverage, the League of Audiences and Alfred Wareing were far from 
universally popular. Wareing’s dealings with the BBC demonstrated a 
failure to get his message across which was to become typical of the 
League’s later history. 
The relationship began well. Despite Wareing’s views on 
mechanised art, there were approving articles about the League in the 
BBC’s Radio Times.1 Their author was Filson Young, an external 
adviser providing views to the BBC on individual programmes and the 
balance between them.2 In February 1936 Young, noting that the League 
was ‘industrious and ambitious enough to draft a Bill’, feared that ‘the 
likelihood of such a Bill being passed is so small that for the moment it 
would be a waste of time to discuss its proposals in detail’.3 Four weeks 
later he had changed his mind: 
…the more I study them [the League’s objectives], the more I am convinced 
of their importance. The effort to organise this demand [for arts subsidy] is 
long overdue… in matters of the spirit British Governments are not likely to 
move, except in response to a very clear and urgent public demand… The 
names of those who are supporting the League… promises well for the 
organisation of a public demand.4    
Richard Lambert, editor of the BBC’s other main publication, The 
Listener, was equally enthusiastic. He and Wareing had a cordial 
exchange of letters in July 1934, before the League’s launch. Lambert 
welcomed Wareing’s request that the BBC publicise his cause: ‘…please 
 
1 See also Chapter 4, p71 
2 Briggs, p71 
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be sure that you let us in on the ground floor [of the League’s plans], and 
we will do our best to help it forward’.5 But Lambert’s enthusiasm was 
not shared by BBC senior management. In November 1934, after further 
exchanges with Lambert, Wareing sought a meeting with the Director-
General, Sir John Reith. Reith’s secretary requested advice from 
Gladstone Murray, BBC Director of Information and Publications (and 
Lambert’s boss), but made her own position clear: ‘This seems to be 
rather a silly sort of thing. I don’t suppose… there would be any reason 
for the D.G. giving his name to it’. Murray agreed, recommending ‘the 
accustomed formula in declining’.6   
Wareing continued to make no headway with the BBC’s upper 
echelons. An internal BBC account of its dealings with him, produced in 
1936, recorded that ‘During the autumn [of 1934], Mr Wareing asked 
that the D.G. should be on the [League’s] General Council and the 
Editor of the Listener on the Executive Council. But in neither request 
was he successful’.7  Wareing was not put off, and continued 
corresponding with Lambert, apparently the only member of the BBC 
hierarchy to view him positively: a June 1935 memo from Lambert to 
Gladstone Murray makes clear that Lambert had refused Wareing’s 
invitation to join the League’s Executive Committee ‘in accordance with 
your [Murray’s] direction’, not through Lambert’s choice.8 In general, 
attitudes to Wareing became less positive the higher one went in the 
BBC. When Murray sought the views of his boss, the Controller of 
Programmes Alan Dawnay, on Wareing’s latest request for a meeting 
with Reith, Dawnay wrote: ‘I am sure DG will not want to receive these 
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people [sic]. Cannot Editor Listener reply suggesting that they shd come 
& unburden their hearts to you [Murray]?’.9  
Murray accepted the responsibility. His note of the subsequent 
meeting began: ‘You asked me to deflect Mr. Alfred Wareing from the 
D.G. This I did, spending most of an afternoon in his company’.10 
Murray dropped the bored Mandarin tone long enough to express mild 
enthusiasm for the League’s objectives: ‘…its success would be 
definitely advantageous to our work…. [It] would mean widespread 
development of intelligent listening and active participation in drama 
and music. It bears socially on the problem of leisure’. But he lapsed 
back into it when describing Wareing himself: ‘…mild, idealistic, and 
pleasant mannered, filled with something of the crank ingredient which 
is normal to protagonists of the kind’. 
At this stage, while the BBC was at best condescending towards 
Wareing himself, it was not hostile to the League’s aims. Indeed, as 
Murray’s comment indicated, it was modestly in favour. Cecil Graves, 
soon to take over as Controller of Programmes and later as BBC Deputy 
Director-General,11 commenting on Murray’s meeting with Wareing, 
doubted ‘if there is any urgency about Mr. Wareing’s scheme’ and 
advocated a policy of wait-and-see: ‘I think it will be some time before 
we do anything about such a scheme (if ever)… We come in, I think, if 
we think the show is a good one….’12  
This condition was never met: the BBC hierarchy exhibited 
throughout its dealings with Wareing an aversion to inappropriate 
enthusiasm. Although Wareing’s persistence led to a meeting with Sir 
Stephen Tallents, the BBC’s Controller of Public Relations, in 
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December 1935,13 this was clearly the BBC going through the motions. 
Tallents reported to Reith’s private secretary: ‘My own impression of Mr 
Wareing was that he was an honest, decent man, promoting bona fide a 
perfectly hopeless scheme’.14 In 1936, as noted above, an internal BBC 
document was prepared, summarising its dealings with the League of 
Audiences.15 In essence it was an account of approaches by Wareing and 
polite rebuffs by the BBC: ‘It was explained to him… that this could not 
be done either…’; ‘He was told that [active assistance by the BBC] was 
extremely unlikely’; ‘He was told… “it was not felt appropriate for the 
B.B.C. to join the initial subscription list”’. After a further request by 
Wareing to see Reith, in September 1936, Tallents reported to Reith on 
enquiries he had made: 
When Mr. Wareing came to see me in December 1935, he produced a 
holograph letter of the previous August from Mr. Neville Chamberlain to 
himself, which seemed to indicate official support.  I have now ascertained 
privately that… Mr. Chamberlain was feeling a little uneasy about his 
previous reference to possible support…. [Chamberlain’s private secretary] 
thought there was no possible chance of Government support.16  
But as ever Wareing was persistent. He enlisted the help of Walter 
Elliot, Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries,17 a friend since before 
World War I, who had coached Wareing for meetings in Whitehall.18 
Soon after Tallents’ dismissive note, Elliot wrote to Reith (on Minister 
of Agriculture and Fisheries notepaper):  
….to introduce to you Mr. Alfred Wareing, a personal friend of long standing 
who is working very hard to arouse greater interest in the Drama and 
Music… I have no doubt your attention has already been called to this 
movement in which a good deal of interest is being taken… Wareing…is 
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anxious to secure your personal interest, and I should be most grateful to you 
if you could spare him a few minutes of your time.19  
Not even Elliot’s intervention secured Wareing a meeting: Reith refused, 
citing pressure of work.20 In early 1937 Elliot also tried to secure for 
Wareing a further meeting with Sir Stephen Tallents. Here too he failed. 
Tallents responded starkly21: ‘I have seen him once, and do not think he 
would gain either satisfaction or practical advantage by seeing me 
again’. Tallents reported that Wareing had ‘tried, after seeing me, to get 
at Sir John Reith’. Since the League’s proposals appeared to Tallents 
‘impractical and nebulous’, he had advised Reith against meeting him. 
Although ‘I liked him when we met, and of course would see him again 
if you really wished it… I do not see how I can possibly give him 
practical help.’  
The archives record no further attempts by Wareing to see Reith. 
It is perhaps surprising, with the League attracting both  favourable press 
coverage and high profile supporters within and beyond the artistic 
world, that the BBC was so resistant; equally surprising that its attitude 
was due not to hostility to the League’s ideas but to the belief that the 
ideas were ‘impractical and nebulous’ and doomed to fail. The final 
exchanges between Wareing and the BBC are noted below; but from 
mid-1938, the BBC was far from alone in its negative attitude towards 
the League.     
 
The League of Audiences and the theatrical establishment 
 
 Among the League of Audiences’ papers is a letter from February 
1939.22 It is anonymous, though was probably a copy of a letter whose 
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original was signed, being headed ‘(Name and Address confidential)’. It 
begins: ‘I suspect you have been wondering for some time why I have 
not become a member of the League of Audiences, since you know that I 
agree whole-heartedly with what it is trying to do’. The writer continued:  
When I first became interested in the League, I told all my friends in the 
Theatre about it, and was exceedingly surprised when several of them warned 
me not to have anything whatever to do with it…. They then told me that 
certain West End Managers were violently opposed to the League…, and 
would not dream of employing a young actor or actress who was known to be 
associated with it. 
Well established actors could support the League openly, since ‘Their 
value at the Box Office makes them quite safe as far as West End 
Managers are concerned…. [Many young actors] have starved and 
cannot afford to lose an engagement… It is from the well-known people 
that a lead must come!’.  
 The writer did not explain the hostility of West End theatre 
managers; but it was real, indicative of Wareing’s failure to work with 
the theatre establishment, and a key factor behind the League’s decline. 
Geoffrey Whitworth, founder and Director of the British Drama League, 
identified the problem when writing to Wareing in March 1937.23 The 
letter was discussed in Chapter 4 for its probably disingenuous argument 
about the dangers of state control of the arts. But it ranged more widely. 
Whitworth, a skilled networker, advised Wareing that ‘any 
“endorsement” to be of value at the present moment should include that 
of… British Actors Equity, the Society of West-End Theatre Managers, 
the Touring Managers’ Association, the Association of Repertory 
Theatres, the League of British Dramatists and the like’. Whitworth 
noted that ‘while on the musical and social sides you have already 
 
23 V&A/THM/149/4, Whitworth-Wareing, 12/3/37, for all quotations in this paragraph 
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obtained a large measure of support, none of the above specifically 
dramatic institutions appears to be on your list of supporters… 
ultimately the success of the scheme will depend on harmonious 
working with the “providers” [of drama]’ – a lesson which Whitworth 
himself lived by.  
Wareing’s relationship with the BBC demonstrated the problems 
caused by his persistence (or obstinacy) and lack of political acumen. 
These weaknesses were also apparent, more damagingly, in his dealings 
with the organisations listed by Whitworth, particularly the BDL itself. 
The BDL was probably the most important theatre organisation in 
Britain between the wars (the writer on theatre Clive Barker described it 
as ‘underlying the fabric of inter-war British theatre’).24 Its aims were 
‘To assist the development of the Art of the Theatre and its right 
relationship with the life of the Community’ – this at a time when, as 
Whitworth’s successor, Martin Browne put it, ‘the theatre was still 
thought of by the average Briton as entertainment pure and simple – a 
“night out”’.25 Thus the BDL’s aims were close to those of the League of 
Audiences. But as noted in Chapter 4,26 far from collaborating with the 
League, the BDL actively opposed it. Whitworth’s differences with 
Wareing went well beyond the probably bogus disagreement about state 
funding and state control. They stemmed from the BDL’s membership 
and role, Whitworth’s mission, and Wareing’s obstinacy and tactical 
failings.  
The BDL was an umbrella body of umbrella bodies, representing 
a wide  range of theatre interests from amateur and community groups to 
professional ‘little theatres’ to drama schools and commercial theatre 
 
24 Clive Barker: ‘Theatre and society: the Edwardian legacy’, in Barker and Gale (ed): British Theatre 
between the Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p15 
25 E Martin Browne: ‘The British Drama League’, Educational Theatre Journal, Vol. 5, No. 3, 
October 1953, p203 
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management. In addition Whitworth led the campaigns to remove 
Entertainments Duty from live performances and to found a National 
Theatre. Wareing’s exclusive focus on subsidy was always likely to put 
him on a collision course with Whitworth and the BDL, and with other 
theatre trade bodies.  Wareing’s attempt to recruit a representative from 
the Theatrical Management Association to the League’s Executive 
Committee, for example, failed because ‘members are still of the opinion 
that they must confine their support to… [the campaign] to abolish the 
Entertainment Tax….It is regretted, therefore, that we cannot help your 
movement until the Entertainments Tax has been removed’.27  
Indeed, each side was ready to damage the other in pursuit of its 
own aims. Wareing was so focussed on the campaign for subsidy that he 
was prepared to make trouble, and lose supporters, when the press 
confused it with that for ending Entertainments Duty. Early in the 
League’s history he reported to its Executive Committee that ‘a 
misleading cartoon appeared in the Sheffield Independent, Nottingham 
Journal, Yorkshire Observer, Birmingham Gazette [and] Northern 
Echo’.28 The offending cartoon, entitled ‘His Master’s Voice?’, depicted 
the League (personified as a small man) ‘backed by film and theatre 
interests’ (personified by large men making such comments as 
‘Marvellous little feller’ and ‘He’ll put it over’) sending a message by 
loudspeaker ‘with the object of bringing pressure to bear on the 
Chancellor [Neville Chamberlain] to reduce the entertainment tax’.29 
(See below.)  Wareing noted that ‘A letter from our Solicitors was sent 
to the Editors concerned, who published corrections’. 
 
27 V&A/THM/149/7, Collins (TMA)-Wareing, 21/5/37 
28 V&A/THM/149/5, Report to League Executive Committee, 2/11/34 
29 Northern Echo (and other newspapers), 13/10/34 
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The theatrical establishment behaved similarly. The umbrella 
organisation in the Entertainments Duty campaign was, in 1938, the 
Stage and Allied Arts League.30 Writing to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer in February 1938, its Chairman, Walter Payne, treated 
subsidy and relief from Entertainments Duty as a zero-sum game, and 
dealt with Wareing’s work as with an insignificant nuisance:  
An attempt has been made recently to secure Parliamentary support for a Bill 
entitled “The Music and Drama Bill”, the object of which is to secure a 
Government grant to subsidise certain forms of dramatic and musical 
enterprise selected according to the whim of Commissioners…. We feel sure 
you will agree that any such subsidy… would be premature and indefensible 
until the fundamental obstacle to progress for British dramatic and musical 
enterprise – i.e., the entertainments duty – has been removed.31 
The conflict harmed both causes. Theatrical managers and 
Geoffrey Whitworth could have tried harder to work with Wareing. The 
 
30 See Chapter 9, passim 
31 National Archives file T172/1338, Payne-Sir John Simon, 14/2/38 
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League of Audiences counted among its supporters theatrical stars, 
leaders from the world of music and senior figures from organsiations 
beyond the arts, such as the Church of England. Their support could 
have strengthened Whitworth’s various causes. But the League of 
Audiences’ isolation damaged the League itself still more. Wareing 
apparently never recognised that subsidy for professional theatre might 
not be a high priority for amateur drama enthusiasts, commercial theatre 
management or National Theatre campaigners. His failure to work with 
representative organisations in the theatre world became an increasing 
problem as time went on. The coalition of theatre interests campaigning 
for the removal of Entertainments Duty became, consciously or not, a 
coalition against the Music and Drama Bill. 
The behind-the-scenes tensions between Wareing and the 
organisations representing theatre were also played out publicly in the 
BDL magazine Drama. The April 1938 article in Drama about the 
Music and Drama Bill32 was considered in Chapter 4, in the context of 
the Bill’s alleged threats to artistic freedom.33 The article also reported 
that, to ‘take advice’ on the Bill, the Council of the BDL had ‘set up a 
special Committee, who in turn summoned a special Conference of the 
leading theatrical organisations in this country’. This had resolved that 
theatre, professional and amateur, ‘was suffering, very unjustly, under 
the tax on living entertainment [Entertainments Duty was payable on 
admission prices to all theatre, amateur as well as professional]’, that the 
Bill’s aims could be better met by removing Entertainments Duty than 
by introducing subsidy, but that when that had been achieved, it would 
be ‘prepared to support the underlying principle of the Bill’. Drama 
commented: ‘It appears to us that the Drama League [Drama’s 
publisher!] has done a service in obtaining this expression of opinion 
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from a conference so representative of the theatre both in London and in 
the Provinces, and also of the amateur movement’. 
Wareing may have been unimpressed by the article’s conclusion: 
‘…when the time comes, the Resolution should prove a powerful 
advantage to the prospects of the Music and Drama Bill. We hope that 
members of the Drama League will throw their whole weight behind the 
Bill if and when the preliminary conditions mentioned above [the 
abolition of Entertainments Duty] have been satisfied’. This was support 
so qualified as to be indistinguishable from opposition; though the 
suggestion, however tenuous, that BDL members should at some future 
point campaign for the Music and Drama Bill suggests that the BDL’s 
objections to it were less conclusive than the BDL publicly, and 
Whitworth privately, suggested. 
Late in the League’s history this hostile theatrical alliance still 
existed. In February 1939 Lord Esher, Chairman of the BDL, wrote to 
Wareing to report that at a further meeting of all the main theatrical 
umbrella bodies ‘the view was unanimously expressed that the 
representatives would not be in a position to support the Bill in any form 
unless and until the Entertainments Tax on the Living Theatre was 
remitted’.34 The meeting also decided that even then, support would be 
conditional on the removal from the Bill of all of the Commissioners’ 
proposed powers other than that of making grants. These points were 
repeated almost verbatim several months later in a letter from Geoffrey 
Whitworth to George Morrison MP, Chairman of the League of 
Audiences’ Parliamentary Music and Drama Committee.35 Whitworth 
wrote: ‘The amateur movement, so far as it is represented by the British 
Drama League, is at one with the professional theatre in regarding the 
abolition of the Entertainments Tax as the chief reform to be worked for 
 
34 V&A/THM/149/4, Esher-Wareing, 8/2/39 
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at the moment’. The letter added a further condition for support: that the 
Music and Drama Bill’s proposed Commissioners should include 
representatives of theatre managers, dramatists and amateur theatre.  
Some commentators saw this attitude by the theatre establishment 
as highly damaging. The Era magazine began an October 1938 article in 
some exasperation: ‘Why in the name of all that is reasonable is the 
theatre, always crying out about its financial hindrances, so fiercely 
opposed to plans for its being helped?’.36 It reminded readers of Cecil 
Chisholm’s call in his 1934 book Repertory37 for a campaigning 
movement for theatre subsidy, and noted: ‘The movement has started. 
The League of Audiences exists…. [But] what support does this 
movement get from the theatre?... When did West-End managers ever 
co-operate except against somebody or something that they regard as a 
usurper of their rights?...  Why is the theatre so determined to fight its 
own best interests?’.         
 
The end of the League of Audiences: (a) Decline 
 
Briefing Sir John Reith on the League of Audiences, Sir Stephen 
Tallents of the BBC had reported that Neville Chamberlain ‘was feeling 
a little uneasy’ about his expressions of support to Alfred Wareing.38  
But Chamberlain continued to make encouraging noises. In December 
1935 he helped arrange a meeting between Wareing and the Lord Mayor 
of Birmingham,39 and the following month, acknowledging Wareing’s 
thanks, wrote again to ‘hope your plans will go forward’.40 Wareing 
continued to lobby Chamberlain. Writing to him in the summer of 1938, 
 
36 The Era, 13/10/38, for all quotations in this paragraph 
37 See Chapter 2, pp27-8, and Chapter 3, p44  
38 See note 16 above 
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Wareing used his own health as an aid to moral blackmail: ‘My heart is 
giving trouble and makes me anxious about the future of our 
movement…. In this past week there have been signs that I am almost at 
the end of my physical strength… I am not afraid of anything except the 
future of our cause. I am only concerned that you should know how 
much has been done. It would hearten me to tell you, will you please let 
me?’.41 Chamberlain’s reply, though sympathetic (‘I was sorry to have 
your letter of 17th July and to hear of your troubles’), was non-
committal.42 This may have been due to Chamberlain’s having higher 
priorities at the time; but just two months after the Toynbee Hall 
meeting, and despite continuing positive press coverage, the League was 
on a downward slope. 
Having held successful meetings in the House of Commons in 
1936 and early 1938, Wareing considered that the next step should be a 
House of Lords debate on the Music and Drama Bill. In May 1938, the 
month of the Toynbee Hall meeting, he asked the Archbishop of 
Canterbury to move the motion for a debate.43 To strengthen his case, he 
passed the Archbishop letters from other peers apparently in favour of 
the motion. These letters are not in the League’s archive, but those that 
remain, and records of telephone messages, suggest that Wareing had 
overreached himself and that the climate had changed. Lord Leverhulme 
wrote that ‘If the purpose of the motion is to ask the Government to give 
some form of financial support to Drama, I do not see how such a 
request is for one moment likely to be considered at a time when the 
nation is carrying a peak load of taxation’.44 There were telephone 
messages, brutal from Lord Swaythling (‘he…is not interested in the 
project; he rather thinks it is a waste of time and would not care to take 
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part in a debate’), less so from the Marquess of Carisbrooke (‘He is in 
sympathy with your work… at the same time he regrets it is not possible 
for him to allow his name to be used’; this message has a note added in 
pencil: ‘Not sent to A[rchbishop] of C[anterbury]’).45  
The Archbishop was unimpressed with the letters he did receive. 
On 8 June he wrote to Wareing that he had decided against moving the 
motion.46 The letter is characteristic of many that Wareing received – 
disappointing in substance and anguished in tone, as if causing pain to 
Wareing caused the writer more pain still: ‘I am compelled to inflict on 
you what I fear will be a real disappointment… Believe me, I dislike 
exceedingly disappointing your wholehearted and single-minded 
enthusiasm … I fear I have no alternative. I am very sorry’. He pleaded 
pressure of work, but cited further reasons: lack of support from the 
peers whom Wareing had approached (‘When they speak of “supporting 
the Archbishop”, it seems to me often to mean support by their presence 
rather than by their votes’); and that ‘when taxation has been increased 
and the Government is faced with enormous expenditure’ the time was 
wrong to seek a further call on public funds. Wareing’s reply no doubt 
increased the Archbishop’s discomfort: ‘Your kind, long letter of 
Wednesday did not arrive until yesterday, and even now I can do no 
more than write this acknowledgement…’.47  
In July 1938, the month Wareing wrote to Chamberlain about his 
heart problems, George Morrison MP secured a meeting for himself and 
Wareing with Sir John Simon, Chamberlain’s successor as Chancellor of 
the Exchequer. Wareing’s report of this meeting recorded that Simon, as 
his predecessor had done, ‘made it clear that we must obtain stronger 
backing from the Electorate’; but a footnote added: ‘Sir John Simon said 
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“We can’t afford it!”. He did not ask how much it would cost’.48 As with 
Wareing’s previous meetings with Ministers, no government record of 
this encounter seems to survive in the National Archives.  
From this point on, there were only a few hopeful signs for the 
League of Audiences. Some high profile supporters spoke up for it. J B 
Priestley included the League in a speech at the 1938 Malvern Festival, 
though he concentrated on the campaign against Entertainments Duty.49 
In January 1939 Sir Thomas Beecham addressed the Incorporated 
Society of Musicians, noting that ‘The arts of Music and Drama need 
more secure foundations… The Music and Drama Bill… for which the 
consideration of Parliament will be asked when times are more 
propitious, sets out a possible plan’.50 And as late as August 1939 the 
Bishop of Worcester devoted his annual Malvern Festival sermon to 
promoting state subsidy for the arts in general and the work of the 
League in particular.51  
But the League, as a public campaigning body, needed not only 
influential supporters and positive publicity but also money. By late 
1938 its lack of cash was causing many League loyalists to lose heart. Its 
Executive Committee appointed a committee to consider the future. Its 
report, of December 1938, concluded: 
…(a) adequate financial support has not been forthcoming from members of 
the League to sustain the work. (b)… having regard to the present 
commitments of the Government under its rearmament programme there can 
be no hope that the Music and Drama Bill… can be acceptable to the 
Government at the present time or in the immediate future.52 
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Its proposals were equally downbeat. It was ‘unable to recommend that 
any appeal should be made to the public in support of the work of the 
League’. And it recommended that until ‘it appears prudent to revive the 
effort to secure Government support’, the League should become a body 
simply encouraging concert- and theatre-going; though the committee 
‘finds it difficult to believe that this cultural objective… will be strong 
enough in itself to gain financial support’.   
Lack of money had always been a problem for the League, even 
when at its most successful as a campaigning organisation. St John 
Ervine saw Wareing as ‘this man whose faith moves mountains’.53 But 
Wareing’s optimism, as well as his persistence, had its disadvantages, 
particularly in relation to finance. His draft budget for the League’s first 
year, 1934, had projected income of £8,000 and spending of £7,663.54 
The anticipated income was made up of £3,000 in membership 
subscriptions and £5,000 in ‘Donations from persons pecuniarily 
interested in the prosperity from increased audiences’.55 In practice the 
League’s annual income never exceeded £1,900, and in the year ending 
September 1938 – during which it had gained so much positive press 
coverage and public attention – its income was £543 against spending of 
£1,240.56  
Given its financial situation, the views of the special committee, 
the increasingly difficult political climate and the hostility (in effect) of 
the theatrical establishment, it is surprising that the League was not 
dissolved at this point. But it took several weeks for this thought even to 
surface. Two letters to Wareing from Wilfred Stephenson, a member of 
the Executive Committee, are illuminating in this respect. Stephenson, 
an Inland Revenue Commissioner, showed the same mixture of 
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devotion, guilt and pain at causing pain which Wareing evoked in many 
supporters. The day after the League’s Executive Committee discussed 
the special committee’s report, in December 1938, Stephenson wrote in 
encouraging terms (beginning his letter ‘My dear wonderful friend’, and 
signing off ‘Kindest regards and unbounded admiration’): ‘I hope you 
took courage by yesterday’s meeting: courage, did I say? God knows 
you couldn’t hold any more of that… I know that all the work is done by 
yourself and Hodgkinson and Baker – and more power to your 
elbows’.57 But his mood had changed by the following month, when a 
colleague on the Executive Committee tabled a motion to wind up the 
League.58 Stephenson (in a letter ending ‘In all personal sympathy’) 
attempted to spell out the realities for Wareing: 
Your enthusiasm and tireless work during these years have been… little short 
of a miracle…. We have, in fact, a tremendous body of spiritual backers and 
less, much less, than no money at all with which to carry on the Gospel. 
When… you ask us, the Committee, to continue this indefinite liability, you 
are merely deferring, and certainly increasing… the assessment when the 
inevitable end comes.  
Stephenson believed that the Executive Committee would pass the 
motion to dissolve the League and appoint a liquidator. If so, ‘we 
members will be assessed by that Liquidator at anything between 
thirteen and fifteen pounds a head. I am prepared to face that. But no 
more. And, frankly, I shall be very much astonished if the other 
members come to any other conclusion. One doesn’t talk of “being 
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The end of the League of Audiences: (b) Fall 
 
 But Stephenson was mistaken, mainly due to Jo Hodgkinson, 
Chairman of the League’s Executive Committee. Hodgkinson had joined 
Toynbee Hall in 1930 as James Mallon’s deputy, and organised its 
orchestra, choir and ‘Little Theatre’.59 He was important in John 
Christie’s ‘Council of Power’ conferences60 and despite his work for the 
League was among the few participants in those discussions to gain 
Christie’s respect. He was later described as ‘one of the best known 
figures in the post war theatre world’, serving as Arts Council Drama 
Director from 1954 to 1970. 61 Hodgkinson wrote to the committee 
before its meeting on 17 January 1939 in optimistic terms: if the decision 
was to close down, committee members would be personally liable for 
debts totalling £200; but ‘we are making more contacts daily and getting 
more encouragement. And if we are able to keep going, we can perhaps 
expect real and active support… when the present situation calms 
down’.62 The motion to wind up the League failed even to secure a 
seconder. Instead the committee accepted a suggestion by one of its 
members, Eric White, that he seek help for the League from the National 
Council of Social Service  (forerunner of the National Council of 
Voluntary Organisations), for which White then worked.63 White later 
spent nearly thirty years working at CEMA and the Arts Council, and 
wrote a history of the Arts Council: see below. 
The committee reconvened a week later. White had failed to 
persuade his employer to fund the League, but the winding-up motion 
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was not revived. On the contrary: Wareing tabled a ‘put up or shut up’ 
resolution, that the Executive Committee was ‘bound in honour to put 
forward its united utmost endeavours to carry on the work of the League 
as at present’, and that those who disagreed should ‘be invited to resign 
and their offers to discharge their proportion of the debts…. [should] be 
accepted’.64 Discussion on this was adjourned and the resolution was 
withdrawn; but the meeting accepted a proposal by J G Wilson, 
Chairman of the booksellers Bumpus, that members should seek a total 
of fifty pledges of £5 each to provide enough money for the League to 
continue until the end of the year.65  
 Serious fundraising ensued, though Wilfred Stephenson was 
among several Executive Committee members who took Wareing’s 
ultimatum at face value and resigned.66 In February 1939 many League 
members received requests for a £5 donation, including Sir Henry Wood 
(who paid) and J B Priestley (who sent £10).67 The most generous donor 
was John Christie of Glyndebourne. 
 Christie’s role was ambiguous. He considered the League’s 
proposals to be in many ways in conflict with his own;68 and as noted in 
Chapter 3, he described Wareing to Harold Baker, the League’s 
Treasurer and Honorary Secretary, in a letter of February 1938, as ‘an 
infuriating old man’ and the League as ‘a number of little people with 
small minds’.69 Yet he gave the League a total of £160 between February 
1937 and July 1938.70 Christie’s correspondence with Baker is revealing 
about the League at this time, about Christie, and about Baker’s attempts 
to act as a bridge between the two. Alongside its insults, Christie’s 
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February 1938 letter illustrated his key differences with Wareing: 
‘Wareing’s purpose, he tells me, is to defeat the machines… His method 
of defeating the machines (which I do not wish to do), is… to produce 
on a large scale stuff of a lower value than the machines give’.71 Baker 
replied: ‘When we are stronger we can sort the chaff from the wheat – 
meanwhile we should enlist all the support we can for “Government 
action”’.72  
 Christie’s criticisms of Wareing were more measured by late 
1938, when Baker sought further financial help for the League: ‘…old 
Wareing has come a bit too soon…. The right time to work up the 
audience side is when you can deliver the goods and, at present, music is 
not organised to do this…I think that but for Wareing, the Audiences 
League would be shelved for a bit’.73 But Christie continued his 
financial support of the League, or, rather, of Wareing himself. In 
January 1939 he took over the role of personal benefactor from another 
donor. Just after the League’s meeting at which the winding-up motion 
failed to find support, Baker wrote to Christie’s secretary that ‘[Mr. 
Christie] will make no further contributions to the League, but will give 
Mr. Wareing £50 for his personal subsistence….I think that for every 
reason, Mr. Christie’s name should be concealed (Mr. Christie agrees)… 
if you will arrange for the cheque to go to Dr. Mallon [Warden of 
Toynbee Hall], he will pay it to Mr. Wareing as though it came from the 
previous benefactor’.74 It is unclear who the previous benefactor was. 
When the approach to the National Council of Social Service 
came to nothing, Baker again asked Christie for help. This time Christie 
contributed £25, with the offer of a further £25 if a total of £250 
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(presumably the fifty £5 stakes) was raised.75 A later scribbled note from 
Baker to Christie records that this £250 target was not reached, but that 
the League’s Executive Committee had decided to carry on for another 
month: ‘Enough money has been given unconditionally to do that & no 
more… the optimistic members (of whom I was not one) think they may 
achieve [the £250 target] before the end of March’.76   
While these transactions continued, in part without Wareing’s 
knowledge, he too was shameless in seeking money for the League. A 
thank-you letter from him to C E Lawrence, editor of the Quarterly 
Review, began: ‘I hate to take your money, but I love the League 
more’.77 Lawrence himself was apparently under Wareing’s spell, at one 
stage writing to him that ‘You are at once something of Greatheart, an 
elf and a pirate’.78 Wareing seems not to have acknowledged how close 
to extinction the League was by early 1939, beyond thanking J G 
Wilson, whose idea of seeking £5 contributions from supporters ‘not 
only averted a great danger but rallied the whole group’.79 Instead, 
Wareing talked and wrote with apparently undiminished energy. In 
January 1939 he met and then corresponded with Kenneth Lindsay, 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Education.80 At the meeting, 
Lindsay asked Wareing which  local authorities were most active in 
supporting the performing arts; Wareing suggested Birmingham, putting 
this down to Neville Chamberlain’s efforts when Lord Mayor.81 Later in 
1939, despite the League’s fragile state, he recruited to its Executive 
Committee representatives of six organisations, including the Workers’ 
Educational Association, the National Association of Head Teachers and 
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the Incorporated Society of Musicians,82 though none from the theatrical 
world. With the WEA, at least, there were pre-existing connections: the 
Archbishop of York William Temple, James Mallon and R H Tawney, 
all League Vice-Presidents, were respectively the WEA’s founding 
President, its Treasurer and its current President.83  
Even in these difficult times, Wareing’s persistence was generally 
tempered by extreme, almost cloying, courtesy. But on occasion he 
could be petulant if feeling snubbed. In November 1938, Janet Quigley, 
a BBC producer, asked him to suggest an ‘extreme critic’ of the 
campaign for a National Theatre to take part in a programme on the 
subject.84 (It is noteworthy that Wareing was approached to nominate an 
anti-National Theatre speaker.) The relationship soured when Quigley 
failed to maintain the correspondence, prompting a sarcastic letter from 
Wareing : ‘I fear you must be ill, and hope when this comes to hand it 
finds you restored so that you will be able to give attention to my 
letters’.85  
This was a rare crack in the façade. In general he accepted the 
League’s reverses with extraordinary outward calm, appearing to believe 
that the League’s situation, and that in the wider world, were about to 
take a turn for the better. In April 1939, responding to Jo Hodgkinson’s 
noting ‘the difficulty of asking for money after the recent crisis’, 
Wareing ‘replied that he would start writing letters again after the Easter 
holidays, when he hoped there would be calmer conditions and more 
confidence’.86 In May he wrote a combative article for The Musical 
Times,87 chiding musicians’ organisations for not informing their 
members about the Music and Drama Bill, urging united action and 
 
82 V&A/THM/149/5, November 1939 ‘Report of the Honorary Organising Secretary’  
83 See, for instance, the League’s and WEA’s letter headings, preserved in V&A/THM/149/7  
84 V&A/THM/149/5, Quigley-Wareing, 24/11/38 
85 ibid , Wareing-Quigley, 21/12/38 
86 V&A/THM/149/7, minutes of League Executive Committee meeting, 4/4/39 
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reproving Sir John Simon for responding ‘We can’t afford it!’ when he 
met Wareing the previous summer: ‘I thought it queer that he did not 
first ask us ‘How much will it cost?’…. who is it finds the money the 
Chancellor says he can’t afford? Is not that money provided by you and 
me?’.  
That he was not a lone voice even at this stage is shown by The 
Musical Times’ making space for him, and by its strong editorial support 
in the same issue: ‘The apathy of the musical profession towards the 
League and the Music and Drama Bill is both astonishing and 
discreditable… there is a strong and growing support for the Bill 
amongst members of Parliament of all parties’.88 The Musical Times 
used the recent reduction of the rate of Entertainments Duty on live 
music and drama,89 ‘despite the present fantastic outlay on armaments’,90 
as a further argument that if the political will were there, the money 
could be found.       
Wareing’s ‘Carry on regardless’ approach during 1939 included 
requests to Sir Adrian Boult, Chief Conductor of the BBC Symphony 
Orchestra, to address the orchestra,91 and to the BBC for air-time for a 
talk on the Music and Drama Bill.92 Both were politely rebuffed.93 By 
July 1939 James Mallon, among Wareing’s most loyal supporters, felt 
‘bound in honesty to express my view that at the present moment any 
attempt to obtain money from the Government is entirely hopeless’.94 
Mallon cited ‘terrific struggles between the Treasury and the B.B.C. 
about inconsiderable sums’ (he was a BBC Governor)95 to demonstrate 
the futility of seeking public funding. But Wareing did not moderate his 
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efforts, and did not appear discouraged when, in the summer of 1939, 
the League lost its London office and began operating out of ‘Temporary 
Offices’96 – Wareing’s home in Stratford-on-Avon.97 Even in August 
1939 he was writing to the Secretary of the Theatrical Management 
Association: ‘I expect you are on holiday now… Do let us meet when 
you return – I’d like you to see what we are doing here’.98 He still hoped 
for a House of Lords debate on the Music and Drama Bill, enlisting 
Walter Elliot’s help to broker an introduction to Lord Elgin. Less than 
three weeks before war was declared he was pressing Elgin to open it (‘I 
hope with all my heart that you will tell me that you will be able to 
consent’).99   
Wareing further demonstrated his extreme resilience on the 
outbreak of war. Winifred Isaac, Wareing’s disciple and biographer, 
reported his writing in his diary after war was declared ‘the words of the 
Premier in the House of Commons on 2nd September: ‘Everything that I 
have worked for, everything I have hoped for, everything I have 
believed in, during my public life, has crashed in ruins’. They were the 
echo of his [Wareing’s] own thoughts’.100 This was typical of Isaac’s 
insistence in her biography on dwelling on the pathos of Wareing’s final 
years. A different picture emerges from a letter later in September 1939 
from Wareing to the Archbishop of York.101 While he wrote ‘I am in a 
maze – all is crashed to smithereens’, within a few sentences he had 
moved from apparent despair to fresh resolve: ‘…I feel it is up to me to 
build again. What do you think? I believe we shall be needed more than 
ever when this madness passes’. Also contrary to the view Isaac sought 
to convey, Wareing’s November 1939 report on the League’s work over 
 
96 So described in V&A/THM/149/5, November 1939 ‘Report of the Honorary Organising Secretary’  
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99 ibid, Wareing-Elgin, 16/8/39 
100 Isaac, p149  
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the previous year showed no sign of waning hopes and no record of the 
League’s reverses.102 Indeed, given the timing, it appears as either a 
brave or a delusional document.  
It claimed that ‘steady progress’ had been made over the period, 
and that all would have been well but for the outbreak of war. Plans had 
continued for the House of Lords debate ‘which the Archbishop of 
Canterbury in the previous year had contemplated introducing’. By 
March 1939 ‘there were reasons for hoping this Debate might be opened 
by the Marquess of Lothian. But when our Government declared its 
intention to aid Poland, the War clouds lowered again… We then 
interested the Earl of Elgin, but the situation worsened and he rightly 
decided the time was inopportune’. Waring had also ‘worked for some 
months upon plans for a great representative Public Meeting’ to be 
addressed by the Archbishop of York, claiming also that ‘The Premier 
gave his consent to the appearance of a Member of his Cabinet’. But the 
meeting was scheduled for October 20, 1939, ‘when our movement… 
was halted by the outbreak of war’. 
The view that the war caused the League to founder is only 
superficially plausible. The causes are considered below, but it is 
relevant to note here that Wareing’s report was dated a few weeks before 
CEMA was established, which in many ways realised the League’s 
ambitions, and that the League’s decline was evident from mid-1938. By 
September 1939, it was clearly not viable. Nonetheless, in November 
1939, Wareing was already looking forward to the post-war world. It 
was vital to prosecute the war, but ‘it falls to… others as an equally 
important duty to prepare for Peace… our movement has become more 
than ever vital…We must not be caught napping when Peace comes’.103 
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In the same month, a key supporter, the playwright James Bridie, argued 
in a letter to The Times104 that the outbreak of war made government 
support of the arts more urgent:  
…the League of Audiences recently secured a measure of Parliamentary 
support for a commission… whose function was to be the encouragement and 
patronage of music and the drama. The objection… that it was Utopian does 
not apply to such a commission now, when the Arts are no longer able to 
proceed under their own power and emergency measures are necessary if 
they are to be saved.     
– an argument in effect accepted by the government when a few months 
later it began to fund CEMA.   
 
The end of the League of Audiences: (c) Lingering death  
 
The remaining history of the League of Audiences can be briefly 
told, though despite its near-death experiences in 1939 it continued to 
exist, in shadow form, for thirteen more years. Wareing appeared 
unimpressed by CEMA, in January 1940 describing it to George 
Gordon, the League’s President, as ‘like pouring water into a sieve’.105 
(See below for Winifred Isaac’s maudlin account of Wareing’s reaction 
to CEMA.) In June 1940, Jo Hodgkinson, the assiduous Chairman of the 
League’s Executive Committee, attempted again to close the League 
down. Hodgkinson’s letter to Wareing does not survive, but Wareing’s 
reply is recorded in the League’s ‘Letter Book’.  Much was in his 
familiar style: ‘It is heartbreaking to know that what has taken more than 
six years of the utmost I cd give in building up has been smashed to 
pieces’.106 But he appeared to bow to the inevitable: ‘I must… accept yr 
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decision as the only practical one we can take’. Indeed, Wareing became 
uncharacteristically practical, noting that he was the League’s largest 
creditor: ‘I hope that part of the sum, which totals abt. £740, will be 
refunded to me as one of the outstanding liabilities’. 
Even this was not the end. In summer 1940 Wareing sought and 
received funds for the League from, among others, the Bishop of 
Worcester (‘I can’t resist your plea even though it may be the last time I 
shall be able to manage it…. I send you a guinea. I am sorry that this war 
should have come and knocked your work on the head’).107 He also 
received two encouraging letters in August 1940, responding to a further 
report not in the archive. One was from Wilfred Stephenson, who had 
resigned from the League’s Executive Committee in January 1939.108  
Stephenson was ‘amazed to see you and the League still alive. Indeed I 
have often wondered this year when I was going to get the winding-up 
notice’. He harped on this theme of amazement: ‘…here you are and 
indeed here it is, at the end of a year of much the most ruinous war we 
British have ever been involved in… - that is extraordinary under all the 
impossible circumstances’. Stephenson reflected, as an Inland Revenue 
Commissioner, on the League’s failure in the period leading up to the 
war: ‘No wonder [Sir John] Simon waved his hands about in so helpless 
gesture [sic] when you went to him for money!... When I look upon 
National finance I am really appalled’. He offered Wareing ‘warm 
encouragement and a genuine blessing on your wonderful pluck and 
perseverance’. The other letter, enclosing his subscription, was from 
Daniel Lipson, Independent Conservative MP, who ‘agree[d] that it was 
necessary to keep the League in being so that when the War is over… 
Drama and Music may be able to play the part they ought in our 
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National life. We shall then remember, with gratitude I hope, all you 
have done…’.109 
This was almost the League’s, and Wareing’s, last hurrah. In her 
biography, Winifred Isaac wrote that ‘his friends and supporters became 
more and more scattered and engrossed in important war work. The final 
death-blow to his hopes came with the blitz of 1940’.110 She did not note 
that by then several of these friends and supporters were working for 
CEMA. Indeed her biography at this point conveys two apparently 
incompatible messages: that by summer 1940 Wareing had suffered ‘the 
final death-blow to his hopes’, but that in CEMA ‘most of his ideas were 
being used’.111 The inconsistency is explored further below. Wareing 
himself did not long survive the end of the League’s active life. He died 
in April 1942, aged 66. Funeral reports in the local press112 recorded a 
‘Tribute to the late Librarian’, Wareing having spent his final year as 
Stratford-upon-Avon’s Borough Librarian, but mentioned neither his 
pioneering work for the repertory movement nor the League of 
Audiences. A brief obituary in The Times113 did describe him as ‘founder 
of the League of Audiences, and a repertory theatre pioneer’. The 
League itself remained dormant until ten years later, finally and 
formally, it was wound up. 
The copy of Winifred Isaac’s biography of Wareing in the Special 
Collection of Senate House Library has a manuscript note in Isaac’s 
hand that the League’s winding-up was ‘because its objects would seem 
to have been achieved in the work of the Arts Council of Great 
Britain’.114 The same words occur in the minutes of the League’s final 
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meeting, held, appropriately or not, at the Arts Council’s offices, in 
August 1952.115 It was chaired by Jo Hodgkinson (by 1952 Drama 
Director at the Arts Council), and included among others Harold Baker 
(the longest-serving of the League’s office holders, still listed as 
‘Treasurer’), Eric White (since 1942, Assistant Secretary to CEMA and 
then to the Arts Council), and Winifred Isaac. Hodgkinson recorded the 
considerations, fortunate and unfortunate, leading to the Executive 
Committee’s decision that the League was ‘unable to carry on with its 
objects’: first, ‘lack of support and finance’; and second, ‘because its 
objects would seem to have been achieved in the Arts Council of Great 
Britain’. He paid tribute to the ‘great work done by the late Alfred 
Wareing… as a result of which the way had been prepared for the 
setting-up of C.E.M.A and the Arts Council of Great Britain’. 
But the link between Wareing and the League on the one hand and 
the creation of CEMA and the Arts Council on the other was at the time 
a subject of controversy and has since been wholly forgotten.   
              
The significance and legacy of the League of Audiences 
  
From one perspective, the League of Audiences was a failure: in 
the 1930s the government did not set up an agency to distribute public 
money to the arts, and the League itself has since been written out of 
history. The causes of the former included the government’s 
unwillingness to spend extra resources as war approached, an attitude 
soon reversed when war was declared; Wareing’s lack of political 
acumen, in particular his failure to make common cause with those 
campaigning for the removal of Entertainments Duty; the consequent 
 
115 V&A/THM/149/1, minutes of League Special General Meeting, 25/8/52, for all later quotations in 
this paragraph  
  126 
hostility of the ‘organised’ theatre sector; and (discussed in the following 
chapters) the at best ambivalent attitude of John Christie. 
  But a far more positive case can be made for the League. For 
several years from 1934 it achieved widespread and favourable press 
coverage; numbered among its active members some of the most notable 
writers, critics, musicians and actors of the time; attracted the support of 
many MPs and senior churchmen; made the cause of state funding of the 
performing arts a topic of public discussion; provided a focus for an 
intense, if now forgotten, debate about the effects of ‘mechanised art’; 
and created a belief that the issue was not if but when arm’s length 
government funding of the performing arts would be introduced in 
Britain. Two further points can be made in the League’s favour. First, 
several of those most closely associated with it went on to key positions 
in CEMA and then the Arts Council. James Bridie and Ivor Brown 
became members of the Council; Jo Hodgkinson and Eric White were 
among its senior staff. The League was where their ideas were formed 
(though see below for their differing views of this heritage). Second, the 
mechanism for public funding adopted by the government in 
establishing CEMA and then the Arts Council was essentially that 
advocated by Wareing: ‘…a semi-independent body… provided with 
modest funds to stimulate, comfort and support any societies… which 
are striving with serious purpose and a reasonable prospect of success to 
present for public enjoyment the arts of music, drama and painting’, as 
Keynes described the Arts Council.116 
It is paradoxical that the government accepted both the principle 
and the League’s proposed model of state arts funding at a time when 
the League itself, after steep decline, was a spent force. The League’s 
history and legacy – its contribution to CEMA and the Arts Council – 
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are important but almost wholly unacknowledged elements of the story 
of government and the arts in Britain.  
After Wareing’s death, it was mainly those who had known him 
personally who emphasised the centrality of his role. The intensity with 
which they expressed this view is striking. Winifred Isaac, Wareing’s 
deputy and disciple, saw CEMA as embodying Wareing’s vision, but 
this, for her, merely emphasised the pathos of his last years. This is her 
account of the announcement of CEMA’s plans: ‘...we found that most 
of his ideas were being used, and no acknowledgement was made of 
their origin. When I exclaimed at the injustice of his name not being 
mentioned, he kept silence. There are some griefs too deep for words. 
The neglect of those responsible… ‘quite vanquished him’. ‘This was 
the unkindest cut of all’.’117  
Others managed to praise his achievement less sentimentally. 
Reporting the creation of the Arts Council in June 1945, The Observer 
noted that it ‘would have delighted Alfred Wareing… Smooth, smiling, 
very deaf, very devoted, very persistent, and not afraid of wearying the 
opposition into agreement, Wareing was the kind of man who starts 
things: when others complete them, this type should have honourable 
remembrance’.118 And in 1952, when the League of Audiences was 
finally wound up, the Manchester Guardian recalled Wareing’s 
‘passionately cherished obsession’ on behalf of state subsidy, and quoted 
Ivor Brown’s recollection of the period ‘when I groaned at every ring of 
the telephone. Wareing again!’.119 The Guardian commented: ‘But 
Wareing was not so mad after all, and he and his league did much to 
prepare the way for C.E.M.A. and then for the Arts Council, which is, in 
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fact, the realisation of his dream and on a grander scale than he could 
have thought possible’.  
The citing of Ivor Brown is apposite. He was closely involved in 
the League in the 1930s, became CEMA’s first Drama Director in 1940 
(from which he moved to become editor of The Observer in 1942), and 
was also, from its foundation, a member of the Arts Council.120 In his 
foreword to Isaac’s biography,121 Brown recognised Wareing’s unique 
role (‘Nobody else could or would have done it’), and suggested that 
CEMA owed much to Wareing: ‘But this time what he had planned 
came true. C.E.M.A…. was founded’. But he then stated an apparent 
contradiction, without recognising or resolving it: on the one hand, in 
Brown’s view, ‘war blew up what he [Wareing] was so laboriously 
building’; but on the other, CEMA, which realised his aims, was created 
only a few months into the war. The contradiction can be resolved if – as 
the evidence suggests – much of the 1930s is seen as a period generally 
sympathetic to the concept of arts subsidy. On this reading, Wareing’s 
dreams were possibly close to realisation several times during the 
decade, and were undone not in September 1939 but before that, due to 
the threat of war, international crises and focus on rearmament of the 
later 1930s.  
Brown was more explicit still about the debt which the Arts 
Council rather than CEMA owed to Wareing. CEMA was a wartime 
organisation; the Arts Council, like Wareing’s proposed Commission, 
was intended for peacetime. The Arts Council Charter of 1946 ‘was 
really Wareing’s Music and Drama Bill in a larger and more lavish form. 
That fight was over’. But Brown believed that even before his death in 
1942, Wareing ‘knew that the theatre in Coketown was getting a better 
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chance and that the good things of the arts were being decently dispersed 
instead of centralized. And that was what he cared about’.       
The writers of the other forewords to Isaac’s biography, James 
Bridie and Walter Elliot, were even more explicit in presenting the Arts 
Council as Wareing’s legacy. Bridie, playwright, founder of Glasgow 
Citizens’ Theatre, Chairman of the Scottish Committee of CEMA from 
1942 and member of the Arts Council and Chairman of its Scottish 
Committee from its foundation,122 considered that ‘…the Arts Council 
was formed on almost precisely the lines he had worked out’.123 Bridie 
was as outraged as Isaac at Wareing’s lack of recognition: ‘In none of 
the literature of C.E.M.A. or the Arts Council has his name been so 
much as mentioned.  But there is no doubt that he is its “onlie begetter”. 
The Arts Council rests on his dreams, on his hard work, and on his 
martyrdom’.124  
Bridie was not alone in using terms like ‘martyrdom’ in 
association with Wareing. Some were hostile to him, some (such as John 
Christie) were ambivalent, some (including the BBC hierarchy) regarded 
him as an impractical dreamer. But in his friends he inspired a 
combination of loyalty, protective love and almost biblical awe. This 
was clear from the pain people close to Wareing expressed when having 
to convey bad news to him – see, for instance, the letters to him from the 
Archbishop of Canterbury and Wilfred Stephenson discussed above.125 
Walter Elliot’s foreword to Isaac’s biography126 explicitly accorded 
prophetic status to Wareing. Elliot, Baldwin’s and Chamberlain’s 
Cabinet colleague, was as certain as James Bridie and Ivor Brown were 
that Wareing had paved the way for CEMA and the Arts Council. 
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Wareing ‘set himself to confer upon the theatre that which it had 
completely failed to get for itself – a twentieth century patron… the rank 
and file citizenry of Great Britain… He did it’. Elliot continued: 
There was no C.E.M.A. then; there was no Arts Council. There were just 
ideas; ideas in Wareing’s head, or printed in rather shabby memoranda. There 
was no Lord Keynes; subtle, renowned, arrogant, to argue down the cleverest 
and beat up the proud. Only a little, small man, full of faith and 
determination. He battered away at these enormous barriers. All the barriers 
broke up… others walked through to enter into the kingdom. Wareing did not 
go through… Such is the reward of prophets…. There is a fairly heavy 
responsibility on those who are to carry on the work; because it is built upon 
an ordinary savage, propitiatory, human sacrifice.    
Such extraordinary imagery may have been partly a response to 
the general failure, and in particular the failure by Keynes and the Arts 
Council, to recognise Wareing’s contribution. James Bridie’s comments 
suggest this, and the Arts Council’s attitude does contrast starkly with 
these extravagant tributes. While Bridie and Ivor Brown were closely 
associated with CEMA and the Arts Council, the organisations 
themselves never acknowledged Wareing’s role. The Arts Council’s 
review of its first ten years127 made passing reference to the League, in a 
section headed ‘The Climate of the ’Thirties’; but this was in a list of 
more than a dozen organisations, including the National Council of 
Social Service, the Women’s Institutes and the Townswomen’s Guilds, 
which helped to create ‘the climate of opinion and interest in which 
CEMA and the Arts Council were subsequently able to flourish’. This 
list was almost identical to that in Andrew Sinclair’s 1995 history of the 
Arts Council, discussed in Chapter 1,128 except that Sinclair did not even 
mention the League.    
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Jo Hodgkinson and Eric White, like James Bridie and Ivor Brown, 
were closely associated with the League, CEMA and the Arts Council; 
their association with the Council was as senior bureaucrats, retiring in 
1970 and 1971 respectively. White’s attitude, however, contrasted 
starkly with that of Brown and Bridie, and also changed markedly over 
time. His correspondence with Winifred Isaac in 1950 and 1951 about 
Isaac’s biography of Wareing is tantalising. In January 1950 he 
acknowledged Wareing’s contribution generously, if unclearly: the 
League’s ‘attempt to promote a music and drama bill was unexpectedly 
near success… [as] was shown later when the war-time work of CEMA 
led to the establishment of the Arts Council’.129 When he received 
Isaac’s biography in March 1951, he recalled his time on the League’s 
Executive Committee: ‘…much of what I learnt has stood me in good 
stead during the period when I have been working for CEMA and the 
Arts Council’.130  
For reasons hard to discern, his view was markedly less generous 
by that autumn. Isaac wrote to White in September 1951 to report on the 
notice her book had attracted – pointing out positive views not of the 
book itself, but of Wareing’s contribution to arts subsidy.131 Citing 
reviews from The Observer, the Times Literary Supplement and others to 
the effect that ‘Wareing’s greatest achievement came after his death with 
the formation of CEMA and the Arts Council’,132 she contrasted these 
tributes with the Arts Council’s silence about Wareing and the League. 
She appealed to White ‘as a member of the Executive Committee of the 
League of Audiences, and one who has admitted the personal debt you 
owe to AW… to suggest a means by which the grave omission of the 
Arts Council can be remedied’. Her own modest proposal was an article 
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in the Arts Council Bulletin. She even suggested a writer for the article, 
since if she wrote it herself ‘it would look as if I were advertising my 
book’.  
 In response Eric White sought to diminish this view of Wareing’s 
contribution.133 He suggested that Wareing’s meeting with Sir John 
Simon, Chancellor of the Exchequer, in July 1938 showed that the 
League of Audiences was doomed to fail. Given Simon’s negative 
attitude, ‘it was only to be expected that progress… would have to come 
from a completely different direction. As you know, it was the initiative 
of men like Lord De La Warr, Lord Macmillan and Dr. Tom Jones that a 
practical system of State aid for the arts was worked out’. White did not 
specify how their work was in a ‘completely different direction’ from 
Wareing’s. He claimed that he wrote ‘not to belittle Wareing’s work… 
but to put the League of Audiences and the Arts Council into correct 
perspective’, and paid him somewhat neutral tribute: ‘Anyone who was 
in contact with Wareing knows only too well how whole-hearted was the 
fervour with which he devoted himself to the cause of trying to secure 
State aid for Music and Drama’. He went further in distancing the Arts 
Council from the League: in a clear reference to James Bridie’s and Ivor 
Brown’s strong support for Wareing, he continued: ‘…members of the 
Arts Council… have been quite prepared to testify to this [Wareing’s 
contribution] in public… But it should always be remembered that such 
statements are made by them in their personal capacity’. 
This letter raises several questions: why White’s views of the 
League, or at least his expression of them, changed between early and 
late 1951; why he was so anxious to distance the Arts Council from the 
League, and from statements in Wareing’s support made by Council 
members ‘in their personal capacity’; and whether this represented 
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Council policy, formal or informal, or simply White’s personal view. A 
letter from Jo Hodgkinson to Winifred Isaac134 fails to answer these 
questions. Isaac had written to Hodgkinson after receiving White’s 
discouraging letter, renewing her request that the Council publish a 
tribute to Wareing in its Bulletin. Hodgkinson was more sympathetic 
than White: ‘I am very much in sympathy with your idea… and I shall 
do my best to bring this about… no one has a greater admiration for him 
[Wareing] than I have’. But he advised her not to overstate her case: it 
would be unwise ‘to press for the Arts Council to state categorically… 
that everything it is doing now all arises from the original work of Mr. 
Wareing’. Hodgkinson suggested that Isaac take the line ‘that his work 
had played an important part… in establishing the right atmosphere for 
the formation of C.E.M.A. and the Arts Council’. This seems to have 
been intended as helpful advice; but in practice the Arts Council failed to 
acknowledge Wareing’s role at all. Examination of the Arts Council’s 
papers casts no light on what lay behind its attitude to Wareing and the 
League.    
Eric White’s own view hardened over the following quarter-
century. In 1971 he retired. Andrew Sinclair has suggested135 that this 
was part of a ‘policy of artistic cleansing’ by the then Chairman, Lord 
Goodman, who, according to Sinclair, saw White as ‘an inadequate and 
retrograde man’. Sinclair himself described White as someone who 
‘particularly enjoyed refusing the requests of those he did not like’. In 
1975 White published his own history of the Arts Council,136 a curious, 
lopsided document. Its 320 pages include, for instance, just five 
references to Mary Glasgow, Secretary to CEMA throughout its 
existence, and Secretary-General of the Arts Council for its first five 
 
134 V&A/ THM/149/6, Hodgkinson-Isaac, 17/10/51 for all quotations in this paragraph 
135 Sinclair, p166, for the following three quotations 
136 The Arts Council of Great Britain (London: Davis-Poynter, 1975) 
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years (thus in both cases White’s boss). Only one, recording her 
replacement by William Emrys Williams in 1951, is longer than a 
sentence, and three merely include her name in a list of staff. 
 But unlike most other writers about the Arts Council, White did 
discuss Alfred Wareing and the League of Audiences, devoting to them 
half of his opening five-page chapter, ‘The Struggling Thirties’.137 
White’s treatment of Wareing suggests that Sinclair assessed White 
fairly. Certainly, one would never infer from White’s book that the 
League had a high public profile and numerous celebrated supporters 
over several years, nor that White himself had been a member of its 
Executive Committee, actively seeking money to secure its survival in 
1939. He noted that the League ‘succeeded in enlisting the support of a 
number of men and women of good will’; but concluded that it was ‘a 
quixotic enterprise… it cannot be maintained that the League became an 
important or powerful force’.138 As for Wareing, ‘Like so many 
intensive idealists, he seemed slightly daft at times’.139  
This was a mean-spirited and inadequate epitaph for a man who 
made public funding of live music and drama a significant topic of 
public and press discussion in the 1930s and who was regarded by some 
as the ‘onlie begetter’ of the Arts Council. But White’s is the most 
substantial discussion of Wareing and the League of Audiences since 
Winifred Isaac’s biography of 1951. The League, though not Wareing by 
name, was the subject of a few tendentious and inaccurate passages in 
Richard Witts’ ‘Alternative History of the Arts Council’, Artist 
Unknown (1998).140 More recently Euan McArthur, in Scotland, CEMA 
and the Arts Council, 1919-1967 (2016),141 also without mentioning 
 
137 ibid, pp17-22 
138 ibid, p18 
139 ibid, p19 
140 London: Warner Books, pp27-30 
141 Abingdon: Routledge, 2016, p132; see also pp24 and 28  
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Wareing by name, made passing references to an unspecific connection 
between ‘the failure of the Music and Drama Bill’ and CEMA’s funding 
policies. But apart from such scattered mentions, since Eric White’s 
dismissive summing-up in 1975 Alfred Wareing and the League of 
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Chapter 6 
 




Alfred Wareing’s League of Audiences was the highest profile 
movement to seek public money for the performing arts in Britain in the 
1930s; but it was not the only one. This chapter considers a very 
different initiative, John Christie’s ‘Council of Power’. The following 
two chapters examine Christie’s attempts during the war to establish 
what by then he called the National Council of Music.  
Christie’s approach differed from the League’s in methods, 
principles and issues. The League aimed to be a popular movement, and 
received much highly favourable publicity. Christie neither sought nor 
received public or press attention for his work to ‘organise music’. But 
many leading cultural figures of the period were involved in his 
campaign, and it was the forum in which debates were first aired which 
were to be, and to remain, central to state funding of the arts.   
The issues preoccupying supporters and opponents of the League 
of Audiences1 became less relevant or changed their form after World 
War II. Benn Levy, among the most active pre-war opponents of state 
arts funding,2 joined the post-war Arts Council. And far from treating 
music and drama subsidy as a weapon in the fight against ‘mechanised 
art’, CEMA and the Arts Council saw nothing to fight. For them, radio 
and recordings were positive forces for the arts and for society, and they 
argued that as funders they existed partly to satisfy a demand for live 
music in particular which the gramophone and the BBC had helped to 
 
1 See, generally, Chapter 4 
2 Chapter 4, pp88-90 
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create.3 By contrast, matters discussed at John Christie’s 1938 
Glyndebourne conferences remained contentious for decades for CEMA 
and then the Arts Council: whether the main priority of arts funding 
should be higher standards or increased availability (‘raising’ or 
‘spreading’, in Arts Council language); and whether amateur or only 
professional art should be supported from public funds. Both are major 
themes of this and the following two chapters.   
What Christie’s work in this area shares with the League is 
neglect by almost all who have written about CEMA and the Arts 
Council or more generally about the state and the arts in Britain. Even 
Christie’s only full-length biography4 does not mention his pre-war 
campaign for public funding of the arts. Only Richard Witts, in Artist 
Unknown,5 has considered this aspect of Christie’s work, but Witts’ 
questionable judgements and unsubstantiated assertions make his work 
of limited value.   
        
The beginnings: ‘I want to form a Royal Society of Music’ 
 
All these qualities are on display in Richard Witts’ opening 
sentences, in which John Christie has a starring role: ‘John Christie 
enjoyed the company of Nazis, while Maynard Keynes preferred the 
fellowship of boys. That is precisely why we have an Arts Council and 
not a Council for Music and the Arts’.6 This grabs the attention and 
suggests that Christie was in some way important in the history of arts 
funding. It has no other value.  
 
3 See, for instance, John Maynard Keynes: ‘The Arts Council: Its Policy and Hopes’ (The Listener, 
12/7/45)   
4 Wilfred Blunt: John Christie of Glyndebourne (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1968); hereafter ‘Blunt’ 
5 London: Warner Books, 1998; hereafter ‘Witts’ 
6 Witts, p9 
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John Christie is best known as the founder in 1934 of 
Glyndebourne Festival Opera.7 He was born in 1882 into a prosperous 
but unhappy family. Wilfrid Blunt reported that Christie’s father ‘was 
insanely jealous of his son, who had to be kept, so far as was possible, 
out of his sight’; that for three years of Christie’s infancy his parents 
were separated; and that it was due only to his mother’s possessing ‘the 
highest sense of duty’ that she moved back to the family home when 
Christie was four years old.8 After an undistinguished school career at 
Eton and a spell in the army ended by a riding accident, Christie read 
sciences at Cambridge. He graduated in 1906 and spent sixteen years, 
with a break for war service in the army, teaching science at Eton. He 
had an early and long-lasting passion for the operas of Wagner, but at 
this stage no other connection with music or the arts in general.9  
The Glyndebourne estate had been in Christie’s family, not 
always in direct line of descent, from the fourteenth century.10 In 1913 
Christie’s father (presumably having overcome his jealousy) handed it 
over to his son, though it became John Christie’s in law only in 192011 
and his main residence in 1922.12 Christie’s idea of building an opera 
theatre at Glyndebourne dated from just after his marriage to the opera 
singer Audrey Mildmay in 1931.13 He intended that from its first season 
Glyndebourne should provide ‘“superb performances” which the public 
would treat with respect and not attempt to “sandwich between business 
interviews and a society party”’.14 He achieved this. The Press was 
‘unanimous that this was a venture to be taken seriously’, and from the 
 
7 Biographical material on Christie from Blunt and from Spike Hughes: Glyndebourne: A History of 
the Festival Opera (Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1965), hereafter ‘Hughes’. 
8 Blunt, p12 
9 See Blunt, pp22-39 
10 Hughes, pp15-20, provides a history of the house and estate from 1300 to Christie’s birth. 
11 Blunt, p56 
12 ibid, Chapters 6 and 7 passim 
13 Hughes, pp32-3 
14 Blunt, p161, quoting an article by Christie in the Monthly Musical Record for November 1933 
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start the BBC was ‘clamouring for permission to broadcast some of the 
performances’.15 This ensured a hearing for Christie’s views on the arts 
and arts funding; as will be seen, he often failed to make good use of 
these opportunities.  
Christie’s ambivalence towards the League of Audiences and 
Alfred Wareing in particular was explored earlier.16 He dismissed 
Wareing as ‘an infuriating old man’, but in late 1938 and 1939 he was 
not only the League’s largest donor but also, anonymously, a benefactor 
to Wareing himself when Wareing was in real financial need. The 
aspects of his character which this reveals – irascible, quixotic, 
generous, determined, irrational, overbearing – were apparent too in his 
work on arts funding. Isaiah Berlin wrote of Christie’s ‘peerless 
personality… the single-mindedness of a secular visionary… boldness, 
indomitable will and total independence’.17 These qualities were a huge 
asset in creating the Glyndebourne Festival, given that opera ‘was not 
part of the British cultural heritage’.18 But their corollary was obstinacy, 
rudeness, myopia and unconcealed contempt for those who did not share 
his views.19  
All this was clear from the start of his ‘Council of Power’ 
initiative, in February 1936. A letter to the critic Herbert Read contains 
the earliest record of his ideas.20 Opening with ‘Once more I need your 
help, in fact it is now impossible to get on without you’, Christie set out 
his opinion of the musical establishment: 
 
15 ibid, pp172 and 180 respectively 
16 See Chapter 5, pp115-7 
17 Isaiah Berlin: ‘Mozart at Glyndebourne half a century ago’, in John Higgins (ed): Glyndebourne – 
A Celebration (London: Jonathan Cape, 1984), p103   
18 ibid, p104 
19 Blunt’s book has the strengths and weaknesses of most authorised biographies, but does describe 
some of Christie’s less attractive characteristics.   
20 Glyndebourne archive: box ‘John Christie correspondence 1934-37; misc correspondence July 
1936-February 1940’ (hereafter: ‘Glyndebourne 1’), Christie-Herbert Read, 4/2/36, for all quotations 
in this paragraph.  
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I want to form a Royal Society of Music. There are only three musical bodies 
at the moment in England:- 
(1)  The Musicians Union – ignorant and hopeless. 
(2)  The Incorporated Society – nearly as bad. 
(3)  The Musicians Company – which as far as I know only dines and sleeps. 
Equally characteristic was his view of musicians themselves: ‘It is 
necessary to include leading musicians in the country, such as Donald 
Tovey… Most of the others will have to pull up their socks before they 
are admitted’; his wish for royal patronage; his lack of clarity about the 
aims of the proposed organisation: ‘I want your help in setting out the 
purposes of the Society and its ideals’; and his vanity: ‘The Society has 
got to be authoritative. In coming from Glyndebourne, it would, perhaps, 
have behind it the only authority which at present seems possible’.  
Christie proposed that ‘it should be called:- “THE ROYAL SOCIETY 
OF MUSIC (BRITISH EMPIRE)” ’. He did not at this stage envisage 
that the society should receive and distribute government money. Rather, 
‘if Music had an effective Society it would be able to command respect’ 
from government; and, somehow, this would lead to ‘help – financial 
and otherwise – for Music’.   
It would be easy to dismiss this as buffoonery; it was certainly 
woolly-minded and vague. No reply is preserved in the archive. But 
alongside Glyndebourne’s growing reputation, which made it difficult to 
dismiss Christie’s views, he had well-informed, influential and 
supportive advisers. Among these was Sir Alan ‘Tommy’ Lascelles, 
between 1935 and 1953 assistant private secretary or private secretary to 
all monarchs from George V to Elizabeth II.21 On 13 February 1936, a 
week after writing to Read and less than a month after George V’s death, 
Christie wrote to Lascelles seeking royal support for his ill-defined 
 
21 Frank Prochaska, ‘Lascelles, Sir Alan Frederick (1887–1981)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 [http://0-
www.oxforddnb.com.catalogue.ulrls.lon.ac.uk/view/article/31334, accessed 13 Aug 2014] 
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‘Royal Society of Music’.22 Lascelles was realistic but not totally 
discouraging: ‘The King… cannot be publicly associated with any new 
venture until it is actually in being and stands securely on a solid basis, 
of which financial security and public approval are the two obvious 
corner-stones. The King’s name cannot be associated with anything 
about which there is any danger of its being a “frost”’.23 But the King’s 
name might be associated with an organisation which ‘has justified its 
claim to exist and can show it has the backing of a body of people really 
representative of the cause for which it is working’.24 This set a high bar.  
Over the following eighteen months Christie devoted himself 
mainly to Glyndebourne. He made several unsuccessful approaches to 
the BBC for subsidy in return for broadcasting performances, the BBC 
paying instead a fee per broadcast,25 and to the Treasury for remission of 
Entertainments Duty on Glyndebourne performances.26 Christie returned 
to his broader national aims only in November 1937, in a long letter to 
the playwright, novelist and Independent MP A P Herbert setting out his 
ideas for ‘what I call, at the moment, a Council of Power’.27 This is the 
earliest traceable reference to the phrase; its origin is unclear, though it 
is characteristic of Christie. The letter suggests that Christie did not 
know Herbert well other than as an MP with artistic credentials, deeply 
involved in the campaign to repeal Entertainments Duty. Christie wanted 
a parliamentarian on his side, and ‘of all the people in the House, I 
would rather have you’. This regard may not have been reciprocated: the 
 
22 The Glyndebourne archive does not contain this letter; the date is taken from Lascelles’ reply of 
10/3/36, in Glyndebourne 1. 
23 ibid  
24 ibid 
25 Letters in Glyndebourne 1. 
26 See, generally, Chapter 9 
27 Glyndebourne archive: box ‘John Christie – letters re Glyndebourne Conference of Musicians 
5&6/3/1938 and 2/7/1938’ (hereafter ‘Glyndebourne 2’), Christie-A P Herbert, 6/11/37, for all 
quotations in this and the following three paragraphs. 
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Glyndebourne archive contains no reply from Herbert, and as will be 
seen below, Christie soon turned his attention to another MP. 
Christie wrote to Herbert that ‘we are trying to create a new 
industry, and we are trying to provide for the increased leisure of the 
people in time to come’. Achieving these aims should be masterminded 
by the Council of Power, consisting of ‘several people who may be 
musical but who are essentially wise and experienced’. They would not 
be musicians: ‘The advice I have been given by leading musicians has 
patently been colossally bad – I have not taken it.’. This small council 
would be ‘supported by a much larger and more or less ubiquitous 
Council’, but the smaller ‘should not be appointed by the larger 
Council’. Indeed, while the activities of the Council of Power were, as 
Christie expressed them, obscure, the role of the larger council was 
clear: window-dressing. 
By now Christie was hoping for public funding, but more from 
local than from central government: ‘My scheme avoids throwing more 
than a nominal expense on the Exchequer, but does throw an expense on 
the rates until the local people accept and use a new feature in their 
lives’. He claimed to oppose subsidised ticket prices, despite seeking 
subsidy for Glyndebourne, because ‘The curse of modern life seems to 
be cheapness, which, in Art or in Law is equally fatal’. The cost for 
central government would be ‘the expenses of headquarters, plus some 
special feature, such as the engagement of Toscanini…etc., for 
continuous periods of six months, or a year, or several years etc.’. There 
would also be ‘the salaries of say a dozen British conductors who would 
be working under the autocratic control of the world’s greatest 
conductors’. The emphasis on autocracy and on Christie’s concept of 
high standards was typical, as was the focus on music. He did ‘believe 
that Drama must be included… But there again… the problem is to 
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achieve the supremely good and to show up the bad commercial work 
with which the public is satisfied’. 
Christie hoped that the prestige of the Council of Power would 
persuade local authorities to provide guarantees against loss for concert 
series, one of his few specific proposals: ‘...local authorities would be 
failing if they did not make the scheme go’. The Council of Power 
would provide ‘the inspiration and education of the local authorities’, 
but Christie also saw a need for tactical schemes and (vaguely defined) 
legal powers. Concerning the former, ‘I should use dodges, such as 
allocating certain seats of honour to certain local magnates, in order… to 
obtain local glamour for the concerts’. As for legal powers, the League 
of Audiences’ Music and Drama Bill would be useful, though it would 
require ‘modification… because neither you nor I nor anyone else have 
any power to influence the local authorities, who are at present ignorant 
and ready to remain ignorant’. 
 
The Glyndebourne conference of March 1938  
 
Christie prepares 
Throughout this phase of his work Christie combined obsessive 
interest in ancillary detail, such as the constitution and composition of 
the Council of Power and the wider supporting council, some tactical 
ideas of possibly reasonable quality, such as the ‘seats of honour’ for 
local business people, and a lack of strategic grasp. He never managed to 
explain, for instance, why, except under legal compulsion, local 
authorities should accept his plans. Compared with Christie’s focus and 
skill in creating a world–class opera house from very little, his pre-war 
campaign for public funding of the arts was in many respects remarkably 
inept. Its significance became apparent in its next phase: two 
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conferences at Glyndebourne, in March and July 1938. These, as noted 
above, discussed, apparently for the first time, issues which were to be 
central to CEMA and the Arts Council: whether the primary purpose of 
public funding should be raising standards or reaching as many people 
as possible; and whether it should assist amateur music and drama or 
professional work alone.  
Christie’s key helper at this period was ‘one of John’s most loyal 
and devoted assistants’,28 his secretary W E Edwards. Edwards came to 
Glyndebourne in 1920 as an accountant for Ringmer Building Works, a 
large building business which Christie ran from the house.29 He 
eventually became responsible for administering most of Christie’s 
business activities, working for him until 1953. In 1968, when Wilfred 
Blunt’s biography was published, Edwards was still a director of 
Ringmer Building Works.30 Papers in the Glyndebourne archive show 
that at this period Edwards as much as Christie led the thinking on the 
proposed Council of Power, a term Edwards was fond of. He seems to 
have believed as much as Christie did in the need for strong central 
control exercised by Christie himself.  
The March 1938 conference originated in Edwards’ view, 
expressed in a letter to Christie,31 that there were several unco-ordinated 
initiatives seeking subsidy for the performing arts, notably the League of 
Audiences and the campaign to found a National Theatre, which 
‘continues with apparently no kind of solution to the problem of how it 
is to live’, and that there would be serious but unspecified problems 
‘unless a strong centralising lead comes along fairly early in the New 
Year [1938]’. Christie’s reply was mainly an attack on the principle of 
subsidy: ‘The cure must come by Music and Drama being fashionable… 
 
28 Blunt, p81 
29 ibid, p79 
30 ibid, p81 
31 Glyndebourne 2, Edwards-Christie, 29/12/37 
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rather than by subsidizing people’s absence [sic] and pretending that 
anyone who listens to Music and Drama must be poor. You can have 
cheap seats but you must also have expensive ones for people who can 
pay.... cheapening it… will make it unfashionable’.32 Despite not 
addressing Edwards’ points directly, and despite Christie’s apparent 
dislike of subsidy, in essence they agreed. The same day Edwards wrote 
to Christie, Christie himself wrote to his friend Robert Forbes, Principal 
of the Royal Manchester College of Music, that ‘The Country and the 
politicians pay little heed to musicians because they do not think them 
sensible. I believe very strongly that the solution of the problem lies in 
organization…. Intrigue and plotting at present prevent most of the 
advance that could be made… Life is complicated, but I am absolutely 
sure that I am right’.33  
Edwards sometimes outdid Christie in grandiose, authoritarian 
and vague language. Responding to Christie’s comments on subsidy, 
Edwards suggested that it was of ‘far-reaching importance… to find out 
whether the promoters of The Music and Drama Bill are intent upon 
only obtaining a “subsidy” or whether they are willing to have the Bill 
drawn up into a much higher category, as being the means by which 
your [Christie’s] National Control could be established’.34 But Edwards 
also attempted, mainly unsuccessfully, to prevent Christie pursuing 
vendettas. One was against a highly connected member of the BBC 
Music Department, Owen Mase, also in effect the representative in 
Britain of the conductor Arturo Toscanini35 and director of the London 
Music Festival. Christie was offended not to have been invited to join 
the festival committee: ‘I think they have shown great discourtesy to 
 
32 ibid, Christie-Edwards, 30/12/37 
33 ibid, Christie-Forbes, 29/12/37 
34 ibid, Edwards-Christie, 14/1/38 
35 See, generally, Christopher Dyment: Toscanini in Britain (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell Press, 
2012) 
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Glyndebourne and to me’.36 But Edwards saw  Mase, and the festival’s 
Chairman Sir Hugh Allen, as possible allies.37 Allen, the recently retired 
Director of the Royal College of Music, remained an influential figure in 
the British musical establishment. Edwards advised Christie that ‘little 
good could come of a direct attack with regard to the omission of a 
gesture to you or to Glyndebourne’.38 Fruitlessly: Christie had written to 
Mase the day before, to complain of a ‘wholly unnecessary act of 
discourtesy’.39 Mase played no part in Christie’s work, and Allen 
became something of a hate-figure to Christie.40 
Edwards’ attempts to ensure that the conference dealt with drama 
as well as music also foundered on Christie’s sensitivity to perceived 
slights. At Edwards’ suggestion, Christie invited Lord Lytton, Chairman 
of the Board of the Old Vic and Sadler’s Wells, to nominate a 
representative. Lytton’s nominee was Muriel Gough, a Sadler’s Wells 
governor.41 Christie’s response was graceless: ‘I was hoping to get from 
you a representative whose contribution would be… [more than as] a 
mere protagonist for Sadler’s Wells’.42 Though Gough attended the 
March conference, no further contact is recorded between Lytton and 
Christie.   
At this stage, however, relations were apparently cordial between 
Christie and John Maynard Keynes, who as Chairman of CEMA and 
subsequently the Arts Council became the key figure in arts funding in 
Britain during the war. Richard Witts claimed in Artist Unknown that 
Christie and Keynes had an ‘aversion for each other’, and that this 
somehow explained ‘why we have an Arts Council and not a Council of 
 
36 Glyndebourne 2, Christie-Rudolf Bing (Glyndebourne General Manager), 28/1/38 
37 ibid, Edwards-Christie, 26/1/38 
38 ibid 
39 ibid, Christie-Mase, 25/1/38 
40 See below and Chapter 7 
41 Susie Gilbert: Opera for Everybody: The Story of English National Opera (London: Faber and 
Faber, 2009 ), p68 
42 Glyndebourne 2, Christie-Lytton, 3/2/38  
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Music and the Arts’.43 The two fell out seriously after Keynes became 
Chairman of CEMA in 1942,44 but Witts provided no evidence of earlier 
animosity, failed to explain how an Arts Council differed from a Council 
for Music and the Arts, and offered no reason why any such difference 
might stem from Keynes’ and Christie’s mutual aversion. In 1937 their 
relationship was sufficiently positive for Keynes to invite Christie to a 
performance of Moliere’s The Misanthrope at the Cambridge Arts 
Theatre, starring his wife Lydia Lopokova.45 Furthermore Keynes 
respected Christie’s work at Glyndebourne. In a private letter to Sir 
Stephen Tallents, BBC Controller of Public Relations, in 1937,46 he 
urged that more opera be broadcast from Glyndebourne, and also ‘in the 
long period of the year when there is no opera, why not give the whole 
sequence of the Glyndebourne records?’.  
Relations still seemed satisfactory at the time of Christie’s 
conferences. As will be seen, Christie and Keynes had similar views on 
the type of ‘high art’ which deserved and needed government funding, 
and before the March conference Edwards recorded: ‘Mr Christie also 
wonders whether he should endeavour to get Mr. Keynes for this 
meeting; I thought it would be an excellent thing if he could do so’.47 
Keynes was invited, though declined due to ill health: ‘I am sorry to say 
that I am still out of health and unable, for the present, to accept any 
engagements.’.48 Given Christie’s chronic inability to conceal his 
feelings, the absence of overt hostility in his pre-war correspondence 
with Keynes almost certainly indicated an absence of underlying 
hostility. 
 
43 Witts, p9 
44 See, generally, Chapter 8 
45 Glyndebourne 1, Keynes-Christie 28/1/37  
46 Keynes-Tallents, 12/7/37, reprinted in Donald Moggridge (ed): The Collected Writings of John 
Maynard Keynes Volume XXVIII: Social, Political and Literary Writings (London: 
Macmillan/Cambridge University Press/Royal Economic Society, 1982), pp352-3 
47 Glyndebourne 2, file note by Edwards, 18/1/38 
48 ibid, Keynes-Christie 22/1/38 
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Christie suffered a perceived setback before the conference. He 
wrote to his wife, on operatic tour in Italy, that he was ‘a bit depressed 
about the result of my interview with the P.M.’s Secretary. He says that 
there is… no money for anything owing to Rearmament. So that my 
schemes however good or however bad can get no support’.49 The 
papers contain no other reference to this meeting, but it influenced 
Christie’s tactics for the conference: the aim ‘must be to formulate the 
scheme, put our house in order’. Once this was done, ‘if in such 
circumstances it is not fed [by government funding], it is being starved 
to death. The destruction would then be by the Government’.             
Despite Keynes’ absence, attendance at the March conference was 
varied and distinguished,50 though all but one of those present were men. 
There were more musicians than might have been expected from 
Christie’s writings, including the composer Ralph Vaughan Williams, 
the conductor Malcolm Sargent, and Sir Hugh Allen, despite the 
correspondence about the London Festival of Music. Their presence is 
the more surprising given Christie’s notes for his opening remarks, 
which included: ‘Ineffectiveness of musicians, shown by Entertainment 
Tax [presumably their failure to have it abolished]. Inability to use a 
musician or group of musicians – jealousy – temperament – training on 
too small lines’.51 But he was selective about the musicians he invited, 
being adamant, for instance, that Sir Thomas Beecham should not 
attend: ‘I am told that Beecham is hostile to me, and… he does nothing 
to suggest that he isn’t…. I think it is better to regard him as a conductor 
and that’s that! In every other connection he seems to fail’.52  
 
49 Glyndebourne archive: file ‘Family correspondence, 1934-41’, folder headed ‘John Christie to 
Audrey Christie, 1938’, Christie-Audrey Christie, 29[sic]/2/38 (presumably 28/2 or 1/3), for this and 
the following quotations 
50 Glyndebourne 2, document headed ‘LIST OF GUESTS FOR WEEK-END, MARCH 5TH-6TH, 
1938’ 
51 ibid, Christie’s typed notes for conference of 5-6/3/38 
52 ibid, Christie–Harry Colles, 24/1/38   
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Most non-musicians at the conference had some connection with 
music, though they also included the King’s private secretary Sir Alan 
Lascelles, to represent the Palace point of view.53 One participant 
particularly sympathetic to Christie’s approach was Robert Mayer, a 
businessman who in 1923 founded a highly successful and long-running 
series of children’s concerts, conducted by Adrian Boult and Malcolm 
Sargent, and in 1932 co-founded (with Beecham) the London 
Philharmonic Orchestra.54 He wrote to Christie before the conference:  
The time is ripe to turn England into a musical Mecca…. There are other 
similarities between you and us [sic]. We both created something where 
nothing existed before. We, like you, belong to the small minority which is 
building and never satisfied, in contra distinction to the mediocre and self-
satisfied man [sic] from which our profession is suffering badly.55 
The sentiments and their expression might have been Christie’s own.  
Although, as Edwards wrote to Christie, ‘the League [of 
Audiences] policy would not coincide with your own’,56 the League 
could not be ignored. Edwards preferred that Alfred Wareing not be 
invited, but this needed careful handling: ‘…you will need to have some 
right of interest in the [League’s] Music and Drama Bill, and… you can 
hardly by-pass Wareing, unless you get him willingly to agree that 
either, or both, Mr. Baker or Mr. Hodgkinson should be at the 
conference’.   
 Both Jo Hodgkinson, Chairman of the League’s Executive 
Committee, and Harold Baker, its Secretary and Treasurer, were 
invited.57 Wareing was not.  Hodgkinson was used as a bridge between 
 
53 ibid, file note by Edwards, 18/1/38 
54 Robert Armstrong, ‘Mayer, Sir Robert (1879–1985)’, rev. Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2011 [http://0-
www.oxforddnb.com.catalogue.ulrls.lon.ac.uk/view/article/31430, accessed 7 July 2014] 
55 Glyndebourne 2, Mayer-Christie, 19/1/38 
56 ibid, Edwards-Christie, 26/1/38, for this and the following quotation. 
57 On Hodgkinson and Baker and their work for the League see, generally, Chapter 5; for Baker see 
also Chapter 3, pp54-6 
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the League and Christie. In the note in which he discussed inviting 
Keynes, Edwards recorded ‘the desirability of the most careful 
consultation with Mr. Hodgkinson’ to discover the League’s view of 
‘Mr. Christie’s projected revision of the Music and Drama Bill’.58 Later, 
after ‘a long and interesting conversation with Hodgkinson’, Edwards 
decided that ‘he has a growing regard for your [Christie’s] scheme’.59 
Given the vagueness and shifting nature of Christie’s scheme, 
Hodgkinson may have been expressing general rather than specific 
support. But he was to be an important participant at the conference, 
specifically praised by Christie.  Harold Baker, unlike Hodgkinson, was 
a friend of Christie.60 Christie’s letter to Baker describing Alfred 
Wareing as ‘an infuriating old man’ dates from just before the 
conference.61 Even by Christie’s standards this letter was insensitive to 
his own weaknesses and to its recipient’s feelings. Christie wrote of ‘that 
damned old fool Wareing’ that ‘he listens to no one’ and described the 
League of Audiences as ‘the gathering together of a number of little 
people with small minds’.62 Baker took no apparent offence.   
Preparing for the conference, Edwards produced for Christie a 
comparison between the League’s proposals and his own.63 This was not 
an objective document (unsurprisingly, given his devotion to Christie 
and enthusiasm for the Council of Power) but nor was it wholly unfair. It 
accepted that under Christie’s scheme ‘the benefit will not be quickly 
apparent’, and its statement of aims was reasonable. The Council of 
Power sought ‘To Raise the standard of Music and Drama throughout 
the Country… To use and develop latent talent in the country…[and] 
 
58 Glyndebourne 2, file note by Edwards, 18/1/38 
59 ibid, Edwards-Christie, 26/1/38 
60 Baker’s friendship with Christie is clear from correspondence in the Glyndebourne archive, not 
from published sources.  
61 Glyndebourne 2, Christie-Baker, 4/2/38  
62 ibid 
63 ibid, manuscript document headed ‘SUGGESTED SCHEMES’, undated but from context February 
1938, for all quotations in this and the following paragraph. 
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create a larger listening public for first-class music by proper 
organisation and representation’. The League, by contrast, aimed ‘To 
combat mechanisation by increasing living music and drama…To 
promote the arts of music and drama by means of a Government 
subsidy… [and] Popularise music and drama “More, better, cheaper”’.  
Then Edwards’ objectivity slipped. Under the League’s proposals, 
‘a subsidy is going to enable second-class performances to continue’, 
while with Christie’s proposals ‘the money cannot get into the pockets 
of the wrong people, because it will be spent directly by the Council of 
Power’. The League would cause standards ‘to be lowered throughout’, 
whereas ‘Mr. Christie’s scheme works from the top – the initiative and 
activity comes from the leaders’. Christie and Edwards always assumed 
that this top-down system, with Christie at the top, would of itself lead to 
higher standards. The leaders – the Council of Power itself – would be ‘a 
self-appointed voluntary body of people… [acting as] the executive in 
organising music and in particular setting up permanent orchestras’. It 
would ‘be supported by a larger body of musicians who would be able to 
present their point of view to the Council of Power… The Government 
should grant loans through the Council of Power… Municipalities would 
be required to support the scheme’.  
Before the conference, Christie also discussed his ideas with 
Adrian Boult, the BBC’s Director of Music and principal conductor of 
its symphony orchestra.64 In a follow-up letter, he revealed surprising 
insecurity: ‘I know that I have got to put my case with much greater 
feeling and inspiration on March 5th than I did yesterday’; but he 
concluded, more typically: ‘…simple honesty of purpose will win rather 
than intrigue… I am inclined to ignore the alleged tales of hostility one 
 
64 Briggs, pp170-84 
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hears because they seem so silly’.65 Boult sought to reassure him: ‘…the 
people you mentioned as coming to Glyndebourne for your Conference 
will be whole-heartedly out to help matters. I do not think you need fear 
intrigue’.66   
 
Discussion at the conference 
Christie’s introductory remarks to the conference were delivered 
‘in the ORGAN ROOM – 9.30p.m. (Port on the tables)’.67 The highly 
detailed minutes contain only brief references to international tensions. 
Christie himself commented that ‘There is no Government subsidy likely 
to be forthcoming until the re-armament question is over’.68 Jo 
Hodgkinson disagreed, suggesting that ‘The Government was rushed 
into finding millions for the Physical Training and Recreation Act,69 and 
such a distinguished body as yourselves could soon rush them into 
finding money for music’.70 These comments were more typical of the 
conference than Christie’s: discussion centred on where, how and by 
whom public money should be spent, not on how to persuade the 
government to part with it.  
The most important issue aired at the March 1938 conference was 
whether the key priority for arts policy and subsidy should be raising 
standards or widening availability. Alfred Wareing rarely addressed this 
explicitly, though Christie and Edwards believed that Christie aimed at 
‘better’, the League at ‘more’.71 The tension between these two priorities 
existed from the early days of CEMA and has continued throughout the 
Art’s Council’s existence. Keynes as Chairman of CEMA was in 
 
65 Glyndebourne 2, Christie-Boult, 16/2/38 
66 ibid, Boult-Christie, 19/2/38 
67 ibid, unsigned note to Christie headed ‘Time-table and information’  
68 ibid, minutes of conference of 5-6/3/38  
69 See Chapter 3, pp60-1 
70 op cit, conference minutes 
71 See note 63 
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Christie’s camp: in his study of CEMA, Fred Leventhal described 
Keynes as ‘unashamedly elitist’.72 But both CEMA and the Arts Council 
for decades sought to paper over the cracks by use of the formula ‘the 
best for the most’. According to Leventhal the phrase was coined by Ivor 
Brown, Wareing’s friend and at the time working for CEMA and editor 
of its bulletin. Leventhal commented that Brown ‘was, perhaps not 
unwittingly, seeking to reconcile two divergent currents’.73 The phrase 
fails in this aim: in a situation of limited resources choices are 
unavoidable, and ‘the best for the most’ provides little guidance to 
making such choices.   
Jo Hodgkinson recognised the issue during the March conference: 
‘Supposing the State is willing to find money for Music and Drama, it 
will be limited in any case. Supposing you had to judge how that money 
should be spent. Would it be concentrated in first-class Opera Houses, 
first-class Orchestras and first-class Theatres, or to be spread over the 
whole Country [sic]’.74   He had no answer to the dilemma: ‘It is not 
unlikely that the Government will find money for this… When we have 
got the money there will be important things to decide – whether the 
money should be spent on the masses in the state or on standard. 
Personally I cannot make up my mind on this…’. ‘Standard’ was a 
common usage at the time for what would now be ‘standards’.  
Christie had no such hesitancy. His own concept of excellence 
always came first: ‘I quite agree that we should let the mob hear 
Opera… there should be some performances which are reserved for the 
poor (our dress rehearsals)…In working for a higher standard of music, 
of course we want to get the mob interested… what I am alarmed at is 
that the mob should control music, because their taste is so bad’. At this 
 
72 Leventhal, p317, and see, generally, Chapter 8 
73 Leventhal, p297 
74 Glyndebourne 2, minutes of conference of 5-6/3/38, for all quotations in this and the following six 
paragraphs except where specified otherwise.  
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point Ralph Vaughan Williams intervened: ‘Could I ask Mr Christie 
what he means by “the mob”?’. Christie’s reply was: ‘The cinema 
crowd’. Vaughan Williams was the strongest proponent of the contrary 
view: ‘We want to make opera popular and the thing that everyone 
wants to go to, from the richest to the poorest. We may have to leave out 
perfection to get popularity’. Malcolm Sargent agreed: ‘I think that if we 
cannot get the standard of Glyndebourne everywhere it is better to have 
a lower standard than none at all, for the ordinary person’.  
Also relevant to the future CEMA and Arts Council, Vaughan 
Williams sought to discuss support for music-making by amateurs. In a 
1932 lecture75 he had connected this with concern about ‘machine-made 
music’76: ‘Gramophones and wireless have brought the world’s riches to 
the doors of the humblest, but if we all become listeners, there will soon 
be no one left to listen to. Modern invention is tending to make us 
content only with the cream of music, but where will the cream come 
from if there is no milk to skim it off?’. At the Glyndebourne conference 
he argued that ‘it is important that we shall become, not a Nation of 
music listeners, but of music makers’. He linked this with the campaign 
for high standards by arguing that amateur music-making was not only 
good in itself but would raise professional standards by forming a 
discerning and critical audience and as the soil from which future 
professional musicians might grow: ‘When people start making music 
they discriminate for themselves. We have magnificent orchestras at the 
moment, but they will get past their best. Who is to take their place?’.  
 
75 Reprinted in Ralph Vaughan Williams: National Music and Other Essays (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1963), p68; hereafter ‘National Music’ 
76 See Chapter 4, pp72-75 
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The argument that ‘educated amateurs’ helped maintain high 
professional standards was current also in the musical press. In August 
1937, for instance, a Musical Times article77 had suggested that: 
…People who can do something for themselves are better able to judge the 
merits of other people’s performances…. the League of Audiences… points 
out the paradox that in this mechanized age the survival of personal 
interpretation in music and the preservation of the inspiration of sophisticated 
audiences have become imperative. 
No-one responded to Vaughan Williams’ arguments, but the issue of 
amateur art featured more strongly in Christie’s July conference. 
Vaughan Williams also raised the issue of national art. This was a 
recurring theme for him in the 1930s: his 1932 lecture had been one of a 
course of lectures on the subject delivered at Bryn Mawr College, 
Pennsylvania.78 At the conference he said: ‘We all admire your 
performances [at Glyndebourne], but it is only through your personal 
initiative that these performances are taking place in England…. They 
might have been in any other part of the world…. We must aim at an art 
made by our own people’. Again Sargent agreed, explicitly linking this 
with the question of artistic standards: ‘I admire Glyndebourne very 
much; it is the best opera I have ever been to and I admire you [Christie] 
for creating it, but I would admire you much more if you did not care 
what the Foreigner thinks’. 
Aside from these questions of principle, discussion at the 
conference focused on how to structure government support of the arts. 
Ideas ranged from some which remained current in the Arts Council for 
several decades to others either trivial or prejudiced. Among the former 
were Malcolm Sargent’s thoughts on the role of local government, in 
 
77 Cecil Palmer: ‘Music and Personal Interpretation’, The Musical Times, Vol 78 No 1134, August 
1937, p697  
78 Reprinted in National Music, pp1-82 
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particular the potential for matched funding challenges to coax local 
authorities to spend: 
More good could be done by the local Corporation than the State with regard 
to local music. They know local artists… The combination of the State with 
the Corporation would be the easiest method…. If it were known that if £500 
would be given from the Corporation and £500 from the State funds, it would 
be a grand thing. The more they give, the more they will get, and the 
ratepayers will feel that they are getting something from the State. 
This was not the first time Sargent had made this suggestion. He had 
written to The Times about it in June 1937, suggesting that among its 
advantages would be the provision of subsidy for music without ‘the 
dangers which can result when any form of artistic enterprise is 
controlled by a Government department’.79 But as with Vaughan 
Williams’ case for supporting amateurs, this went unanswered; Sargent 
later in the conference asked plaintively ‘I should like to know what is 
the snag in my idea of a £ to £ basis, which seems to me very good’.        
Jo Hodgkinson attempted to reconcile the views expressed at the 
conference: wider availability or higher quality; support for amateur art 
or for professionals only; local funding or a central distributing body, in 
Christie’s words, ‘autocratic and protected from abuse by politicians and 
the public’. Despite his role in the League of Audiences, Hodgkinson 
was remarkably willing to cede leadership, suggesting that ‘Mr. Christie 
should call together some men to form a National Council…. What we 
want is a National Body, without money, which could act in pulling 
together all interests… The Government won’t do anything until such a 
body is formed and has respect and trust all round’. Hodgkinson was 
even ready to concede substantial control over the League’s Music and 
Drama Bill: ‘…it has been decided to redraft the whole Bill. It has been 
decided to call representatives of all organizations, which might be said 
 
79 23/6/37, p12; see also Chapter 9, p295 
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to have a personal interest, round a table to state their opinions. Could 
Mr. Christie send representatives from this Conference to this meeting, 
and could we agree to work together?’. Hodgkinson may have been 
carried away by the moment: there is nothing in the League’s papers to 
suggest that Alfred Wareing had agreed to or even knew about this offer, 
and Wareing was as little inclined to compromise as Christie himself.  
Even with Hodgkinson’s diplomatic skills, consensus was likely 
to be either impossible or empty of substance. In this case it was the 
latter – a resolution both vacuous and obscure: ‘The Conference passed 
the following resolution:- 
“A Committee should be appointed to consider whether they 
could appoint some Body who would gain the respect of the 
whole Country”.’. 80   
In a considerable overstatement Richard Witts claimed of the 
March 1938 conference that ‘In that astonishing weekend the group 
defined all the basics of the Arts Council’.81 This was by no means the 
case. Important topics were raised (like Sargent on matched funding, and 
Vaughan Williams on the support of amateur arts) but not pursued; and 
Christie’s obstinacy and obsessions did the event no favours. But the 
conference certainly deserves more attention than it has received. It aired 
crucial dilemmas, practical questions and philosophical issues around 
state funding of the arts, and demonstrated, contrary to the views of most 
commentators, that these were debated actively and intensely in the 
1930s. It constitutes an important and forgotten part of the Arts 
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The July 1938 conference 
 
Despite Hodgkinson’s lame conference resolution, Christie was 
full of praise for him. He wrote to his friend Harry Colles, music editor 
of The Times:  
I think you will now have realised that the success of our operations was due 
to the wide, wise and strong element of the non-professional at our meeting. 
The vested interests did not know how strong we were…. The ball was 
definitely rolling to them when… they roused Hodgkinson, who, in a 
masterly speech at precisely the right time, won the day.82 
Christie was well pleased with the conference. He wrote to another 
friend, the singer Roy Henderson: ‘I am sure we are on the right track in 
concentrating on standard. I am sure that the standard is often impossibly 
low’.83 Henderson was a strong ally. In an undated letter to Christie from 
this period he wrote: ‘…this is one hell of a life for anyone who feels 
that there is value in correct notes, correct time and rhythm and a 
dynamic range down to ppp’.84 Christie confided to Colles one area of 
failure: ‘…there was one person with whom I entirely failed to make a 
contact – Miss Muriel Gough [the Old Vic/Sadler’s Wells nominee] – 
but I can only say that Rhona Byron [a friend and neighbour of 
Christie],85 who is level-headed and sensible, thought Miss Gough as 
stupid as I did. She would not listen, but persisted in talking…’;86 a 
frequent Christie complaint.      
The committee taking forward Hodgkinson’s resolution consisted 
of Christie, Frank Eames, Secretary of the Incorporated Society of 
Musicians (ISM), which Christie had criticised so severely, Hodgkinson 
himself and Robert Mayer, the businessman and supporter of music for 
 
82 Glyndebourne 2, Christie-Colles, 8/3/38 
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84 ibid, Henderson-Christie, undated 
85 Blunt, p220 
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  159 
young people.87 ‘The profession’ was in a minority of one. Each member 
approached the task differently. Christie used the committee to further 
his focus on musical standards and on vague means of achieving this. 
From now on, the initiative was almost exclusively about music; he 
dropped his already very secondary focus on drama. Hodgkinson 
continued to try to keep the peace. Mayer worked behind the scenes, 
providing private advice to Christie. He argued, for instance, that it was 
unrealistic and damaging to distinguish between ‘good music and “mere 
entertainment”’, 88 since local councils would not accept this: ‘Take a 
concrete case: Bournemouth subsidises an orchestra with a proviso that 
there are (x) concerts of classical music and (x) concerts of light music; 
you could not separate the two…. without the mixture they would not 
subsidise anything at all’. This was sound advice, on which Christie did 
not act.  
The fourth member, Eames, wrote a paper simultaneously 
detailed, vague and bureaucratic, setting out possible aims and terms of 
reference for the proposed national organisation.89 Its primary purpose 
would be ‘To promote the best interests of the Art of Music throughout 
the United Kingdom and any other countries’. The first proposed sub-
purpose was ‘To admit to representation on the Council such 
institutions, societies, committees or other bodies incorporated or 
unincorporated in such manner as may from time to time be determined’. 
Its functions would include: ‘To watch over legislation affecting 
Music… and to oppose any legislation considered harmful to Music and 
generally to watch over, promote and safeguard the interests of Music’.  
Given thinking and writing of this quality, it is no surprise that the 
committee’s report, produced for Christie’s conference in July 1938, 
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lacked substance apart from listing the organisations which might send 
representatives to constitute the ‘Body who would gain the respect of the 
whole country’, with few suggestions about what it might actually do.90 
By now it was called the National Council of Music (NCM). The 
committee envisaged there being twenty-one ‘ordinary members’ and a 
separate, subordinate group of one hundred ‘representative members’, 
drawn from organisations as diverse as the Welsh Education Board, the 
BBC, the ISM, the seven major music schools and the County Councils 
Association. Compiling the ‘representative members’ list was mainly 
Frank Eames’ work. Christie and Robert Mayer showed more 
enthusiasm for the twenty-one ‘ordinary members’, where they 
envisaged power residing.   
Writing to Keynes, Christie explained that they would be ‘21… 
people of wide experience of life’; then ‘music… will speak sensibly, 
because it will have to carry these 21 with it and this rules out pettiness, 
intrigues and feuds’.91 The letter is further evidence that Christie thought 
well of Keynes at this stage. Christie was ‘delighted to hear’ that Keynes 
would be attending the July conference, wondered whether Keynes’ wife 
would be present, and hoped that he might arrive early so Christie could 
explain his proposals. Christie had also ‘ventured to suggest your name 
as one of these 21’. In fact Keynes wrote two days later withdrawing 
from the conference, once again citing ill-health.92   
Robert Mayer produced his own list of possible ‘ordinary 
members’, his secretary noting that he had included women in his list, 
since in Mayer’s view, ‘we can usefully imitate the U.S.A. where 
women take a much larger part in the administration of music….’.93 The 
women he suggested included the pacifist and social reformer Dame 
 
90 ibid, report of committee appointed at conference of 5-6/3/38 
91 ibid, Christie-Keynes, 18/6/38, for this and the following three quotations. 
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Elizabeth Cadbury and Baroness Ravensdale, daughter of Lord 
Curzon,94 neither of whom appears to have had much connection with 
music; though according to her entry in the Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography Baroness Ravensdale began in 1917 a lifetime of 
voluntary work by singing at a boys’ club in the East End of London.95 
Mayer’s list also included Keynes, R H Tawney and Lord Macmillan, 
who became Minister of Information on the outbreak of war and was the 
first Chairman of CEMA. 
There was considerable overlap between attendance at the March 
and July conferences. Jo Hodgkinson was again present, this time with 
his Toynbee Hall boss James Mallon, also active in the League of 
Audiences.96 As in March there was strong representation from 
practicing musicians, including, again, Ralph Vaughan Williams. And as 
in March the conference apparently saw little threat in the international 
situation. Indeed, Christie suggested a positive side: ‘We have got a 
marvellous opportunity. The rest of the World is upside down and 
England is stable’.97 But he compared England unfavourably to Austria, 
where ‘everyone seems to talk about music’. His opening remarks had 
two familiar themes: ‘If you want people to respect music, I believe that 
you have got to concentrate on the standard of performance’; and ‘If we 
could get the representation of music sufficiently authoritative, I believe 
that the Government and other people would pay attention’. For Christie, 
‘The existence of Entertainments Tax proves that there is no authority at 
the moment’. Frank Eames responded that ‘it was entirely due to the 
work of the I.S.M. that the Entertainments Tax was removed from Music 
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Societies’. This was far from true.98 Christie then illustrated the sort of 
person he had in mind to represent music:  
…I suggest a man such as Archibald Sinclair, Leader of the Liberal Party. He 
has got four million votes and is a power in the country. If people like that 
came to the conclusion that musicians were right… it would be difficult for 
the Government not to accept their opinion… it would be a tremendous asset 
to Professional musical opinion if it could be backed by consultation with 
people such as Archie Sinclair.  
Christie’s paean to Sinclair then tailed off rather bizarrely: ‘He has done 
nothing for music, and has achieved nothing, but it would, I believe, help 
in that way’.   
When Eames introduced the committee’s report, it became clear 
that his view of the proposed council differed fundamentally from 
Christie’s. Eames expressed no interest in the distinguished ‘ordinary 
members’; he supported the council’s lobbying for state funding of 
music; but before that could happen ‘We want a complete statistical 
survey of music in this Country. Such a survey is necessary before the 
Council could approach the Government on any scheme for State Aid 
for Music’. This was a view Christie came round to several years later.99 
But the following exchange makes it difficult to understand why Eames 
had laboured so painstakingly on the council’s membership and 
procedures – apparently he wished it to be powerless: 
Dr.[James]Mallon: The words REFERENCE or ADVISORY do not 
sufficiently express the nature of the new body… I suggest “Co-ordinating 
Body” or some word which suggests the power to initiate…. 
Mr. Eames: I would like to suggest that it is most important that the initiative 
of this Council should be very severely restricted. 
The July conference involved much discussion of this type, and 
still more about which organisations should be entitled to nominate 
 
98 See Chapter 9 
99 See Chapter 8 
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‘representative members’ to the national council (orchestras? music 
publishers? agents?). But the conference was more notable for Vaughan 
Williams championing the cause of amateur music-making. He argued 
that ‘the backbone of music is the amateur. I am all for having ideals of 
high standards, but this must not discourage people…. Our object should 
be to raise the standard of music all over England… What we want is a 
clause [in the statement of the council’s functions] to encourage 
everyone to make their own music’. Christie’s friend Harold Baker 
proposed the addition of a clause drafted by Christie: ‘To make a 
continuous effort to improve the standard of performance of music in 
England, with a view to raising the status of music in our lives’. This, he 
suggested, supported both amateur music-making and high performance 
standards. Vaughan Williams agreed: ‘“To maintain a high standard” 
treads on nobody’s toes’. But Robert Mayer, without explanation, 
described it as ‘a dangerous clause’. With no further discussion it was 
rejected as a power for the national council, instead becoming part of the 
preamble to its terms of reference. 
The outcome of this conference too lacked substance: another 
committee to take forward the creation of the National Council of Music. 
Christie, Eames and Mayer were agreed as members of this committee 
as of the previous one; Robert Forbes and George Dyson (see below) 
were added; but Jo Hodgkinson had had enough: ‘I think my work is 
finished with the work of the small interim Committee’. The minutes 
also include an enigmatic contribution by the concert promoter Harold 
Holt about the committee’s membership: ‘I suggest Sir Thomas 
Beecham. I withdraw that suggestion’; without intervening comments. 
Then the participants adjourned for a performance of Verdi’s 
Macbeth. 
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Christie in the approach to war 
 
Robert Forbes, Principal of the Royal Manchester College of 
Music and now one of Christie’s committee, was a strong ally. 
Following the July conference they reflected on the conference, musical 
standards and amateur music-making. Forbes believed that Christie’s 
work at Glyndebourne had already ‘done more for the prestige of 
English music than generations of choral societies, amateur orchestras, 
colleges…, schools of native composers, doctors of music and all the 
rest of the paraphernalia we look upon as our “National Musical 
Life”’.100 Forbes ‘was quite horrified at the outlook of people like 
Vaughan Williams, to whom standards of performance mean nothing. … 
This complacent contentment with mediocrity on the part of our so-
called leaders of music in England has been a curse for many years’. 
Forbes’s extremism was to continue into wartime.101 Christie’s reply 
was, for him, remarkably moderate: ‘I agree with Vaughan Williams that 
we do not want a Nation of listeners, like America, and, in fact, neither 
my effort at standard nor Vaughan Williams’ effort at public-house 
music [sic] is in itself complete. I think that Vaughan Williams is really 
coming round to see that both are necessary’.102 But ‘I can see so clearly 
that the prestige of music depends at this moment more on the standard 
of performance than on the number of people making music. The 
immediate purpose is to gain respect for music as such’.  
Christie’s next approach suggests a shift from this uncharacteristic 
moderation to something far less balanced. In October 1938 he wrote to 
Lady Reading,103 who later founded and chaired the Women’s Voluntary 
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Service.104 The letter was a distorted echo of discussion at the 
conferences, a remarkable communication from a man taken seriously in 
the world of music, and with substantial artistic, business and political 
contacts, to someone he scarcely knew. He chose Lady Reading as the 
recipient ‘because as you will remember I was so much impressed by 
your conversation with me at dinner’. He proceeded to offer alarming 
confidences and make still more alarming claims. He regarded 
Glyndebourne as ‘only the first step’ in his mission. Using its prestige as 
‘an acknowledged and undisputed International achievement’, he wanted 
to use it as ‘the background of very much bigger and more important 
work… a National Council of Music, which shall be the sole and 
absolute Authority for music in the British Isles’. Concerning his 
credentials, Christie provided an account of the conferences rather 
different from their minutes: ‘I summoned the leading musical people in 
England to two conferences at Glyndebourne with a view to the National 
Council of Music, and was told by them that, owing to the achievement 
of Glyndebourne, I was the one person in the country who had the right 
to summon them’. He suggested that ‘a Committee is at work on what 
should be the final details’. He did not explain the purpose or methods of 
the ‘sole and absolute Authority for music’, and his account of the 
committee formed at the July conference was simply untrue. W E 
Edwards recorded in a memo (undated, but probably from early 1939) 
that ‘There has up to the present time been no formal meeting of that 
Committee… Mr Christie’s desire is not to press for work through that 
Committee at the moment’.105  
This was probably because Christie wanted any committee to be 
subordinate to him, as he explained with bizarre candour to Lady 
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Reading: ‘I hear on all sides that I have succeeded because I am an 
autocrat and not a Committee’. Alongside his national council he wished 
to form ‘a Trust for music… I want £1,000,000 and I want the Trust 
controlled by me, as an autocrat, with an Advisory and Consultative 
Committee which can only talk and not decide….’. As if writing of a 
third party, he ‘believe[d] that this basis is the right basis and that it will 
receive the support of other people… I cannot but believe that the 
Dictator of this Trust would act wisely…’.  The trust ‘would be a force 
the Government would have to reckon with if the Government started 
interfering with music’. He was silent on what the trust would do, but 
continued baldly: ‘I want to find some very rich person who will give 
the million…’. Finally he explained what he sought from Lady Reading: 
‘Would you interest yourself as the link between me and such a 
benefactor?’. 
Unsurprisingly, Lady Reading’s answer was ‘No’: ‘…I fear that I 
may have raised in your mind, hopes and expectations which, much as I 
would wish to do so, I am quite unable to implement… frankly I have 
not amongst my acquaintances anyone who I think might possibly be 
prepared to offer £1,000,000 for your scheme’.106 She did accept that 
‘there are people with money, and if one knew how to get hold of them 
they might put it up; people like Lady Yule, Lord Nuffield and very 
possibly extremely rich Welsh people who being such lovers of music 
might be prepared to act on its behalf’.  
This correspondence showed Christie’s delusional side. His 
dealings around this time with 10 Downing Street were more rational. 
He had several exchanges of letters with Neville Chamberlain and with 
Lord Dunglass, later Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Chamberlain’s 
 
106 Glyndebourne 2, Reading-Christie, 11/11/38, for this and the following quotation 
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Parliamentary Private Secretary.107 Writing to Dunglass in February 
1939 Christie explained that he was addressing him rather than 
Chamberlain because ‘I do not think it fair to ask him [Chamberlain] in 
these difficult times and when the Labour Party are behaving so badly, 
to give up his time to consider my problem’.108 The problem was whom 
to appoint to the NCM. Christie’s proposed categories of member 
suggested a nod towards Vaughan Williams’ view of amateurs: ‘1. 
Leading musicians in England. 2. Most important – in fact more 
important than the leading musicians!...  (a) Musical amateurs… (b) 
Men of great distinction in England who would think it worth while to 
advise and support music, professional and non-professional’. He sought 
Chamberlain’s advice on this last category, explaining that: 
I have already talked to Archie Sinclair about it and obtained his general 
approval. My own view is that Chamberlain would be almost the most 
suitable of all because he is a man who, of all the leading politicians, is 
almost alone in actually showing some interest in music. Sam Hoare has been 
to Glyndebourne, but I don’t know him personally.  
Christie displayed his less rational side in suggesting that professional 
musicians ‘have been such fools and have done their work so badly that 
the politicians would be justified in turning round and giving them a 
damned good thrashing’. And his lack of interest in the international 
situation perhaps showed in his noting, simply as an issue of timing, that 
‘I am going to Germany early next week’.   
Dunglass replied the next day. While ‘the P.M. is overwhelmed 
with work over the next week or so and I am doubtful whether, as P.M., 
he could be actively associated with such a body… he will I know be 
very much interested & I should like to talk the matter over with him’.109 
 
107 ‘Lord Dunglass’ was a courtesy title which did not prevent his being an MP: 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alec-Douglas-Home, accessed 9/8/18  
108 Glyndebourne 2, Christie-Dunglass, 1/2/39, for all quotations in this paragraph 
109 ibid, Dunglass-Christie, 2/2/39 
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He seems to have done so: the archive contains a list of possible national 
council members which, according to W E Edwards’ covering note, was 
‘a copy of the list of names given to you [Christie] by the Prime 
Minister’.110 Elsewhere in the archive is what appears to be the original 
list, unsigned but on paper headed ‘Prime Minister’.111 There were 
nineteen names, including Tom Jones, who was to be the prime mover 
behind CEMA and Lord Macmillan, its first Chairman; two Court of 
Appeal judges; several active or retired politicians, mainly Liberal or 
National Liberal, including Archibald Sinclair and Reginald McKenna, 
but also the Labour politician Hugh Dalton; Sir Montagu Norman, 
Governor of the Bank of England; Sir John Reith, recently retired as 
Director-General of the BBC; Lord Howard de Walden, who, among 
other links with the arts, had hosted the League of Audiences’ first ‘at 
home’ in May 1935;112 and J B Priestley. Despite its distinction, the list 
is significant more for showing that Chamberlain took Christie’s 
initiative seriously than for its consequences: there is no evidence that 
Christie used it. 
Christie’s direct correspondence with Chamberlain was fairly 
frequent but mainly at a courtesy level – for instance, an invitation from 
Christie to Verdi’s Macbeth at Glyndebourne in May 1939, and 
Chamberlain’s reply that he had already arranged to see it in July: ‘I am 
looking forward very much to the occasion, and hope that I may have the 
pleasure of seeing you and Mrs Christie then’.113 The Times later 
reported114 that Chamberlain and his wife ‘were guests of John 
Christie… and sat in his private box. When the lights went up… the 
audience turned towards the box and stood cheering and clapping 
 
110 ibid, Edwards-Christie, 19/4/39, covering list of names headed by Lord Alness.  
111 Glyndebourne archive: box entitled ‘National Council of Music – Minutes and Correspondence 
1940-1942 (hereafter ‘Glyndebourne 3’), undated manuscript note.  
112 See Chapter 3, p54 
113 Glyndebourne 2, Chamberlain-Christie, 27/5/39; Christie’s invitation is not in the archive  
114 3/7/39 
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continuously for over a minute’. Their correspondence, which included 
offers of help by Christie when war broke out, continued almost until 
Chamberlain’s death in 1940.115 But in July 1939 Christie instead 
approached Dunglass again.116  
This was in effect a begging letter on behalf of Glyndebourne, and 
apparently followed a meeting the previous day. Christie began by 
thanking Dunglass for his help and ‘in case it may be of use to you… 
setting down one or two points that I made’.  It, and Dunglass’ reply, 
reveal Christie’s inconsistent approach to the question of subsidy, and 
the government’s view of it at the time. Christie wrote that 
Glyndebourne was ‘self-supporting if people buy the tickets’, but that he 
could not build up reserves to cover losses in ‘a bad year Internationally, 
or perhaps from Labour troubles’. Accordingly, in order to maintain ‘the 
prestige of the Festival in the eyes of the world, and so… the prestige of 
British music, which, as you know, is my essential concern, I am asking 
for £10,000 a year for a few years’. Christie bolstered this appeal with 
three arguments. First: ‘So much money is taken by the Government out 
of music, it does not seem much to put back. If I had had £5,000 a year 
subsidy since I started, I should already have £30,000… to build up a 
reserve’. Second, ‘Covent Garden has, after all, much more than this, 
and has only paid this subsidy to the foreign artists who arrive the day 
before and leave the day after with their fees’.117 Third, ‘the National 
Council of Music should be formed after the holidays [that is, in autumn 
1939], but it will be a little embarrassing for me immediately to ask their 
help as their first official duty’.  
Dunglass replied on 18 August, two weeks before the outbreak of 
war: ‘I find that the chances of a Treasury subsidy for Glyndebourne are, 
 
115 See Chapter 7, pp173 and 186-7 
116 Glyndebourne 2, Christie-Dunglass, 18/7/39, for all quotations in the following paragraph 
117 The subsidy to Covent Garden in the early 1930s was considered briefly in Chapter 2, p36. 
  170 
at present at least, not worth pursuing. I am met at every turn by the 
contention that a subsidy could not be justified… to something which 
caters to the comparatively wealthy’.118 He recommended that Christie 
apply for funds to the Pilgrim Trust, a reasonable suggestion given that 
three months later the Pilgrim Trust provided the initial funding for what 
became CEMA. Christie seems not to have followed it up.   
Christie’s statement that the NCM was close to being set up was 
as false in July 1939 as it had been in October 1938 when made to Lady 
Reading. But the prospect and then the declaration of war seemed 
temporarily to spur him on. In August 1939 he tried to organise yet 
another conference, to take place at his Devon home from 22 to 25 
September: ‘I am going to endeavour to get some special fares for the 
journey from the Southern Railway’.119 He pursued the idea into 
September, writing to George Dyson, Director of the Royal College of 
Music, six days after war was declared: ‘I believe that our Council 
should be formed now and that we should not wait for Peace’.120 He 
proposed that the conference go ahead as planned: ‘We have still got our 
servants and our house. The trains down here from London are at present 
not too full’.121 The conference was finally postponed at four days’ 
notice, Christie hoping, as it turned out, in vain, that it would take place 
‘in two or three weeks’ time’.122 Even Robert Forbes, among Christie’s 
most like-minded friends, wrote that while he ‘had not heard… that the 
conference was postponed, I naturally assumed that it was bound to be 
for the present’.123  
 
 
118 Glyndebourne 2, Dunglass-Christie, 18/8/39 
119 ibid, Christie-Sir Walford Davies (Master of the King’s Music), 11/8/39; there are similar letters, 
of the same date, to other leading musicians including Ralph Vaughan Williams.  
120 ibid, Christie-Dyson, 9/9/39 
121 ibid 
122 Glyndebourne 2, Christie to the invitees, 18/9/39  
123 ibid, Forbes-Christie, 22/9/39 
  171 
Conclusion 
 
John Christie had many qualities of a pioneer, including energy, 
vision and self-belief. These were evident in his creating the 
Glyndebourne Festival, from its earliest years recognised as providing 
the highest standard of opera performances in Britain – for those with 
sufficient money and time. But as he said in a radio talk in July 1939, 
‘Glyndebourne… is the first step in our work. Our real purpose is to 
raise the status of music in England’.124 This chapter has recorded his 
steps towards this larger goal up to the outbreak of war – determined, 
clumsy, sometimes deluded, always eccentric. It has also discussed 
debates which Christie’s work opened up, about state support of 
amateurs and professionals in the arts and the inherent tensions between 
supporting high standards and promoting wide availability. Historians of 
CEMA and the Arts Council and cultural commentators more widely 
agree that these were and are issues central to the relationship between 
the state and the arts, but none except for Richard Witts in Artist 
Unknown has considered John Christie’s role in creating a forum for 
these debates.  
Apart from Glyndebourne itself, Christie had little success by 
September 1939 in ‘raising the status of music in England’. But his 
conferences and lobbying meant that artists, arts administrators and (to 
some extent) politicians were for the first time considering these issues 
of arts policy. He strengthened his efforts during the war. The following 
two chapters discuss Christie’s wartime attempts to create the National 
Council of Music, and suggest that they too have an importance in 
British cultural history which has been undeservedly overlooked. 
  
 
124 ibid, text of  interval talk in a BBC broadcast of Verdi’s Macbeth, 7/7/39   
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Chapter 7 
 
‘CEMA is already broken down’: John Christie and the 




Most of this thesis focuses on the pre-war period. But John 
Christie’s wartime efforts to create and lead a government-funded body 
to support music are as worth studying, and as little studied, as his 1938 
conferences. They show that CEMA was not, and was not seen at the 
time as, the only possible model of arts funding, just as Christie’s and 
Alfred Wareing’s work showed that campaigns for arts subsidy were 
active well before the war. Christie’s wartime discussions with artists 
such as Ralph Vaughan Williams reveal the changing philosophy behind 
state funding of the arts. And he exerted an important but wholly 
unacknowledged influence on CEMA’s evolution into the Arts Council.  
This chapter examines Christie’s work early in the war – his 
success, despite his clumsiness and arrogance, in enlisting distinguished 
figures within and beyond British music to support the National Council 
of Music (NCM), a proposed organisation whose only constant feature 
was Christie’s central role. It also demonstrates how little CEMA 
figured in such discussions. Chapter 8 discusses the period from 1941, 
and the unravelling of Christie’s aspirations due in large part to Rab 
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Preliminary lobbying: to summer 1940 
 
Glyndebourne’s prestige meant that in 1939 Christie could count 
on senior politicians treating his views with apparent respect, or at least 
politeness.  Correspondence unrelated to state support of music provides 
a good illustration. On 9 September 1939 he wrote to the Liberal Party 
leader Archibald Sinclair, whom in 1938 he had named as an ideal 
member of the NCM,1 suggesting that his work at Glyndebourne could 
assist the war effort generally:  
…I can bring my organisation with me, which contains accountants and men 
of constructive ability. The work… we are now doing at Glyndebourne, may 
well become the basis of new Social work on a large scale after the War…. I 
feel that one of the important problems of the day is a check on all the 
appalling extravagance all the little jacks in office are letting loose in every 
direction.2 
This may have referred to Glyndebourne’s receiving on the outbreak of 
war 260 child evacuees and sixty helpers,3 though the letter itself failed 
to clarify this. Nonetheless, rather than sending a bare acknowledgement 
Sinclair forwarded it to Lord Macmillan, Minister of Information. 
Macmillan thanked Sinclair for bringing to his attention Christie’s ‘very 
generous offer’ and undertook to deal direct with Christie if ever ‘in a 
position… to make practical use of it’.4  
The same month Christie wrote to Neville Chamberlain about 
setting up an equally ill-defined ‘Ministry of Economy’. Chamberlain 
replied that this ‘would be impracticable in these present days when we 
are urgently engaged in bringing the war machine into operation’, but 
 
1 Chapter 6, p162 
2 Glyndebourne 2, Christie-Sinclair, 9/9/39 
3 ibid, Christie letter of 18/9/39 to the invitees to the cancelled September 1939 conference 
4 ibid, Macmillan-Sinclair, 25/9/39 
  174 
undertook ‘to have the proposal more fully examined as soon as the 
pressure under which we are now working is somewhat relaxed’.5   
Given that he was dealt with so respectfully in areas where he 
lacked standing and expertise, it is not surprising that Christie was taken 
and took himself so seriously in his specialist area, music, despite his 
lapses from rationality. There were two reasons why such lapses were 
common during the war. First, he did not have the opera festival to 
absorb his energies. Second, his wife, the soprano Audrey Mildmay, 
generally a restraining influence, was in Canada and the USA with their 
children from 1940 to 1944.6 Some close friends, particularly Harry 
Colles, music editor of The Times from 1911 to his death in 1943,7 tried 
to take on this role, with only limited success. From the research 
perspective, however, Audrey’s wartime absence had a major benefit: 
Christie’s frequent and lengthy letters to her8 provide an invaluable 
insight into his activities, views and state of mind throughout this period. 
Although Christie wrote to George Dyson in early September 
1939 that the NCM should be formed immediately and ‘we should not 
wait for peace’,9 he made little progress before summer 1940. But he 
engaged in combative correspondence about CEMA and the NCM with 
Dyson and Sir Walford Davies, Master of the King’s Music, and formed 
a surprisingly strong bond with the government Minister most concerned 
with arts subsidy, Herwald Ramsbotham, President of the Board of 
Education.     
 
5 ibid, Chamberlain-Christie, 19/9/39  
6 Blunt, Chapter 19 
7 Ivor Atkins, ‘Colles, Henry Cope (1879–1943)’, rev. Nigel Scaife, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://0-
www.oxforddnb.com.catalogue.ulrls.lon.ac.uk/view/article/32496, accessed 11 May 2015] 
8 Hundreds of John Christie’s letters, though few of Audrey Christie’s/Mildmay’s, are in the 
Glyndebourne archive. All quotations from the correspondence in this chapter are from a box of 
family correspondence, 1934-41 (hereafter ‘Glyndebourne 4’). 
9 Glyndebourne 2, Christie-Dyson, 9/9/39 
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CEMA’s history has been much studied.10 The focus of this thesis 
is what happened before and around CEMA, a subject which, when 
studied at all, has been misrepresented.11 But a brief outline of CEMA is 
necessary here, since its development had crucial consequences for 
Christie’s NCM. Initially CEMA (then the Committee, not Council, for 
the Encouragement of Music and the Arts) operated only with charitable 
funding, from the Pilgrim Trust.12 It was created following an approach 
from the Board of Education in late 1939 suggesting that the Trust might 
support amateur artistic activity. From the start CEMA operated with the 
Board’s backing, from Board office space and with Mary Glasgow, a 
Board schools inspector, as its first staff member, but with no direct 
government funding. It applied for a Treasury grant only in March 1940.  
Fred Leventhal wrote in The Best for the Most that initially 
CEMA focused on ‘amateur and educational activity in which 
professionals might play an auxiliary role’.13 This is a reasonable 
summary of CEMA’s early philosophy and practice, though in reality 
they were never so simple. From early on, for instance, George Dyson 
organised orchestral concerts in industrial areas with CEMA providing 
guarantees against loss, with similar arrangements for tours by 
professional drama repertory companies.14 Bidding for Treasury funds in 
March 1940 CEMA formulated broad and ambitious objectives:     
a. The preservation so far as possible of the highest standards in war-time of 
the arts of music, drama, and painting and design. 
b. The widespread provision of opportunities for hearing good music and for 
the enjoyment of the arts generally among people who, on account of war-
time conditions, have been cut off from these things. 
c. The encouragement of music-making and play-acting by the people 
 
10 See Chapter 1 and bibliography  
11 ibid 
12 Leventhal provides the best brief account of CEMA’s history  
13 Leventhal, p295 
14 ibid, p296 
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themselves. 
d. Through the above activities, the rendering of indirect assistance to 
professional singers and players who may be suffering from a war-time lack 
of demand for their work.15     
Leventhal noted that this was the first time maintaining high standards 
had primacy among CEMA’s objectives, but that throughout its first 
year ‘CEMA was nothing if not improvisational, shifting uneasily 
between encouraging amateur activity while supporting professional 
performances’.16 
Christie’s reaction to CEMA combined belief that it was of little 
significance with unshakeable confidence that the backing of the 
(unformed) NCM was essential to CEMA’s success. At this period 
George Dyson, Director of the Royal College of Music, also had the title 
Hon Director, Pilgrim Trust Concerts. In February 194017 Christie 
suggested to him that CEMA would fail without the NCM behind it. If 
the government refused a grant, the Pilgrim Trust would have ‘no 
authority with which to combat their refusal. This is exactly where the 
National Council of Music should come in…. the question of how much 
contribution the Government should make is, in my opinion, exactly the 
kind of point on which we should want advice from our Council’. (It is 
not clear who were the ‘we’ in this sentence.) Furthermore, work was 
needed on ‘the kind of way in which the money is to be used… once 
more a matter for the Council’. Overall, ‘…the Government will feel 
much more secure with our Council behind it to back it. It is a vital 
necessity that the Government should be conscious that our Art is 
organised, and powerfully organised’.  
 
15 National Archives file ED136/188B, ‘Memorandum in support of an Application to the Treasury 
for Financial Assistance’, 6 March 1940  
16 Leventhal, p298 
17 Glyndebourne 2, Christie-Dyson, 1/2/40, for all quotations in this paragraph 
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Dyson’s reply18 did not address Christie’s claims for the NCM:  
…the Pilgrim Trust Committee… includes members nominated by the Board 
of Education…. The President of the Board [of Education]19 is very 
interested, and it is from this side that a possibility of Government help may 
arise…. I am sure you will agree that all these steps are completely in 
keeping with the ideas that our National Council of Music would exist to 
further.  
Christie’s other correspondent, Sir Walford Davies, was an 
equivocal supporter of the NCM. Like Dyson, he was closely involved 
with CEMA from its origins.20 Writing in March 194021 Davies 
questioned Christie’s tactics: ‘The more I think over it the more certain I 
am that we cannot ask the Government to invite “self and three friends” 
(so to speak) to form a National Council of Music ad hoc, least of all at 
this juncture’. He also opposed the idea of setting up the NCM without 
government support, advising that ‘an ad hoc Music Council with Dyson 
as Chairman would be practicable, and… might form the exactly right 
nucleus for a permanent National Council of Music after it had done 
efficient War Service and proved itself’. His letter also described 
CEMA’s perceived purpose at this period: ‘…the “Committee for 
Encouragement” has, I gather, had specific orders to do what is a war-
time job of limited extent’. This view of CEMA’s duration and role 
persisted until late 1941.22       
While Christie took no further public steps to set up his National 
Council until June 1940, the archive contains a manuscript note by him 
from March, reporting: ‘The present suggestion is that we four persons, 
Sir Walford Davies, Dr Colles, Dr Dyson and John Christie should 
receive an invitation from the President of the Board of Education to 
 
18 ibid, Dyson-Christie 5/2/40 
19 At this point the National Labour politician Earl De La Warr 
20 Weingartner, p58 et seq 
21 Glyndebourne 3, Davies-Christie, 31/3/40, for all quotations in this paragraph.  
22 See Chapter 8 
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form this Council [the NCM]’.23 The note contains no context, and no 
indication who had made the ‘present suggestion’; probably only 
Christie himself.   
 Around this time Christie also wrote, though circulated only 
several months later, a ‘Memorandum on Music and Drama’.24 Despite 
its title, and though the memorandum argued that two councils should be 
established – ‘Both bodies would be interested in the good stuff rather 
than in the rubbish’ – music was his only real concern. Alfred Wareing’s 
League of Audiences, while supported by many musicians, concentrated 
mainly on drama; neither Wareing nor Christie lobbied effectively on 
behalf of music and drama jointly, which reduced the effectiveness of 
both campaigns.  
The memorandum’s two thousand words about the state and the 
arts contained no mention of CEMA. Christie dropped the relatively 
conciliatory approach of the 1938 Glyndebourne conferences and 
focused on musical standards to the exclusion of broadening music’s 
availability and encouraging amateur music-making. He suggested that 
there were two ‘classes of thought’:  that represented by ‘Vaughan 
Williams and Sir Hugh Allen, that the people should be making music 
and that then all will be well’; and that represented by Glyndebourne, 
that the highest standards of performance would cause people to ‘think 
about music, write about it, talk about it and pay for it…. respect rather 
than familiarity is the keynote’. The future depended on the NCM, ‘on 
which Glyndebourne has been working for two years and [which] is 
about to be formed’, as it was, allegedly, so often between 1938 and 
1944.  
 
23 Glyndebourne 3, ms note by Christie; undated, but covering developments to March 1940 
24 Glyndebourne 2, undated memorandum by Christie (probably March 1940), for all quotations in 
this and the following two paragraphs.  
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Christie’s vision of the future was rosy, unlike his view of the 
present: ‘Almost the whole of the public funds devoted to music in the 
form of the Municipal Orchestras and the B.B.C. are devoted to offering 
rubbish with which an attempt is made to mix a small quantity of good 
stuff’. The theme of ‘rubbish’ versus ‘good stuff’ featured strongly: 
‘Woolworth’s cannot sell Rolls Royces and… a tiny Municipal 
Orchestra, required to play rubbish on the pier, cannot once a week turn 
its hand to Beethoven and Mozart… the public taste is damaged by 
being continually offered rubbish’. His plea for organisation was ‘only 
for good music and good drama. The rubbish can look after itself… 
Charabanc trips are arranged… only for the rubbish. All forces conspire 
to assist the rubbish’. And in another nod towards subsidy: ‘It may be 
that the Entertainment Tax should be increased on the rubbish and that 
the good stuff should be financially assisted’.  
Christie circulated the memorandum in July 1940, following 
further unconstructive correspondence with Walford Davies. Davies 
defended himself and CEMA from what he saw as Christie’s unfair 
attacks: ‘Colles tells me of the impression that nothing is happening [ie 
that CEMA was doing nothing]. Are 1200 or so music-makings in needy 
places, however modest, nothing?... When the War is over, with hopes 
of a long-term peace… then long live the National Council of Music’.25 
Writing to Harry Colles about this letter,26 Christie noted that CEMA’s 
music organisers, Davies, George Dyson and Reginald Jacques, ‘have 
got something like a student performance in their minds. None of these 3 
men, as far as I know, have worked with great artists…’. To Davies, 
Christie was patronising and grand: ‘I don’t know much about 
C.E.M.A., but this work has been given to you, Dyson and Jacques & 
Co. to do and your position would be safer if you had the protection of 
 
25 ibid, Davies-Christie, 5/6/40 
26 ibid, Christie-Colles, 7/6/40 
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my Council…. I am not at all proposing that our Council should dictate 
to you, more especially as you have been given the job and the money’.27  
Also at this time Christie got to know Herwald Ramsbotham, who 
succeeded Earl De La Warr as President of the Board of Education in 
April 1940.28 Ramsbotham, heading the department responsible for 
funding CEMA, was potentially a huge catch for Christie. Christie first 
wrote to him in June 1940, proposing that Glyndebourne be funded to 
create an orchestra for regional touring during the war.29 He followed 
this with a stage-managed dinner at Brooks’s Club. Christie promised 
Ramsbotham that ‘The incidents of British music are not without 
humour’,30 and asked his friend the singer Roy Henderson ‘to give him 
[Ramsbotham] some idea of the actual nature of a musician’s life… 
[then] you [Henderson] should retire home shortly after 9 p.m. so that I 
can go on with my stuff’.31 Henderson, undismayed by his secondary 
role, wrote subsequently to Christie that Ramsbotham was ‘an extremely 
nice fellow, and one who really had culture at heart’.32 Ramsbotham 
failed to secure CEMA funding for the proposed Glyndebourne 
orchestra, though wrote to Christie that ‘Council members were in full 
sympathy with all your points’.33 This letter also set out the official view 
of CEMA in June 1940: ‘…[its] mandate from the Treasury is to bring 
the arts to people who do not normally get them and who may be feeling 
the strain of war. It is trying to do this quickly as a real emergency 
measure…’. Their cordial relationship continued for several years, well 
beyond Ramsbotham’s time at the Board of Education.  
 
 
27 ibid, Christie-Davies, 7/6/40 
28 http://www.educationengland.org.uk/history/timeline.html, accessed 3/12/18 
29 Glyndebourne 2, Ramsbotham-Christie, 8/6/40, replying to Christie-Ramsbotham, 4/6/40 (not on 
file) 
30 ibid, Christie-Ramsbotham, 10/6/40 
31 ibid, Christie-Henderson, 13/6/40 
32 ibid, Henderson-Christie, 23/6/40 
33 Glyndebourne 3, Ramsbotham-Christie, 27/6/40, for this and the following quotation  
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‘The psychological moment has arrived’: to December 1940 
  
Christie and the musicians 
Alongside Christie’s view that music was a central element of life 
was a disregard of the war’s relevance. Both characteristics were 
displayed in the next phase of his campaign for the NCM, from summer 
1940 to spring 1941 – the period of the Battle of Britain and the Blitz. 
He exhibited an idiosyncratic, indeed eccentric, perspective on the Blitz: 
‘…it’s all nonsense about war nerves. The very idea!... It’s children’s 
fireworks. The children would enjoy the bangs; so would you & of 
course I do & always did’.34 
During this period Christie invited a roster of distinguished 
musicians and non-musicians to join the non-existent Council, received 
acceptances from most, gathered many of them for several large 
meetings in London hotels, and gained their agreement that the NCM 
should be formed.  
In July he wrote to Walford Davies35 to announce that ‘The 
psychological moment has arrived’ to set up the NCM. Its first task 
should be to ensure the financial viability of the major British orchestras. 
Christie’s one concession to the war was acknowledging that ‘there is no 
question of asking for money for the next month or so until this invasion 
scare be overpassed’. Davies showed apparent enthusiasm in principle 
for the NCM but advised patience:  
…I cannot refrain from counselling you to wait a little longer…. You speak 
of the “psychological moment” as having arrived. This statement convinces 
me of nothing but your own delightful and admirable enthusiasm. I am 
afraid, dear man, this letter will seem stodgy and annoying, but I had to write 
 
34 Glyndebourne 4, folder headed ‘John Christie to Audrey Christie in Canada, 1940’, hereafter 
‘Glyndebourne 4/1’, JC-AC, 30/9/40 
35 Glyndebourne 3, Christie-Davies, 26/7/40, for the two following quotations 
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it… seeing the danger of a premature Council, queering the pitch for the real 
thing after the war.36 
Davies’ comradely tone is notable, given Christie’s undiplomatic 
approach and Davies’ disagreement with Christie’s strategy and tactics 
for the NCM. Furthermore, in the same letter Davies expressed deeply 
uncomradely views of another key musical figure: ‘I cannot but feel that 
the Nation’s music will suffer as little if the L.P.O. [London 
Philharmonic Orchestra] dies as it would if Beecham died’. This is not 
the only example of Christie’s bluntness and lack of discretion 
prompting a similar response in his correspondents. 
 Harry Colles saw this letter as a serious blow: ‘It is just what I 
feared would happen when I advised you to let him [Davies] alone for a 
bit. Now he has dissociated himself definitely from your project and that 
means that if he is consulted about it as “Master of the King’s Musick” 
he will say so, and that will crab it in “Royal” circles. However, it can’t 
be helped now’.37 Ten days later Colles was more sanguine: ‘I am told 
that Walford has had a short holiday since he wrote to you. That may 
have done him good. However, better leave him to me for the present’.38       
 Most of Christie’s correspondents around this time were more 
positive than Walford Davies. In August 1940 Christie wrote to Sir 
Adrian Boult that the NCM was ‘At long last… being formed’, and 
inviting Boult ‘to join as one of the leading Professionals’.39 CEMA was 
not mentioned: ‘The proposal is to form a new Company not for profit, 
which can undertake any work for which the Government pays… The 
contribution I have in mind… from the Government… is say, a million a 
year’. As ever gilding the lily, Christie claimed: ‘I have got acceptances 
and extremely strong support… for this scheme, and I am advised also 
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that it should be put in execution now’. But Christie admitted to Boult: 
‘For your private information… dear old Walford Davies is hanging fire, 
but I expect will come in presently… I feel it is better to leave him alone 
at the moment. I hear he is bombed down in his cellar every night’. 
Boult took all this at face value: ‘I shall have much pleasure in serving 
on your Committee. I must get formal permission, but am sure this will 
be granted as my Chief, Nicolls [Basil Nicolls, BBC Director of 
Programmes], whom you met the other day, knows all about it. I will not 
tackle Walford unless he talks to me about it’.40  
Throughout his work on the NCM one constant was Christie’s 
claims, sometimes with slight justification, more often with none, of its 
imminent formation. The surprise is not that he seemed to believe this 
but that so many of his correspondents did so.        
Malcolm Sargent was equally enthusiastic, writing, also in August 
1940: ‘I think your scheme is excellent, and am delighted to come in on 
your executive committee’.41 Rare among Christie’s correspondents at 
this time Sargent saw CEMA as a possible competitor. He reported 
talking to Christie’s friend Robert Forbes,42 who had been ‘full of the 
work that the C.E.M.A. is doing at the moment and inferred that they 
would be carrying on after the war and would become the permanent 
organising body of England’s music…. I think you should look into this, 
as it would cut across your plans’. Christie seemed unconcerned: ‘I am 
quite happy about C.E.M.A. They are only temporary. They have no 
foundation, and they are doing some work I expect quite decently, only 
it is not the work which is of the more difficult kind…’.43 
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Forbes himself expressed to Christie44 no doubts about the NCM 
and did not mention CEMA: ‘I should be very happy indeed to become a 
member of your proposed National Council of Music, and I take it as a 
compliment that you should ask me…’. As in 1938 his views were 
extreme:  
I am in entire sympathy with your aims…. If we can all get together… 
something may happen, and possibly quite quickly. In my own view the great 
trouble in this country is that the Government and the great bulk of the 
population have always resolutely refused to recognise music as an Art; – it 
is mildly tolerated as a social amenity, as a harmless recreation, as an 
educational instrument… - but as one of the Fine Arts – never! 
Forbes complained about the Carnegie UK Trust funding ‘assistance to 
amateur choral and orchestral societies, rural music schools, village 
choirs, and so on and so forth – possibly worthy enough objects in 
themselves, but none of them, to my mind, helping Music’. He 
concluded, surprisingly in August 1940: ‘I agree with you that there 
could be no better time than the present to influence the official attitude 
towards music…’. Replying to Forbes,45 Christie himself mentioned 
CEMA, possibly prompted by Sargent’s letter. Alongside his usual 
bluster (‘I feel absolutely certain that we are on the right lines in this 
Council. We cannot be disputed or if we are we can win’), he wrote, 
apropos of nothing: ‘I do not feel in the least concerned about C.E.M.A. 
It is already broken down… It was altogether too small in purpose, in 
scope and in personnel’.  
Roy Henderson helped feed Christie’s over-confidence. A letter 
from him of August 194046 may explain Christie’s reference to CEMA’s 
having ‘already broken down’: ‘I wish your Council was in being. There 
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is such a lot of devilish work going on’ – the twin villains being CEMA 
and ENSA.  
The work of ENSA – the Entertainments National Service 
Organisation – is beyond the scope of this thesis. It has received 
surprisingly little academic attention. For Janet Minihan the distinction 
between CEMA and ENSA was that ‘ENSA… had no goals beyond 
enlivening the tension and drudgery of war service with music, films, 
variety shows and drama. CEMA started with broader aims, which 
developed throughout the war and ended with the development of the 
Arts Council’.47 This rather CEMA-centric description echoed Keynes’: 
‘E.N.S.A. was charged with the entertainment of the Services… the duty 
of C.E.M.A. was to maintain the opportunities of artistic performance 
for the hard-pressed and often exiled civilians’.48 Basil Dean, ENSA’s 
founder and no fan of Keynes, provided a different view: ‘…it was 
irksome to find ourselves regarded as the chain-store of the concert 
world, while CEMA dealt only with the custom-built trade. We had our 
exclusive counters, too… but we did not waste time preening ourselves 
so much’.49         
Henderson wrote50 that at ENSA concerts ‘the conditions are 
dreadful, people eating and I daresay talking during the performance, 
with the possibility of hostile aircraft at any moment’. Each singer was 
required to perform ‘at not less than 14 concerts, sometimes over 20 in a 
week, half of them after midnight, for a maximum of £7 per week, less 
what he has to pay for board+lodging!!!... There is no thought of the 
long training+the professional status of musicians’. Henderson also had 
grave concerns about Reginald Jacques, CEMA’s Music Director: 
‘Jacques seems to administer great chunks of this money. He knows 
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nothing about the profession except a very few artists and his own 
orchestra [the Jacques String Orchestra]. The result is that his orchestra 
has been well looked after…’. Even worse, Jacques had decided that 
concerts should have free admission: ‘What a let-down for the artists to 
be the objects of a collection! What a status for the profession!’. 
Henderson concluded: ‘I am anxiously awaiting news of your Council’. 
In later letters51 Henderson expressed even stronger opposition than 
Christie himself to government funding for music being channelled 
through artists rather than through what he called ‘Patrons’.      
 
Successes and excesses 
In a letter of July 1940 to Neville Chamberlain, at this point Lord 
President of the Council, Christie expanded on the suggestion that 
CEMA had ‘already broken down’.52 He began with the familiar, 
baseless, claim that ‘At long last our National Council of Music is to be 
formed’. Concerning CEMA, not referred to by name anywhere in the 
letter, he wrote: ‘I predicted that the Professionals leading this work 
would fall out with the rest of the Professionals and the Government 
would burn its fingers. So it has turned out. Now I am told by the 
Professional, Dyson of the College, that I had better get on with my own 
ideas’. It is unclear how much of this he believed; very little was true. 
Christie showed an equal disregard for reality in setting out his plans. 
The NCM’s two priorities would be ‘to deal with the Government in 
saving our four orchestras…. [and to] recommend that Glyndebourne 
should take over these four orchestras’. As for funding, ‘the figure I have 
in mind to be allocated from the money collected by the P.O. for the 
B.B.C. [via the radio licence fee], but now pinched by the Treasury, is, 
let us say, a million’. Finally, Christie explained why he was writing: ‘I 
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want to start a similar organisation for Drama and I want to link up 
these… in one common Ministry of Fine Arts…. the ship would have to 
be steered through political waters, and… in my Council I have not so 
far included anybody who is able to do that. I should like to make a 
personal appeal… that you should join us’.  
Even if the proposal had been more coherent, summer 1940 was 
the wrong time to put it to Chamberlain. His private secretary explained 
that he was seriously ill,53 and subsequently wrote that ‘His time and 
attention are already so completely occupied that he is quite unable to 
contemplate taking up any further responsibilities. Later on when the 
War is over and the burdens of office are not so heavy Mr. Chamberlain 
would be glad to reconsider the position…’.54 Chamberlain died that 
November.          
   What suggests that this response was a genuine expression of 
regret rather than an elaborate brush-off is the welcome given by so 
many others during summer and autumn 1940 to Christie’s premature 
announcement of the NCM’s creation. In July, for instance, Sir Kenneth 
Clark, Director of the National Gallery and a founder council member of 
CEMA, wrote to Christie: ‘I am all in favour of a National Council of 
Music which should be concerned primarily with music and not with 
musicians and their employment’.55 In a letter of 25 July to his wife 
Christie described how he had prepared the ground with Clark, and with 
J B Priestley.56 He had come to London:  
…to see Sir Kenneth Clark & later in the afternoon I had a long talk with 
Priestley, both about the National Council of Music. Both are very much 
against all this amateur music & very strongly in favour of the highest 
standard…. I was well impressed by Kenneth Clark again by Priestley but in 
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a different way. He is a splendid fighting man and is ready to take on the 
Government or anybody else. 
He was concerned that Priestley ‘has a bee in his bonnet about Lords & 
Ladies & the aristocracy… which may be dangerous if it breaks out in 
our Council. However I want the fight that is in him’. He also wanted 
Priestley’s perceived influence on the Labour party, ‘whom he will 
shame into giving their due support to music’.   
Christie was clear whom he wanted and didn’t want on the NCM. 
This letter contains the first mention of his recruiting ‘Bongy – Sir 
Maurice Bonham Carter… who was Asquith’s secretary & who feels 
very strongly about standard’. ‘Bongy’, a businessman and also 
Asquith’s son-in-law,57 was to play a major role in the NCM. On the 
other hand, Tom Jones, Vice-Chairman of and the guiding force behind 
CEMA at this stage, ‘is leading Walford Davies & the Pilgrim Trust in 
the direction of these amateurs, & he is now regarded… as unsuitable’. 
Among the ‘suitables’ Christie included ‘Harry Colles, Kenneth Clark, 
Priestley, Bongy, N. Chamberlain, Finlay, Greene [two senior judges; 
Sir Wilfrid Greene, Master of the Rolls, became a major supporter], 
perhaps Mallon or Hodgkinson [from Toynbee Hall], perhaps A. P. 
Herbert’. Among possible musician members of the NCM he included 
Adrian Boult, Malcolm Sargent, Ralph Vaughan Williams, the heads of 
the major music colleges, ‘when he returns to England, Beecham. 
Possibly Myra Hess’.      
It says much for Christie’s prestige that most of these were keen 
to be members. It says much for his lack of diplomatic skill that most of 
this support dribbled away over the following years. CEMA was hardly 
relevant: almost no-one suggested that CEMA should do the job which 
Christie vaguely envisaged for the NCM. Kenneth Clark and Walford 
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Davies, for instance, founder members of CEMA, saw no conflict 
between this and their potential role on the NCM.  
Christie cast his net still wider during summer 1940, receiving 
acceptances from, among others, the mathematician and physicist Sir 
James Jeans, the architect Sir Edwin Lutyens, and John Spedan Lewis, 
founder of the John Lewis Partnership. Lewis hesitated due to pressure 
of business:  
I felt that not even my extreme desire to see this country moving towards 
abundance of real music and my gratitude for Glyndebourne and my very 
great regard for you and Audrey ought to induce me to allow myself the 
distinction and pleasure of being a member of your Council…. [But] the 
temptation was sore and… I will place myself at your disposal and serve on 
your Council if you wish.58  
More effusive still was Ethel Snowden, widow of Ramsey MacDonald’s 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Snowden and, earlier in the century, 
an active feminist and suffragist:59 ‘I… offer you a thousand 
congratulations on having achieved a great piece of work…. I bless you 
for it’.60 William Jowitt, Solicitor-General in the wartime coalition 
government and Lord Chancellor in the post-war Labour government, 
was ‘tremendously in favour of making good music available for the 
people… [and] would gladly do what I can to help you in any way’.61 He 
had some concern that joining the NCM might conflict with his 
government role: ‘If in due course you made – as I hope you will – 
demands upon the Government for subvention, I might have to resist the 
‘outrageous claim’. It would be Pooh-Bah-ish of me to make and resist 
 
58 Glyndebourne 3, Lewis-Christie, 8/8/40 
59 June Hannam, ‘Snowden, Ethel (1881–1951)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 
University Press, 2004; online edn, Oct 2009 [http://0-
www.oxforddnb.com.catalogue.ulrls.lon.ac.uk/view/article/48517, accessed 20 July 2015] 
60 Glyndebourne 3, Snowden-Christie, 4/9/40 
61 ibid, Jowitt-Christie, 6/9/40, for this and later quotations in this paragraph  
  190 
the claim…. [But] I think this largely theoretical… [and] subject to 
this… I’ll readily do what I can’.  
Alongside Christie’s ability to enthuse his correspondents was a 
chronic tendency to overreach himself. Four days after reporting his 
meetings with Clark and Priestley, he wrote to Audrey:62 ‘…the first 
practical matter… is the saving of our four orchestras & I propose that 
the Council should recommend that Glyndebourne should be entrusted 
with it, the Government to pay. The next should be the control of the 
four antagonistic Opera Companies & again I propose that 
Glyndebourne should do it’. The NCM was only the start: ‘The next step 
will be the creation of a N. C. Drama…. Next we deal with the painters 
etc, & then with the architects. Lastly we combine all together in a 
Ministry of Fine Arts’.    
Writing to Herwald Ramsbotham at the Board of Education (a 
manuscript letter beginning: ‘Are you alive? I am & with ease. Here’s 
progress!’) in September 1940,63 Christie summarised his view of 
developments:  
My National Council of Music is nearly ready to be formed &, unless Hitler 
interferes, there is a reasonable chance of its first meeting being held in 
Buckingham Palace or Windsor by invitation of the K or Q. All the 
professionals have joined except Henry Wood who wants to be a free lance 
(carp not lance in my opinion) and Allen has not answered…. We have got it 
all cut and dried….  
Christie’s references to royalty were absolutely groundless, and he 
overstated the enthusiasm in some quarters. Keynes refused membership 
of the NCM with apparent regret: ‘I… wish the new project very well 
indeed. But I do feel that I must not take on a new activity’.64 The music 
critic Ernest Newman refused because he thought the NCM could not 
 
62 Glyndebourne 4/1, JC-AC, 29/7/40, for the two following quotations 
63 V&A Archive, CEMA papers, file EL2/4-A (hereafter ‘V&A EL2/4-A’), Christie-Ramsbotham, 
20/9/40   
64 Glyndebourne 3, Keynes-Christie, 30/9/40 
  191 
work: ‘I have had a very long and often close association with brave 
schemes for making this country musical and I have had the same 
melancholy experience with all of them’.65 Christie persisted but 
Newman replied: ‘I wish I could share your optimism, but alas, I can’t. 
The intelligent musical public of this country I estimate at around 
2/3,000 people all told…. As for a Ministry of Fine Arts… the very 
thought of it makes me laugh… and my own capacity for appreciating 
bad jokes is not what it used to be’.66 Christie often copied to Harry 
Colles his correspondence about the NCM. Colles wrote of Newman’s 
letter: ‘…frankly I do not think much of [it]. It is easy to be bitter and 
superior’.67   
Christie suggested to Audrey that his failure to gain Sir Henry 
Wood’s support was due to the influence of Lady Wood: ‘A rather 
difficult lunch with Lady Wood, at which dear old Henry Wood was 
present…. Lady W I think intends to make mischief if she can…. Henry 
Wood visibly crumpled…. She is a tartar…. Harry [Colles] says there 
has not been a divorce, and she is not Lady Wood’.68 (Wood was indeed 
not married to ‘Lady Wood’. Wood’s wife having refused a divorce, his 
partner, Jessie Linton, had changed her name by deed poll to Lady Jessie 
Wood. ‘Lady’ was thus not a title but a forename.)69 Wood gave Christie 
a further opportunity to persuade him: while ‘I never enter into any 
project unless I am certain it is of service to the work on which I have 
spent the greater part of my life’,70 he offered to delay a Promenade 
Concert rehearsal so that Christie could explain his plan in more detail 
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over ‘the stolid, solid fare at the Langham Hotel’. Colles’ view was still 
‘that his [Wood’s] woman will make him inimical. A pity!’.71  
But Wood was ‘inimical’ for other reasons. Apparently, at the 
lunch Christie argued that a key objective of the NCM should be to 
establish a new orchestra. Wood wrote afterwards that if Christie had, 
instead, made it a priority to stabilise the finances of the existing 
orchestras, ‘I should have welcomed your proposed “National Council of 
Music”’.72 This was capricious and ill-judged on Christie’s part: in all 
his previous correspondence, he had made ‘the saving of our four 
orchestras’ a primary aim of the NCM, with no mention of creating a 
new orchestra. Wood also revealed an attitude to foreign musicians 
which Christie never shared: ‘…goodness knows where our fine 
orchestral musicians would find themselves eventually, since we are 
overrun with the foreign refugee, who will… be only too willing to 
allow his exploitation by managements…. we don’t want the foreign 
conductors either – they must stay where they are after this war is over – 
and we have as good, and better here...’.  
Christie alienated other potential allies more directly. The key 
example was Sir Hugh Allen, ex-Director of the Royal College of Music 
and President of the Incorporated Society of Musicians (ISM). For the 
ISM Christie had contempt,73 for Allen himself, deep dislike. He wrote 
to Audrey following a meeting with Allen: ‘He was silly & not 
constructive & not logical…. He has such strong bees in his bonnet & 
such prejudices that I just think he cannot be helpful. He won’t learn and 
he won’t understand’;74 criticisms from which Christie himself was not 
immune. Harry Colles, too, had little time for Allen and less for Frank 
Eames, the ISM’s Secretary: ‘I am still convinced that Eames… is the 
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tail which wags the dog. Allen’s bark comes out the other end’.75 
Christie wrote at length and disparagingly to others about Allen and the 
ISM. He lost William Jowitt’s support by sending him a tirade whose 
only clear point was that he, Christie, found Allen’s and the ISM’s 
opposition ‘ludicrously stupid’.76 Jowitt’s response was: ‘…I feel that 
the opposition of Allen should make me… reconsider my position…. Sir 
Hugh Allen is a great name in the world of music and I think I might 
incur the censure of my superiors if I lent my name to any controversial 
matter in which the Government have not taken sides’.77 But Herwald 
Ramsbotham at the Board of Education read a similar letter ‘with great 
interest combined with sympathy for you…. I am sure you are right in 
resisting the inclusion of what is in effect the trades union element in 
your organisation’.78 
The archive also contains a draft letter to Allen,79 not sent, in 
which Christie wondered ‘What judgement will our Council make of 
you and your attitude to us… I am afraid they will be likely to condemn 
you. Don’t be a Hitler’. He warned that ‘Our Council will judge you 
with cold steel’, but concluded ‘Is there anything… I have expressed to 
which you take exception?’. It is not clear, however, to what extent this 
hostility was in Christie’s head alone. Allen accepted Christie’s 
invitation to his January 1941 meeting on the NCM (see below) in 
positive and cordial terms: ‘It’s good news to know that you are bringing 
together the members of the National Council for Music… I shall be 
very glad to come to the meeting’.80   
The ‘Hitler’ letter to Allen may have remained unsent on the 
advice of Harry Colles in his role as restraining influence. Roy 
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Henderson, on the other hand, egged Christie on, commenting that 
Christie’s ‘Hitler’ draft was ‘candid and fair and straight from the 
shoulder’.81 Colles certainly dissuaded Christie from writing insultingly 
to Myra Hess, whose offence had been a polite refusal to join the NCM 
because she was too busy running the National Gallery concerts. 
Christie’s draft reply is not in the archive; Colles’ response to it suggests 
its nature: ‘“O no John”, etc! You know perfectly well, my dear John, 
that Audrey would never pass such a letter as this to Myra Hess. It is the 
sort of thing we all write, or think of writing, when we are annoyed, but 
before the ink is dry we know that its only possible destination is the 
waste paper basket!’.82 A week later Colles persuaded Hess to agree to 
join the NCM.83        
Sir Alan Lascelles, George VI’s Private Secretary, had less 
success as an adviser, a role he had played also in Christie’s pre-war 
conferences.84 His correspondence with Christie between August and 
October 1940 illustrates Christie’s strong tendency to damage his case 
by overstatement and wish-fulfilment. Lascelles’ position led him to 
hesitate to join the NCM: ‘If I were just I, I should say “Yes” at once to 
your flattering offer. But since my only claim to sit on any Body of 
importance is based… on my right to use this [Buckingham Palace] 
note-paper, I have got to be ultra-careful of my virtue’.85 A ‘Yes’ would 
depend on Christie’s gaining sufficient support from ‘the professionals – 
Allen, Dyson, Forbes, H.Wood, V.Williams, etc’. Christie’s reply86 was 
cavalier: ‘Dear old Walford Davies, he is backing out of the scheme at 
the moment and giving, fortunately, the most ridiculous reasons…. I 
should not be surprised to find that Allen, Vaughan Williams and 
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Walford Davies, all seventy years old, perhaps back out. These three are 
not quite reliable and they are losing contact’.    
Despite this, Lascelles replied that ‘you can certainly put me down 
as a provisional acceptor’.87 Christie then enquired about holding the 
NCM’s initial meeting at Buckingham Palace, and about royal 
involvement generally. In a manuscript note of September 194088 
Lascelles was negative on both counts. Concerning royal support: ‘Such 
expert opinion as I have taken is unanimous in saying that Walford 
Davies’ co-operation is essential to any approach to R. [Royal] family. 
He may be tiresome, but for good or ill, he holds the appointment of 
Master of the Music…’. As for using Buckingham Palace, ‘Clearly no 
meetings can be held at B.P. at present – or anywhere else, I shld say, 
until life is less disorganized + people more inclined to gather together’.  
So when, two days after Lascelles’ letter, Christie wrote to 
Herwald Ramsbotham that there was ‘a reasonable chance’ that the King 
or Queen would invite the NCM to hold its initial meeting at 
Buckingham Palace or Windsor Castle (see above), not only was this 
claim baseless, it directly contradicted the explicit advice of the King’s 
Private Secretary. Rambotham was not the only Minister whom Christie 
misled about this. On 2 October he wrote to Audrey that he had used a 
mention of royalty to overcome William Jowitt’s doubts about the 
propriety of a Minister joining the NCM: ‘A great day. I saw Jowitt, who 
I find a strong supporter…. Jowitt hesitated a little until he found there 
was a possibility of the K[ing] & Q[ueen] being interested and inviting 
us to Windsor. Then he said at once he would join. That perhaps also 
applies to Ramsbotham & to Bevin…. I like the idea of Windsor’.89  
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Lascelles was deeply unimpressed when Christie explained how 
he had secured Jowitt’s support: 
“The Buckingham Palace scheme”, I imagine, means the suggestion that 
possibly a council meeting might be held here; that suggestion, as far as I 
know, has gone no further than private conversation between you and me…. 
Their Majesties’ knowledge of the whole idea is limited to a conversational 
reference by myself, and I have certainly never mentioned to anybody that 
they had any views about it….90    
Lascelles became blunter still: ‘…as I have always said – I fear many 
times – the fundamental rule… is that The King and Queen can never be 
asked to associate themselves, directly or indirectly, with any public 
scheme until it is a going concern, de facto and de jure; and this scheme 
cannot be said to be that’. Lascelles had indeed made this point to 
Christie as early as 1936.91 Now he hammered it home: ‘Their Majesties 
must never be associated with a dud concern, and it is our business to 
safeguard them from such a possibility’. He set out the necessary steps 
before Christie could ask to lead a deputation (including the Master of 
the King’s Music and a representative of the Board of Education) to the 
Lord Chamberlain in order to seek Royal support: ‘Till you have done 
that, let nobody whatever make any use at all of The King’s name or The 
Queen’s’. Lascelles concluded in a more conciliatory but no more 
hopeful tone: ‘Are you sure that the man in the bomb-torn street is in the 
right frame of mind to take… as much interest in your scheme as he 
ought to? I am not’.  
Christie made some effort to correct the false impression of royal 
support. Backtracking somewhat, on 29 October he wrote to Jowitt that 
‘at the right moment when warlike conditions are calmer and better, [we 
shall]… approach the King and Queen’.92 But this was the same letter in 
 
90 Glyndebourne 3, Lascelles-Christie, 11/10/40, for all quotations in this paragraph. 
91 See Chapter 6, pp140-1 
92 Glyndebourne 3, Christie-Jowitt, 29/10/40 
  197 
which his attack on Sir Hugh Allen and the ISM caused Jowitt to 
withdraw his support. A letter to Audrey also suggests that he had not 
ignored Lascelles’ lecture:  
I dropped in this morning to the Lord Chamberlain’s office….  He said he 
recognised me at once, so I supposed he had been at Glyndebourne…. It is 
satisfactory that Glyndebourne should be found to get this recognition. He 
thinks the K.&Q. should certainly be interested in this scheme, but we all 
agree now that this is not the right moment.93 
But Christie was not discouraged – quite the reverse.   
 
‘Let the flags be out. Let us drive in State’: to spring 1941 
 
In all that Christie wrote about the NCM he rarely described it the 
same way twice, was often wholly vague in setting out its aims, and, 
when specific, generally contradicted his earlier statements. It would, 
variously, co-ordinate the main British orchestras and opera companies, 
fund them, put them under Glyndebourne’s control, create a ‘super-
orchestra’ to supplant them, bring over world-class foreign musicians to 
train British musicians, advise the government, or ‘protect’ CEMA in 
some unspecified way. The only constants were its exclusive focus on 
Christie’s concept of ‘standards’, and Christie’s and Glyndebourne’s 
central role. Audrey Christie urged greater clarity. Writing from Canada, 
she quoted Hester Colles (Harry Colles’ wife) reporting to her that ‘you 
[Christie] have your stuff so clear in your own mind that you don’t make 
it clear to others’.94 She confessed that she herself needed help with this: 
‘…apropos of Hester: Will you give me in concise a.b.c. form the 
fundamental reasons for N.C.M. I find if I try to explain it I don’t really 
know what I am talking about’.  
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Christie did not respond to this challenge. The problem lay both in 
the NCM’s shifting scope and purpose and in its lack of clarity. But at 
this stage few were put off by these characteristics. The nearest the 
NCM came to a clear statement of purpose was in its draft memorandum 
and articles of association. These appeared in summer 1941 and are 
discussed in the next chapter. They arose from four elaborate meetings at 
London hotels in early 1941, but owed more to detailed work by 
Christie, the Master of the Rolls Sir Wilfrid Greene and Sir Maurice 
Bonham Carter.  
The first meeting was at the Dorchester Hotel in January 1941. 
Preparing for it, Christie wrote two memoranda. One was a rambling, 
elitist justification for the NCM and public funding of music.95 The 
NCM should operate with:  
…that freedom of thought and action in regard to music which is beyond the 
restrictions of individual and particular bodies and institutions… While such 
a plan will rightly pursue the greatest good for the greatest number, it will not 
subscribe to the dissipation of the whole substance for the passing vanity of 
so-called popular or mass entertainment.  
Concerning public funding, ‘where the work is on a national basis from 
its inception, then it cannot be… voluntarily supported where the subject 
of that work is Art…. [Instead,] under the aegis of a properly constituted 
body, with men of repute in public affairs… the Nation should provide 
such sustenance as is required’ – an obscure way of saying that good 
music needed subsidy distributed by people like him. The other 
memorandum96 was about the NCM’s potential to create more and better 
musicians. To ensure the conductors of the future, ‘The musically 
talented child should be grabbed by the scruff of the neck at an early 
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age. Starting somewhere about the age of 6…. by that means at the end 
of say 20 years we should probably have a star conductor’. Also from 
the age of around six, gifted instrumentalists should ‘study at either of 
our Royal schools with perhaps the N.C.M. or the music school as the 
foster parent’.  
 Perhaps fortunately, neither memorandum was circulated. 
Christie’s invitation to the Dorchester Hotel meeting was bland by 
comparison: ‘…a resolution will be moved that The National Council of 
Music be formed, and that a Committee be appointed to consider the 
Memorandum and Articles of Association, and also the formation of an 
operative company to carry out the work of the Council’.97 But the 
structure of council plus operative company became controversial once 
some realised that it was cover for Christie’s intention to control the 
NCM.  
On the invitation’s reverse Christie listed ‘the names of those who 
have accepted membership of our Council’. The forty-one names were 
impressive: musicians enthusiastic for the NCM such as Sir Adrian 
Boult and Malcolm Sargent, some qualified supporters such as Ralph 
Vaughan Williams and Sir Walford Davies, ‘Patrons’ including Sir 
Kenneth Clark, Sir James Jeans and Sir Edwin Lutyens, and ‘Politicians 
and Public’ including James Mallon, Sir Maurice Bonham Carter, Sir 
Wilfrid Greene and J B Priestley.  
Priestley had in fact declined Christie’s invitation due to pressure 
of work and because ‘at the moment the mere use of my name might, 
with some sections of the government, do you more harm than good’: 98 
this was the period of his weekly ‘Postscript’ radio talks, more popular 
with the public than with the government. But most of those listed had 
genuinely signed up. Christie expected good attendance but included 
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among those who would not be there ‘Lady Reading who cannot get 
away & Priestley who has an inferiority complex… We look like being 
40 at the meeting…. It’s a very good response in these times’.99 Among 
the few direct references to the war was Malcolm Sargent’s acceptance – 
a postcard with the message ‘I have been very busy in the North both 
conducting + bomb-dodging’.100 Christie’s and Bonham Carter’s plan for 
the meeting ran: ‘Bongy calls on me to move the resolution. I make my 
address 15-20 minutes. Malcolm Sargent seconds it. Harry Colles says a 
few words. Then anyone else, including I suppose Allen. But Malcolm 
says that Allen swims with the tide & at the time will be quite tame. He 
has seen him like it before’.101 
Attendance at the Dorchester meeting, though thirty-one against 
Christie’s projected forty, was distinguished. In addition to most of those 
listed above, Myra Hess, Sir Alan Lascelles and Mary Glasgow, the 
Secretary of CEMA, attended.102 Stanley Marchant, Principal of the 
Royal Academy of Music, wrote to Christie afterwards that he ‘thought 
it very remarkable that you were able to collect such a galaxy of people, 
and I congratulate you on doing so’.103 Christie’s opening remarks, 
moving the motion to found the NCM, were separately printed.104 The 
starting points were that ‘When we win this war we shall have great 
prestige and we shall excite great jealousy. We must show ourselves 
worthy of that prestige’; that ‘It is respect rather than familiarity which is 
important’; and that the NCM ‘can give protection to the government’. 
Abandoning or concealing his wish for Glyndebourne to establish a 
‘super-orchestra’ or run the whole British operatic and orchestral 
machinery, he claimed to want collaboration between the ‘four famous 
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orchestras: the L.S.O., the L.P.O., the Halle, and the Scottish’ (the BBC 
Symphony Orchestra was not mentioned) and the ‘four famous opera 
companies: Covent Garden, Sadler’s Wells, the Carl Rosa, and an other’ 
(sic; a coy reference to Glyndebourne). And ‘the dignity of our 
personnel should guarantee protection to anyone who accepts our 
advice…. we can help to hold the prestige of our Empire, we can help 
and help in time to build a better world’.  
 Seconding the motion, Malcolm Sargent said that there was 
widespread and unsatisfied love of music in Britain and that the NCM 
‘should form the channel through which governmental provision could 
be made’.105 No speaker suggested that this might be CEMA’s role. The 
meeting unanimously supported the creation of the NCM, though 
Vaughan Williams recorded his support for the resolution rather than for 
Christie’s speech, since ‘there were one or two points on which he was 
doubtful’. Sir Hugh Allen and others were more doubtful about the 
second part of the resolution, that a committee examine the NCM’s 
setting up an operative company. But this too passed after Sir Wilfrid 
Greene made a technical legal intervention and Vaughan Williams 
amended the resolution so that the committee would have to report back 
to the full council. A committee of seventeen was appointed and ‘The 
meeting then adjourned, after Sir Adrian Boult had proposed a vote of 
thanks to the Chairman’.   
Writing to Audrey,106 Christie described his own speech as 
‘intended to be referred to in later years, rather than for immediate 
consumption’. He summarised Vaughan Williams’ intervention as ‘All 
the performances abroad were bad. All in England were good.…. The 
speech was so divinely silly’. He was scathing about Sir Hugh Allen and 
his ally Lord Palmer, Vice-President of the Royal College of Music: 
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‘Tommy [Lascelles] watched him [Palmer] at lunch, & said to me 
afterwards, I have always found, that any man who wears a diamond 
ring is a shit. Palmer drank my health at lunch. Allen had his head right 
in the trough. He is a ridiculous man’.  
For Christie, the favoured musicians were those who agreed with 
him, such as Malcolm Sargent. Christie and he ‘had a long talk together 
& there is a simple, open and frank understanding between us’. The 
committee appointed at the Dorchester would meet on January 23 ‘I 
expect at the Ritz’. Overall, ‘I can say that up to now it has been a 
triumph…. Harry [Colles] is indignant that it did not occur to any 
professional to say how much indebted we all are & should be to me…. I 
think he is right’.  
Audrey Christie did what she could to guide him by 
correspondence. In the letter requesting ‘in concise a.b.c. form the 
fundamental reasons for N.C.M’, she also offered Christie tactical 
advice: ‘Don’t let Palmer’s “smallness” sidetrack you…. I am sure you 
despise the means but when the job is worth something then it is worth a 
little juggling to smooth out stupid little kinks in personalities. He has 
given a good deal to music in his time I suppose & is rather proud of 
himself. A little recognition… & he will be utterly mollified’.107 There is 
no evidence that Christie acted on this advice.                
 Eleven committee members, including Bonham Carter, Greene, 
George (now Sir George) Dyson, Myra Hess, Harry Colles and Christie 
himself, met at the Ritz on 23 January. The meeting almost foundered on 
two issues raised by Dyson. First, he ‘thought that some existing musical 
Institutions were suspicious of the Council and its intentions’,108 
suspicions fuelled by the NCM’s wide terms of reference and 
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particularly by the executive role of its operative company. Second 
(remarkably, this issue not been raised before), Dyson ‘asked… how the 
work of the Council would differ from such existing bodies as 
C.E.M.A.’. Christie responded that the NCM was a ‘much larger scheme 
[than CEMA]…. the whole intention of the Council should be to insist 
upon a very high standard of work’. This view received wide support. 
Concerning the operative company, Bonham Carter, again chairing, 
commissioned Christie to produce a note in favour, and Dyson a note 
against, for the next meeting.  
 Christie wrote to Audrey109 that he had chosen venues and 
personnel with care: NCM members ‘must be conscious that they are 
having only the best…. The Dorchester, The Ritz, & obviously 
distinguished & leading & big men instead of the Covent Garden 
crowd’. But his account of the committee meeting suggests that it was a 
fraught occasion: ‘…half the time (2 hours) was spent blowing off 
steam’; and following Dyson’s many interventions ‘at last I went up in 
smoke’. For Christie the disagreement centred on defining and achieving 
high artistic standards. He summarised Dyson’s argument, and CEMA’s 
approach, as: ‘…every town must… have their own orchestra, & that 
rivalry would make them compete and that this would produce the right 
standard’. His view was that with so many orchestras, most ‘would get a 
conductor who was a choirman who would appeal to the crowd and its 
vulgarity. The vulgarity would increase. You will get more vulgarity’. 
State aid was justified only for work of the highest standard. This 
required tight organisation, close control (by Christie himself, via the 
NCM), and very few orchestras: ‘the Govern’t will demand and rightly 
demand that we do this’. According to Christie, ‘Dyson’s eyes started 
from his head at what I was saying or at the vehemence of it, he grew 
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pale & he was out of breath’. But as always, Christie praised those 
‘professionals’ who agreed with and flattered him: ‘Theodore Holland 
[composer, and professor at the Royal Academy of Music] has written to 
me “We are all deeply indebted to you for your guidance”. That’s the 
sort of professional I like!’.  
 The committee met to consider Christie’s and Dyson’s notes, 
again at the Ritz, in early February 1941. Christie’s was a none-too-
subtle attempt to make the council itself largely irrelevant, concentrating 
power in the ‘operative company’, which would be under his control: 
‘…the members of the Council cannot reasonably be called upon to 
devote a great amount of time to routine work…. The Company is 
essential for this practical work. The Council remains the Advisory 
Body’.110 Dyson’s note was blunt: ‘(1) The proposal is not practicable…. 
(2) The Company may seriously impair the prestige and independence of 
the Council…. (3) The Company is unnecessary. The proper functions of 
a National Council can best be performed by its own Committee of 
Management’. The committee’s report, prepared for the next full 
meeting deferred a decision on the question – superficially about 
structure but in fact reflecting Christie’s determination to control the 
NCM and Dyson’s suspicions about this.  
By now Christie had a strong antipathy for Dyson. He wrote to the 
music publisher Leslie Boosey that artists like Myra Hess and Adrian 
Boult ‘know what we are talking about, and the professors like Dyson… 
do not. Dyson has lived an isolated life…. He has not mixed with artists 
and the great musicians…  We appear to be fundamentally opposed’.111 
Straight after the committee meeting, Christie telegrammed Audrey to 
report ‘OPEN SUPPORT EVERY INDIVIDUAL EXCEPT DYSON 
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STRONG SUPPORT ASTOR JOWITT RAMSBOTHAM GENERAL 
FORMATION MEETING SOON POSSIBLE TRIUMPH VERY WELL 
HERE NO COLD CLOTHES’.112  His following letter113 included the 
usual exhaustive account of the meeting, designed to demonstrate that 
the committee ‘seem to take entirely my conception of the scheme & 
believe it and say so’; that ‘Dyson is a most peculiar man. He simply 
does not listen’; and that ‘I have steered this ship astonishingly well & 
with unerring judgement’. But he was not absolutely blinded by self-
love and by his practice of imputing his own faults to others: ‘It seems 
almost incredible that I should have done all this without your being 
here. I expect Harry [Colles] saw that too & has kept a special watching 
brief’.         
The next meeting, in March 1941 at the Dorchester, also attracted 
distinguished names, including Edwin Lutyens, Malcolm Sargent, Ralph 
Vaughan Williams and John Spedan Lewis, as well as Hugh Allen and 
George Dyson.114 Given the state of the war, Christie’s opening remarks, 
again printed separately,115 were high-flown and inappropriate. He saw 
the NCM as a world-wide concept: ‘…this is a matter of supreme 
importance. If this scheme is right in this country, it is right in Canada, 
in Australia, in America, in Germany and Italy…. I look forward to the 
creation of National Councils of Music in all these countries…created by 
England, with its headquarters in London…. We can have the whole 
world looking to us….’. The speech sagged into slogan and cliché: ‘All 
is in the melting pot. It is now or never. I ask you to think big. We want 
a better world’; and its conclusion was massively overblown: ‘Let the 
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flags be out. Let us drive in State and let Victory find us in the first 
Coaches’. 
No-one sought to match Christie’s rhetoric. Malcolm Sargent 
again seconded the motion.116 Vaughan Williams said that ‘It would help 
me, and I think others, to know that other points of view – other 
standards [of artistic excellence, apart from Christie’s] – can be allowed 
for’. Christie reassured him, and the resolution passed unanimously. The 
meeting passed several other motions: that Bonham Carter, Greene and 
Christie should constitute the NCM’s ‘legal committee’, consulting the 
Inland Revenue and Charity Commission to ensure the NCM’s 
charitable status; that if there were no problems, the NCM should then 
be immediately incorporated; and that its first meeting should be held 
within four weeks of incorporation. Despite this apparent success, 
Christie’s account of the meeting to Audrey displayed self-doubt 
unusual for him at this period: ‘I did badly [as a correspondent] for three 
weeks. I was busy & worried about the N.C.M…. I was in an uncertain 
mood & not inclined to sit down & write letters…. But it turned out all 
right &… I don’t think we have anything to fear at the moment’.117  
This mood is the more surprising since in early 1941, alongside 
the successsful hotel meetings, Christie was strengthening his 
relationship with Herwald Ramsbotham at the Board of Education. In 
January he reported to Audrey118 that Ramsbotham had helped 
substantially both with Glyndebourne business (facilitating the 
naturalisation application by Rudolf Bing, Glyndebourne General 
Manager) and potentially with the NCM, ‘offer[ing] to go with me to see 
Kingsley Wood [Chancellor of the Exchequer] at the Treasury. I expect 
we shall do it’. Less than two weeks later he wrote: ‘Today I went to see 
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Miss Glasgow [Secretary of CEMA] and Ramsbotham. They both regard 
Dyson as difficult’.119 In reply to Ramsbotham’s repeated offer to meet 
Sir Kingsley Wood with him, Christie said (according to his letter to 
Audrey) that there were two methods of dealing with the Treasury: ‘(1) 
W[ilfrid] Greene’s gentle, clever persuasion backed by his known ability 
& importance & skill, (2) my overwhelming vehement keenness & 
determination when I know that I am right’. He listed for Audrey his 
supporters within the government: ‘Jowitt, Bevin, Archie [Sinclair], 
Ramsbotham, Morton [Desmond Morton, an assistant to Winston 
Churchill and former pupil of Christie at Eton] & R. [Ramsbotham] says 
we must get Churchill in on this if necessary’. The list was exaggerated 
but Ramsbotham was a genuine enthusiast and a potentially crucial ally.  
 
Christie’s friends and supporters in spring 1941 
 
In early 1941 Christie remained an influential figure whose ill-
defined NCM seemed on the way to success. This was despite his 
extreme views and equally extreme expression of them, his volatility and 
arrogance, his inability to think strategically, his passion for 
overstatement and his tendency to insult those who disagreed with him. 
Considering Christie’s friends and supporters alongside his personality 
helps explain why at this stage he appeared close to achieving his aims.    
First, though he engaged in broadsides against professional 
musicians and ‘the professors’, he was inconsistent in this as in many 
other respects: both types of hate-figure were among his admirers and 
confidants. Robert Forbes and Ralph Vaughan Williams are considered 
below. Other musicians, too, respected him, his work and his views. Sir 
Adrian Boult temperamentally very different from Christie, wrote after 
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the first Dorchester Hotel meeting to thank Christie for ‘a most excellent 
lunch and delightful meeting… you have certainly collected a first-class 
gathering of brain-power’, adding in manuscript: ‘if the Council is run 
by the Amateurs, it really should get things done!’.120  
Even with musicians with whom he often disagreed, such as Sir 
Walford Davies, Christie could demonstrate affection and openness – 
though an openness leading him on occasion to display extreme vanity. 
In his final letter to Davies, who died in March 1941, Christie wrote: ‘I 
feel that I am miles ahead of the Continent, and that I can see the way to 
make England the great Centre of the World’s music…. At this point I 
appear egotistical and shall do so as long as I am wanted. Then the 
Council must completely eclipse me…. Think big’.121  
Other musicians, such as the violist Lionel Tertis, were simply 
fans. He wrote to Christie122 that he had taken a house in Hereford to 
nurse his sick wife ‘with a feeling of concern that its distance from 
Town may prevent me from giving to you and the fine project on which 
you have embanked [sic], such help as I may be capable of…. In You… 
a Champion has at last arisen who has at heart the highest standard of 
musical art’.  
Second, alongside his ranting Christie could be both generous and 
discreet, illustrated by his anonymous financial support for Alfred 
Wareing when Wareing and the League of Audiences fell on hard 
times.123 Third, he could on occasion inspire almost instant and deep 
respect. This, for instance, comes from a letter of May 1941 by George 
Evan Smith, an Australian on attachment to the BBC: ‘I felt so 
stimulated by your ideas… that I felt impelled to drop you a line…. 
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Meeting you has been an experience that I shan’t lightly forget…. when 
I return to Australia I shall be able to say: “Here was a man”’.124   
Finally, while he was a ‘big thinker’ and good hater, he was 
moderate compared to some of his allies. John Spedan Lewis, after the 
first Dorchester Hotel meeting, urged Christie to ‘…build up your 
organisation in such a way that the position in it of all professional 
musicians without exception is wholly and solely advisory’.125 
Recognising that this ‘requires some definition of a professional 
musician’, Lewis proposed a handy rule-of-thumb: ‘…anyone, who 
cannot deny that he has made in any twelve months as much as a 
hundred pounds by making music or writing about it, should be 
disqualified for any but advisory functions’. Three months later Lewis 
suggested that ‘so far as there is a real drive towards mediocrity, the true 
roots of that drive are not in the potential audience but in the present 
performers’.126         
Robert Forbes, Principal of the Royal Manchester College of 
Music and an ally since the 1938 conferences, made these views seem 
tame. A February 1941 letter from Forbes127 displayed contempt and 
spite towards his colleagues and profession. Unable to attend the 1941 
meetings due to wartime disruption, he expressed his ‘complete and 
absolute agreement’ with Christie on two points: ‘…the first is that “the 
Musicians must depend on Music rather than Music on Musicians”…. 
The second is your insistence on the raising of “standards”’. Forbes 
elaborated on these themes: ‘The plain and obvious truth is – but of 
course neither I nor anyone else dare say it where it ought to be said – 
that 90% of the members of the I.S.M. have no claim to be musicians in 
the real sense of the word’. The ISM was not the half of it: 
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It is equally true – and Dyson knows it as well as I do – that not more than 
10% of his students or Marchant’s or mine have any real right to contemplate 
a musical career. But we are all caught in the monstrous machine that grinds 
out hundreds of mediocrities year in and year out, and incidentally grinds a 
good deal of the music out of those of us who have to spend our days 
teaching “unteachables”....  
Forbes wrote at length of ‘this wretched commerce of musical 
“education”…  the talented wasting their lives in teaching, or pretending 
to teach, those without any talent…. I can see no hope of getting out of 
this morass except by raising of “standards” and a ruthless squeezing out 
of mediocrity’. As for his antagonists, ‘Why Dyson can’t see this I can’t 
imagine…. Vaughan Williams…. seems to enjoy really bad amateur 
performances of his own works – I think a first class one would probably 
hurt him’.   
Forbes included a self-pitying anecdote about ‘what an appeal to 
the mob results in’ – in this case, Forbes’ ousting as conductor of the 
Halle Orchestra’s ‘Municipal Concerts’ by ‘a shocking little bounder – 
one of the monkey-on-a-stick type of Conductor – [appointed] to give 
“popular” concerts’. He concluded with further personal attacks: ‘The 
trouble is that… [Sir Hugh] Allen can’t conceive a musical enterprise 
being of National importance unless he is at the head of it, …[and] 
Dyson is always right and everybody else wrong’.    
Harry Colles commented on this letter: ‘…much of it is true. But 
it is certainly bitter in tone + that does not make me put entire 
confidence in him as a colleague. However it is our fate to accept help 
from men on whom we cannot put unreserved reliance’.128 Christie’s 
reply to Forbes was less bitter and more self-confident than Forbes’ 
letter. The answer lay in ‘Thinking big…. There are certain strong 
prejudices in the path, that of mere consumption and that of the anti-
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foreigner, anti-Jew, anti-whatnot. Thinking big we cannot be bothered 
with these prejudices…. I just think that we cannot fail for the simple 
reason that everything so far has shown that the scheme is right…. We 
are certain of success’.129           
Unlike Forbes, Christie was rarely misanthropic. His openness to 
debate is illustrated in his correspondence with Ralph Vaughan 
Williams. Christie and Vaughan Williams often disagreed and traded 
heavy verbal blows; but while their relationship deteriorated later in 
some respects, their discussions at this time were cordial. In June 1941, 
for instance, Christie wrote to Vaughan Williams130 seeking 
unsuccessfully to persuade him to accept the post of Master of the 
King’s Music in succession to Walford Davies: ‘Who else is there?... 
You are considering your own whim… The interest of music urgently 
needs that you should accept’.  
Writing to Christie at this period, Vaughan Williams explored the 
issue of Englishness in art, using Glyndebourne itself as illustration:  
It provided a wonderful and beautiful entertainment for those who could 
afford it. But it has not built for the future. It has done nothing towards 
fertilizing the dormant seed of English opera… The few English 
performers… merely became… bad imitations of continental singers…. 
[Glyndebourne] is like a bunch of flowers in a glass of water – very lovely 
while it lasts but having no roots in the soil.131 
He generalised the point: ‘What course are we to pursue? Are we to take 
the English standard of singing and mould it to opera or are we to force 
the continental style down English throats..?... Perhaps… you really 
think that we in England have no musical tradition worth speaking of…. 
(The doctrine of “Herrenvolk” is not confined to the Nazis)’. More 
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generally still: ‘Do you, in fact wish to establish a little “Europe in 
England”… affecting among Englishmen only those snobs and prigs 
who… do not recognise the intimate connection between art and life?’. 
Vaughan Williams used Roy Henderson as illustration: ‘It was painful to 
me to hear great artists like Roy Henderson and Heddle Nash trying 
conscientiously to be funny in the Teutonic manner’. He supported his 
case with language as extreme as Christie’s: ‘If musical life in this 
country is merely to be a bad imitation of continental methods it is 
doomed. See the awful results at Sadler’s Wells of smearing themselves 
with the droppings of the Russian Ballet’. He concluded with this plea: 
‘Your task, it seems to me, is to become musically an Englishman and to 
see music as we see it and then add to it your own unique experience and 
knowledge’. 
 Finally, it is worth noting that Christie’s professional relationships 
reveal a pattern: that they were often intense but often short-lived. He 
worked closely with Harold Baker and Robert Mayer during the 
‘Council of Power’ period,132 but they seem to have played no part in his 
work after 1939. His correspondence about the NCM with Sir Alan 
Lascelles, Sir Adrian Boult, Robert Forbes and John Spedan Lewis 
seems to have largely ceased in 1941. He later formed an alliance with 
Lord Esher, but that too was brief.133 After summer 1941, Christie’s 
confidants and colleagues on the NCM work were few – primarily Harry 
Colles and Roy Henderson from the musical side and Maurice Bonham 
Carter and Wilfrid Greene as ‘men of affairs’. Christie could inspire 
strong enthusiasm, respect and affection; for whatever reason the 




132 See, generally, Chapter 6 
133 Chapter 8, pp250-3 
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Conclusion 
 
In spring 1941 the aims and methods of Christie’s proposed 
National Council of Music remained shifting and obscure, and Christie 
himself was distrusted by at least some members of the musical 
establishment. But he was supported by many leading musicians and 
such other distinguished figures as Sir Edwin Lutyens, Sir James Jeans 
and Sir Kenneth Clark. He had a strong relationship with Herwald 
Ramsbotham, the Cabinet Minister most relevant to his cause. His 
London hotel meetings had concluded with the resolution to establish the 
NCM. His closest advisers were the music editor of The Times, the 
second most senior judge in England and Wales and a businessman with 
strong political connections. All seemed set fair for the NCM. Artistic 
and policy issues could for now take second place to the administrative 
and legal challenges of setting it up. But while Christie continued to 
campaign energetically within and beyond government, and Harry 
Colles, Wilfrid Greene and Maurice Bonham Carter provided almost 
unquestioning support, the NCM was never established. The next 
chapter discusses how and why it failed, and considers Christie’s 
‘shadow presence’ in the creation of the Arts Council. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Butler, Keynes and the end of Christie’s National Council 
of Music: 1941-44 
 
Global ambitions and legal minutiae: the NCM spring to autumn 
1941 
 
The histories of Alfred Wareing’s League of Audiences and John 
Christie’s National Council of Music have much in common. Both 
seemed on the verge of a breakthrough after major meetings, though the 
contrast of venues is notable: Wareing’s at Toynbee Hall in May 1938 
chaired by the Archbishop of Canterbury,1 Christie’s at the Dorchester 
and Ritz Hotels in January to March 1941. In both cases this proved 
deceptive and these meetings marked the high point of their campaigns. 
Both went downhill from then on, though this became apparent sooner in 
Wareing’s case than in Christie’s. Both influenced the design and focus 
of the Arts Council. Both failed to have this influence acknowledged by 
the Arts Council and later commentators. Both have remained in 
obscurity ever since. 
Christie’s NCM took a surprising route after the hotel meetings of 
early 1941. Until that summer he corresponded widely about it. Then 
discussion about the NCM between him and the musical world dried to a 
trickle. Instead, Sir Maurice Bonham Carter and Sir Wilfrid (now Lord) 
Greene worked on the formalities of establishing it and Christie 
expanded his ill-defined ambitions world-wide, seeking to engage 
government Ministers and officials in his plans. He still saw CEMA as 
no challenge to the NCM, a lack of foresight which proved costly in the 
 
1 See Chapter 4, pp79-82 
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long term. What weakened the project in this period, however, was 
Christie’s increasingly grandiose aims and his compulsion to keep all 
power in his own hands.  
The latter was clear from the NCM’s structure. In July 1941 
Bonham Carter wrote to the members of the still notional NCM,2 
reporting that he, Christie and Greene (the ‘Legal Committee’ 
established in March) had agreed its draft memorandum and articles of 
association. Musicians would have no positions of responsibility: 
‘…your Committee was strongly of the opinion that it was inadvisable 
for professional musicians to be included on the Board of Management 
[where power would lie]’. Indeed ‘under the advice of learned Counsel’ 
(not in the archive; it may have been a euphemism for Greene) any 
professional musician on the Board could not take paid work with an 
institution benefitting from the NCM, and having a musician on the 
Board would endanger the NCM’s charitable status. Instead musicians 
could sit on the council itself and on a ‘Technical Advisory Committee’. 
Neither would have any authority. Bonham Carter claimed that in order 
to complete the articles of association it had been necessary to list in 
advance, thus without consultation, membership of the Board and 
Technical Advisory Committee. He, Christie and Greene had appointed 
themselves to the Board, plus three ‘men of affairs’: John Spedan Lewis 
(more anti-musician than Christie himself), the judge Viscount Finlay 
and the Chairman of Barclay’s Bank Edwin Fisher. Neither Finlay nor 
Fisher had been active in previous NCM discussions. Most of the nine 
members proposed for the Technical Advisory Committee were 
musicians sympathetic to Christie. They included Adrian Boult, Harry 
Colles, Myra Hess, Malcolm Sargent, Lionel Tertis and Ralph Vaughan 
Williams.  
 
2 Glyndebourne 3, Bonham Carter-NCM members, July 1941 (no specific date), for all quotations in 
this paragraph 
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One name not included was Sir George Dyson, now wholly 
disillusioned with the project. He wrote to Christie that he did not want 
join a committee ‘so lacking in effective authority’,3 and since ‘I cannot 
belong to the Board of Management, apparently, on account of my 
professional position… [and] all the active functions of the Council are 
given to the Board of Management, membership of the Council is not 
really the place for those of us who already have wide responsibilities in 
other spheres’. By contrast, Lionel Tertis, for example, remained 
delighted to be part of Christie’s plans, and could ‘only hope that I may 
prove of real use to you. You know what I feel concerning this noble 
project…. I see in you a champion for our cause at long last’.4  
The structure Dyson objected to was set out in the 22-page draft 
memorandum and articles of association, prepared by June 1941.5 This 
was the closest Christie came to specifying the NCM’s purposes and 
methods. But its fifteen ‘Objects’, running to more than three closely 
printed pages, provided no clarity. The first object was that the NCM 
would be the ‘central authority… on all matters connected with the art of 
music’, the second that it would ‘act as an advisory or consultative body 
to H.M. Government’ on all matters connected with music. Most objects 
were equally general, such as co-ordinating ‘the activities of companies 
and persons… [providing] musical, operatic, corybantic [sic] and other 
performances… connected with the musical life of the nation generally’. 
Money was not mentioned until object (E): ‘To receive, administer, 
control and distribute, or determine the distribution of funds provided by 
H.M. Government…’. Later objects included setting-up and awarding 
music prizes, establishing music libraries, commissioning works of 
music, providing musical performances (‘so far as may be considered 
 
3 ibid, Dyson-Christie, 2/7/41 for this and the following quotation 
4 ibid, Tertis-Christie, 6/8/41 
5 ibid, ‘Memorandum and Articles of Association of The National Council of Music’ for all 
quotations in this and the following paragraph 
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necessary’), and co-ordinating ‘musical culture in England and other 
countries’. 
Thus almost anything connected with music could be within the 
NCM’s scope. Most of the objects, to be realised, would require existing 
organisations to cede power, money or both to the new organisation, 
which none of them had agreed; and there was no indication of the 
source of the NCM’s authority. What was clear was that power would 
not lie with the main council but with the Board of Management, 
responsible for ‘the management of the affairs of the Council’ including 
the appointment of members, of whom there would be no more than 
fifty. The Technical Advisory Committee ‘shall be advisory only’.  
Meanwhile Christie attempted to woo Whitehall, sometimes to 
advance the NCM but more often to share increasingly grand and woolly 
visions. In May 1941 he wrote to Audrey: ‘I see Ramsbotham fairly 
often on one thing or another. Yesterday afternoon I saw Horace Wilson 
head of the Treasury & then Alan Barlow (brother of Tommy) about 
£5,000 a year grant for the expenses of the N.C.M. It was an unofficial 
visit and Bongy is following it up’.6 (Sir Alan Barlow was a senior 
Treasury official whose public spending responsibilities included the 
Board of Education.) While happy to exploit his contacts (‘Of course, I 
used the link with Neville Chamberlain’), Christie was aware of this 
strategy’s limits: ‘I am pleased that when I ring up (without writing) the 
head of the Treasury he at once sees me, but I shall be infuriated if the 
only result is to turn us down. I don’t want the compliments. I want the 
substance’.  
In June 1941 he wrote to Barlow with the draft memorandum and 
articles of association.7 The letter was mainly a marketing pitch. Christie 
enclosed, and suggested that Barlow ‘might add to our file’, the letter in 
 
6 Glyndebourne 4/2, JC-AC, 30/5/41, for all quotations in this paragraph 
7 Glyndebourne 3, Christie-Barlow, 4/6/41, for all quotations in this paragraph 
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which George Evan Smith at the BBC had written ‘when I return to 
Australia I shall be able to say: “Here was a man”’.8 He reported, 
truthfully, that ‘I am backed by the strong personal support of men such 
as Bongy, Wilfrid Greene… and others’, and that ‘Wilfrid Greene has 
been giving up other work to help us… with the legal side’. He stated as 
if it were an established fact that ‘There is to be an N.C.M. in every 
country – an international organisation with headquarters in London’. 
While remaining entirely vague on details, Christie ‘would remind you 
that we stand for constructive policy as opposed to the mere 
consumption of money’. But his main selling point was that ‘For the first 
time, Music will be in the hands of wise men of affairs as well as of 
musicians. I assume that the Government will welcome this step 
forward’. The use of Bonham Carter’s nickname suggests that he, 
Barlow and Christie were acquainted, as does the letter’s postscript: ‘I 
have 12,000 bottles of German wine buried in the Downs – enough for 
three [Glyndebourne] Festivals’. But the archive contains no reply, and 
Barlow seems to have been unpersuaded by Christie’s letter.9  
Setting up the NCM remained slow work. Christie, inclined to 
mark the slightest advance by sending Audrey self-congratulatory 
telegrams and detailed letters, wrote to her in early August 1941: ‘I have 
been a bad correspondent. I have no news. I am waiting to finish the 
N.C.M. & days pass & practically nothing happens’.10 But even in the 
course of this letter his mood lifted: ‘We shall gather a fighting force. 
Some of us want to take our coats off…. a new world is in the air….In 
the Council & in my leading of it lies progress’.  
In summer and autumn 1941 Christie made few attempts to gain 
new allies. Among these few were discussions with the theatre director 
 
8 See Chapter 7, pp208-9 
9 See the note of Barlow’s December 1941 meeting with Rab Butler, below. 
10 Glyndebourne 4/2, JC-AC, 5/8/41, for this and the following quotation  
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Tyrone Guthrie, and, on Adrian Boult’s advice, with the composer 
Arthur Bliss.11 He described Bliss to Audrey as ‘a splendid man 
outspoken and vehemently declaiming against the bad standard in 
England…. I want a bit more of this kind of thing from the British 
Musician’. More often Christie dealt with his frustration at the NCM’s 
slow progress by large, vapid ideas of ‘an N.C.M. in every country’. A 
July 1941 telegram to Audrey read: ‘AM ASKING SUPPORT BRITISH 
COUNCIL CHURCHILL SOME HOPE SENT CANADA 
AMERICA…’.12 In the August letter chiding himself for being a bad 
correspondent he anticipated the NCM’s being established and its first 
meeting being held the following month. Then ‘I think I could arrange 
for my passage to Canada for a few days afterwards, assuming the 
British Council approves’.13 He considered this likely since ‘I have the 
strong support of the Chairman… for the N.C.M. in Canada & the 
States’. Later in August: ‘I have a new idea which is revolving in my 
mind. I think you must create the N.C.M. in Canada. I will come over 
and start it with you….’.14 In his next letter he reported that he ‘saw 
Vincent Massey [the Canadian High Commissioner to the UK] yesterday 
& he approved of your being the driving force in Canada as I am here. 
He also wants me to get Churchill to send me to Mackenzie King [the 
Canadian Prime Minister]’.15 According to Christie, many in the British 
Embassy in Washington thought that ‘the Americans only want guns & 
blood & thunder’; he himself believed that ‘the N.C.M. is just what 
Roosevelt will want. It is above dollars & trade unions. It is a matter of 
right & wrong & not of politics’.  
 
11 ibid, 2/10/41, and for the following quotation 
12 ibid,, telegram JC-AC, 7/7/41 
13 ibid, JC-AC, 5/8/41 
14 ibid, JC-AC, 23/8/41 
15 ibid, JC-AC, 30/8-2/9/41 for this and following two quotations 
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There is no evidence in the archive of much reality behind any of 
this.   
With the NCM proceeding so slowly Christie passed the time 
lecturing Audrey on the political condition of England. One theme was 
the dead hand of civil service control: ‘For years we have been 
strangling the Francis Drakes & now we reap the reward. Men of action 
are rare & when you do get them you get brutes like Beaverbrook who 
use the situation to get power (it used to be money) at the expense of 
others who are not so self seeking and are of good principles’.16 Another 
theme was more extreme still: ‘I feel that all cultured people… must 
organize and let their organization work for them and insist on the 
support of the higher things of life in the new world. Let us give tangible 
shape to the new World now. Let the organization be called the 
Glyndebourne Society’.17 Christie’s syntax became mangled, the concept 
woozily prophetic: 
Let it be the central organization of all the arts, of Learning, Literature, 
Science. Let all these form (through you & me) their N.C.M’s. N.C. 
Architecture, N.C. Science, etc., which will advise and protect us, the 
Glyndebourne Society. We want the support of all the Press, of all 
organizations…. We should have power… we don’t beg but lead.  
He spent several pages expounding these ideas, sometimes obscurely 
(‘We stand once more for right and wrong as we do in Music’), 
sometimes mundanely (‘The fee for joining the organization should be 
1/-’), before reporting ‘I have no news of the N.C.M.’.      
Christie wrote several times to Audrey about the Glyndebourne 
Society, showing little regard for logic: ‘I think it is the only way of 
beating the Politicians & the Civil Service…. I want the Cabinet to join 
first of all’,18 and at times toppling into megalomania: ‘I want it 
 
16 ibid, JC-AC, 5/12/41 
17 ibid, JC-AC, 2/9/41, for all quotations in this paragraph 
18 ibid, JC-AC, 28/9/41, for this and the following quotation 
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supported by all the press, by all professional organizations, Clergy, 
Lawyers, Scientists, Accountants & learned Societies…. all of which 
will deal with Glyndebourne’. He had ‘discussed it shortly with 
Barrington-Ward, the new Editor of The Times & he thought I should 
get the scheme backed by all the groups, societies etc first & then go to 
the P.M. and the Cabinet with it’.19 As often with Christie, it is unclear 
whether this accurately reflected the discussion or was a projection onto 
others of his own views. He acknowledged that his pursuit of wilder 
dreams was due in part to lack of other occupation: ‘…here life is so dull 
& one never sees anyone. The only thing for me is to have an intense 
interest such as the N.C.M.’.  
He continued to write about NCMs in Canada and the USA, 
repeating to Sir Ronald Campbell, Minister in the British Embassy in 
Washington, that he ‘expect[ed] to be sent to Canada… with a personal 
recommendation from Churchill to Mackenzie King’,20 and that the 
NCM ‘is just what Roosevelt will want’. He suggested that ‘The other 
Arts will settle round Music because we are first in the field’, and 
concluded: ‘You can see in this scheme a fiery star leading the New 
World’. It is doubtful whether, in September 1941, Christie had any 
reason to expect that Churchill would send him to Canada or the USA. It 
was only in October that he approached two members of the Cabinet 
about this: Anthony Eden (Foreign Secretary) and Brendan Bracken 
(Minister of Information). To Eden he elaborated on the theme of NCMs 
throughout the world in a letter headed ‘Reconstruction and the New 
World’.21 He began (as usual): ‘We are just about to incorporate the 
National Council of Music’. Suggesting, with no further explanation, 
that the NCM’s aim was ‘to advise the Government and to protect it in 
 
19 ibid, JC-AC, 11/10/41, for this and the following quotation 
20 Glyndebourne 3, Christie-Campbell, 8/9/41, for this and the three following  quotations 
21 ibid, Christie- Eden, 31/10/41, for later all quotations in this paragraph 
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taking our advice’, he continued: ‘But the next step concerns you. I want 
to be sent officially to America and to Canada to Roosevelt and 
Mackenzie King to get the scheme started there as well. After the war in 
all Countries…. This scheme gives Roosevelt and the Federal 
Government just what they want’. The Glyndebourne archive contains 
no reply.  
Christie approached Brendan Bracken less directly, as part of a 
complex scheme to get to Winston Churchill. He explained, confusingly, 
to Audrey: ‘I  have written to Morton [in Churchill’s office] telling him 
that I want with the assistance of Bongy to approach Churchill through 
Mrs. Churchill with a view to his sending me direct to Roosevelt and 
Mackenzie King, and Morton has sent my letter to Brendan Bracken…. 
Probably it depends on him’.22 This approach too went nowhere.  
But Christie’s relationship with another Cabinet Minister was far 
more important than those with Eden and Bracken, and had much to do 
with his ultimate failure.  
 
‘We are at last unofficially accepted & wanted’: Christie 
misunderstands - autumn 1941 to spring 1942   
 
 In July 1941 Rab Butler replaced Herwald Ramsbotham as 
President of the Board of Education. It took Christie a long while to 
realise how damaging this development would prove to his plans.  
He believed that his relationship with Butler began well. Although 
on Butler’s appointment he wrote to Audrey: ‘The [NCM] plans have 
been put out of joint by the change from Ramsbotham to Butler at the B 
of Education’,23 his first meeting, a month later, filled him with 
 
22 Glyndebourne 4/2, JC-AC, 2/10/41 
23 ibid, JC-AC, 30/8-2/9/41 
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enthusiasm. He reported this ‘splendid interview’24 to Audrey in the 
same letter in which he described the complex manoeuvrings intended to 
enlist Churchill’s support: ‘[Butler] told me… that the B. of E. were very 
much interested. It is clear that Ramsbotham has left a very good 
recommendation….’. This was not all: ‘…almost the best thing was that 
he said – quite rightly – that he did not wish to prejudge the matter [of 
the NCM] but would like to talk it over with a friend of his whose 
opinion he very much valued & that if I liked I could be there too. 
Whom do you think – Wilfrid Greene! It just could not be better’.  
Following the meeting he also wrote an upbeat letter to Butler.25 
Its terms make clear that Christie had shared with Butler his vision of the 
Glyndebourne Society; this is unlikely to have raised Butler’s opinion of 
him. Later in October 1941 Christie reported to Audrey that Butler had 
indeed discussed the NCM with Greene.26 He believed that Butler and 
his officials ‘are realising that the Government has to do this and other 
things [probably a vague reference to long-term government support for 
the arts], but we are first in the field with the right people and the right 
scheme and I am accepted as a result of Glyndebourne’.    
He also believed he was working well with Mary Glasgow, 
CEMA’s Secretary.27 In November he reported to Audrey a meeting 
with Glasgow at which he found ‘intense indignation there [at CEMA] 
against E.N.S.A.28 and particularly Basil Dean [ENSA’s Director]. They 
would like to cooperate with me. So all that is sweet’.29 The apparently 
good relationship continued: later in November Glasgow was a guest at 
Glyndebourne, where (this seems to have been written during the visit) 
‘we have been talking about C.E.M.A. N.C.M. Carnegie & all. It seems 
 
24 ibid, JC-AC, 2/10/41, and for the two following  quotations 
25 Glyndebourne 3, Christie-Butler, 3/10/41 
26 Glyndebourne 4/2, JC-AC, 19/10/41 
27 See Chapter 7, pp175-7, for a brief account of CEMA’s founding and early history 
28 See Chapter 7, p185, for a note on ENSA and its relationship with CEMA 
29 Glyndebourne 4/2, JC-AC, 5/11/41 
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that Dyson was turned off C.E.M.A. by Macmillan [Chairman of 
CEMA; this was not the case]…. They don’t think well of him there…. I 
think I stand well with all except Dyson…. I have got a good deal of 
information from Miss Glasgow’.30 He was clearly exhilarated by the 
visit, writing two days later to Audrey that ‘We talked of C.E.M.A., 
N.C.M., New World etc. until she must have been exhausted. Our [the 
NCM’s] Memorandum & Articles had been sent to the Board of 
Education… & had been sent to her to deal with!... The Government 
departments are, I think, supporting us’.31  
His meetings with Glasgow led to a short-lived but marked rise in 
his opinion of CEMA. Previously he had nothing good to say for it. Now 
he suggested that CEMA might be central to his vague dream of 
extending the NCM model to other subjects. These now included 
‘Religion, Cruelty to Animals & Children’ alongside the arts, 
architecture and science:  
Then an enlargement of C.E.M.A…. into a central body to coordinate all 
these interests, perhaps on the basis of my idea of 1/- a head from a million of 
the people to show their interest…. It may be that Glyndebourne should 
become the headquarters of this organization…. Our family being the host 
but all paid for by the Government. Will you let me know your views on the 
matter?   
Audrey’s response, if any, has not survived, though Christie persisted for 
a while in the view that ‘the whole lot [of National Councils] should be 
collected under some Committee such as an extension of C.E.M.A.’32                   
But Christie was fundamentally mistaken. The more positive he 
became about Butler and Mary Glasgow, the more comprehensively his 
hopes were to be dashed. This was despite his views being not 
fundamentally different from Butler’s. Butler wanted government 
 
30 ibid, JC-AC, 22/11/41 
31 ibid, JC-AC, 24/11/41, for this and the following two quotations 
32 ibid, JC-AC 26/11/41 
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support of the arts to continue beyond wartime, discussion within 
CEMA and the Board of Education about this longer term support was 
along lines which Christie would have found sympathetic, and Christie 
and the NCM even featured in these discussions. But in every respect 
these factors harmed rather than furthered Christie’s hopes.   
The obviously crucial development was Butler’s appointing John 
Maynard Keynes as Chairman of CEMA in early 1942. This is 
considered below. But Christie’s problems with the Board of Education 
and CEMA began before this. While commentators agree that Keynes’ 
arrival led to a change in CEMA’s direction away from amateur to 
professional and from spreading resources widely to raising standards, 
these changes owe much to earlier work by Mary Glasgow, Robert 
Wood (Deputy Secretary at the Board of Education) and Butler.  
Glasgow’s role in CEMA’s and the Arts Council’s history has 
received relatively little attention.33 The focus has been on the dominant 
but contrasting figures of Keynes, CEMA’s second Chairman, and Tom 
Jones, its first Vice-Chairman. Jones rather than Lord Macmillan, 
CEMA’s first Chairman, was its initial guiding force. But a frank note of 
August 1941 from Glasgow to Robert Wood34 included the earliest 
mention of two matters which would prove crucial to CEMA’s history 
and Christie’s failure. First, she proposed that Keynes have a role on 
CEMA’s council. The Pilgrim Trust had announced that it would soon 
cease co-funding CEMA. Since CEMA’s Chairman (Macmillan) and 
Vice-Chairman (Jones) were there by virtue of being on the Pilgrim 
Trust Board, their future on CEMA was uncertain. Glasgow made her 
sympathies clear: ‘Lord Macmillan is… quite useless as a Chairman… 
he writes periodic letters of appreciation, but gives us no direction of any 
 
33 As noted in Chapter 5, pp133-4, Eric White’s history of the Arts Council contained just five brief 
mentions of her. 
34 NA ED136/188B, Glasgow-Wood, 6/8/41, for all quotations in this and the following paragraph. 
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kind…. Would it be possible to make the Vice-Chairman, who has done 
all the work, Chairman?’. Beyond this ‘There should be some 
distinguished [generalist] names on Council: e.g. Mr. J.M. Keynes’. The 
latter suggestion probably owed more to Keynes’ connections within and 
beyond the arts than to his reputation as an economist – there is no 
indication that such skills were thought relevant. 
Glasgow’s second theme was that CEMA needed more expertise 
in the areas it funded, drama, music and visual art. A Council member 
should chair an ‘Executive Committee’ for each of them. This is the first 
mention of the expert panels for music, drama and visual art which 
Keynes introduced in late 1942 and which led Christie to believe that his 
ideas had been stolen - see below. Finally, although Glasgow backed 
Tom Jones for Chairman and Jones was a keen advocate of amateur arts, 
she did not share this enthusiasm: ‘I would also like to add a 
recommendation that Mr. du Garde Peach [CEMA’s head of amateur 
drama] & Amateur Drama should be totally abandoned’.  
Robert (later Sir Robert) Wood, best known as one of the 
architects of the 1944 Education Act,35 was also central to CEMA’s 
evolution into the Arts Council. A letter from him to Tom Jones of 
September 1941,36 cited by several commentators,37 was the earliest 
official attempt to consider public funding of the arts ‘from the point of 
view of permanent planning as opposed to present emergency 
arrangements’. Wood considered that while CEMA was ‘a war 
emergency organisation… the Exchequer will, in fact, have to continue 
to support this sort of effort to bring the best to the most in Music, 
Drama and Art’. Four years before the Arts Council came into being, the 
 
35 David Crook, ‘Wood, Sir Robert Stanford (1886–1963)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://0-
www.oxforddnb.com.catalogue.ulrls.lon.ac.uk/view/article/37004, accessed 19 Dec 2015] 
36 V&A/EL2/4, Wood-Jones, 27/9/41, for all quotations in this and the following  two paragraphs 
37 For instance Leventhal, p304, and Weingartner, p86 
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letter sketched out this more permanent body with remarkable accuracy. 
Concerning its form, ‘there is, I think, much to be said for putting it a bit 
outside the purely Departmental machine…. This Council… should, I 
believe, quite definitely be related to the Board of Education, although… 
the fact that it has a separate entity… might be recognised by some form 
of incorporation or Charter’.  
Given Jones’ support of amateur arts, Wood stepped carefully 
when considering this permanent body’s priorities. It was important ‘to 
clear our minds between what is emergency and what is permanent’. In 
the beginning ‘C.E.M.A. directed its attention to the amateur field to 
prevent things being blacked out by the war…. [but recently] we have 
been concentrating more and more on the professional side’. Wood 
suggested that while this ‘duality of purpose’ was acceptable in wartime, 
a permanent peace-time body ‘ought to concentrate on and confine itself 
to the maintaining of the highest standards; on the fostering of the very 
best in Music, Drama and Art…’. Wood ended by noting that he had 
discussed this with Butler, who ‘would probably not be unsympathetic to 
the considerations I have put down’.  
Thus Glasgow had proposed the creation of specialist committees 
in CEMA for music, drama and art, and Wood envisaged CEMA’s 
becoming a permanent body operating under charter at arm’s length 
from the Board of Education and supporting only high quality 
professional work. Much of this might be seen as the realisation of 
Christie’s dreams. But there is a reference at the start of Wood’s letter, 
unremarked by commentators, which suggests a different view: ‘…as 
you will know, there are various stirrings of the waters, e.g. John 
Christie with his proposed National Council of Music, but I am not at all 
sure that these stirrings will always produce waters of healing, and it 
behoves us, perhaps, to be thinking ahead a bit’. It seems that while the 
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Arts Council’s founding principles were similar to Christie’s, among the 
early motivations for setting it up was Wood’s wish that Christie should 
not prevail. The reasons for this will be considered below, as will other 
examples of the same phenomenon. 
Jones replied to Wood that ‘our moving away from the amateur 
field is against the original understanding with the Treasury who all 
along have stressed “making by the people themselves”’.38 This did not 
appeal to Wood or Butler: it is not surprising that they favoured Keynes 
over Jones for Chairman. Butler approached Keynes in December 1941, 
suggesting that chairing CEMA ‘would not demand too much from you 
in actual time… [but] your guidance at this stage of its development 
would be invaluable’.39 As to the future, ‘while the Council’s work will 
remain emergency war work, it does, I think, point the way to something 
that might occupy a more permanent place in our social organisation’. 
Keynes required some coaxing; not only was he hugely busy, but ‘I have 
been in only limited sympathy with the principles on which it [CEMA] 
has been carried on hitherto’.40 Butler overcame Keynes’ doubts at a 
meeting with him in January 1942. A few days later he accepted the 
chairmanship.41 
Keynes had long been a formidable advocate of high standards 
and professionalism in the arts. Fred Leventhal, citing a letter from 
Christie to Glasgow and a meeting between Keynes and Glasgow, both 
in July 1940, described Keynes as an ‘even more trenchant critic’ than 
Christie of CEMA’s initial focus.42 (This was Leventhal’s only reference 
to Christie; he did not mention the NCM.) Soon after agreeing to 
become CEMA’s Chairman, Keynes made his, and apparently 
 
38 V&A/EL2/4, Jones-Wood, 29/9/41 
39 V&A/EL2/11, Butler-Keynes, 17/12/41, for this and the following quotation. 
40 ibid, Keynes-Butler, 24/12/41 
41 ibid, Keynes-Butler, 14/1/42 
42 Leventhal, pp301-2 
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Glasgow’s, approach to arts funding clear in a letter to Ifor Evans, a 
CEMA member:   
I was worried lest what one may call the welfare side was to be developed at 
the expense of the artistic side and of standards generally. Before agreeing to 
act as Chairman, I expressed this view very clearly to [Butler].… He told me 
that I need have no anxiety on that head, that he shared this view himself and 
that, with the disappearance of the Pilgrim Trust from the management 
(combined with Miss Glasgow’s bias in the right direction) all ought to be 
well on this score.43  
Butler himself was not the ally Christie thought him, and the 
combination of Butler and Keynes ultimately proved fatal to the NCM. 
But Christie’s later conflicts with Keynes, as with Butler, involved no 
disagreement of principle – their views on the arts were similar. There 
was undoubtedly a personality clash, though this had not been apparent 
during their cordial exchanges in 1938.44 But the more fundamental 
problems were that both had a compulsion to be in charge, that Keynes 
had in fact been put in charge, and, subsequently, that Keynes was 
infuriated by Christie’s failure to provide any detail for his vision.   
Butler’s note of the meeting at which Keynes accepted the 
chairmanship45 is significant in these and other respects. First, it 
confirmed that Keynes was ‘keen that C.E.M.A. should concentrate on 
standard and not on mere dissipation [sic] of any form of music and 
art…. He objected to C.E.M.A. being a welfare organisation’. Second, 
Keynes ‘responded well to the suggestion that we should organise a 
Council outside a Government office, which should encourage, in 
general music, drama, and the arts, and act as a channel for the granting 
of Government money’. Thus even before Keynes became CEMA’s 
Chairman, he and Butler had agreed the essential structure of what 
 
43 Keynes-Evans 28/1/42, cited in Anna Upchurch: ‘Keynes's legacy: an intellectual's influence 
reflected in arts policy’, International Journal of Cultural Policy, January 2011, Vol. 17 Issue 1, p77.  
44 See, generally, Chapter 6 
45 V&A/EL2/11, untitled file note by Butler, 7/1/42, for this and all later quotations in this paragraph 
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became the Arts Council. Third, Keynes ‘agrees with me that Mr. 
Christie’s organisation will have to play in with us in any ultimate 
scheme’. This final point confirms that Christie influenced those 
planning CEMA’s future, Butler and Keynes as well as Wood. Wood 
wished to outflank Christie’s NCM. For Butler and Keynes the NCM 
had to co-operate with and subordinate itself to any new permanent 
organisation, if this is the meaning of ‘play in with us’. For all of them, 
Christie and his plans were both highly relevant and an object of 
suspicion.  
Two further examples, respectively from within and outside 
Whitehall, illustrate the negative attitudes towards Christie and his plans 
during early planning for what became the Arts Council. First, in 
December 1941 Butler noted a discussion about CEMA with Sir Alan 
Barlow of the Treasury. He prefaced this, apropos of nothing else in the 
meeting, by recording that ‘the Treasury were not disposed to give Mr. 
Christie any money’.46  
Second, in March 1942 Lord Esher, President of the British 
Drama League, wrote to congratulate Keynes on becoming CEMA’s 
Chairman.47 Esher noted that ‘the patronage system has been at last 
destroyed by the war… [so that] music, drama & painting [have] no 
alternative but to throw themselves into the arms of Socialism’. Because 
of or despite this lack of alternatives:  
London… is alive with people devising schemes for state subsidy & avoiding 
state control. Mr. Basil Dean has plans for the control of E.N.S.A. over 
drama after the war. Mr. John Christie has a Committee ready to take over 
the control of subsidised music after the war. Now I am against both of these 
 
46 V&A/EL2/4, file note by Butler, 4/12/41  
47 CEMA file ‘Esher, The Viscount  (Senior)’, V&A/EL2/14, Esher-Keynes, 4/3/42, for all quotations 
in this paragraph 
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unpopular “strong” men, & I am convinced that in C.E.M.A. we have the 
embryo of the required organisation.48 
Esher argued that expert advisers be added to CEMA, to increase its 
credibility in the artistic world, protect it from state control and diminish 
the influence of such ‘strong men’. Keynes may have been flattered by 
Esher’s letter. He noted to Mary Glasgow: ‘I think it very likely that 
Lord Esher himself might be a suitable person for a reconstructed 
Council, when the time comes for that’.49   
The suspicion which Christie aroused and his unawareness of it 
are graphically illustrated by Christie’s and Butler’s widely differing 
accounts of a meeting in February 1942, soon after Keynes agreed to 
become CEMA’s Chairman. Christie’s was in a letter to Audrey, 
Butler’s in a minute for his officials.50 Christie introduced his with: 
‘Now I have good news. I went to see Butler this morning & had a 
splendid interview’. His letter was mainly in the form of a reconstructed 
dialogue between him and Butler but with arbitrary and confusing use of 
direct and reported speech:  
I began by telling him that if the Government create their own music council, 
if it goes wrong they get blamed & they have no protection. If our show goes 
wrong, that is our funeral & the Government escape…. They don’t want to 
create their own show. When do you want to start? Now; for one thing if we 
don’t you never know but something else may crop up. I think you are right.   
On this point, Butler’s note simply recorded Christie’s saying that plans 
for the NCM were far advanced, and that Lord Greene had ‘run circles 
around the Board of Trade’s legal adviser’, and Butler’s response that ‘I 
was quite in favour of the idea of his Council remaining as independent 
as possible’.  
 
48 Esher soon developed a more positive view of Christie – see below. 
49 V&A/EL2/14, Keynes-Glasgow, undated, covering Keynes-Esher, 25/3/42 
50 Christie’s account: Glyndebourne box titled ‘Christie Correspondence JC-AC 1942-1943, 1945-51 
etc’ (hereafter ‘Glyndebourne 5’), folder headed ‘John Christie-Audrey Christie (Jan to April)’ 
(hereafter ‘Glyndebourne 5/1’), JC-AC, 9/2/42. Butler’s account: V&A/EL2/4, file note by Butler, 
10/2/42. All quotations in the following four paragraphs are from these sources.  
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Concerning the possibility of the NCM and CEMA co-operating, 
Christie wrote (in Butler’s voice):   
I [Butler] have asked Keynes to become Chairman & he has accepted. I think 
C.E.M.A. is to become later the central body which will coordinate Music, 
Drama & Painting. I have talked to Keynes about it and he talked about you 
[Christie]. I want you to go and see him in the near future. Make your own 
appointment with him. Go alone, not with Wilfrid Greene. You are the fons 
et origo of the whole thing.  
In Butler’s account, he asked Christie ‘whether he was averse from 
linking up with C.E.M.A. now. He did not give me a negative answer, 
but rather implied, at my suggestion, that he might have a talk with Mr. 
Maynard Keynes. I am accordingly warning Mr. Keynes that he may be 
favoured by a visit from Mr. Christie’. This strange form of words 
suggests that Butler originated the idea of Christie and Keynes meeting.            
 The two records diverge most startlingly on the issue of funding 
the NCM. Butler wrote: ‘Mr. Christie... said that all he now wanted was 
£5,000 for secretarial expenses. He told me that he had had a most 
unsatisfactory interview with Sir Alan Barlow. He did not give me any 
indication as to how he now expected to receive the subsidy which his 
Council needs’. In Christie’s version, Butler asked ‘What are you doing 
about expenses? Well I [Christie] have asked for £5000 a year…. Yes I 
[Butler] think you are quite right to begin small’. After exchanges about 
George Dyson being a ‘difficult man’, Butler said (according to 
Christie): ‘Well I will see Alan Barlow at the Treasury about it’. 
Christie’s conclusion to Audrey was: ‘So there we are. We are at last 
unofficially accepted & wanted. The Treasury are realising that they will 
have to carry the Burdens. You see Butler’s wife was a Courtauld & they 
cannot or won’t go on paying for art. So Butler is well able to bring the 
position home to Barlow’. Both accounts mentioned a sum of £5000. 
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They had nothing else in common. This alone suggests that Christie’s 
plans were facing problems. 
Butler’s note reveals a further complicating factor: ambivalence 
towards Christie as an individual. Butler took him and the NCM 
seriously: ‘Christie has a strong Council and, as is known, great energy. 
It would be a pity to dismiss his efforts; on the other hand, these will be 
apt to stray and will want careful watching’. He was not keen ‘to hurry 
on the final marriage between C.E.M.A. and this Council. What would 
be best would be to find some device whereby the Council could justify 
its existence for a short period, and, if it proves its worth, eventually be 
associated in some way with the post-war C.E.M.A….’. But Butler also 
found Christie rather ridiculous. He reported that Christie ‘appeared to 
me to be dressed in evening dress’ and ‘told me in passing that he had 
sold all his wine for some £20,000, which had given him considerable 
satisfaction. He told me that in future people would drink beer at 
Glyndebourne…’. A figure of fun is at a disadvantage, particularly one 
like Christie, too insensitive to spot it and anyway too maladroit to 
remedy it. He reported to Audrey that ‘Butler was delighted at our wine 
sale & thought we deserved it’. He was still seen as a serious player 
rather than a buffoon or nuisance, but Butler’s mixed attitude was a sign 
of things to come. With Keynes as CEMA’s Chairman the balance 
shifted decisively against Christie. His mistaken belief that Butler would 
attempt, and probably succeed, to persuade the Treasury to provide a 
grant, his own fruitless efforts to gain funding, and his increasingly bitter 
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‘Damn the machine’: Keynes blocks the NCM – spring and summer 
1942 
 
 In his biography of Keynes, Robert Skidelsky commented that arts 
policy at CEMA under Keynes’s chairmanship ‘was closely bound up 
with his own personal philosophy. He brought to his new job a 
worshipful attitude to the arts, decided views on how they should be 
financed, and a strong but limited range of sympathies’.51 The 
description could be applied equally to Christie. But these similarities 
led not to a meeting of minds but to mutual mistrust, scorn on Keynes’ 
part and rage on Christie’s.  
 A letter of March 1942 from Christie to Audrey52 set the scene for 
his attempts to work with Keynes, a lengthy, digressive statement of his 
views on England finally working round to the NCM, CEMA and 
Keynes. He suggested that lack of imagination rather than bravery had 
got Britain through the Blitz. Churchill’s leadership had helped, but ‘I 
don’t like him and am shy of him. I suspect that he is dangerous’. The 
problem was ‘the machine’ – the system created and sustained by 
cowardly politicians and civil servants. Christie regarded himself as ‘just 
the kind of man they [the creators of ‘the machine’] wish to destroy’; he 
put Sir John Reith and J B Priestley in the same category. Only bullies 
like Churchill and Beaverbrook (‘I hate Beaverbrook & regard him as 
being totally evil’) could successfully fight the machine.  
 Christie wondered whether Keynes was a Beaverbrook, a Reith, or 
a small-minded coward: ‘….he comes from the Treasury. Will he play 
big or just fiddle? I don’t know’. Never shy of emphasising his own 
qualities – ‘I have the vision, the experience, the contacts, the abilities & 
 
51 Robert Skidelsky: John Maynard Keynes, Volume Three - Fighting for Britain 1937-46 (London: 
Macmillan, 2000), p287  
52 Glyndebourne 5/1, JC-AC, 17/3/42, for all quotations in this and the following paragraph 
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the credentials’ – he believed that he and Keynes could do much 
together, provided that Keynes would ‘see big… [and] see his 
opportunity as well as mine’.          
 He was to be disappointed. His initial approach to Keynes is not in 
the Glyndebourne archive, but Keynes’ reply is:  
If you will let me have a clear statement of just what it is you want and put it 
forward with the approval of your Council, I will then ask my CEMA 
officials if they think it has any relevant bearing on our activities…. I have 
not in fact the foggiest idea of just what you want and should not have the 
foggiest idea what to reply to you.53 
Christie’s reply54 was incoherent even by his standards. The points that 
emerged clearly were that the NCM did not yet exist (the legal 
formalities were still being settled), but that there would by some 
unexplained route be similar councils for drama and ‘painting’. Apart 
from that (the fractured syntax seemed to indicate confused thought), he 
understood that CEMA ‘is likely to develop from an organisation for 
providing music and consuming money into say five just men who will 
co-ordinate the needs of music, drama and painting after receiving the 
advice of the National Council’s music, drama and painting and so 
advise the Board of Education’. Yet more obscurely, he suggested, in 
relation to these three councils, that ‘some settling of their claims will be 
desired by the President of the Board of Education. I hope C.E.M.A. will 
do this’. 
 Keynes was unimpressed: ‘I am still quite in the dark as to the 
meaning of your letter…. I must, I am afraid, beg… that you must first 
of all tell me in plain terms what it is all about, and that the proposal is 
an official one from your Council’.55 Christie drafted a long reply which, 
without answering Keynes’ concerns, attempted to describe how the 
 
53 Glyndebourne 3, Keynes-Christie, 27/3/42 
54 ibid, Christie-Keynes, 15/4/42, for quotations in the reminder of this paragraph 
55 ibid, Keynes-Christie, 21/4/42 
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NCM and CEMA might work together. But this remained unsent. 
Meanwhile he confessed to Audrey that ‘I have been disturbed. Keynes, 
the new Chairman of C.E.M.A. practically refuses to see me’.56 He 
reported Lord Greene telling him that Butler should not have appointed 
Keynes, and wondered ‘whether there is a suspicious hostility between 
G[reene]. & K[eynes].…. They are perhaps Brains Nos. 1&2 in 
England’. He was concerned that Keynes would simply pass him on to 
more junior members of CEMA, which would be ‘obviously nonsense’.  
He waited several weeks before, on Greene’s advice,57 sending a 
modest response to Keynes admitting that Keynes’ letter ‘has 
embarrassed me’ and that, as it was not incorporated, ‘I cannot give you 
the official view of my Council’.58 He still sought a meeting, but with 
less bluster than before. At this point, as Christie predicted and 
presumably in order to avoid further correspondence, Keynes suggested 
that Christie deal not with him but with CEMA’s Music Director, 
Reginald Jacques, since ‘I [Keynes] would be quite out of my depth’.59 
Never one to take a hint, Christie replied enclosing a new memorandum 
about the NCM. He half apologised for troubling Keynes again, but ‘I 
cannot escape the conclusion that you and I are thrown together in this 
matter’.60 He suggested that the memorandum ‘should not be discussed 
with the musical members of C.E.M.A…. and that when you have read 
[it]… you may perhaps agree’. 
 The memorandum61 contained few new thoughts. The key themes 
were the low status and poor condition of music in England, the need for 
the NCM ‘to represent the art of Music with the necessary authority to 
plan for music and to support the Government’, for ‘respect rather than 
 
56 Glyndebourne 5/1, JC-AC, 27/4/42, for this and later quotations in this paragraph 
57 ibid, JC-AC, 30/4/42 
58 Glyndebourne 3, Christie-Keynes, 19/5/42 
59 ibid, Keynes-Christie, 22/5/42 
60 ibid, Christie-Keynes, 4/6/42 
61 ibid, memorandum enclosed with Christie-Keynes, 4/6/42, for all quotations in this paragraph  
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familiarity’, and for ‘State Aid’, which Christie tried and failed to 
distinguish from subsidy. The one concrete proposal was that an 
unspecified public body should ‘pay the cost of [the NCM’s]… 
investigation of Musical conditions and results and needs in this country, 
and also to pay the cost of the Council’s formation’. The memorandum 
proposed a sum of £5,000 a year, with the NCM’s office and staff based 
at Glyndebourne. Concerning the investigation, ‘We are not prepared to 
accept someone else’s analysis of the present position’.   
 Keynes checked with Mary Glasgow that CEMA could not grant 
the NCM £5,000 even if he wanted to.62 Glasgow advised that the 
Treasury would not ‘look kindly upon our using money to finance 
somebody else’s investigations in our own field of operations’.63 Keynes 
was thus highly discouraging to Christie on this point and on the 
memorandum generally: ‘This is still too nebulous. I cannot see what 
proposal I could possibly bring before my Council [nor]… how you 
could reasonably expect CEMA to express any opinion on the matter 
with only the foggiest ideas of what the body would do’.64  
 Christie tried another route to influence the government, with a 
rambling letter to Sir Stafford Cripps, Leader of the House of Commons 
and Lord Privy Seal.65 Alongside dreams of a new Glyndebourne in 
Ontario and obscure passages about his wish ‘to crystallize the National 
Conscience by giving it a constitution and a home (Glyndebourne)’, he 
sought to interest Cripps in the NCM. This went to CEMA for advice. It 
indicates CEMA’s low opinion of Christie by this stage, or its sniffy 
attitude to a potential rival, that Glasgow reported to Sir Robert Wood: 
 
62 CEMA file ‘Lord Keynes Correspondence 1942’, V&A/EL2/37, Keynes-Glasgow, 5/6/42  
63 ibid, Glasgow-Keynes, 6/6/42 
64 Glyndebourne 3, Keynes-Christie, 11/6/42 
65 ibid, Christie-Cripps, 6/6/42 
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‘The Christie persecution has extended to Sir Stafford Cripps’.66 On 
Glasgow’s advice, Cripps brushed off the approach.  
 Writing to Audrey in early June,67 Christie suggested that CEMA 
‘are trying to dig themselves in & to prevent the N.C.M. from 
working…. Chairman Keynes… refuses to see me. Jacques a second 
class musician & Miss Glasgow a civil servant and school inspector. All 
they do is spread mediocrity…. It is depressing.’. For Christie, Sir 
Kenneth Clark, also on CEMA’s Council, was its one saving grace. 
After meeting Clark, he wrote several days later but in the same letter: ‘I 
said [to Clark] the N.C.M. news was good only because of Clarke’s [sic] 
enthusiasm. I sent on the memorandum to Keynes with express 
instructions that it was not to be sent on to his musicians – Vaughan-
Williams [sic] and Jacques. Clarke said we should have a good deal of 
trouble with V-W & that he thought him very silly’. Christie indulged in 
increasing and unfair criticism of Vaughan Williams at this period, 
contrasting with their previous mutual respect.   
As Keynes and Glasgow became more dismissive of Christie, his 
closest associates, Harry Colles, Lord Greene and Sir Maurice Bonham 
Carter, rallied to him. Colles reported to Christie: ‘I have written to 
Keynes, simply and a little bluntly, to tell him that he is wrong in 
thinking the N.C.M. to be solely your scheme backed by “paper” 
names’…. we who have been attending conferences & meetings about it 
for the past four years are also busy people who may reasonably expect 
him to spend one hour in hearing about it from you’.68 Colles also 
offered Christie tactical advice should he meet Keynes:  
…you had better confine it simply to the need for the N.C.M. itself…. It will 
be necessary to convince him that we have our feet planted on certain ground, 
 
66 NA ED136/188B, Glasgow-Wood, 20/6/42 
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because he evidently thinks that you are standing on your head! So don’t, my 
dear man, talk about founding N.C.M’s all over the place, about 
Glyndebourne in Canada or National Conscience at Glyndebourne, or the 
cause may be lost from the first.       
The aim of meeting Keynes should be simply to ‘make him realise that 
we are out to straighten out the confusions of musical life in post-war 
Britain… [and] that we already see ways of beginning… I want to get 
past this stage of suspicions in the mind of Keynes and of others’. 
Colles’ blunt but sympathetic tone, and his evident expectation that 
Christie would accept it, help explain how Christie could inspire 
affection in his friends. Colles even parodied Christie’s own style: ‘My 
ideas are not “always right”, but I know that this one is’.  
 But there was no meeting. Keynes’ reply to Colles was terse and 
grand: he did not object to Christie’s meeting anyone at CEMA, but ‘as 
Chairman of CEMA, it is not my business to discuss proposals in their 
early stages. I am mainly occupied in quite different matters’.69 Colles 
wrote to Christie: ‘I fear I can do no more. I think the idea of your being 
granted permission by his Lordship to see Jacques or 
V[aughan].W[illiams]. about it is rather funny! Nevertheless as you 
know I’m sorry rather than amused’.70 
Bonham Carter too approached Keynes, using his own 
involvement in the NCM as evidence that Christie was no crank: ‘My 
excuse for adding to the correspondence… is that I have taken part in the 
discussions… in the drafting of the [NCM] constitution, and in the 
present approach to the Government’.71 This attempt fared no better than 
Colles’.  
  Christie’s secretary W E Edwards wrote to Lord Greene that 
Keynes’ stonewalling and barely disguised insults had created ‘a strong 
 
69 ibid, Keynes-Colles, 16/6/42 
70 ibid, Colles-Christie, 19/6/42 
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sense of disappointment in Mr. Christie’s mind at this dull culmination 
of his informal but encouraging conversations with Mr. Ramsbotham 
and later with Mr. Butler.… Mr. Christie thinks now that… the only 
important question is whether or not it is worth attempting to go on in 
the face of the now seeming discouragement in official quarters’.72 
Greene shared this frustration, writing to Christie: ‘I fear that Butler is 
just playing with you and that there is nothing to be done in that 
direction’.73  
Christie pithily summed up to Audrey his state of mind in June 
1942: ‘Damn the machine’.74 
Nonetheless he had not lost all credit. Lord Esher, critical of 
Christie in March 1942 (see above), invited him to stay just two months 
later. Christie reported to Audrey: ‘I liked him very much. Very easy to 
work with and no trace of selfishness…. We talked about ideals and 
planning and he is considering the National Council of Drama. He is 
inclined to join up with the N.C.M. I am inclined to agree’.75 This was 
accurate, rather than a Christie delusion. In July 1942 Butler wrote to 
Keynes, reporting that Esher wished that ‘Drama would be organised on 
much the same lines as… Christie had organised his Council of 
Music’.76 Butler hoped that Esher ‘did not think the Christie model was 
ideal’, but Esher stuck to his point: ‘Christie had collected an interesting 
set of people together’, whereas CEMA ‘included too many people too 
close to the job and not independent enough’. In December 1942 Keynes 
proposed and Butler agreed that Esher should join CEMA’s council,77 
further evidence that Keynes and Butler objected to Christie personally 
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rather than to his views – though clearly they, unlike the NCM’s 
supporters, found these views infuriatingly vague.  
Meanwhile Christie remained uncharacteristically polite to 
Keynes, as if Keynes were offering advice rather than brush-offs. The 
nearest he came to a reproach was to suggest that ‘Your [Keynes’] 
theory seems to be “start and we’ll tell you if you’re wrong”, but surely 
discussion leading to a “right start” would be a good deal better’.78 
Keynes himself remained determined not to meet Christie. CEMA 
council minutes suggest that his and Glasgow’s disdain and impatience 
towards Christie were now CEMA policy: 
The Secretary reported that the Chairman, the President of the Board of 
Education, and the Lord Privy Seal [Cripps] had all received a number of 
letters from Mr. John Christie in connection with his National Council of 
Music. It was not clear to any of them exactly what Mr. Christie was asking 
for and none of them felt that he had any spare time to go into the matter until 
further details were known.79 
CEMA’s council agreed that Christie should instead meet CEMA’s 
music specialists. Christie accepted this with fairly good grace.80   
 The minutes of this meeting, in July 1942,81 suggest that Christie 
left most of the talking to Bonham Carter and Colles. CEMA was 
represented by two Council members, Stanley Marchant, Principal of the 
Royal Academy of Music, and Vaughan Williams, plus Reginald 
Jacques and Mary Glasgow. Bonham Carter set out, more clearly than 
Christie generally managed, three possible ways forward for CEMA and 
the NCM:  
(1) that C.E.M.A. might be regarded as a special organisation set up to deal 
with wartime conditions; (2) that C.E.M.A. might go on after the war and 
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itself assume the functions of a N.C.M; (3) that C.E.M.A. might become the 
general instrument to advise the Government on the allocation of funds for 
the Arts, working though the N.C.M. in matters concerning music.       
Colles added that the NCM’s members needed to know the 
government’s attitude and whether CEMA might find £5,000 for the 
proposed survey of music in England. Neither point was addressed. The 
meeting’s limited conclusion was that the NCM would put a more 
detailed proposal to CEMA and that meanwhile CEMA’s council would 
receive a report on the meeting with the NCM.  
 The NCM representatives did not see the meeting for the window 
dressing it was. Christie wrote to Lord Greene that ‘apart from mild 
obstruction by old Vaughan Williams, [it] was quite happy’.82 So Colles 
worked on the proposed national survey, Christie repeatedly sought 
news of CEMA’s discussion about the NCM, and CEMA itself largely 
ignored the topic. On 1 September 1942 Christie suggested that the 
NCM and CEMA collaborate on the proposed national survey83– 
surprisingly, given his earlier insistence on the NCM’s independence. 
On 2 September, CEMA’s council decided ‘it was impossible to give 
any adequate answer to Mr. Christie’s request before seeing the details 
of the proposed investigation’.84 Christie wrote to Audrey: ‘No 
telephone message this morning from Miss Glasgow. The C.E.M.A. 
meeting was last night at 5. I think that if they had readily cooperated, 
Miss Glasgow would have written. It looks bad’.85  
It was worse than that: CEMA saw nothing to co-operate with. 
Glasgow wrote to Keynes two days after the CEMA council meeting: 
‘You will… be interested to know that he [Christie] has rung up three 
times today (I was out each time) to find out what the Council’s 
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“decision” was. Which doesn’t make sense because the N.C.M. are 
supposed to be preparing an outline of the “investigation” for the 
Council’s consideration’.86            
Within six months of Keynes’ becoming Chairman of CEMA, 
Christie had become for him and Glasgow a combination of persistent 
nuisance and shared joke. Despite the best efforts of Colles, Bonham 
Carter, Greene and Christie himself, there was no way back to serious 
acceptance. These efforts included a massive scaling down of ambitions 
- from major pots of government money to spend and National Councils 
of Music around the world to the modest proposed joint CEMA/NCM 
survey of music in England. None of this impressed CEMA, which 
under Keynes’ chairmanship increasingly saw itself as an organisation 
focused on raising professional standards in the performing arts – the 
task Christie had envisaged for the NCM.  
  
‘I see nothing but hate & envy’: late 1942 to spring 1943 
 
From autumn 1942 Christie saw his dream of a National Council 
of Music slipping away. On Colles’ and Audrey’s advice he remained on 
best behaviour when dealing with CEMA, but anger and depression 
were close to the surface. Anger showed in his reaction to Thomas 
Russell’s book Philharmonic,87 an account of the world of classical 
orchestras by the business manager of the London Philharmonic 
Orchestra. It contained a (slightly) veiled attack on the NCM: ‘…the 
convenor of one council of the dilettante type, patrons with other 
people’s money, gathered a great deal of data from experienced 
orchestral organizers - but failed to invite any one of them on to his 
 
86 V&A/EL2/37, Glasgow-Keynes, 4/9/42 
87 London: Hutchinson & Co, 1942 
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council’.88 Christie wrote to Audrey: ‘It has… completely 
misrepresented me & our N.C.M….The man must be a cad’.89 And later: 
‘I gather that Russell is a little man, very red, & thwarted’.90 He aimed at 
external targets too: ‘This war separates people… I think Churchill is 
responsible for that. He seems to me to base his attitude on the hate of 
the Germans. Hate is intolerable’.91 He revealed his depression to 
Audrey: ‘I am so lonely…. I can not tell you how bored I am. All the 
sense of development of achievement of inspiration has gone. I see 
nothing but hate & envy & irritation & blame of others’. 
But he spent much of September 1942 working with Harry Colles 
on the proposed CEMA/NCM survey of music in England, and several 
days in October with Bonham Carter at Glyndebourne planning the final 
touches. In her letter of thanks, Violet Bonham Carter described 
Glyndebourne, with its resident evacuee children,92 as ‘perfect in 
conception & execution…. Plato’s Republic & Utopia are left far 
behind’.93 Christie hoped to persuade Butler to appoint Lord Greene 
chairman of the survey;94 he failed even to secure a meeting with Butler.  
The proposal, submitted in October, was a substantial printed 
document.95 Ignoring the NCM’s pre-war origins, Harry Colles’ 
introductory note began: ‘Post-war music will be the consequence of 
war-time music, not the restitution of pre-war music. That, in a word, is 
the justification of the formation of a National Council of Music now’. 
Colles argued that before the war classical music had depended on 
private enterprise, but ‘The principle that when private enterprise is 
insufficient, the Government may wisely step in has been admitted, first, 
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94 ibid, JC-AC, 10/ and 13/9/42 
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in the case of the B.B.C, more recently in the creation of C.E.M.A. as a 
war-time expedient. Can it go further? It seems inevitable that it will be 
forced to do so by circumstance’. Colles used increased public demand 
for music as an elitist argument for the NCM:  
[The demand is] now mainly from what may be called the smaller tax-
playing class, and it is a class to which Governments are wont to incline their 
ears…. But some of us view this prospect with apprehension. The benefit of 
the taxpayer and the welfare of music… are two entirely different things, and 
it is with the benefit of music that we are concerned. 
The answer was to create an independent council ‘with an Executive of 
men of affairs, conversant with the Arts, but not claiming personal 
musicianship’, helping the government to resist claims which ‘might be 
disastrous to the art’. Colles’ note was silent on why CEMA could not 
fulfil this role, on the relationship between this council and CEMA, and 
indeed on CEMA generally. 
 The bulk of the document, equally silent about CEMA despite 
Christie’s proposal for collaboration, was the proposal for a survey of 
music in England. It would cover ‘agencies by which music is provided’, 
including orchestras, festivals, choral societies, and ballet and opera 
companies. The section on opera did not attempt impartiality: 
‘Glyndebourne is in a class by itself, as setting a standard of superlative 
work on international lines’. The survey’s purpose was described only 
towards the end: ‘…the practice and enjoyment of music is an important 
if not even an essential element in the cultural wellbeing of a civilised 
community…. [but] private patronage must restrict music to the few, is 
casual and often wasteful…. [The survey would] set up a policy which 
would justify State aid for music on a permanent basis’. This was ‘not to 
be confused with subsidies’, though as so often the document failed to 
distinguish the two convincingly. Equally, ‘[for] the application of State 
aid, the art of music is not to be confused with “entertainment”’.  
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The document ended with the survey’s proposed terms of 
reference, modest given Christie’s grandiose utterances since 1938: 
To consider the conditions prevailing in normal times in regard to the Art of 
Music….  
To prepare a survey of the principal fields of Music….  
To consider the development of Music up to the present time and the use of 
State Aid to extend it….  
To consider the problem of suitable buildings for musical work.  
Keynes showed as little respect for this step-by-step, detailed 
approach to the NCM as for Christie’s earlier vague and grand 
pronouncements. In effect he killed it by neglect. He took a month to 
write to Christie, then informed him that CEMA would probably not 
discuss the survey proposal for another two months.96 In fact (see below) 
CEMA’s council never discussed it. But it was the letter’s other 
announcement which finally ended Christie’s patient politeness when 
dealing with Keynes. It reported a development which was to be central 
to CEMA’s, and later the Arts Council’s, way of working:97 ‘…the 
addition to the Council of three Panels to give the other members of the 
Council the finest expert advice in the three branches of music, art and 
drama’. The music panel’s members would be Arthur Bliss, Myra Hess, 
the composer, conductor and critic Constant Lambert,98 and the frankly 
obscure composer Thomas Wood. Keynes explained that he and Butler 
intended this approach to supplement CEMA’s expertise without adding 
to council numbers. Keynes would chair all three panels, and the 
council’s specialists in each area (for music, Vaughan Williams and 
Stanley Marchant) would attend the meetings of their respective panel. 
 
96 Glyndebourne 3, Keynes-Christie, 19/11/42, for all quotations in this paragraph 
97 http://www.artscouncil.org.uk/media/uploads/pdf/Norgrove_governance_review_2013.pdf, p7 
(accessed 24 September 2015)  
98 See Chapter 4, pp73-5 
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Mary Glasgow had mooted the concept of expert panels in August 
1941,99 and CEMA’s panels were not the first of their kind: ENSA100 
had Music and Drama Advisory Councils.101 ENSA’s antagonistic 
relationship with CEMA is beyond the scope of this thesis,102 but it may 
indicate Keynes’ and Christie’s attitude to ENSA that in this 
correspondence neither even mentioned its music council, established in 
1941 and larger and at least as distinguished as CEMA’s proposed music 
panel.103 It included the composers Sir Arnold Bax (Master of the King’s 
Music), William Walton, and CEMA’s recruit Constant Lambert; one of 
Christie’s strong supporters from 1938 to 1941, Malcolm Sargent; and 
two of his antagonists, Sir Hugh Allen and Sir George Dyson.   
Mary Glasgow had prompted Keynes’ letter to Christie about the 
music panel: ‘I was wondering whether, on your principle of ‘doing 
anything you like, provided you tell enough people about it’, it would be 
good to write (a) to Lord Esher and (b) to Christie giving them an idea of 
the Panel plans’.104  
Christie and Keynes were at one in believing that state support for 
the arts should focus on raising standards rather than widening 
availability. But the development of expert panels suggests a major area 
of difference: Christie, unlike Keynes, saw no role for professional 
musicians in the decision-making process. So it is unclear why he 
reacted to Keynes’ letter by drafting a reply105 which suggested that: 
‘…it is the intention of C.E.M.A. to enlarge itself to do the work that the 
N.C.M. set out to do, and for this reason I propose to withdraw my 
efforts to help by creating the N.C.M.’ – efforts Keynes had neither 
 
99 See p225-6 above 
100 See Chapter 7, p185, for a note on ENSA 
101 Basil Dean: The Theatre at War (London: George G Harrap, 1956), pp470-1 
102 See, for instance, The Theatre at War, p135: the bad institutional relationship was matched by 
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103 The Theatre at War, pp214-5, 470-1 and 548  
104 V&A/EL2/37,  Glasgow-Keynes, 13/11/42 
105 Glyndebourne 3, Christie-Keynes, 21/11/42 (not sent?), for the three following quotations   
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invited nor welcomed. He challenged Keynes’ view that with these four 
advisers, CEMA would have access to the finest expert advice 
(‘overstatement won’t do in Art’ – a dictum he rarely followed himself), 
and demanded that the NCM music survey proposal be returned and any 
copies destroyed. He ended: ‘I am writing to Butler’. His draft letter to 
Butler106 was a mixture of tale-telling about Keynes and warnings of 
disaster. It began: ‘Months ago you told me personally that you wished 
me to see Keynes, and that as soon as possible. Throughout this period 
Keynes has refused to see me’. It continued, presumably referring to the 
proposed music panel, though the letter did not specify this: ‘It seems 
clear that the Government intends to develop C.E.M.A. and not to use 
the N.C.M…. As Art is so essentially different from, say, tanks, will you 
allow me to ask you whether this is going to result in a catastrophic 
error?’.    
But the drafts remained drafts. Christie first consulted his three 
closest advisers. He wrote to Maurice Bonham Carter: ‘I want to make 
Keynes show his hand. I think he will show his hand against us. Then I 
want to have Butler’s sanction that I should address a full meeting of 
C.E.M.A. and I believe that I could win the day, and discomfit 
Keynes’.107 He wrote to Wilfrid Greene that ‘Keynes knows nothing 
about it…. I expect Butler understands these matters better than Keynes 
does’.108 Greene had previously suggested to Christie that ‘Butler is just 
playing with you’.109 He now advised caution: ‘…your proposed 
letters… bang bolt and bar the door. They also read (what is quite 
natural) as though you are piqued. If you send them it is the end of your 
efforts. Is this wise?’110 Harry Colles disagreed: ‘I think that the 
 
106 ibid, Christie-Butler, 21/11/42 (not sent?), for the two following quotations 
107 ibid, Christie-Bonham Carter, 21/11/42 
108 ibid, Christie-Greene, 21/11/42 
109 ibid, Greene-Christie, 2/7/42 
110 ibid, Greene-Christie, 24/11/42 
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withdrawal of your memorandum from C.E.M.A. was the only course 
open to you…. the Government has made up its mind beforehand not to 
accept the N.C.M.… it is no good battling against a judgement which 
has been delivered before evidence has been taken!’.111 But Greene’s 
view prevailed, the letters were not sent, and the initiative limped on.  
Colles was, however, largely correct. After a brief and formal 
mention in October 1942,112 CEMA’s council never discussed the 
proposed music survey. Instead it was delegated to the first meeting of 
the music panel, in January 1943. Keynes reported the outcome in a 
letter to Bonham Carter.113 His tone was less chilly than in his letters to 
Christie. The letter began with encouraging words: ‘…we shall be much 
interested in its [the survey’s] conclusions and will hope to profit by 
them…. We and you are embarking on a new field of organisation, and 
the more we know about it the better’. But it was empty of substance: 
‘How much more, if anything, you want us to say at this stage, I am not 
quite clear. It is not within the terms of our Treasury grant to make a 
contribution to the expenses of an outside enquiry…’. Christie’s 
response was to draft letters to Keynes and Butler114 in which anger was 
mixed with icy formality. A typical passage in the letter to Butler reads: 
‘I have the honour to submit that Lord Keynes’s letter of 22nd January is 
a most unsatisfactory culmination of twelve months’ endeavour to fulfil 
your request that I should see him on this matter’. But these letters too 
appear to have remained unsent. 
There seems to have been no more correspondence between 
Christie and Keynes about the NCM. They briefly encountered one 
another in Brooks’s Club in February 1943, when, according to Christie, 
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113 NA ED136/189, Keynes-Bonham Carter, 22/1/43, for the two following quotations 
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Keynes ‘was civil for a moment and both of us avoided any mention of 
our contention & Keynes left’.115  
While Keynes and Butler, the two people he most needed to 
influence, would have nothing to do with him, Christie retained not only 
his closest advisers Colles, Bonham Carter and Greene, but also, 
sporadically, other influential supporters. Some did not understand 
Christie’s unhappiness about CEMA. Myra Hess wrote: ‘…it may not be 
necessary to take such a gloomy view of the current musical situation. In 
every plan C.E.M.A. discusses, the question of standard is considered 
with the greatest seriousness; and the aim of everybody, Keynes 
included, is that the artistic standard should be raised’.116 But some 
appreciated Christie’s hurt pride. One such was Herwald Ramsbotham, 
who on being replaced at the Board of Education by Butler had become, 
as Lord Soulbury, Chairman of the Assistance Board. Soulbury sought to 
approach Butler on Christie’s behalf,117 but when, after several months, 
he finally managed to do so, he reported that Butler’s response had taken 
matters no further.118 Their correspondence is significant mainly in 
showing that even a government and party colleague was unable to 
influence Butler in this respect.  
Christie had more revealing discussions with Lord Esher, now on 
CEMA’s council. Esher was in some respects a less pugnacious and 
more pragmatic version of Christie himself. Their relationship was good 
despite Christie’s slight private doubts: ‘We stand well together. But it is 
queer how unsuitably these new peers behave (his father was made a 
peer). Every piece of notepaper with a coronet and E under it’.119As 
noted above, Esher now supported Christie and wished to create a drama 
 
115 Glyndebourne 5, folder titled ‘1943 John Christie to Audrey Christie (Jan to July)’ [hereafter 
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organisation analogous to the NCM. He provided confidential, clear-
sighted views about CEMA’s attitude towards his and Christie’s plans.  
Esher’s ‘drama NCM’, the Civic Theatre Scheme, aimed to enable 
towns to open repertory theatres ‘by a combination of Local and State 
subsidy, fifty per cent of the necessary funds being guaranteed by the 
Government and fifty per cent raised from Rates or from voluntary 
subscriptions’.120 The plan was submitted to the government in late 1942 
by a bewildering range of signatories including George Bernard Shaw, 
Malcolm Sargent, the playwright James Bridie, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury (William Temple, previously Archbishop of York), J B 
Priestley and T S Eliot.121 The list thus included some of the strongest 
pre-war supporters of arts subsidy (Bridie and Temple) and one of its 
strongest opponents (Eliot).122 
Esher told Christie that CEMA’s treatment of this proposal was 
similar to its treatment of the NCM: ‘The Civic Theatre Scheme has had 
considerable support…. But the crux of the matter is that C.E.M.A., who 
are as essential to our finances as they are to yours, fight shy of it & 
have postponed consideration of it for three months’.123 Esher believed 
that: 
…the real stumbling-block in the scheme is the suggested creation of a Civic 
Theatre Council with large powers & authority, which would inevitably be a 
rival to C.E.M.A., and which I am sure C.E.M.A. will never accept. The 
same applies to your proposed Council of Music, & I am convinced that both 
these Councils will either have to disappear or to be so modified that they are 
entirely subordinate to C.E.M.A. 
Esher suggested that it be made clear ‘these Councils are not there to 
rival C.E.M.A. but to assist and support C.E.M.A. in its inevitable fight 
 
120 Norman Marshall: The Other Theatre (London: John Lehmann, 1947),  p206 
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122 See, generally, Chapters 3-5 
123 Glyndebourne 3, Esher-Christie, 21/1/43, for all quotations in this paragraph 
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with the Treasury’. Assuming, wrongly, that the NCM was a 
collaboration with music professionals, he wondered ‘whether there is 
any chance of the music people modifying their plan’, which Esher 
hoped to persuade the ‘drama people’ to do.   
 Christie’s reply124 partly accepted Esher’s diagnosis but differed 
fundamentally as to prescription. CEMA had been set up as a wartime 
expedient, but now ‘CEMA and Keynes are digging themselves in to do 
the work of the future…. [CEMA] has done nothing but mediocrity, 
which it has persistently described as “being the finest possible etc.”…’. 
High standards could come only from a body like the NCM, with similar 
independent bodies for drama and the visual arts. CEMA ‘should be 
developed into… a small intermediary body to deal on behalf of the 
President [of the Board of Education] with our three Councils’. Instead 
‘Keynes is making a copy of our N.C.M., and, being a copy, perhaps a 
bad copy’.    
Esher attempted sympathetically to explain to Christie why the 
moment for the NCM had passed, probably for ever.125 He understood 
Christie’s criticisms of CEMA, but ‘disagree[d] with your handling of 
the political situation…. Keynes’ [music] panel can only be improved if 
those who want to improve it are not really out to supplant it’ (which 
clearly Christie wished to do). CEMA, as a quasi-public body seeking to 
raise artistic standards, had to fight on two fronts, against the Treasury 
and the public – inevitably a slow business: ‘Of all public departments, 
the Treasury is the most difficult to rush. Sapping and mining is the only 
hope’. As for the public, Esher mounted an elitist argument similar to 
that used by Harry Colles to support the NCM: ‘Mediocrity is the eternal 
danger of democracy.... In a democracy, the public must be persuaded 
out of its instinct for mediocrity’. Christie had been ‘able to avoid it 
 
124 ibid, Christie-Esher, 1/2/43, for all quotations in this paragraph.   
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[mediocrity] at Glyndebourne because A. You were an autocrat. B. You 
were an artist. C. You were rich – a most unusual combination’.  
Esher became more direct:  
I am sure C.E.M.A. are determined… to carry on after the War, and I am sure 
they will fight to the death any Council that tries to do the work they consider 
to be their function. They would never be content to be an intermediary body 
between the Board of Education and these Councils for the Arts… and the 
Board of Education will certainly support them.  
Hence Esher now sought to ‘persuade the theatre people to withdraw 
their suggested Council’. He suggested that ‘C.E.M.A’s Panels may be 
converted very slowly into something very similar to your National 
Council of Music…’, a thought which may have pleased Christie less 
than Esher realised. And he sympathised with Christie’s ‘natural 
impatience with these fumbling steps in democratic progress. Successful 
autocrats are rare and you have been one. It must be painful to descend 
to the slow pace of democracy…. But you are now working in a field 
where these are the rules’.       
The Glyndebourne archive contains no further letters between 
Christie and Esher. But ‘shadow-correspondence’ in May 1943 perhaps 
showed  Christie internalising the tension between his own direct, 
guileless and tactically inept approach and Esher’s extreme pragmatism 
in dealing with Keynes and CEMA. Christie had a letter critical of 
CEMA published in The Times.126 Mary Glasgow assumed that Keynes 
would wish to reply to it, and drafted a letter for his signature. Keynes 
disagreed: ‘…my instinct very strongly is to make no answer 
whatever….One cannot be appearing in public or writing in The Times 
too often. One must choose one’s seasons carefully….’.127  Christie, 
however, followed his Times letter with two draft letters to Keynes, 
 
126 The Times, 20/5/43, p5 
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neither of which seems to have been sent. One was emollient, in Esher’s 
style: ‘Would it now be a sensible thing for us to meet and talk over our 
respective points of view?… There will of course be honest differences 
of opinion between us, but that should not preclude reasonable 
discussion’.128 The other, dated the following day, was far more 
‘Christie’: ‘With some abruptness you as Chairman of C.E.M.A. have 
refused to see me…. Is this intentional and is this extreme discourtesy a 
personal matter between you and me?’.129 The drafts suggest a troubled 
state of mind, as does a letter to Audrey from this time: ‘Mentally I am 
rather shattered by my treatment over the N.C.M…’.130  
There may have been a further reason for this. On 6 March 1943 
he had written to Audrey: ‘I enclose a cutting from today’s Times at 
which I opened the paper & at first thought it must be the article 
[about]… which Harry [Colles] had telephoned… Then I saw his name 
at the head of the article, and wondered why there should be this 
publicity. It did not dawn on me that it could be an obituary notice’.131 
Harry Colles, Christie’s most constant friend and adviser during 
Audrey’s absence, had died suddenly two days earlier.132 Christie 
continued, with unusual simplicity: ‘I am very sorry indeed. In your 
absence he had always done what you did so well [to] check and guide 
me and I was conscious of it. He gave me great strength in the 
background as it appeared to be but actually in leading me. There was 
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The end of the NCM: spring 1943 to autumn 1944 
 
Christie’s work on the NCM did not end at this point. But his later 
efforts lacked sustained energy, showing flashes of wild optimism 
alternating with gloom and inactivity, and demonstrated even less 
realism than previously. His vision of the NCM became grander and 
more nebulous, then disappeared.  
In spring 1943 he again sought official support to visit Canada and 
the USA to discuss ‘the status which Art must have in the new 
World’,133 but the initiative was without conviction. He thought it likely 
that Richard Law, the Foreign Office Minister to whom he had written, 
would consult Butler who in turn would probably ‘be very glad to get 
me out of the Country so that I could not interfere with C.E.M.A. as 
many politicians would be glad to get Beveridge out! I don’t for a 
moment expect that anything will come of it. Anyhow, I have tried it’.134 
As he expected, nothing came of it.  
In June he wrote to Audrey: ‘I personally think that the NCM is 
dead, though I expect that Keynes will bag most of the ideas for 
C.E.M.A.. He has behaved like a cad’.135 Two weeks later he reported 
that Bonham Carter and Roy Henderson both wanted the NCM initiative 
to continue, and that ‘the better musicians don’t like C.E.M.A. (which 
they think means the Council for the Encouragement of mediocre 
artists)’.136 But ‘the present position is that C.E.M.A. has the money 
which it spends on mediocrity & is actually doing things. The N.C.M. 
has no money…’.   
In an optimistic phase, in July 1943, he organised an NCM 
meeting at the Ritz attended by Roy Henderson, Maurice Bonham Carter 
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and Malcolm Sargent among others. He wrote to Audrey: ‘I think in the 
future we may find that we carry the Public with us & the leading 
artists…. We may well find that C.E.M.A. gets into trouble and that 
Keynes is backing the wrong horse. The tea at the Ritz is excellent. The 
bill was £2.14 + 10/- tip’.137 But his spirits sank again: in early 
September he wrote: ‘This morning I got a letter from Myra Hess 
resigning from the N.C.M. I suspect that Marchant will follow suit and 
perhaps Vaughan Williams. Keynes’s carrot of Treasury money will be 
too much for them’.138  
Christie’s most sustained later burst of activity on the NCM came 
in late 1943 and early 1944. The Glyndebourne archive contains a copy 
of a letter (so presumably it was sent) from him to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Sir John Anderson, undated except for ‘? about Dec.’43’ in 
manuscript. It was a further bid for government recognition and funding 
for the NCM. It did not make a convincing case, beginning in self-
aggrandising style, and growing wilder: ‘I feel that I cannot avoid or 
delay in taking up the matter of Music with you personally. I regard the 
current position as almost wholly unsatisfactory…. The Government has 
got to act. It is necessary to back one man. I believe that man must be 
I’.139 It continued:  
At present all are wrong:- Conductors. Orchestras, Soloists and 
Composers…. They are wrong because the conditions are wrong, but much 
more because they are smugly self satisfied, and their audiences are doped 
with mediocrity. The professionals must be under a new control which must 
never be satisfied. I can provide this control….We are thwarted by the 
Treasury, by Keynes and by C.E.M.A. 
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The final sentence was unlikely to be received sympathetically by the 
Chancellor. Equally ill-judged were Christie’s argument that ‘the body 
controlling art must be independent of the Politicians and the Civil 
Service’, his bald request for £1 million a year, and his summary of 
music abroad in such terms as ‘France has counted but little. American 
musicians are controlled by gangsters’. The archive contains no reply. 
      But Christie began 1944 in unrealistically positive mood. Apparently 
unaffected by Keynes’ refusal, over nearly two years, to see him, he 
wrote to Audrey of potential meetings in Buckingham Palace, national 
councils for a bewildering range of subjects, and the creation of a 
‘Ministry of the Mind’ under the aegis of the Lord President of the 
Council.140 Ignoring his consistent failure to gain a penny of public 
funding for the NCM, he proposed that all these councils be ‘absolutely 
& entirely independent of the civil service and the Politicians but 
perhaps financed to some extent by the Treasury’. The letter does not 
show Christie at his most balanced: ‘No-one in the Government is 
interested & nothing gets done. In other words, there is no channel. I 
create that channel…. I have a feeling that these things may begin to 
move. I have the advantage of age combined with youth: - I see in the 
dark like young people’.   
      There was little foundation for any of this, though in early 1944 
Christie briefly and surprisingly managed to interest the Cabinet 
Secretary, Sir Edward Bridges, in his ideas. He told Audrey: ‘I had an 
excellent talk with Bridges. I hear he is a very good man…. Bridges 
thinks he can help on the N.C.M. I think I have made the right 
contact….’.141 Ten days later: ‘Bridges came to lunch & is a splendid 
collaborator. He thinks my plans for culture etc. are a splendid 
 
140 ibid, JC-AC, 18/1/44, for all quotations in this paragraph 
141 ibid, JC-AC, 6/ and 9/1/44 
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scheme’.142 The NCM’s articles of association were still in draft after 
three years; but once in final form, Bridges would ‘start the ball rolling 
at his end…. When it comes off, the scheme will have full publicity. The 
forces of good will become vocal…. The Heavens are opening at long 
last’. He acknowledged short term difficulties, but during this brief 
period his confidence was undented:  
Here on the one side I am planning National & International Work and likely 
to bring it off and on the other hand struggling for months over a petty cash 
sum…. It’s too silly for words…. I think we can now get our N.C.M. through 
quite quickly and get a start made on the other subjects Architecture, Drama, 
Art, Letters, Prevention of Cruelty, perhaps Religion, Idealism and National 
Culture. 
He did not explain what the National Councils of Religion, Idealism and 
the rest would actually do, but wrote about them often and repetitiously 
at this stage. 
Around this time he also wrote three memoranda with the general 
heading ‘Art in Reconstruction’.143 The intended audience was Robert 
Foot, briefly Director-General of the BBC.144 Christie continued these 
efforts with Foot’s successor, William Haley. The memoranda dealt not 
only with the NCM but also, at length, with the BBC’s role as the key 
provider of music in Britain and the potential of the Royal Opera House 
Covent Garden to be the exemplar of artistic standards, a larger and 
geographically more accessible Glyndebourne. These memoranda were 
part of Christie’s planning for a campaign to take over Covent Garden. 
Concerning the NCM they said little new. The history of Covent Garden 
is outside the scope of this thesis, but CEMA’s discussion of it in the 
second half of 1944, considered briefly below, reveals CEMA’s 
continuing negative attitude to Christie.  
 
142 ibid, JC-AC, 19/1/44, for all later quotations in this paragraph  
143 In Glyndebourne 5/4; undated 
144 ibid, JC-AC, 14/2/44 
  259 
Christie’s somewhat manic optimism of early 1944 alternated 
with deep pessimism. He wrote to Audrey in February that at a meeting 
at the BBC ‘I suddenly fizzed. I just let fly…. I have rarely created such 
an effect’;145 but in the same letter: ‘The machine yawns…. The machine 
has won…. the machine is in control everywhere’. Temporarily at least, 
his view of Sir Thomas Beecham had altered from his pre-war 
suspicion:146 ‘I would gladly collaborate with Beecham…. We two could 
get on very well together. It was the little men, who kept us apart’. 
Around this time he also corresponded with the Foreign Secretary, 
Anthony Eden. Eden responded non-committally to Christie’s request 
that the Foreign Office provide £1000 to assist Audrey to pursue his 
plans in New York,147 but the archive contains no reply from Eden to a 
subsequent letter which somehow linked this with a ‘proposal… to run 
permanent Opera, Operetta, Ballet, Drama and Chamber Music at 
Covent Garden and at two other theatres and at two or three concert halls 
in London, at a level of performance unknown in the past’.148 This, 
apparently, would ‘light at the centre of things in the Capital of the 
Empire… a fire of such artistic intensity that the whole World gazes at it 
with open eyes and open ears’.  
This period reached a climax in a letter to Audrey shortly before 
her return from America. The NCM formed a minor part of a far grander 
vision: 
My idea is to collect a large sum of money for a National Glyndebourne 
Trust to control a Corporation which shall run Covent Garden, The 
Haymarket…, the New Queen’s Hall… all to be on superb lines and to link 
these up with the National Gallery & the National Portrait Gallery & the 
 
145 ibid, JC-AC, 27/2/44, and for the following two quotations  
146 See Chapter 6, pp148 
147 Glyndebourne 5/4, Eden-Christie, 17/3/44 
148 ibid, Christie-Eden, 20/3/44, for this and the following quotation  
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other Galleries…. I want the Treasury to collaborate…. We might get one of 
the Royal Houses in St. James’s Palace as our Headquarters.149       
There was more in the same vein, but nothing then or subsequently 
about the NCM’s practical realisation. During the rest of 1944 he 
concentrated on attempts to involve himself in the future of the Royal 
Opera House and to interest the Director-General of the BBC in his more 
obscure plans. The NCM project was effectively over.  
As an epilogue, it is worth recording Keynes’ continuing refusal 
to engage seriously with Christie during this later period, not only about 
the NCM but even about opera, his area of expertise and success. 
Christie was a shadowy presence in discussions about Covent Garden’s 
future at all three CEMA council meetings in the second half of 1944. 
Keynes was absent in America, and all were chaired by Sir Kenneth 
Clark. In July Clark reported on an agreement reached for the music 
publisher Boosey and Hawkes to take on the lease of Covent Garden 
from January 1945.150 A committee to oversee this had been established 
comprising himself, Sir Stanley Marchant, Leslie Boosey and Ralph 
Hawkes. The committee had met once and had invited William Walton 
to join. Responding to a question from Lord Esher, Clark reported that 
the committee had also considered inviting Christie, that he, Clark, had 
been in favour, but that the committee had decided against this. Esher’s 
response was revealing: ‘…he was glad to know that it was not the 
C.E.M.A. representatives who had opposed Mr. Christie’s election’.  
In September Clark reported that three further members had 
joined the committee, including Samuel Courtauld (Rab Butler’s father-
in-law) and, as Chairman, Keynes. Clark, apparently unprompted, ‘was 
able to reassure the Council that Mr. John Christie had been brought into 
consultation by Mr. Leslie Boosey and had agreed with Mr. Boosey that 
 
149 ibid, JC-AC, 29/3/44 
150 V&A/EL1/6, Minutes of CEMA’s 29th meeting, 25/7/44, for all material in this paragraph 
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he would not be a suitable member of the Committee’.151 The reference 
was not further explained. But by November, the committee ‘was still in 
touch with Mr. John Christie and it had now been suggested that Mr. 
Christie should join it. This proposal was awaiting Lord Keynes’ 
approval’.152 Keynes withheld approval. Christie remained excluded. 
Keynes was now, in effect, Chairman of both CEMA and the Royal 
Opera House. In every year since 1945, CEMA’s successor the Arts 
Council has given a larger grant to the Royal Opera House than to any 




This chapter began by noting parallels between John Christie’s 
National Council of Music and Alfred Wareing’s League of Audiences. 
But in some respects they were fundamentally different.  
The League sought and received public attention and aimed to 
influence public as well as government opinion. It gained considerable 
publicity for most of its existence. Before the lengthy period of extreme 
neglect set in, Wareing was in some quarters celebrated, sometimes in 
extreme terms, as a, indeed the, pioneer whose work led to the 
establishment of the Arts Council.153  
Christie was far better known than Wareing, and the ‘Council of 
Power’/NCM had real importance in the history of arts funding. But 
despite Christie’s central place as a provider of ‘high culture’, his 
powerful friends and associates, and six years of intense if erratic effort, 
this work has at no stage, then or since, received public, or much 
academic, recognition.  
 
151 ibid, Minutes of CEMA’s 30th meeting, 26/09/44 
152 ibid, Minutes of CEMA’s 31st meeting, 28/11/44 
153 Chapter 5, pp125-30 
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There are obvious reasons this, in particular his failure to produce 
a clear plan, rather than vague rhetoric, for how the NCM would work, 
and the determination of CEMA and of Keynes in particular not to deal 
with him. Christie’s attitude to ‘the mob’, his tendency to alienate key 
individuals, his sometimes delusional flights of fancy and his 
unshakeable belief in his own rightness are also relevant. But these 
factors make the NCM initiative of greater rather than less interest, 
casting new light on Christie’s complex personality as well as on the 
relationship between the state and the arts in the 1930s and early 1940s. 
The research for this thesis has revealed important debates opened up by 
Christie from 1938; his relationship and dealings with key cultural 
figures of the time; his influence, probably more negative than positive, 
on planning for the Arts Council; the credit he had and often wasted due 
to the prestige of opera at Glyndebourne; his access to 10 Downing St 
when Chamberlain was Prime Minister and the Board of Education 
when Ramsbotham was its President; and the misfortunes of timing, 
compounded by tactical ineptitude, which caused him to lose access 
when it mattered most. And it has provided illustrations of and insights 
into the contradictions of his character.  
John Christie’s work was important in the history of arts funding 
in Britain. These three chapters have sought to rescue it from, on the one 
hand, almost total neglect and, on the other, the silliness of Richard 
Witts’ statement that ‘John Christie enjoyed the company of Nazis, 
while Maynard Keynes preferred the fellowship of boys. That is 
precisely why we have an Arts Council and not a Council for Music and 
the Arts’.154 
 
154 Witts, p9 
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Chapter 9 
 
‘No Levy on Laughter – and No Fine on Fun!’: the 




Alfred Wareing’s League of Audiences failed partly because he 
would work only with those whose purpose was identical with his own. 
His aim was to have theatre and live music aided by subsidy distributed 
at arm’s length from government, the system which came to be 
embodied in the Arts Council. Nothing else would do. Wareing’s plan 
was ‘not primarily or even remotely concerned with the entertainment 
duty. And it differs from most other schemes, whose idea is to build a 
National Theatre, and so forth’.1 This exclusivity limited the League’s 
appeal and, by creating powerful opposition within the theatre 
profession, contributed much to the League’s decline.2 The crucial area 
of disagreement was Entertainments Duty, a tax on tickets for 
exhibitions, films, sports events and theatre and live music. The 
commercial theatre establishment saw abolishing the duty as a higher 
priority than gaining subsidy: for them, Wareing’s ‘subsidy first and 
only’ approach was a damaging diversion.  
This chapter examines Entertainments Duty and the campaign 
against it. It sketches its history to the early 1930s and then considers in 
more detail two elements of the campaign. The first was the tax 
exemption gained by the Old Vic and Sadler’s Wells theatres. This 
required the government to consider the educational value of theatre and 
live music. The second was theatre organisations’ substantial success in 
 
1 The Observer, 25/11/34; see, generally,  Chapter 3 
2 See Chapter 5, pp101-8, on Wareing’s relationship with the theatre establishment  
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the later 1930s in having their tax burden reduced, and in particular to be 
taxed more lightly than cinema. The chapter ends by considering the 
importance of these episodes in the history of arts funding.  
The duty’s pre-war history has been even more neglected by 
historians than that of the League of Audiences and the National Council 
of Music.3 For both positive and negative reasons it is as important as 
either. Negatively, the campaign against Entertainments Duty harmed 
the League. Positively, it led to tax cuts for live music and theatre which 
were significant victories in the broader campaign for government 
support of the arts at a time when, according to the usual view, there was 
little campaigning and no victories.  
The Sunday Times argued in 1935 that ‘The remission of a tax is, 
of course, a form of subsidy, and… is given on aesthetic grounds’,4 a 
doubtful view but one widely held, including in some parts of 
government. The Sunday Times’s statement also reflected a view that the 
campaigns for subsidy and against Entertainments Duty had much in 
common and thus should have co-operated. There were further parallels 
between the two campaigns, given the League’s fear of the moral effects 
of the ‘mechanised arts’ of broadcasting, recording and film, and the 
Entertainments Duty campaigners’ fear of the economic effects of film 
in particular on theatre. But in practice they had a destructive 
relationship, and the League of Audiences came off worse. 
Entertainments Duty campaigners worked hard to damage the League, 
even taking their attack direct to the Chancellor of the Exchequer.5  
Finally, since the issue involved tax revenue, the government 
could not avoid discussing the duty. Treasury, Customs and Excise and 
 
3 The duty’s wartime history is partly covered in Weingartner, pp122-27.   
4 Sunday Times,7/4/35 
5 See Chapter 5, pp101-8 
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Board of Education papers on the subject provide a unique insight into 
government attitudes to live music and theatre between the wars. 
 
Origin and history of Entertainments Duty to 1933 
 
 Entertainments Duty was a tax on admission prices for 
entertainment provided by others: ‘…payments for admission to watch 
other persons dancing or playing games are liable to the duty, but 
payments for the right to dance or play games are not’.6 It was literally a 
visible tax, in the form of a stamp on tickets, a point considered below.   
The duty was introduced by the Finance (New Duties) Act 1916 
as a wartime measure. It was finally repealed in 1960. The main 
published source of information on it is A P Herbert’s ‘No Fine on Fun’ 
(1957),7 subtitled The Comical History of the Entertainments Duty. As 
title and subtitle suggest, this was not an objective account. Herbert 
campaigned against the duty as a writer for the theatre and musical stage 
and as Independent MP for Oxford University – indeed, from his time as 
candidate in the 1935 election, when he said: ‘I regard it as a tax upon 
knowledge and enlightenment and the free communication of minds. I 
shall therefore press for its abolition, at least, where it is imposed upon 
music and the living theatre’.8 He put it more snappily in a 1953 speech, 
when no longer an MP: ‘I offer to all parties this battle-cry: “No Tax on 
Thought – No Duty on Beauty – No Levy on Laughter – and No Fine on 
Fun!”’.9  
 
6 National Archives file CUST153/1: Entertainments Duty Volume 1: Historical Memoranda 1916-
1938 (hereafter ‘CUST153/1’), p64; first page of undated (late 1930s) Customs and Excise (hereafter 
‘C&E’) note on the history of the tax  
7 London: Methuen, 1957; hereafter ‘Herbert’. 
8 Quoted in Herbert, p12 
9 ibid, p13 
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Speaking on the 1938 Finance Bill, Herbert summarised the 
theatrical profession’s financial rather than cultural arguments against 
the duty:   
…managers, authors, designers and musicians spend… many months 
preparing the show…. The actors are drawing pretty good wages and salaries, 
and paying Income Tax, and rightly; the authors are drawing good royalties, 
and paying Income Tax, and rightly…. But the manager, who is taking the 
risks, is not receiving a penny of profit.... and all that time the State is putting 
its hands into the till and grabbing 15 to 20 per cent. on the basic prices. Is 
there a single industry in the world where the same thing would be done or 
suffered?10  
Herbert assumed that the duty’s original purpose had been to raise 
revenue.11 The earliest substantial Customs and Excise briefing paper, of 
December 1915,12 suggests otherwise:   
We have been asked [presumably by the Treasury] to report on the possibility 
of taxing amusements. As it is understood that the object in view is rather to 
reduce expenditure than to raise revenue, it is proposed to consider the 
methods by which such a duty might be levied, as well as its economic 
incidence and general effects, but to make no attempt at estimating its 
yield…. [Since] the object is to reduce expenditure on amusements, or by 
raising cost to reduce the amount of money which those who frequent them 
have to spend on other “luxuries,” it appears preferable to arrange that the tax 
shall be paid directly and knowingly by the public….  
To meet this aim the tax would be indicated by a government 
stamp affixed to admission tickets. While the tax should be 
‘comprehensive and heavy’, this was not in order to maximise revenue 
but ‘to effect a drastic reduction in the expenditure of the public on 
amusements generally’. The anonymous author was apparently a true 
believer in the evils of entertainment:  
 
10 HC Deb 30/6/38, vol 337, col 2242 
11 Herbert, pp15-16 
12 National Archives file CUST153/2: ‘Entertainments Duty Volume 2: Questions of Policy 1915 to 
1943’ (hereafter ‘CUST153/2’), pp1, 1A and 2, C&E paper 7/12/15, ‘Suggested Taxation of 
Amusements’, for all quotations in this and the following paragraph 
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The Government will no doubt be subjected to sentimental appeals about 
“amusements for wounded soldiers,”… and about the numbers of those 
connected with theatres, &c., who would be thrown out of employment, but 
such appeals should not be difficult to resist. One great object of any such 
duty… would be to throw people out of such employments and into 
employments… more useful to the community.            
    The government made no such statement publicly, but the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reginald McKenna, as reported in The 
Times, justified the duty to Parliament on other quasi-moral grounds: its 
purpose was ‘to distribute the burden of taxation over the whole 
community, including the class which did not pay income tax at present, 
but still has money enough to spend on amusements. (Hear, hear.)’.13 To 
meet this aim, during the duty’s first few years the government’s policy 
was ‘to tax the patrons of the lower-priced seats proportionately higher 
than the patrons of the higher-priced seats’.14     
Attaching a government stamp to admission tickets involved 
creating several offences and classes of potential offender. Audience 
members without stamps on their tickets, box office staff issuing tickets 
without stamps or with forged stamps, ticket collectors permitting entry 
without a stamped ticket, and managers allowing any of this to happen 
would all commit criminal offences, though initially Customs and Excise 
believed ‘it is not desirable that penalties against members of the 
audience should be enforced. (Cautions will suffice).’.15  
From the start, rates of duty were frequently amended. Customs 
and Excise first proposed a duty of 50 per cent at all ticket price levels.16 
But the rates in the Bill were far lower and, as noted, were weighted 
towards cheaper tickets, ranging  from ‘1/2d on payments not exceeding 
 
13 The Times, 13/4/16, p10: report of first day of the Bill’s Committee stage 
14 CUST153/1, p226, undated (but 1939) C&E briefing note to the Chancellor of the Exchequer  
15 CUST153/2, p11, C&E briefing note, 20/3/16  
16 CUST153/1, p5, ‘Mr Reade’s History of the Entertainments Duty 1916-1925’ (hereafter ‘Reade’); 
Reade’s history runs to 63 pages. 
  268 
2d to 1s on payments between 7s.6d and 12s.6d’.17 Rates were altered 
six times, both up and down, by 1935, by which time, at most ticket 
prices, they were above their 1916 levels. 
Also from the start, definitions posed problems and exemptions 
required complex casework.18 Even during the Bill’s passage the 
government had to table several amendments about exempted types of 
entertainment. There were exemptions for entertainments ‘of a wholly 
educational character’ and for those deemed partly educational if 
organised by a not-for-profit organisation or by one ‘founded with the 
object of reviving national pastimes’.19 Oddly, while Board of Education 
staff decided whether entertainments were wholly educational, decisions 
on partly educational cases were for Customs and Excise staff.20 In the 
long term the ‘partly educational’ exemption for not-for-profit 
organisations proved highly problematic – see below. In the short term, 
even before the duty came into effect, the provision about reviving 
national pastimes caused controversy in Parliament and on The Times’ 
letters page. The Gaelic Athletic Association, which prohibited British 
armed services personnel from taking part in its activities, sought and 
received tax exemption for football and hurling fixtures – an action a 
Times correspondent described as ‘a sop to disloyalty’.21 Concerning the 
detailed application of exemptions, even at the Bill’s Report stage the 
Solicitor-General was unclear whether duty would be payable on, among 
other examples suggested by MPs, admission to botanical gardens or to 
entertainments put on by the Jockey Club.22  
 
17 ibid 
18 National Archives file ED10/210, for instance, deals solely with applications for tax exemption for 
celebrations connected with the 1937 coronation.  
19 Finance (New Duties) Act 1916, s1(5) 
20 ibid 
21 20/4/16, p7 
22 ibid, 18/4/16, p10 
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The Times welcomed the duty as ‘perhaps the most popular in the 
[1916] Budget’.23 It did not specify with whom it was popular; probably 
not audiences or spectators, and certainly not the entertainment industry. 
The campaign for abolition or reduction began almost immediately. It 
took several forms: opposing the principle, seeking a lower rate, 
advocating a wider range of exemptions, and arguing for a tax on profits 
rather than on gross takings.          
Initially most protests came from cinema owners, perhaps because 
their ticket prices were low and thus they were affected 
disproportionately. It was claimed in Parliament as early as 1917 that the 
tax had caused over seven hundred cinemas to close.24 Debating a 
provision in the 1917 Finance Bill to raise rates of duty, not a single 
backbencher spoke in support of the government’s proposals. They 
nonetheless passed with only minor changes.25 The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Andrew Bonar Law, resisted particularly concessions on 
cheaper tickets, pointing out that 80 per cent of the revenue came from 
tickets priced sixpence or less.26 According to Sir Edward Carson, 
Minister without Portfolio in the War Cabinet, writing to Bonar Law, 
cinema owners were so incensed by the duty that many planned ‘to 
boycott all Government films and propaganda and further to use the 
screen to provoke a public agitation for the abolition of the 
entertainments tax’.27 He considered it vital that they be offered relief: 
‘The whole attitude of the working classes to the War may be affected 
by the steps which are taken in this matter’.28 The Treasury were 
unimpressed.  
 
23 ibid, 6/4/16, p9 
24 HC Deb 2/7/17, vol 95, col 796 
25 ibid, cols 794-818 
26 ibid, col 810  
27 CUST153/2, p20, Carson-Bonar Law, 17/12/17 
28 ibid, p21 
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Customs and Excise briefing for the 1923 budget shows that the 
duty had outlived its wartime emergency origins, but was no less 
necessary for that. Revenue was now the issue: ‘It may be urged… that 
cheap entertainment is necessary to the contentment of the people… 
[but] all such arguments fail to recognise that the primary consideration 
at present is one of finance’.29 Repeal would lose the Treasury £9.5 
million a year and was considered unjustifiable, while the case for 
reducing the duty was weak because the industry’s problems were due 
less to the tax and more to ‘the general depression of industry… [and] 
unbusinesslike finance and methods’.30  
 By 1923 such briefing was part of the annual pre-Budget ritual. 
The Chairman of Customs and Excise would pre-emptively argue 
against repeal or  reduction. The Chancellor would receive delegations 
representing theatre and film interests. They would present a case 
sometimes for reduction but usually for repeal, because repeal was ‘the 
only proposal on which it is possible for the various sections of the 
trade… to find complete agreement’.31 Officials would calculate the 
potential loss of revenue, the Chancellor would express general 
sympathy, and the regretful conclusion was that current economic 
conditions prevented any change. Sympathetic MPs would table a flurry 
of amendments supporting the industry during Finance Bill debates but 
usually the provisions passed with amendments withdrawn and only 
minor government concessions.  
 Degrees of regret for being unable to meet the profession’s 
requests varied between Chancellors and parties. The most sympathetic 
in the 1920s was Philip Snowden when Chancellor in the 1924 Labour 
government. He told that year’s delegation ‘that he had always opposed 
 
29 ibid, p117, (unsigned) C&E briefing for the 1923 Budget, 9/6/23   
30 ibid, p138 
31 ibid, p225, 1925 pre-Budget briefing by Chairman of C&E to Winston Churchill  
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the duty, and would like to abolish it if the money were available. But if 
reduction only were possible, he would be inclined to begin at the 
bottom, and so make it more of a luxury tax’,32 a departure from 
previous principles. The 1924 Budget removed the duty on the cheapest 
tickets and reduced it on those slightly more expensive.33 In 1925 the 
new Conservative Chancellor, Winston Churchill, requested the reverse: 
a reduction to benefit the buyers of higher-priced seats.34 This did not 
happen, and Churchill followed the usual pattern: sympathy with the 
aims of an amendment to abolish the duty, understanding of the 
hardships faced by the theatrical profession, and the conclusion that ‘I 
am unable to find the money which would enable the tax to be reduced 
again this year’.35    
Apparently Entertainments Duty could sometimes be fatal for 
theatre companies. The Adult Education Committee, set up by the Board 
of Education, produced a report in 1926 entitled The Drama in Adult 
Education.36 The report does not make clear whether it was 
commissioned by the Board or produced on the committee’s initiative. It 
devoted several pages to the work of the Lena Ashwell Players,37 
praising Ashwell for continuing in peacetime in London boroughs her 
wartime theatre work in France and elsewhere for the troops. But in her 
memoir Myself a Player (1936)38 Ashwell reported that the duty led to 
the Players’ demise the very year the report was published:  
Without the Entertainment Tax we should certainly have survived but during 
the season 1926-27 for entertaining 174,000 people we were taxed 
£2,683.6.8. This charge was imposed before the running expenses were met 
and involved extra staff work for stamping the tickets…. We could not cut 
 
32 CUST153/1, p41, Reade 
33 ibid 
34 ibid 
35 HC Deb 16/6/25, vol 185, cols 376-7  
36 London: HMSO, 1926 
37 ibid, pp36-41 
38 London: Michael Joseph, 1936; see also Chapter 4, pp66-67 
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down expenses, the patrons could not afford to pay more, and so the tax was 
a dead loss to an enterprise… carried on only as a national service.39 
By 1929 Customs and Excise staff were deeply attached to the 
duty. An internal minute to ‘Mr Grylls’ (not otherwise identified) and Sir 
Francis Floud, its Chairman, three weeks after the 1929 Labour 
government took office, began: ‘I think we should be well advised to 
occupy some of our present leisure in preparing powder and shot in 
defence of the maintenance of the Entertainments Tax. Regard must be 
had to Labour utterances on the subject both in and out of office….’.40 
Grylls commented ‘I am in complete agreement. Personally… I have 
very little sympathy with the squeals of the “movie kings”’. Floud 
agreed.41 They need not have worried. While the campaign for reduction 
or abolition continued, the government did not oblige. A Times editorial 
of December 1930 noted, perhaps sarcastically: ‘While the Government 
remained unrepentantly philistine in its attitude towards the arts… there 
could be little hope of obtaining relief for hard cases…. But now we 
have a Government which professes enlightenment’.42 In fact, in his 
second spell as Chancellor, amid a major financial crisis, Philip 
Snowden re-imposed the duty on the cheapest seats which he had 
removed in 1924.43   
There were, however, two pointers to the future during the second 
Labour government. First, in some quarters exemption from 
Entertainments Duty came to be seen as equivalent to government 
support for music and drama – in effect a form of subsidy. The 1930 
Treasury grant to the Covent Garden Opera Syndicate via the BBC was 
 
39 ibid, p244  
40 CUST153/1, p312, minute from ‘A.J.D.’ (not otherwise identified) to ‘Mr Grylls’ and Sir Francis 
Floud, 25/6/29  
41 ibid, p313 
42 13/12/30, p13 
43 National Archives file CUST153/5: Entertainments Duty Volume 5: The Living Theatre 1932 to 
1940 (hereafter ‘CUST153/5’), p8, C&E briefing to Financial Secretary to the Treasury, 21/3/32   
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noted briefly in Chapter 2.44 It led to this exchange in Parliament in 
December 1930:      
Mr D G SOMERVILLE asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, in 
view of his assistance to grand opera, he will consider giving equal assistance 
to the drama by the reduction of the Entertainments Duty?  
Mr P SNOWDEN No, Sir. 
Mr SOMERVILLE In view of the fact that far more people attend the theatre 
and the Cinema than the opera, why should they not be treated with equal 
justice?45  
The Speaker ruled this supplementary question out of order.  
Second, a distinction began to appear in official attitudes towards 
the duty: sympathy towards live music and theatre, and to some extent 
sport, but none towards the ‘movie kings’. While this was not embodied 
in  government policy for several years, the campaigns soon became 
wholly separate and then mutually hostile: those lobbying for tax 
reductions for theatre and live music actively campaigned against similar 
treatment for cinema.  
Some MPs, for instance, noted with approval a provision in the 
1931 Irish Free State Finance Act ‘which exempts from Entertainments 
Duty all entertainments in which the performers are personally 
present’,46 and sought a similar provision in Britain. Campaigners for 
theatre used arguments which applied to live performance but not to 
film, with the economic case sometimes bolstered by xenophobia. 
Walter Payne, a leader of the campaign (see below), writing before the 
1932 budget to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, 
distinguished between ‘places of entertainment… at which living artists, 
the enormous majority of whom are British subjects, are employed, 
and… places where Cinematograph films, largely of alien origin, and the 
 
44 p36 
45 HC Deb 2/12/30, vol 245, col1980  
46 HC Deb 28/7/31, vol 255, col 2107, question by Charles Williams MP 
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profits of which are sent abroad, are exhibited’.47 Two weeks later Payne 
sought a meeting with Chamberlain to argue against reduced duty on 
cheap tickets. This would mainly benefit cinemas and ‘would be 
tantamount to giving a subsidy for competitive forms of entertainment 
and would bring many legitimate theatres in the Country to ruin’.48  
Chamberlain delegated the meeting to a junior Minister, the 
Financial Secretary – Walter Elliot, Alfred Wareing’s loyal friend.49 The 
meeting achieved little for Payne: the Customs and Excise view was that 
‘It would be impossible to justify taxing a person when he goes to a 
cinema but not when he goes to a music hall’.50 This line was maintained 
in the lead-up to the 1933 budget, despite several MPs attempting to 
justify such a distinction. One of these was the very actorly ex-actor 
Alfred Denville, who wrote to Chamberlain in December 1932 to ask: 
‘In the goodness of your heart, will you fix a day on which such artistes 
as:-  
Dame Madge Kendal 
Sir Gerald Du Maurier 
Sir Johnston Forbes Robertson [etc, etc]… 
can wait upon you with the object of pointing out the hardships suffered 
by the Theatres due to the Entertainment Tax, as different to the 
Kinemas [sic]’.51 Chamberlain refused this opportunity to mingle with 
the stars, responding that the duty was ‘a tax on the entertainment-going 
public, and, therefore,… I could not… agree to make a differentiation in 
the duty as between different kinds of entertainment’.52 He chose to omit 
a passage in the draft reply prepared for him pointing out that ‘some of 
 
47 CUST153/5, pp3-4, Payne-Chamberlain, 2/3/32 
48 ibid, p6, Payne-Chamberlain, 15/3/32  
49 See Chapter 3, pp45 and 47, and Chapter 5, pp100-1 and 129-30. The League of Audiences was 
formed two years later. 
50 CUST153/5, p10, C&E briefing to Walter Elliot, 21/3/32   
51 ibid, p 13, Denville-Chamberlain, 10/12/32 
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the artistes mentioned in your [Denville’s] letter appear to find an outlet 
for some part of their energies in film production’.53  
Campaigning intensified as budget day approached. The Evening 
News ran a feature in March 1933, based largely on an interview with 
Denville, on the damaging effects of Entertainments Duty on live 
theatre.54 The same month, solicitors ‘instructed by the Society of West 
End Theatre Managers, the Theatrical Managers’ Association and the 
Entertainments Protection Association, who between them represent 
practically every Theatre and Variety Theatre in the West End and 
Suburbs of London and in the Provinces’,55 wrote to Chamberlain that 
live theatre could continue to exist only if taxed less than the mass-
production industry of cinema. Denville attempted to involve himself in 
the subsequent delegation. Customs and Excise briefed Chamberlain that 
the delegation did not want this and that Denville’s approach was ‘a 
nuisance but… [it] will make for peace if you will give him and his two 
or three Artists ten minutes’.56 The briefing argued, as usual, that tax 
rates should be uniform because it was a tax on consumers, not 
producers, of entertainment.57 But it also contained the argument, novel 
for official circles, that granting ‘special relief from the entertainments 
duty in respect of theatres and music halls would be tantamount to 
giving them a State subsidy in a disguised form’.58  
These arguments prevailed. The lobbying continued. In July 1933 
Walter Payne again wrote to Chamberlain. The letter’s contents (the 
usual plea for tax relief on live performance) were less significant than 
its list of other signatories: not only a bewildering array of representative 
theatre bodies but also individual theatres – Covent Garden, the Old Vic 
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and Sadler’s Wells (two theatres governed as one), and the Shakespeare 
Memorial Theatre; the Musicians’ Union and Actors’ Equity; and 
representatives of ‘ordinary taxpayers’ in the form of the National Union 
of Ratepayers’ Associations and the very right-wing National Citizens 
Union.59  
Customs and Excise officials used several arguments against a 
change:60 it was wrong in principle to benefit theatre at the expense of 
cinema; if theatre was facing hard times, this was due to changing tastes 
rather than the tax; it was inequitable to advantage (generally better off) 
theatre patrons at the expense of (generally worse off) cinema patrons; 
and it would be immensely complicated to distinguish between recorded 
entertainment and entertainment where ‘the human element 
predominated’. But this apparently fixed policy continued for only two 
years more. Meanwhile the theatre and music world looked with interest 
at the attempt by the Old Vic and Sadler’s Wells to have their 
performances classified by the government as ‘partly educational’.    
 
1933-4 - The Old Vic and Sadler’s Wells: music, drama and 
education               
  
As noted above, activities could be exempted from Entertainments 
Duty if they were wholly educational, or partly educational and put on 
by a not-for-profit organisation. Until the 1930s these exemptions were 
applied narrowly. The approach originated in a 1917 memorandum by 
Sir William Graham-Harrison, Second Parliamentary Counsel,61 arguing 
that: 
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…education is clearly capable of being used in a wider or narrower sense. In 
the wider sense it means, speaking generally, the enlargement or 
development of a person’s knowledge, intelligence or taste; in the narrower, 
the training up of children or students by means of some definite or 
systematic course of instruction…. it is reasonably clear that the vague wide 
reading must be discarded…. any interpretation more favourable to the 
taxpayer would undermine the yield of the duty.  
This style of argument is not unusual in government – working 
backwards from a desired outcome in order to justify a particular (not 
always the most natural) interpretation of the law. 
This interpretation and reasoning were maintained for more than 
fifteen years, despite creating occasional absurdities. During passage of 
the 1937 Finance Bill, A P Herbert provided an illustration,62 by that 
time historical, of ‘the strange idea that anything which is at all 
entertaining is something in the nature of an offence on which a fine 
ought to be imposed’. His lectures to not-for-profit literary societies had 
been considered partly educational, and thus tax-exempt, until Customs 
and Excise heard of one entitled ‘On Being Funny’, which was ‘of a 
rather high-brow character. It set out to explain the Bergsonian theory of 
laughter and the essence of humour…’. Herbert provided a precis: 
…in order to assure the Custom House, first, that it was educational, and 
secondly, that it was not at all amusing. To my astonishment, knowing how 
little entertainment that lecture appeared to afford to the public, I was unable 
to convince them of the second part of the proposition. The unhappy society 
had to pay tax upon the lecture, and I was never invited to lecture there again.   
There were a few, apparently arbitrary, exceptions: as early as 
May 1917, for example, the government Law Officers decided that the 
Royal Academy Summer Exhibition was partly educational and that 
tickets for it should be tax-free.63 But generally the word ‘educational’, 
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according to an internal 1920s Customs and Excise document, ‘must be 
read in the strict sense of tuitional…. the entertainment must be given by 
persons whose relation to the audience is that of teacher to taught…. [To 
accept that] performances of “classical” music, drama, etc., were 
educational, as they tended to direct and elevate public taste… would 
lead to wholesale exemption’.64  
While the government refused to regard music and drama as 
educational, the connection between the arts and education was in the 
air. The 1926 report The Drama in Adult Education, referred to above, 
was, in the words of The Times, ‘cautious almost to the point of 
sterility’.65 But it did conclude that drama is ‘a powerful instrument for 
the conveyance of ideas… [and] under the right conditions can be a most 
potent instrument of moral, artistic, and intellectual progress…’.66 This 
finding was largely ignored until it was used to support a reversal of 
government policy in 1934.      
In 1933 the Old Vic and Sadler’s Wells (often known jointly as 
the Vic-Wells) applied for ‘partly educational’ tax exemption. This was 
a formidable test of government policy: the theatres’ not-for-profit 
status, the range of their work and their roots in some of London’s 
poorest communities made them strong candidates for exemption. Under 
Lilian Baylis’s leadership the theatres performed opera and ballet as well 
as drama. Her work led indirectly to the foundation of the Royal 
National Theatre, and more directly to that of English National Opera 
and the Royal Ballet.67 The Drama in Adult Education was fulsome: ‘We 
cannot speak in too high terms of the great work done by Miss Baylis at 
the “Old Vic.” It will always be an example to those who believe that the 
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art of the theatre has a power and influence over the minds of men…’.68 
But this was not reflected in the theatres’ tax status. In 1916 (before 
Sadler’s Wells joined with the Old Vic) Baylis had sought tax exemption 
for the Old Vic and been refused.69 But she had not argued, and Customs 
and Excise and the Board of Education had not pointed out, that while 
commercial theatres had to demonstrate that their work was wholly 
educational in order to be tax-exempt, the Old Vic, as a not-for-profit 
theatre, needed only to demonstrate that its work was partly educational.  
The 1933 campaign began with the Vic-Wells Chairman, Lord 
Lytton, writing to Customs and Excise.70 His letter focused on the 
dictionary definition of ‘educational’ (wide), on the word’s construction 
in the courts (also wide), on the theatres’ charitable objectives, which 
included providing performances for ‘the recreation and instruction of 
the poorer classes’, and on the London County Council’s financial 
support for schools’ attendance at their performances. Lytton wrote that 
he asked not for special treatment nor for a change in the law but for the 
current law to be properly applied. Customs and Excise officials 
proposed a flat rejection,71 maintaining this position despite a question 
from the Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, ‘Can anything be done?’, 
written on a copy of Lytton’s letter sent to him by Lytton.72  
They were also unimpressed by a letter from the Vic-Wells 
Treasurer, Sir Reginald Rowe to Neville Chamberlain.73 Rowe argued 
that there was little danger of setting a precedent, as it was ‘unlikely that 
there are any other bodies with a similar claim’. Customs and Excise 
argued for the narrow interpretation of ‘educational’ – ‘implying some 
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definite form of tuition persisting throughout the entertainment…. 
Whilst the performances at the Old Vic and Sadlers Wells theatre are 
undoubtedly educational in the broad sense of the term they are clearly 
not educational in the strict meaning…’.74 Chamberlain’s private 
secretary commented ‘I am afraid this is only an outstanding case of a 
very common claim which has always had to be resisted in order to 
preserve the revenue from this tax’.75 Chamberlain wrote as advised.  
But this ignored the distinction between the ‘wholly educational’ 
test for commercial companies and the ‘partly educational’ test applying 
to not-for-profit companies. Lytton, unlike Baylis in 1916, was alert to 
the distinction. Having waited two months for a brief and dismissive 
reply from Customs and Excise,76 he wrote to Chamberlain77 arguing 
that since the Charity Commission accepted the theatres’ not-for-profit 
status and partly educational purposes, so should Customs and Excise: 
‘…it is difficult to for us conceive of any case to which these words 
[s1(5)(d) of the Act] could apply, if they do not apply to ours’. Customs 
and Excise officials continued to resist. They argued and Chamberlain 
agreed, though the files record no legal advice sought at this point, that 
as ‘educational’ meant ‘tuitional’ then ‘partly educational’ must mean 
‘partly tuitional’: ‘Some definite form of tuition must… be present’ for 
the exemption to apply’.78    
Lytton let the issue lie for eight months then wrote to Chamberlain 
again.79 He argued that for Customs and Excise to determine both 
individual cases for exemption and the meaning of ‘educational’ in the 
1916 Act against which these cases were assessed ‘puts an unusual and 
inequitable power in the hands of a tax collecting body’; and that the 
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definition used by Customs and Excise was ‘contrary to the meaning of 
the English language as interpreted by English dictionaries and to 
pronouncements on the subject by English judges’. He suggested that 
Chamberlain meet a Vic-Wells delegation: ‘I have found by experience 
that half an hour’s discussion brings one much nearer than months of 
correspondence and saves trouble in the long run’. Lytton distanced the 
Vic-Wells from regular pre-budget lobbying on Entertainments Duty: ‘I 
mean, of course, quite a private and informal [meeting]…, not the kind 
of deputation which you received from the theatre people on the 15th 
March’. This was disingenuous: the 15 March delegation had been on 
behalf of the Stage and Allied Arts Defence League (discussed below) 
and was led by Lytton himself, the League’s President.  
Chamberlain suggested that Lytton meet instead Sir Evelyn 
Murray, Chairman of the Board of Customs and Excise.80 The briefing 
for Murray81 used a further dubious argument to justify the narrow 
definition of ‘educational’: ‘That the line of policy laid down by the 
Board has consistently been maintained with ministerial approval 
suggests that the policy is inherently sound’. It reported the rare cases of 
performances declared exempt, including lecture concerts, where before 
1923 ‘the criterion was that the illustrations, e.g., music, should not 
occupy more than about one-quarter of the time’,82 the Eisteddfod, and 
music competitions, provided that the competition was ‘accompanied by 
a reasoned oral adjudication’.83 It discussed applications which had been 
refused, including for concerts by amateur music societies and by the 
Oxford University Musical Club. The latter had failed when the club 
admitted that while music students attended for the purpose of study, 
‘the majority of the members went to the concerts for the purpose of 
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enjoyment’.84 The assumption was that Customs’ interpretation was 
correct and would prevail.     
At the meeting, in May 1934,85 Lytton and Lilian Baylis argued 
that their theatres were unique, so exempting them would create no 
damaging precedent. First, their charitable aims allowed them to receive 
grants from charitable trusts ‘because it was recognised that the theatres 
were providing benefits for the people from motives of philanthropy’. 
Second, their approach to education was unique. Classes were held 
before productions, with participants then seeing at public performances 
the practical demonstration of what they had studied, and in some cases 
understudying minor parts. To that extent performances were ‘tuitional’. 
If Customs and Excise still did not see this as partly educational, then the 
law should be amended to exempt the two theatres specifically. 
Sir Evelyn Murray disagreed that the Vic-Wells theatres were 
unique in ways relevant to the duty. If they were granted exemption, ‘it 
could not be refused to a large number of other high class entertainments 
of cultural value… provided by non-profit-making syndicates’. He also 
reported that ‘the [government] Law Officers were disposed to agree that 
the word “educational” was rightly construed’ by Customs and Excise. 
But this apparently secure position quickly fell apart. Following the 
meeting, the Vic-Wells requested an authoritative interpretation of 
‘partly educational’.86 Murray wrote to Chamberlain87 that since the Vic-
Wells proposed to take the issue to court, he would seek the Law 
Officers’ opinion on the meaning of the phrase, something which at the 
meeting he had claimed to possess already. The Law Officers’ response 
made it clear that Murray had misrepresented their view:  
 
84 ibid, pp6-10 
85 CUST49/1510, note of meeting of 24/5/34, for all quotations in this and the following paragraph 
86 ibid, Colville-C&E Solicitor, 1/6/34 
87 ibid, Murray-Chamberlain, 12/6/34 
  283 
…the Commissioners have construed the words of section 1(5)(d) of the 
Finance (New Duties) Act, 1916, too narrowly. An element of tuition… is 
not, in our view, a necessary element….  the object of improving or 
educating taste in music or drama, just as much as in pictorial art or in 
literature, is an educational purpose within the section…. the proper 
construction of the word “educational” is a wide one. 88                 
 Murray reported to Chamberlain: ‘The result of this opinion is that 
we shall have to abandon the doctrine… that “partly educational” 
connotes some element of tuition as distinct from culture, and the 
administrative difficulties of deciding what is and what is not within the 
scope of the exemption will certainly be aggravated’.89 Lytton quickly 
sought to exploit his victory, asking Murray whether, ‘As I am also 
interested in the Shakespeare Memorial Theatre’, the exemption would 
apply there also.90 He still attempted to reassure Murray: ‘I do not think 
that the exemption in their [Shakespeare Memorial Theatre and Vic-
Wells] case will serve as a precedent for any other institutions’.  
 Customs and Excise saw such reassurance as hollow. Within days 
of receiving the Law Officers’ opinion, its Board apparently embraced 
the doctrine that music and drama were often partly educational. It drew 
on the 1926 report The Drama in Adult Education, which had previously 
been ignored and whose conclusions would, until a week earlier, have 
been anathema:  
…the Board’s feeling [was] that… it would be expedient to tend towards 
liberality rather than rigidity. Any other attitude would seem to conflict with 
the views expressed in the Report… by the Adult Education Committee of 
the Board of Education. That Committee gave cordial endorsement to the 
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claim that drama produced with what may be called serious purposes… is a 
valuable educational factor.91  
The Board did not explain why it suddenly accorded the report such 
authority, beyond noting that ‘it seems to contain some useful 
indications for the practical working of the “partly educational” 
exemption’.  
A Customs and Excise lawyer attempted to classify plays of 
educational value under headings including ‘Greek play’, ‘Shakespeare’, 
‘Other old plays’ and ‘“The play of ideas’” (all sic), and types of drama 
producer operating for public benefit. Admission even to a production of 
doubtful educational value might be tax-exempt if the producer was of 
the right kind: ‘It would obviously be inexpedient to haggle with the Old 
Vic over “The Importance of Being Earnest”…. [The 1926 report] may 
be treated as evidence of particular weight in the case of any particular 
organisation which it mentions’.       
This was a major project for Customs and Excise. Press coverage 
of the Vic-Wells decision92 was quickly followed by many applications 
for exemption and an attempted system of precedents. Once it was clear 
that the producing organisation was not run for profit, its objects and 
work were examined: it must be ‘genuinely working to spread 
knowledge of the theatre or of music…, [and] the individual play or 
music must have some claim to be regarded as respectable – a mere 
farce or musical comedy is not good enough’.93 The Solicitor to Customs 
and Excise acknowledged that ‘difficult borderline cases are bound to 
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occur from time to time’,94 but did not suggest that the volume would be 
great or that the department’s staff were unqualified to make such 
judgements.  
Within a few days, the Board was presented with seventeen new 
cases for decision.95 Some were far from straightforward, for instance 
the Crompton Stage Society in Lancashire. Some of its work – plays 
produced by members for private audiences of members – was 
recommended for exemption; but productions intended to reduce the 
resulting deficit were taxable because ‘the purpose of these and other 
“big productions” is to raise money by inducing the general public to 
pay for entertainment pure and simple’. Some cases were arcane, such as 
the Southport Society of Practical Psychology. The lawyers 
recommended exemption for all its public activities, even for a lecture 
‘to deal with such matters as… “Pythagoras’ message to all peoples 
regarding the end of the world, which is fast approaching”…. 
interspersed with “Colour-music”, which consists of ordinary light 
music and dance music of inferior quality’.   
The Board of Customs and Excise was clear that there could be no 
short cuts: ‘…the actual programme of every individual entertainment 
must be inspected’.96 But it sought to minimise extra work and loss of 
revenue by not publicising the change of policy. If an organisation had 
previously sought and been refused exemption, it should be told of the 
change, but ‘if the Society, etc, had never at any time made a claim to 
exemption on “partly educational” grounds the question should not be 
raised by the Department’. Customs’ generally unhelpful approach led to 
cases of misleading by omission or worse. For example, the Town Clerk 
of Bideford, Devon, sought tax exemption for admission to a 
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schoolchildren’s pageant celebrating the 1937 coronation. Rather than 
assessing this as a partly educational entertainment by not-for-profit 
organisations, the council and local schools, Customs advised him to 
apply to the Board of Education for ‘wholly educational’ exemption; the 
Board of Education turned it down.97  
On the other hand, members of the government could be helpful 
to those they knew. In 1939 Lord Ivor Churchill wrote to Lord De La 
Warr seeking tax exemption for performances by the visiting Comedie 
Francaise.98 De La Warr was both President of the Board of Education 
and Chairman of the Anglo-French Art and Travel Society, the visit’s 
sponsor. His private secretary advised Board of Education officials to 
pass the request to Customs: ‘…it would be better that the President 
should not be associated with such an approach, either in his capacity as 
President of the Board or otherwise’.99  Customs granted the 
exemption.100 A more blatant case, also in 1939, involved Covent 
Garden applying for tax exemption for a Royal Command performance 
to be attended by the President of the French Republic.101 Customs 
concluded that there was no legal basis for exemption, and requested that 
the Treasury sort it out. The Treasury obliged: ‘…in the special 
circumstances of the case, They [sic, the Lords Commissioners of the 
Treasury] are prepared to authorise an extra-statutory exemption’.102 No 
attempt was made to specify the powers under which the Treasury made 
the exemption. 
Apart from such outlying examples a formal system was soon 
established for seeking and granting ‘partly educational’ exemptions. 
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Customs and Excise files of applications by the London Philharmonic 
Orchestra,103 for instance, contain template exemption certificates 
granted: 
…on the understanding that the musical programmes would be of a character 
similar to those previously exempted. A programme of each of these concerts 
should be furnished as early as possible…. [Customs and Excise] reserve the 
right to call for duty in any case where they are not satisfied that the 
programme submitted is of such a standard as will contribute to the musical 
education of the audience.  
But leaving decisions to Customs officials provided an easy target for 
the system’s critics. The November 1936 editorial in Drama (the British 
Drama League’s magazine) reported the experience of one not-for-profit 
theatre: ‘…plays by Shakespeare and Milton were granted exemption, 
[but] relief was refused for a public performance of Jonson’s “The Mask 
of Cupid.”.’104 And John Christie complained to the Treasury about the 
(as it seemed to him) arbitrary and unfair operation of the tax.105 He 
claimed that Customs had a ‘definite and monstrous hostility’ against 
him because he had pointed out anomalies in the tax, and that ‘having 
exempted us from Entertainment Tax in our second [Glyndebourne] 
Festival, [Customs and Excise] told us that we were not exempt in our 
third Festival only one week before the third Festival started’.  
Such concerns continued for as long as decisions on exemption 
were made case-by-case by Customs and Excise. There is little reason to 
extend the history of the exemption into wartime,106 but several points 
reflect back on the pre-war history of Entertainments Duty.  
In late 1943, in order to avoid disputes between Customs and 
Excise and CEMA, which contested Customs’ ability to determine 
whether drama and music were ‘partly educational’, the Treasury set up 
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a committee under Sir Ernest Pooley to decide this independently.107 Sir 
Archibald Carter, Chairman of Customs and Excise, saw this potentially 
as CEMA’s role. He wrote privately to John Maynard Keynes, CEMA’s 
Chairman, in January 1944:  
If we once could get C.E.M.A. recognised… as a permanent institution, then 
it would clearly be natural to use it as the sole channel through which 
Government assistance to the drama and the arts was given, and if part of 
that… was still to be given in the form of relief from taxation (against which 
a good deal could be said), to make C.E.M.A. the judge in cases of doubt.108 
Keynes attempted to take over the system, but had to report a rare failure 
to CEMA’s council in March 1944: ‘…the suggestion of giving CEMA 
control over tax exemption had been made both to the Chancellor and to 
the Board of Customs and had been refused’.109 He was not a good loser, 
subsequently describing Pooley’s committee to Carter as ‘ignorant of the 
matters with which it is dealing to the point of illiteracy’.110 
From 1946 it was no longer necessary for any government body to 
decide whether a performance was ‘partly educational’. That year’s 
Finance Act provided that if Customs and Excise were satisfied that an 
organisation was not established for profit and had partly educational 
aims, then any entertainment it produced would be tax-exempt. 
Thereafter Entertainments Duty became far less of an issue for not-for-
profit theatres, orchestras and concert halls. 
And in his January 1944 letter to Keynes, Sir Archibald Carter 
also suggested that the ‘partly educational’ exemption had become an 
unintended form of government support for music and drama.111 This is 
discussed below; it confirms the importance of the Entertainments Duty 
campaign in the history of government funding of the arts.         
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The campaign 1933-39: ‘Why should “Crazy nights at Clacton” 
escape?’ 
 
While not-for-profit organisations like the Vic-Wells gained tax 
exemption from 1934 for events deemed partly educational, 
Entertainments Duty remained uniform on all other entertainments. The 
theatrical world reacted to the Vic-Wells decision with a mixture of 
approval, envy and calculation. Drama magazine’s editorial response 
was typical:  
…the result has only been effected by persistence and clever presentation of 
the case on the part of the Old Vic management. The question naturally 
arises, how far can the same result be achieved by other theatres? The 
precedent is a valuable one…. a step in the right direction but still only a 
step. What we demand is nothing less than the total abolition of the tax…112   
Several organisations were established between 1915 and the 1930s to 
campaign for abolition. The evolution of their names indicates how 
those putting on live performances came to distance themselves from the 
film industry: the Entertainments Protection Association, the 
Entertainments Tax Abolition League,113 the Entertainment 
Organisations Joint Committee,114 and the Stage and Allied Arts 
Defence League (the ‘Defence’ was later dropped).115  
The ‘Defence League’, established in late 1933, campaigned 
almost as strongly against tax relief for cinema as in favour of tax relief 
for theatre. Its leaders were Walter Payne and Geoffrey Whitworth: 
Payne, coming from commercial West End theatre; Whitworth, founder 
of the British Drama League, editor of Drama, leader of the campaign 
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for a National Theatre, and among Alfred Wareing’s most formidable 
adversaries.116 Whitworth set out the Defence League’s aims in The 
Spectator in February 1934.117 He focused on the industry’s economics. 
The marginal cost of live performance was far higher than that of 
cinema, and the duty caused theatres to close. The League aimed to 
redress the balance, ‘to establish the right to fiscal preference for the 
play and the concert, the variety show and the circus, over all 
mechanical forms of entertainment. In short, wherever the human 
element predominates in an artistic performance… the present 
entertainments tax of approximately one-sixth of gross receipts… should 
be remitted if not totally abolished’.  
Writing before the Vic-Wells’ tax exemption, Whitworth did not 
focus on the arts’ educational value; this ‘would be a case for special 
pleading and would surely be unnecessary in view of the theatre’s 
manifest claims on the solid ground of orthodox finance and common 
equity’.118 There were strong tactical reasons for this approach. Unlike 
Alfred Wareing, Whitworth was adept at making and maintaining 
alliances. The ‘partly educational’ exemption would benefit only not-
for-profit organisations, while Payne’s and Whitworth’s League was a 
far broader coalition: ‘…almost without exception every organisation 
and Trade Union concerned in the presentation of Musical (including 
Orchestral Concerts and Opera), Dramatic and Variety entertainments 
throughout Great Britain’,119 ranging from the Musicians’ Union to the 
League of British Dramatists to the Association of Circus Proprietors.120  
The League’s President was Lord Lytton, a role which, it was 
suggested above, may have conflicted with that of chairing the Vic-
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Wells. The League corresponded frequently with Neville Chamberlain 
and Sir John Simon, successive Chancellors of the Exchequer, offering 
new examples to bolster old arguments about the economic plight of the 
live theatre and music industries. Thus in 1934 Walter Payne pointed out 
to Chamberlain: 
…the enormous increase in the number of Wireless Licences from which the 
Government derives a substantial revenue… and… the Dog Tracks with the 
mechanical hare combined with the great attraction of betting… [which] have 
attracted millions of persons who formerly patronised the more popular 
places of entertainment. Attendances at Dog Races… increased from 5 
millions to 17 millions in 3 years.121  
Throughout 1934 such arguments continued to meet with refusal 
by the government, but behind the scenes the view was softening. As 
early as February 1934 Chamberlain requested that Customs and Excise 
consider: 
The question of some relief from the Entertainments Tax charged for the 
cheapest seats. (With special reference to the burden of the change as it falls 
on sideshows and the like). 
The question of some relief from the tax as it affects theatres. (Vide the 
recent agitation 
…And what would the cost be? [sic]122  
While noting the growing agitation in and beyond Parliament for a tax 
cut for live performances, his civil servants advised that ‘first 
consideration should be given to a restoration of the duty to the pre-1931 
level [that is, removing the tax imposed then on the cheapest seats; this 
would benefit mainly cinema-goers]’.123 When a Backbench amendment 
to this effect was tabled to the 1934 Finance Bill, Payne wrote to 
Chamberlain that this ‘could only… [cause] further and most serious 
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injury to the interests which our League represents’.124 The amendment 
was withdrawn, and the government maintained its public position into 
1935. Meanwhile Customs continued to analyse changes to the duty, 
including (for no obvious purpose and to no obvious benefit) mapping 
its yield against average figures for unemployment, rainfall and hours of 
sunshine.125  
 The Vic-Wells’ tax exemption provided a further argument for 
campaigners before the 1935 Budget. Payne wrote to Chamberlain that it 
served ‘to increase the grave anomaly and injustice of the position in 
regard to the Duty upon entertainments (many of them indistinguishable 
from those at the “Old Vic” and Sadler’s Wells) given by artistes in 
person elsewhere’.126 Customs dismissed this. All that had happened 
‘was that a legal opinion had somewhat modified, in favour of the 
taxpayer, the previous interpretation of a provision… in force since the 
entertainments duty was imposed…’.127 But Chamberlain was 
sympathetic, asking Customs for ‘a draft of the kind of Clause that 
would be necessary to give effect to the League’s requests’.128  
 Submitting the draft clause, Sir Evelyn Murray made his concerns 
clear: ‘…once any breach is made in the fundamental principle… that it 
is a tax on the patrons of all entertainments, without regard to the 
particular type of entertainment… it is difficult to find a satisfactory 
dividing line’.129 He elaborated the argument to Chamberlain’s Private 
Secretary:130 it would favour middle-class theatre-goers over working-
class cinema-goers, and ‘will exempt many entertainments… of the 
lowest calibre while maintaining the tax on much more wholesome 
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amusements in the region of sport. Why should “Crazy nights in 
Clacton” escape while cricket matches are taxed?’. He wondered 
whether a clause restricted to stage plays alone might be preferable; but 
this would not meet the League’s aims, and ‘could only be defended as a 
specific measure to meet the plea ad misericordium of a deserving and 
hard hit industry’.  
In the event Chamberlain tried to please everyone. He removed 
the tax on cheap seats for all performances, including cinema, and 
reduced the tax on higher-priced live performances. He explained the 
changes in his 1935 Budget speech by combining Snowden’s reimposing 
the duty on cheap seats in 1931 with the problems of those putting on 
live performances: 
[Snowden had] desired to give an opportunity to all sections of the 
community to contribute towards the nation’s needs… [but] the intentions of 
the author have not been altogether fulfilled. Particularly the duty on the 
cheaper seats in the cinema houses and that on those entertainments in which 
living performers have been putting up a very gallant struggle for survival 
against the forces of mechanical performances, seems to have fallen largely 
on the proprietors rather than on the public.131 
There would be £2,300,000 lost tax revenue due to removing duty on 
tickets up to 6d and £400,000 due to reducing duty on tickets for live 
performances, but not sports events, costing over 6d. Chamberlain was 
confident that those who put on live music and drama ‘will not fail to 
appreciate the importance of a change which, for the first time, 
differentiates between this kind of performance and another, and 
differentiates in their favour’.  
They did appreciate it, but they and their supporters in Parliament 
attempted immediately to extend the concession. An amendment to the 
1935 Finance Bill would have made tickets costing up to a shilling for 
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live performances tax-free. Chamberlain supported the principle, 
congratulated himself on the concession already made to assist theatre 
and live music, and opposed the amendment; it was heavily defeated.132 
Another amendment, to provide additional tax relief where musicians 
and actors were involved together in stage performances, was withdrawn 
before it could suffer a similar fate, though Chamberlain again expressed 
sympathy with the principle.133 The previous pattern was resumed: 
lobbying by the Stage and Allied Arts League (now without the 
‘Defence’) and member organisations; sympathy from the Chancellor; 
no consequent action in the Budget speech; and clauses to reduce or end 
the tax tabled by sympathetic MPs during passage of the Finance Bill, to 
little or no effect.    
Geoffrey Whitworth’s role as (among many other things) editor of 
Drama magazine allowed him to use the magazine as a League 
mouthpiece. Chapters 4 and 5 discussed how Drama advanced the case 
that abolishing Entertainments Duty was a higher priority than gaining 
subsidy.134 In the late 1930s Drama repeatedly returned to the subject of 
tax abolition. Its November 1936 editorial135 made Wycherley’s 
Restoration comedy The Country Wife a focus of discontent. 
Performances of the play at the Old Vic were tax-exempt on ‘partly 
educational’ grounds, despite Drama’s view that it ‘is not a suitable play 
for schoolchildren. Twenty years ago it would not have been considered 
a suitable play for adults either!’. A case could be made that it was 
educational ‘to the stage historian or student of manners…. Though we 
should not have thought that the Authorities at the Custom House were 
competent… to make this somewhat subtle distinction’. The League, and 
Drama magazine, repeatedly identified what they saw as anomalies in 
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the ‘partly educational’ exemption, often suggested that Customs and 
Excise were unqualified to operate it, and more than once cited The 
Country Wife in this context. 
The League lobbied the government mainly in private, but also 
had a public face. After Malcolm Sargent wrote to The Times in June 
1937136 not mentioning tax relief, but arguing for local authority subsidy 
for music matched by central government funds, Walter Payne attempted 
to win him and others to the League’s cause: ‘If… Dr. Sargent and the 
many thousands who think as he does will, with strings, brass and wind, 
accompany (fortissimo) the annual prayer addressed by the Stage and 
Allied Arts League… even the Treasury portals may fall, and assistance 
in the form of further relief from taxation be secured’.137 By 1938 the 
League’s letterhead listed forty-two distinguished Vice-Presidents, 
though most may have contributed nothing beyond their name. They 
included the actors Edith Evans and John Gielgud and MPs campaigning 
to end the duty on live performance such as Alfred Denville, though not 
A P Herbert; also, among other parliamentarians, Clement Attlee and 
Winston Churchill.138  
 Indeed, support within Parliament for the League’s position was 
widespread. In 1937 a body called the Parliamentary Stage Committee 
presented Neville Chamberlain with a ‘Memorial’ signed by 305 MPs, 
calling for the duty to be wholly removed from live entertainment.139 In 
‘No Fine on Fun’ A P Herbert recalled more active pre-war lobbying, 
led by ‘a small but enthusiastic band of Members, drawn from all 
parties…. I made the most indignant speeches’.140 He believed that Sir 
John Simon, Chancellor from 1937, ‘a much better and greater man than 
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most people ever knew, had a genuine affection for the theatre… and, I 
am sure, disliked this tax. But for the war, I believe he would have 
abolished it’.141 As will be seen, there is some evidence to support this 
view.  
In 1937 Herbert adopted a new tactic, by tabling an amendment to 
the Finance Bill to end the duty the following year rather than 
immediately. This would not endanger that year’s revenue but would 
‘compel… the Treasury to take thought’.142 In the debate on the 
amendment he said: ‘…we object to it because it is a tax on the things of 
the mind, because it is a tax on receipts and not upon profits, and 
because it is operating against the higher quality of entertainment’.143 He 
flattered Simon shamelessly: ‘... in point of culture and appreciation of 
the arts, the right hon. Gentleman is not the least among his colleagues. 
He is a great master of the language, …and with his upbringing and 
background I am perfectly sure that in his secret soul he cannot persuade 
himself that this is a good tax’. Concerning tactics, ‘Our intention is that 
he shall be the first Chancellor of the Exchequer to have the great 
opportunity and honour of saying that this barbarous tax, which has 
endured for 21 years, shall be by him remodelled and reshaped and made 
into something better’.   
     Simon – while flattering Herbert in return – was not swayed. He 
agreed that Entertainments Duty was a bad tax. But ‘Is there a good tax? 
All taxes, in my view, are evil’.144 As to where the tax fell: ‘I agree that 
it is a misfortune that you should have an instrument of taxation which 
hits… the finest and most beautiful examples of art and culture in 
exactly the same way as it hits very much more vulgar, less elaborate or 
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less well contrived forms of entertainment. But how are you going to do 
otherwise?’.145 The amendment failed.  
Campaigning was still more intense in 1938. Customs’ view was 
that those putting on live entertainment needed no further concessions.146 
Their situation was better than in 1935 due to a general economic upturn 
and to the 1935 concession, ‘tantamount to a transfer of £400,000 a year 
or more from the Exchequer to the pockets of the proprietors, since 
prices were not reduced in consequence’. Walter Payne accepted that 
takings had increased, but argued that costs had risen faster and profits 
were down; more productions were showing a loss which the duty 
caused or made worse.147     
Customs dismissed Payne’s arguments as applying equally to any 
industry subject to indirect taxes.148 Concerning Payne’s repeated point 
that the tax had been a wartime emergency measure: ‘So also were other 
taxes… which remain in force. Financial burdens resulting from the war 
have still to be borne – not to mention the new re-armament 
programme’. One League argument did apply to Entertainments Duty 
alone, that the ‘partly educational’ exemption meant ‘the Grand Opera is 
exempt from duty, while other musical entertainments [promoted by 
commercial companies], such as concerts, are taxed’. Customs were 
unimpressed. This was ‘[simply] the effect of the law as it has stood 
since 1916…. [The] fact that the Opera is, as the League say, largely a 
social function is not relevant’.  
In March 1938 Sir John Simon and Sir Evelyn Murray received a 
delegation including Payne, Whitworth, and management and union 
representatives from theatre, music and variety. The Treasury’s 
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transcript of the meeting149 reveals little new on the Entertainments Duty 
campaign but contains picturesque details: a digression by Simon about 
Sarah Siddons’ career at the Theatre Royal Bath; a pencilled addition 
that ‘At this point a note was handed to Mr Payne of the result of the 
Grand National – Battleship, Royal Danieli, Workman’; cultural one-
upmanship when Payne used ‘a play like “The Country Wife” of 
Congreve’ to support his view that the ‘partly educational’ exemption 
was anomalous, with the pencilled comment ‘He means Wycherley, of 
course!’. Simon professed his love for the theatre and promised to 
consider the delegation’s arguments.   
But there was no change to the tax in the 1938 Budget. During 
passage of the Finance Bill A P Herbert repeated the tactic of tabling an 
amendment to abolish the tax the following year. This was supported by 
all speakers apart from Simon. The Conservative Ralph Assheton 
described Simon as ‘a man of culture, a man of learning and intellect and 
devoted to the arts…. if such a man continues to tax the theatre and does 
not tax betting, I confess that I shall find it difficult to understand the 
workings of his mind’.150 His colleague Walter Higgs noted that 
although ‘Probably I attend the theatre less than any other hon. 
Member… I consider this to be a thoroughly bad tax’.151 The Labour MP 
Ellen Wilkinson linked the subjects of tax relief and subsidy, despite the 
Stage and Allied Arts League’s hostility towards the League of 
Audiences:  
…the British Government is the only Government in Europe that taxes    the 
theatre instead of subsidising it…. In Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland 
and Poland, and of course in Russia, enormous subsidies are given…. Here, 
in… one of the richest countries in the world… we have this vexatious tax…. 
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we do not want the Americanisation of the artistic life of our country. It is not 
only a question of the theatres; where is the reservoir of talent to come from 
if the living theatre is closed down? It means that the reservoir of talent for 
our films will be dried up.152  
Simon’s response was partly the usual mixture of sympathy and 
regret. But there was another pattern becoming apparent: lobbying on 
behalf of theatre and live music, continued resistance by Treasury and 
Customs, but a gradual softening of view by the Chancellor of the day. 
This had been the case with Neville Chamberlain before the 1935 
Budget. It was now the case with Sir John Simon in the even more 
difficult circumstances of 1938 and 1939. In addition to the usual 
platitudes Simon gave this undertaking:  
I do share a great deal of the feeling against this particular form of tax…. I 
offer… this assurance: I am willing to make it my business… to examine the 
working of these taxes, and… I will during the year have them studied from 
every point of view, recognising, as I do, that there is great force in this 
argument, especially as applied to the living theatre.153 
It is notable that, despite the debates and concessions being about live 
performances of music as well as drama, all leaders of the campaign 
were from the theatre world and discussion invariably focused on ‘the 
living theatre’.     
Customs officials met League representatives before the 1939 
Budget. Their main conclusion was that ‘only complete repeal [of the 
tax] would satisfy the theatre industry’.154 This was indeed the theme of 
pre-Budget lobbying. The Parliamentary Stage Committee called for 
abolition.155 Separately a delegation to Simon of MPs and theatre 
impresarios led by the National Liberal MP William Mabane, a 
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parliamentary ally of A P Herbert,156 was organised, indeed stage-
managed. Writing to Simon’s office, Mabane set out the deputation’s 
plan: following his opening statement, speeches of two minutes from 
each of his seven colleagues (‘Mr. Alan Herbert from the point of view 
of the Author…. Mr. Poole on employment in the theatre. Colonel 
Sandeman Allen on the building of theatres…’).157 He attached a 
memorandum158 intended ‘to show that… abolition of the Tax will 
materially improve the position of the living theatre and all those 
connected with it’. The memorandum was an unusually rigorous 
examination of theatre’s plight. It made a quantified case that without 
the tax, some failed theatres would have survived, some plays would 
have had longer runs, and theatre wages would have been higher and 
ticket prices lower. It concluded with an argument sometimes used by 
campaigners which may have been generally xenophobic, more 
specifically prejudiced or simply anti-Hollywood: ‘In these days when a 
National culture can easily be lost, a revived theatre would provide 
resistance to other cultures essentially alien’.  
Advising Sir John Simon,159 Sir Evelyn Murray first made a point 
about Entertainments Duty and sport: ‘…football, cricket, horse and dog 
racing, etc…. excite no sympathy – except perhaps cricket. But as you 
informed the President of the M.C.C. (Major Astor, M.P.) last year, it 
would be extremely difficult to differentiate in favour of cricket’. 
Murray accepted that the tax on live performance posed greater 
presentational problems: ‘The “living” entertainments… are responsible 
for most of the opposition to the tax…. the theatres have secured a great 
deal of sympathy and support in attacking the duty, and it is natural that 
they should push their attack to the utmost limit’. But ending the tax 
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would not solve live theatre’s financial problems, while another tax cut 
would assist it even less and ‘certainly could not be expected to 
extinguish the annual campaign which the theatre interests conduct for 
total abolition’. But he seemed to accept that he had lost the argument 
and that Simon intended to reduce the tax on theatre and live music. He 
advised Simon that ‘a scale can be constructed to cost approximately 
whatever Revenue you are prepared to surrender’.  
This was indeed Simon’s intention: ‘I feel I must make some 
further concession to the living theatre. Could a scale be constructed to 
give up about £250,000?’.160 Murray responded that the duty on live 
performance currently yielded £1.25 million, so such a cut would be 
substantial.161 He produced several possible scales, costing between 
£160,000 and £340,000 a year in revenue foregone. He made clear his 
distaste for the exercise: the concession ‘is frankly intended to go into 
the pockets of the proprietors and will not therefore involve any 
alteration of prices’. If West End theatres were the main intended 
beneficiaries, the tax cut could be concentrated on the higher priced 
seats; but then the scale ‘would be less symmetrical and more vulnerable 
to attack from those who would get less of the loot’. As to timing, given 
the need to print and distribute tickets at the new rate, no change could 
take effect before July 1939. This would reduce the lost tax revenue in 
the first year. The short term loss could be further reduced if the change 
were delayed beyond this. 
Simon agreed to a delay, but chose one of Murray’s more 
generous options. In his 1939 Budget speech162 Simon reminded the 
House that theatre and live music had received tax relief in 1935 and 
continued: 
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The chief difficulty under which the living theatre labours is the rival 
attraction of the cinema… [but] the Duty does aggravate the disability from 
which the living theatre suffers…. I propose therefore to give the 
entertainments in question a further reduction of duty of one penny per 
admission.... It will cost £190,000 this year and £290,000 in a full year.163       
The timing was not propitious. The following day, Neville Chamberlain 
announced the introduction of conscription, stating that ‘the 
circumstances in which we are living… cannot possibly be described as 
peace-time’;164 and the reduction in duty would take effect on September 
3, 1939.165 
 A P Herbert was partly grateful: ‘I should like, on behalf of many 
Members in all quarters… who have for many years pressed the case of 
the living theatre for relief from the Entertainments Duty, to thank the 
Chancellor for what he has done’.166 But he was also partly 
disappointed:  
What the Chancellor has done is to give us one-quarter of what we asked for. 
The total abolition of the tax would mean a loss of revenue of £1,250,000, 
and he is losing £300,000 in a full year…. It would have been a fine thing… 
if at this grave time, when we are compelled to spend these incredible and 
unprecedented sums on weapons of destruction, he had been able to say, "We 
are not pressed so far by that barbarous necessity that we cannot afford to 
take away altogether what is generally regarded as an undesirable tax upon 
the things of the mind."167 
Herbert was not alone. He recorded in ‘No Fine on Fun’ that 
‘undeterred by this concession, or the talk of war, Mr George Hall 
(Labour) proposed to abolish the tax on the living theatre. (Note the date, 
22 June, 1939.)’.168 Hall’s Labour colleague George Benson was 
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particularly grudging: ‘It is true that… the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
is proposing to give a concession to the living theatre, but, while we are 
moderately grateful for that, it must be stressed that the concession is not 
a very generous one’.169 In Benson’s view, even with this concession the 
cards were stacked in favour of cinemas: 
A 6d. seat… on which there is no taxation may be occupied four, five, six, or 
even more, times during the day…. but because the revenue is composed of 
sixpences not a single penny is paid in taxation. You do not get that sort of 
thing in the living theatre…. it is not true to state that… the incidence of 
taxation upon the seats in the living theatre is lower than in the cinema. It is 
not. On the contrary, it is very much higher.170 
In reply, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Harry Crookshank, 
noted that ‘This is… what almost inevitably occurs on these occasions. 
When the Chancellor of the Exchequer makes a concession, at once 
everybody concerned asks why it is not a much bigger one’.171 The 
amendment was defeated. 
 Thus on the day the war broke out, a second reduction came into 
effect in tax rates on admission to theatre and live music performances 
compared with rates for films and sports events. Together with the 1935 
reduction the total amount of tax foregone in a full year would have been 
around £700,000.  
As a postscript, it should be noted that this use of the conditional 
is necessary: in the 1940 Budget tax rates rose again, and live theatre and 
music lost most of their 1939 gains. Alfred Denville claimed that four 
hundred MPs opposed to this rise had been ignored and ‘It… lowers 
one's pride when one feels that a large body of Members of this House 
are treated like school children and are not consulted at all. One realises 
that there is a war on and that certain taxation must be put on to win that 
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war, but why put it on something that will do more harm than good to 
the war effort?’.172 In a less than full-hearted endorsement, Herbert 
described this as Denville ‘splutter[ing] valiantly’.173 Denville found 
himself isolated. The new Chancellor, Sir Kingsley Wood, was able to 
tell the House of Commons that ‘we did consult, confidentially, with a 
very representative body of the living theatre, the Stage and Allied Arts 
League…. They… have said, after careful examination, that… the 
industry would accept the scale and they raised no objection at present in 
view of national needs’.174  
 
Conclusion: ‘Bringing an aesthetic principle into politics’?       
 
 During the 1930s there were three substantial relaxations from the 
full rigour of Entertainments Duty for theatre and live music: 
exemptions from 1934 for ‘partly educational’ performances and 
productions, widely defined, put on by not-for-profit organisations; and 
tax cuts in 1935 and 1939 for all theatre and live music performances, 
differentiating them from cinema and sports events. The first of these, 
while strongly campaigned for, was forced on the government by its own 
lawyers’ interpretation of the law. The second and third were decided by 
Neville Chamberlain and Sir John Simon due partly to campaigning and 
partly to their wish, against officials’ advice, to assist the ‘living theatre’.  
 Despite being in effect forced on the government, the first 
concession was seen as a form of deliberate government support for the 
arts. As noted in Chapter 3, the Sunday Times argued175 that when the 
government exempted the Old Vic and Sadler’s Wells from the duty, 
‘for the first time it brought an aesthetic principle into politics’, and that 
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the remission of the tax was ‘a form of subsidy’. At the time the 
government did not see it this way – it was simply bowing to the legal 
necessities. But in 1944 Sir Archibald Carter, Chairman of Customs and 
Excise, suggested to John Maynard Keynes that tax relief and subsidy 
were in effect alternative forms of government financial help for music 
and drama: ‘It was more or less by accident, and not of set policy, that 
section 1(5)(d) of the 1916 Act came to be used to give assistance to 
music and the drama by means of relief from taxation’.176 He also 
suggested177 that CEMA was the appropriate channel for both allocating 
subsidy and deciding tax exemption cases.   
 If the ‘partly educational’ exemption constituted, as Carter 
suggested, government financial help for music and drama, this help was 
both largely involuntary and of unknown extent. Once the exemption 
was granted, Customs and Excise had no interest in or knowledge of the 
production’s takings, so the amount of tax foregone cannot be assessed. 
The tax reductions of 1935 and 1939, by contrast, resulted from positive 
decisions by the Chancellors of the day, with the annual loss of tax 
calculated in advance.  
As early as 1933 Customs and Excise suggested to Neville 
Chamberlain that ‘special relief from the entertainments duty in respect 
of theatres and music halls would be tantamount to giving them a State 
subsidy in a disguised form’.178 The ‘subsidy in a disguised form’ due to 
these tax cuts was substantial: £400,000 a year from 1935 and a further 
£290,000 a year from 1939 (though the latter turned out to be short-
lived). The 1939 concession alone was worth more than the grant to the 
Arts Council in either of its first two years,179 while except for special 
allocations for the Festival of Britain the annual grant to the Arts 
 
176 Carter-Keynes, 12/1/44, quoted in Weingartner, p125 
177 ibid, and see p288 above 
178 CUST153/5, pp30-1, C&E briefing, 29/3/33 
179 See ACGB First and Second Annual Reports (London: 1946 and 1947 respectively) 
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Council did not exceed £690,000 – the annual combined value of the 
1935 and 1939 tax cuts – until 1953/54.180 The point that if the 
government was prepared to help live music and theatre by cutting taxes, 
it might be persuaded to do the same via subsidy was not lost on The 
Musical Times. In May 1939 it urged its readers to support the League of 
Audiences’ Music and Drama Bill, pointing out to those who doubted 
that the government could find money for the arts that it had just found 
£300,000 a year in the form of tax cuts.181     
Alfred Wareing’s League and John Christie’s ‘Council of Power’ 
demonstrated that the quest for government financial support of the arts 
was active and widespread before the war. They also provide strong 
grounds to question the widespread view that government financial 
support for theatre and live music was almost inconceivable before the 
war. The League of Audiences in particular looked close to success 
several times in the 1930s. Fear of war and preparations for war were 
among the reasons why this did not happen: it is reasonable to argue that 
these factors delayed the introduction of subsidy.  
The successes in the 1930s of the campaign against 
Entertainments Duty provide even stronger grounds for questioning the 
conventional narrative. Chamberlain’s and Simon’s tax cuts were a 
tangible expression of the government’s willingness, in a period of 
rearmament and approaching war, to provide substantial financial help 
for live music and drama. 
  
 
180 ACGB Ninth Annual Report 1953-1954 (London: 1954), p59 
181 May 1939, pp374; see also Chapter 5, pp118-9 
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Chapter 10 
 
Conclusion: Reclaiming lost history 
 
Key lessons from the research 
 
This thesis was originally intended to be a history of CEMA and 
of the early years of the Arts Council. The 1930s, before CEMA’s 
creation, was to be covered in an early background chapter, because 
secondary sources suggested almost unanimously that the subject 
merited no further coverage.1  
It took little research to discover that this view was deeply 
mistaken.  
Two examples suffice to demonstrate this. T S Eliot’s editorial in 
The Criterion in March 1938, an attack over several pages on the League 
of Audiences’ 1930s campaign for subsidy, showed that the campaign 
itself must have been significant.2 And the following quotation from the 
Birmingham Mail in October 19343 cast doubt on several elements of the 
consensus on the subject – that arts subsidy was not a live issue before 
the war, that such discussion as took place was generally hostile to the 
concept, and that only the outbreak of war changed the climate of 
opinion:  ‘…the “League of Audiences” is the latest alias and device of 
that active group of persons who are anxious to put music and the drama 
on the rates or taxes’.  
There is also a strong consensus that once CEMA was established, 
it became the only game in town in terms of the philosophy and practice 
of arts funding. The evidence discussed in Chapters 7 and 8 
 
1 See, generally, Chapter 1 
2 ‘A Commentary’, The Criterion, March 1938, pp478-85. See Chapter 4, pp91-2 
3 12/10/34 
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demonstrated that this view is equally questionable. The research has 
cast a new light on the ‘pre-history’ of CEMA, on its evolution into the 
Arts Council, and on aspects of the relationship between the state and 
the arts in Britain at the time. The findings which have challenged the 
conventional wisdom include:   
(i) Campaigns in the 1930s for state funding for music and drama 
were high profile and attracted widespread support and press 
coverage. 
(ii) The fear, pre-war, that state funding would lead to state control 
of the arts had some currency as an argument against subsidy, 
but far less than commentators have suggested.  
(iii) That fear was strongly outweighed by an argument in favour of 
subsidy: that human beings were losing the battle against ‘the 
machine’, and that subsidising live music and theatre would 
help equalise this battle.  
(iv) Many of those who came to hold important roles in CEMA and 
the Arts Council had been familiar with, and promoted, 
arguments for state funding from as early as 1934 as active 
members of the League of Audiences.  
(v) The funding structure proposed in the 1930s by the League, of 
a body at arm’s length from government independently 
allocating funds provided by the Treasury, was in essence that 
adopted by the government for both CEMA and the Arts 
Council.  
(vi) CEMA’s focus on artistic standards above all, an approach 
associated particularly with John Maynard Keynes when he 
became its Chairman in 1942, was prefigured in John 
Christie’s ‘Council of Power’ conferences in 1938. The same 
is true of other issues which have persisted for much of the 
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Arts Council’s history, such as whether amateur as well 
professional artists should be supported. 
(vii) Christie’s work in this area continued actively into wartime, 
wholly separate from CEMA, attracting considerable support 
from key individuals within and beyond the arts. For much of 
this time CEMA was considered of little significance.  
(viii) Christie’s National Council of Music strongly influenced the 
development of CEMA into the Arts Council. But this 
influence was negative and never publicly acknowledged. 
Among the motivations of Rab Butler, Keynes and senior civil 
servants was their determination that Christie should not 
prevail. 
(ix) The British government in the 1930s was not hostile to the 
concept of financially supporting live music and drama. 
Neville Chamberlain and Sir John Simon, when Chancellors of 
the Exchequer, reduced Entertainments Duty on live 
performance in 1935 and 1939 respectively. In both cases their 
explicit intention was to help theatre in particular to respond to 
the challenge of cinema.   
(x) Within government the opinion was current that these 
reductions in tax rates, and exemption from Entertainments 
Duty for ‘partly educational’ theatre and music performances, 
were equivalent to subsidy. The concessions were substantial. 
The annual budgeted loss of revenue due to Chamberlain’s and 
Simon’s tax cuts was greater than the annual grant received by 
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Areas for further research  
 
This thesis has discussed quite thoroughly the League of Audiences, 
the National Council of Music and the campaign against Entertainments 
Duty. The evidence has demonstrated how misleading are such 
statements as ‘The beginning of cultural policy was a direct result of the 
repercussions of the Second World War’ and ‘War was the foundation of 
the arts’.4 But several other important aspects of the relationship 
between the arts and government in the 1930s could only be touched on. 
They merit further research. They include:  
(i) The BBC as arts funder. Historians of the BBC have dealt with 
many aspects of the relationship between the BBC and the arts. But 
historians of arts subsidy have failed to consider the link between their 
subject and the ‘the greatest music making machine… that has ever 
existed’, as Arthur Bliss described the BBC as early as 1932.5 This 
failure reduces the value of their work. Jorn Weingartner addressed the 
issue to some extent, but the conclusion he drew from his examination of 
the BBC – in effect, that it supported his hypothesis of general public 
hostility to state involvement in the arts in the 1930s6 – defied both logic 
and the evidence.  
In his 1945 radio talk marking the foundation of the Arts Council, 
Keynes acknowledged one important role of the BBC:  
Our war-time experience has led us already to one clear discovery: the 
unsatisfied demand and the enormous public for serious and fine entertainment. 
This certainly did not exist a few years ago. I do not believe that it is merely a 
 
4 Weingartner, p6, and Sinclair, p24, respectively. See, generally, the discussion of historiography in  
Chapter 1, pp14-22 
5 ‘What Broadcasting has done for Music’, The Listener, 16/11/32; reprinted in Gregory Roscow (ed): 
Bliss on Music: Selected Writings of Arthur Bliss 1920-1975 (Oxford: OUP, 1991), p62 
6 Weingarter, pp38-43. See Chapter 1, pp20-1 
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wartime phenomenon. I fancy that the B.B.C. has played a big part, the 
predominant part, in creating this public demand….7  
This was a reasonably generous tribute. But it missed the essential point 
that from the 1920s the BBC not only created demand for classical 
music but was largely responsible for the supply side – for maintaining 
the classical music industry in reasonable health.8 Far from 
acknowledging this, in a 1936 article for the BBC magazine The Listener 
Keynes treated the corporation not as a major public funder of the arts 
but as an organisation itself in need of funding: 
…instead of its [the BBC’s] receiving large subsidies from the state as one would 
expect, an important proportion of the ten shillingses that the public contribute is 
withheld from it as a contribution to general taxes. This was a new and difficult 
business… capable of revolutionising the relation of the state to the arts of public 
entertainment…. Yet, even in its earliest and most precarious days, we 
considered it a proper object of taxation.9                            
Keynes saw this as ‘only the extreme example of the general principle 
that we penalise music, opera, all the arts of the theatre with a heavy, 
indeed a crushing, tax’.10 Given his view of the BBC, and his failure to 
acknowledge the 1930s campaigns for subsidy, it is not surprising that 
Keynes presented the arrival of CEMA and then the Arts Council as 
representing a break with the past rather than continuity: ‘I do not 
believe it is yet realised what an important thing has happened. State 
patronage of the arts has crept in. It has happened in a very English, 
informal, unostentatious way – half baked if you like’.11  
 
7 ‘The Arts Council: Its Policy and Hopes’, reprinted in The Listener, 12/7/45 
8 See Chapter 2, pp32-40 
9 ‘Art and the State’, The Listener, 26/8/36, reprinted in Moggridge, Donald (ed): The Collected 
Writings of John Maynard Keynes Volume XXVIII: Social, Political and Literary Writings (London: 
Macmillan/Cambridge University Press/Royal Economic Society, 1982), p345  
10 ibid 
11 ‘The Arts Council: Its Policy and Hopes’ 
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 Other commentators were more inclined than Keynes to see the 
BBC as a state institution. In the Daily Sketch in 193812 ‘Candidus’ 
supported the League of Audiences’ campaign for subsidy partly on the 
grounds that ‘the grievance of music and drama would not be so 
grievous but for the rise of wireless entertainment, [which]… enables the 
Government to say that its patronage of the arts is not confined to 
pictures’. And as discussed in Chapters 2 and 4,13 some commentators 
went beyond this, seeing the BBC as the harbinger of an authoritarian 
state. As ‘Scrutator’ wrote in the Sunday Times in 1935:14 ‘For the first 
time, the State set up in the business of entertainment… It made a 
monopoly of arts and pleasures… it risked creating a tyranny all the 
more monstrous and dangerous because it was exercised over men’s 
minds’. But historians of arts funding have followed Keynes in treating 
the BBC as having no relevance as a public body funding the arts. This 
thesis has raised the issue but has been able to cover it less fully than it 
deserves.    
 (ii) Other aspects of arts funding in the 1930s. The thesis has 
mentioned other aspects of the relationship between the state and the arts 
in the 1930s, such as the campaign to establish a National Theatre and 
funding by local authorities. Each has received some attention by 
historians, but no-one has brought them together convincingly. Jorn 
Weingartner attempted this briefly, inadequately, and through the lens of 
his hypothesis that ‘The beginning of cultural policy was a direct result 
of the repercussions of the Second World War’.15 His treatment of the 
BBC was considered in Chapter 1.16 His similarly questionable 
discussion of the campaign to found a National Theatre is discussed 
 
12 14/2/38. See Chapter 4, pp64-5 
13 pp33-4 and 72-5 respectively 
14 7/4/35 
15 Weingartner, p6 for the hypothesis and Chapter 4 of his book, passim, for the analysis 
16 pp20-21 
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below. His examination of local government support was limited to two 
pages which argued with little evidence that ‘Birmingham remained an 
exception to the rule of cultural neutrality of the state be it on national or 
on municipal level where the theatre and music were concerned’.17    
Others have examined local government funding of music and 
drama in the 1930s, but coverage is patchy. Concerning music, while a 
number of local councils, not Birmingham alone, supported for instance 
local orchestras or concert seasons financially at this period,18 there is no 
methodical account of its scale across the country, the forms this support 
took, or the reasons for it.  
Concerning theatre, little attention has been paid to support by London 
boroughs, to cite just one example, which appears to have been crucial in 
at least one case. In Myself A Player19 Lena Ashwell, who had provided 
touring theatre for troops in World War I, described how collaboration 
with London boroughs enabled her to produce similar work in 
peacetime:  
Major Attlee, Mayor of Stepney and Chairman of the Labour Mayors, saw 
our work. A meeting was held to discuss the project of performances at the 
Town Halls, or the Baths of the boroughs of Greater London. It was agreed 
that the letting should be at a nominal fee,… [and] that our advertisements 
should go out with the rates demands….20   
Little more can be said here except that without a clear picture of local 
government’s relationship with live music and theatre before the war, an 
important element is missing from the study of the state and the arts.    
The 1930s campaign for a National Theatre does merit brief 
consideration here. Weingartner’s treatment of this is puzzling, focusing 
 
17 Weingartner, p47 
18 See, for instance, Simon Frith, Matt Brennan. Martin Cloonan and Emma Webster: The History of 
Live Music in Britain, Volume 1: 1950-67 (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2016 [originally 
published 2013]), pp41-4 
19 London: Michael Joseph, 1936 
20 ibid, pp238-9 
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particularly on a debate on the subject at a British Drama League 
meeting in 1929.21 From this limited and somewhat random piece of 
evidence he concluded that ‘…the government only supported the 
National Theatre so long as no claim for money from the Treasury was 
staked’.22 In dealing with the topic, Weingartner relied on Geoffrey 
Whitworth’s 1951 book about the National Theatre campaign.23 
Whitworth would not have known of, and Weingartner failed to cite, a 
Cabinet discussion in 1937 which suggests a different view.  
 In a Cabinet memo of March 193724 Earl Stanhope, First 
Commissioner of Works, raised the issue of a vacant plot in South 
Kensington bought by the Office of Works in 1912 but no longer needed 
for its original purpose, as a new site for the Royal College of Art. 
Stanhope planned to sell the plot to the highest bidder, but then ‘I was 
approached – and I understand that the Prime Minister and others of my 
colleagues have also been approached – by parties interested in the 
scheme for the provision of a National Theatre’. They sought to buy the 
site by private negotiation with the Office of Works rather than through 
open tender.  
 Stanhope recommended refusal: ‘…I am primarily concerned to 
obtain the best possible return for the Exchequer for a site which is no 
longer required for Government purposes…’. But there was a rider to 
this statement: not only did Stanhope have ‘I must confess, every 
sympathy with the desire to establish a National Theatre’, he supported 
the principle of subsidising the project. If the National Theatre 
committee had shown that government assistance would have made their 
plan feasible, ‘I should, even at a time like this, have suggested that a 
 
21 Weingartner, pp47-9 
22 ibid, p49 
23 The Making of a National Theatre (London: Faber and Faber, 1951)  
24 NA CAB/24/268, ‘Proposed Site for National Theatre’, memo dated 5/3/37, and for the four 
following quotations 
  315 
subsidy was justifiable. But I should still have felt that a direct cash 
subsidy was the proper method’, rather than the uncommercial, behind-
the-scenes purchase arrangement proposed. At the subsequent Cabinet 
discussion25 Stanhope’s approach was agreed. As to Stanhope’s rider, 
‘No decision was asked for or taken on the principle of a National 
Theatre’… [and] the comment was made that this was not a time for 
suggesting a subsidy of this kind… [but] There was general agreement 
that if a subsidy was ever to be given towards the establishment of a 
National Theatre, it should be a direct subsidy…’.26        
 The purpose of this digression is to suggest that the usual 
presentation of government attitudes in the 1930s to theatre and music – 
indifference in general and hostility on the specific issue of subsidy –  is 
as misleading in relation to the National Theatre project as to the matters 
discussed in detail in the thesis. The subject deserves more rigorous 
investigation than it has received.             
 (iii) The public perception of CEMA. Much has been written 
about CEMA, but gaps remain in our knowledge of it. Little has been 
published about how CEMA was regarded at the time not within 
government or by its own staff and council, but by the general public, by 
well-informed theatre and concert-goers and by those working in these 
industries. Chapters 7 and 8 demonstrated that for a considerable period 
many commentators viewed CEMA as a wartime expedient of limited 
significance, but more work is needed to assess how widespread this 
view was.   
A related question is how far CEMA developed the public 
appetite for live classical music and theatre, a matter touched on in the 
context of the BBC’s role. Keynes, quoted above, suggested with 
 
25 CAB/23/67 – minutes of Cabinet meeting of 10/3/37; the quotation is from p22. 
26 More recent historians of the National Theatre have also not cited this episode. See for instance 
John Elsom and Nicholas Tomalin: The History of the National Theatre (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1978) and Daniel Rosenthal: The National Theatre Story (London: Oberon Books, 2013).    
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uncharacteristic modesty that the BBC had achieved more in this 
respect. Writing after the war, Mary Glasgow, CEMA’s Secretary and 
the first Secretary-General of the Arts Council, agreed:  
The effect of radio on literature and drama has been considerable, but the 
most important success has been in the influence of broadcasting on music. 
When, during the war, concerts were taken by C.E.M.A. to unlikely 
audiences in remote districts and by E.N.S.A. to the armed forces, it was 
discovered that a large and genuine audience for music existed.27  
But some later commentators have suggested that CEMA had a  
more central role in increasing public demand for the arts. Janet Minihan 
wrote that CEMA ‘helped to create an environment in which the arts 
figured regularly, sometimes even prominently, in community life’;28 
while Jorn Weingartner subtitled his history of CEMA ‘Britain and the 
Shaping of National Morale in World War II’. But one contemporary 
observer, at least, was less impressed. In two of his BBC ‘Postscripts’ 
talks in 1940 J B Priestley made the case for state support for the arts. 
But CEMA had no part in his vision. In August he argued for the wide 
availability of a wide variety of art:  
Let us by all means have four young women in green silk playing “Oh 
Johnny, Oh Johnny”, but at the same time let’s have the great symphony 
orchestras pealing out the noblest music, night after night, not for a fortunate 
and privileged few, but for all the people who long for such music. Let’s have 
comedians in the canteens, but at the same time let’s have productions of 
great plays in our theatres…29  
He returned to the theme in October: ‘This winter, here in Lancashire, 
everything from the Halle Orchestra pealing out the finale of Brahms’s 
Fourth Symphony, to a bit of clog dancing should be in full swing’.30 
Both talks argued strongly that culture should be both democratised and 
 
27 B Ifor Evans and Mary Glasgow: The Arts in England (London: The Falcon Press, 1949), p16 
28 The Nationalization of Culture (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1977), p225 
29 J B Priestley: Postscripts (London: William Heinemann, 1940), p53 (broadcast 11/8/40)  
30 ibid, p93 (broadcast 13/10/40), and for the following two quotations 
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structured. Thus, in October: ‘…some official assistance will soon be 
urgently needed to make certain that… gaiety has some communal 
outlet; in other words, recreation and entertainment should be planned 
and organised….’. For Priestley, wartime dangers made this need more 
urgent: ‘The gayer and richer the life we have to defend, the more 
anxious we shall be to defend it. Noble words finely spoken, great 
music, all the treasures of art, laughter and lights, and song, these 
mustn’t be banished but should be given a greater place than ever in our 
lives’.    
If CEMA had been the force that Minihan and Weingartner 
suggested, then it would surely have had a central role, or at least some 
role, in Priestley’s thinking. It received not a single mention in either 
talk. By contrast, Priestley favourably discussed ‘Mr. Basil Dean… and 
his Ensa organisation’.31 Clearly a single commentator, even one as 
influential as Priestley in 1940, is just that; he may not have reflected 
public opinion. And perhaps public perception changed once Keynes 
became Chairman of CEMA. But those who have studied the subject 
have generally relied on official sources. It would be rash to assume that 
CEMA was regarded similarly in the country at large. The question 
whether, and if so when and how, CEMA came to be seen outside 
official circles as an important vehicle for making ‘high culture’ widely 
available is a subject deserving further research,  
Incidentally, but importantly, despite its date Priestley’s polemic 
does not support those who believe that public funding of the arts 
became a salient issue only on the outbreak of war. First, he was a strong 
pre-war supporter of subsidy.32 Second, his argument in 1940 was not 
that the war created a new obligation on the government to support 
music and drama, but that it made it more difficult for the government to 
 
31 ibid, p51 
32 See Chapter 3, p51 
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ignore an obligation which already existed: ‘It may be possible yet, even 
while we struggle and endure… to achieve what’s long been overdue in 
this Island… No burden, it seems, is too great for the people. Then there 
can’t be too rich and great a reward for the people’.33  
 
Forgotten stories and false consensus 
     
This thesis has been in part an exercise in putting the record 
straight. But its aims were wider and less arid than that. The focus has 
been on telling three forgotten stories: of Alfred Wareing’s League of 
Audiences, John Christie’s ‘Council of Power’/National Council of 
Music, and the theatre industry’s campaign against Entertainments Duty. 
Among the pleasures of the research has been exploring the key 
personalities, particularly Wareing and Christie. The hope is that the 
research has added something significant to scholarship concerning the 
cultural, social and political history of 1930s and early 1940s Britain. A 
central conclusion from studying the three campaigns is that state 
support for the arts is among the areas of social policy where it is a 
serious distortion to see (in Jose Harris’ words) ‘the war as the cradle of 
the welfare state’.34 Strong foundations were laid well before the war.  
There is, finally, a puzzling element to the research. The history of 
CEMA and of its evolution into the Arts Council is scarcely virgin 
territory. As discussed in Chapter 1, this is ground trodden by many 
cultural historians. The mystery is that they reached a consensus that 
defied a mass of readily available evidence. Their route to this consensus 
varied. Some stated explicitly that there were no campaigns for state arts 
funding in the 1930s, or if there were that they were insignificant; others 
 
33 Postscripts, p53; emphasis added 
34 Jose Harris: ‘War and Social History: Britain and the Home Front During the Second World War’, 
Contemporary European History, Vol 1, No 1 (March 1992), p17 
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simply ignored the issue; others again claimed that the climate in the 
1930s was actively hostile to the cause of subsidy. But the conclusions 
were similar in all cases: in Andrew Sinclair’s words, that ‘the rise of 
Fascism and Communism’ meant that the 1930s ‘was no climate for the 
patronage of threatened cultures’,35 and that ‘War was the foundation of 
the arts’,36 conclusions which it has been surprisingly easy to demolish.   
For historiographers this may itself constitute a worthwhile case 
study. How did these views emerge, gain acceptance and go generally 
unchallenged for so long, when there is so little evidence to support 
them and so much on the other side? It is the more surprising since the 
consensus is frankly rather dull, while the stories revealed by the 
research for this thesis are richer and more interesting. But the consensus 
has held since 1945, and, for whatever reason, for most of this period 
these stories have remained forgotten. The thesis became an exercise in 
reclaiming lost history. 
  
 
35 Sinclair, pp23-4 
36 ibid, p24 
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